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Introduction 
Capital structure has received much attention since half of a century. However, the debate 
about it is still one of major interests in corporate finance. The reason is that no theory has 
succeeded in explaining what financing decisions should be taken and when. Both 
academicians and practitioners devote time and resources to try to answer these questions. 
From a theoretical standpoint, two streams of thought are in competition. According to the 
first stream, any form of capital structure cannot inflates the firm value. Only new profitable 
investments are able to. Based on theories of optimal capital structure, defenders of the 
second stream of thought argue that the firm can maximise its value by managing the capital 
structure appropriately. 
Yet, among the theories of optimal capital structure, a distinction can be made between 
those that are developed in a static perspective and others that advocate to adjust each 
marginal capital structure choice to the current situation. In the static perspective, a trade-off 
is made between the financing sources in order to maximise the cash flow returned to 
investors. The underlying idea is that firms manage the optimal allocation between basic 
securities while financial intermediaries provide the market with sophisticated combinations 
of these basic securities. When marginal changes in the capital structure are considered, the 
financing solution is designed, by the managers, specifically to fulfil the needs of investors at 
that given time. It is also adapted to the investment project it finances. Theories of that kind 
explain the proliferation of financial instruments issued directly by corporations and they 
associate the financing policy with the investment policy. This last observation is a strong 
characteristic of marginal financing decision models. 
Despite the abundant literature, no theoretical model, which can be falsified empirically, 
relates the capital structure choices to the firm value. Thus, a plethora of empirical studies 
have been dedicated to that subject. Not only they give no clear evidence about the 
explanatory power of a given theory but they also produce contradictive results about the 
variables used to proxy the various theoretical influences. On one hand, tests of the static 
trade-off between financing sources may outline some determinants of the capital structure. 
Though, they fail to estimate their impact on the firm value. On the other hand, tests of 
marginal financing decisions specifically detect the valuation effect of a given capital 
structure choice. They allow to examine under what circumstances a financing solution has a 
significant influence on the firm value. The optimal capital structure, if it exists, is not 
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assumed to be constant over time. The stock price reaction may depend on the motives that 
drive the financing decisions and these tests can take this fact into account. However, the 
empirical evidence remains inconclusive about the relation between the determinants of 
capital structure and the firm value. 
Practitioners do not seem to care about capital structure in the same way as academicians. 
The relation between financing choices and firm value is not their centre of interest. Instead, 
they focus on the preservation of the financing capacity. In a sense, they consider the cost of 
foregoing an investment opportunity as being more important than the cost of capital to 
finance it. For a majority of them, the financing decision is optimal if it does not prevent the 
firm to pursue its investment policy in the future. When the academics assume a direct link 
between the investment project and its financing, practitioners tend to consider them 
separately or, at least, as not irreparably related. Again, the question about the link between 
both investment and financing policies is still unanswered. 
The multitude of interrogations that subsists about capital structure choices justifies the 
additional research this dissertation aims to develop. The objective consists in examining the 
impact of capital structure determinants on the firm market value. Seasoned Equity Offerings 
are chosen as the representation of capital structure choices. The contributions are declined 
relative to six points. First, theories of capital structure and the empirical evidence are 
summarised in order to develop a set of testable hypotheses and to select appropriate 
explanatory variables. The numerous studies propose a wide variety of variables that are 
potentially able to influence both the marginal financing decision and its valuation effect. A 
detailed review of the theoretical and empirical literature is a necessary process to position the 
two empirical researches involved in the dissertation among the existing evidence. 
The second point addresses to the experiment framework . Since most theoretical models 
are developed for the US environment, testing their predictions on a different setting 
constitutes an interesting challenge for their universality. The institutional setting is stated to 
differ from the US context in many ways such as the legal system, the reliance to public 
financing, the corporate governance structure as well as the main flotation method.  Firms 
from continental Europe are well suited for that purpose. The French market is selected given 
its market capitalisation and information availability. 
The stock price reaction to equity issue announcements is examined through the intended 
use of the offering proceeds. Operations realised to finance a specific investment project are 
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separated from those dedicated to pure capital structure motives. The third contribution 
consists in the introduction of this typology. It allows to differentiate the offerings according 
to their average impact on the firm value. Moreover, it proposes a framework that let capital 
structure irrelevancy co-exists with information asymmetry, agency and timing. In a further 
analysis of information asymmetry, the informational content of equity issue announcements 
is tested to be related to future earnings. The revision of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts 
around the announcement is the variable used to capture the part of information that concerns 
future earnings. 
As a fourth point, a conditional methodology is implemented to correct for the selection 
bias involved in the standard analysis of a voluntary-decided corporate event. It takes into 
account the fact that equity issues could be anticipated by investors. It verifies that relevant 
information is still released at the equity issue announcement. One originality of that 
conditional methodology is the formation of a “Non-Event” sample based on the non 
realisation of the equity issue while the managers have received the legal authorisation to do 
it. 
Corporations that finance a specific investment project with equity are found to select this 
financing source deliberately. Their choice is opposed to marginal financing theories 
predictions. This observation, associated with the risk characteristics of investment project, 
justify the examination of the financing decision impact on the stock performance over longer 
horizons, which is the fifth point. The long-term event study about French equity issuers 
involves a large variety of abnormal performance measures, from matching firm to more 
sophisticated beta pricing models. In addition, the explanatory power of three competing 
theories (timing, irrational investors and model uncertainty) are tested on the 3-year abnormal 
performance following equity issues. 
The sixth contribution addresses to one of the hypothesis explaining the long-term 
abnormal performance. A measure of the learning effect is developed to proxy for potential 
model uncertainty implications. It is based on the revision of financial analysts’ earnings 
forecast over the analysis horizon of the abnormal performance. It appears as an inefficient 
use of the offering proceeds. Its valuation effect cannot be entirely integrated into the stock 
price at the announcement because of the uncertainty about the project valuation model. 
Investors are assumed to learn about the investment net contribution to firm value from the 
work of financial analysts. 
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The interpretation of the results should clarify the relation between the determinants of 
capital structure and the firm value. It should reconcile the concern of practitioners about 
preserving the financial flexibility and the academic predictions about the interactions 
between capital structure choices and firm value. It should outline that the joint announcement 
of an equity issue with a specific investment project has implications on the firm value that 
are different from those of pure capital structure operations. 
The dissertation is organised in four chapters. Theories of capital structure are reviewed in 
Chapter 1. They are ranked in three wide groups. The first one addresses to the capital 
structure irrelevancy. It describes the “perfect” conditions for which the firm value is 
independent from capital structure choices. The second category includes static trade-off 
models that relates the fact that cash flow cannot be returned entirely and costlessly to 
investors to the existence of an optimal allocation between debt and equity. Bankruptcy costs, 
taxes and the output market are the determinants concerned with that theoretical branch. To 
outline the diversity among the models, contradictive outcomes are observed. In spite of the 
presence of market imperfections, some models still conclude to the capital structure 
irrelevancy. Other models result in the existence of an optimal capital structure at the firm 
level or at the industry level. The third group entails models of marginal financing decisions. 
They are based on market imperfections that prevent investors and financial intermediaries to 
costlessly and efficiently recombine basic securities to replicate any particular payoff 
structure. These imperfections include information asymmetry, agency and transaction costs. 
Consequently, it is devoted to the firm to issue the appropriate securities so that the costs 
induced by market imperfections may be minimised. The last part of Chapter 1 synthesizes 
the theoretical implications of capital structure choices on the firm value. In particular, its 
potential explanatory variables and their links them to the corresponding theories are 
presented 
In Chapter 2, the empirical literature about the valuation effect of capital structure choices 
is reviewed. Far from being exhaustive, this synthesis aims at reflecting the main streams of 
research in this area although the focus is put on equity financing. It starts with an overview 
of the influence of the institutional setting on equity financing. Major financial markets are 
compared and the results suggest that equity financing is not as different as predicted by the 
recent literature about the legal determinants of outside financing. The overview of the 
literature about the stock price reaction to external financing announcements covers the 
valuation effect at the announcement of direct cash equity issues, equity offerings with rights 
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and issues of other securities. The US evidence is compared to the results of international 
studies in order to determine what explanatory variables have the greatest explanatory power. 
Since information asymmetry appears as one relevant factor influencing the market reaction 
to marginal financing decisions, the informational content of securities issues announcements 
is addressed in more detailed. Evidence is given to the earnings-oriented explanation of the 
informational content. The examination of the impact on the discount factor is inconclusive. 
Financial analysts’ activity could contribute to reduce information asymmetry but it is subject 
to conflicts of interest with the investment banking activities. Marginal financing decisions 
occur at different points in time that may not be independent from the level of information 
asymmetry and agency costs. The fact that the degree of information asymmetry and the 
quantity and quality of growth opportunities may be time-varying influences both the 
marginal financing decision and its valuation effect. The synthesis of what is learned about 
the capital structure, in terms of its static determinants of the factors that influence the equity 
vs. debt financing decision and of the opinion of practitioners is discussed in the last part of 
Chapter 2. The review of the empirical work allows to put forward the hypotheses and the 
explanatory variables that are the most relevant in a test of the stock price reaction to equity 
issues announcements. 
Chapter 3 presents the analysis of the stock price reaction to equity issue announcement on 
the French market between 1984 and 2000. After describing the issuers’ characteristics and 
the Seasoned Equity Offering market, a standard event study is performed to detect the 
announcement valuation effect. The explanatory power of static trade-off, information 
asymmetry, agency and timing is tested according to the intended use of the offering 
proceeds. The influence of information asymmetry is deepened with the inclusion of variables 
measuring the revision in earnings forecasts around the announcement and the earnings 
forecasts dispersion. The relevancy of the information release at the equity issue 
announcement is verified with a conditional methodology that takes into account investors’ 
anticipations of the event. A discussion about the implications of the capital structure 
determinants on the stock price reaction concludes the short-term empirical research and 
introduces some interrogations about longer-term influences on the stock performance. 
The long-term implications of financing decisions on the firm value are examined in 
Chapter 4. In order to outline the intensity of the debates about the long-term abnormal stock 
performance following financing decisions, the review of the literature is addressed in a 
chronological perspective. It starts with the empirical evidence about the “New Issue Puzzle” 
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and continues with its contradictors who attribute long-term anomalies in stock returns to 
measurement and mispricing problems. Abnormal returns that persist during several years 
after an event lead to reject the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Alternative theories are 
developed to explain the long-term anomalies through investors’ irrational behaviour subject 
to cognitive biases when they process new information about the stock prices. Supporters of 
market efficiency criticise the lack of credible alternative hypothesis in behavioural models 
and refute them as theories. They propose model uncertainty as a theory based on investors’ 
rationality and that explain long-term anomalies. Irrational investors, model uncertainty and 
timing are tested on the sample of French equity issuers in a long-term event study. The 
3-year abnormal stock performance after the offering is computed relative to several pricing 
models. The results outline the role of model uncertainty proxied by a learning effect process 
to explain the under-performance of one issuers’ type in particular. 
The main findings are summarised in the conclusion. They are exposed in a way that 
suggests further developments in this research area. 
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Chapter 1 :  Capital structure theories and firm value 
The relation between capital structure and firm value has been a centre of interest in 
corporate finance since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958). In a frictionless 
framework, they show that firm market value depends exclusively on the capacity of the firm 
assets to generate cash flows. It is independent from any capital structure decisions. By 
introducing different market frictions, academic research proposes a wide variety of models 
that explain the impacts of the financing policy on firm value. The aims of this chapter are to 
present a selection of those models, to show how they position themselves relative to the 
frictionless framework and to outline their main implications on empirical tests of the capital 
structure – firm value relation. 
The chapter is organised as follows : Section 1 presents the foundations of capital structure 
theories and the capital structure irrelevancy argument. It starts with the different definitions 
of capital structure. Then, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) propositions are exposed. The 
section ends with a discussion on how market imperfections can be classified to create two 
fields of research : static trade-off models and marginal financing decision models. Section 2 
is dedicated to static trade-off models. Their goal is to define an optimal capital structure 
which maximises firm value. Taxes, bankruptcy costs and product market characteristics are 
the determinants that influence capital structure choices in this context. Static trade-off 
models imply the existence of target debt ratio but they are not conclusive about its 
determination. Section 3 addresses to the alternative field of research : the marginal financing 
decision models. Capital structure choices are analysed in a dynamic perspective. Market 
frictions such as information asymmetry, agency costs and corporate governance 
considerations create among investors a need for specific and specialised financing 
instrument. These models analyse the expected effect on firm value caused by a given 
marginal financing decision. At the same time, they relate investment policy to financing 
decisions. Section 4 concludes the chapter by, first, justifying why tests of the static trade-off 
theories are limited and then, summarising the main theoretical predictions of marginal 
financing decision models. 
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1.1 Capital structure irrelevancy 
1.1.1 Capital structure definitions 
The notion of capital structure includes two embedded aspects. First, capital structure is a 
representation of the firm financing policy at a given moment in time. In other words, it 
constitutes the summary of all past financing decisions involving all funds for investment. 
Second, it implies a given ordination of these funds based on their characteristics in terms of 
claims onto the payoffs, control rights and maturity. This preliminary definition excludes 
from capital structure all kinds of supplier credit, deferred and payable taxes and other non 
financial liabilities. 
Funds for investment are obtained by selling different types of claims on the firm cash 
flows. The way these claims are ordered characterises the capital structure. On one hand, debt 
is a contract that pay out fixed schedules of interests and principal in exchange of investors’ 
cash. It involves bank loans, bonds or leases1. Debt can be from private or public sources with 
the modalities of the contract being private or public. Debt holders do not obtain direct control 
on the investment decisions. On the other hand, equity gives its holder rights to residual 
earnings and to participate to the investment decision through a voting right at the 
shareholders’ meetings. A share of equity is a title deed. Its holder owns a fraction of the 
capital and has a limited liability up to the amount of cash invested in the firm. Debt is a 
senior claim relative to equity which makes the latter a riskier security. The allocation 
between debt and equity is the most commonly used definition of capital structure. It has for 
advantage to be easily observable. In book values, it comes out directly from the balance 
sheet. Both categories of claims are well differentiated. The main drawback lies in the 
difficulty to compute the market value of debt. If public debt is traded on a regulated market, 
private debt such as bank loans is not. Most of theoretical capital structure models require 
market values, which raise problems when book values of debt are used in their tests. 
Separation between ownership and control constitutes an alternative perspective to express 
capital structure. Control rights are in the hands of existing shareholders2. When new 
investments can be financed by internal funds – existing shareholders do not recover all 
                                                 
1 Prevalent accounting standards consider lease contracts as financial debt : International Accounting Standard 
rule 17 and Financial Accounting Standards Board rule 13. 
2 Existing shareholders are those already holding equity at the time a marginal financing decision is taken. They 
are opposed to new shareholders who will buy the newly issued shares. New shareholders (outsiders) are 
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residual earnings but keep them inside the firm as a financing source directly available to the 
manager -, control of existing shareholders remain unchanged. However, if external funds are 
needed, the appearance of new shareholders rebalance the control rights between new and 
existing shareholders. The agency theory formalised by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
addresses to the problem of a manager/owner that loose part or all of his control by opening 
the firm capital to outside shareholders. The outcome is a conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders that results in a cost (agency cost of equity) and in a decrease in 
the firm total market value. In the agency theory, debt has a twofold role. First, it mitigates 
the problem related to the separation of control and ownership as it constitutes an alternative 
financing sources that do not involve new (outside) shareholders. Second, debt financing 
introduces another conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders that is 
emphasised when leverage becomes important. This conflict also generates costs that reduce 
the firm total market value. In a broader perspective, considering capital structure in terms of 
allocation between debt and equity does not prevent to take problems related to the separation 
of control and ownership into account. Marginal financing decisions in terms of debt or equity 
could also denote of agency considerations. This will be further developed in Section 1.3 of 
this chapter. 
In a third perspective, capital structure can be analysed through the maturity of the 
financing solutions. Equity implies no repayment and thus no maturity. Hence, it is 
considered as a long-term financing. The maturity of debt is specified in the contract. It can 
range from short-term (one year or less) to long-term (ten years or more). On one hand, a 
shorter maturity allows to negotiate a new contract more quickly. The interest rate can be 
adjusted at shorter time intervals to correspond to the risk level of the investment throughout 
its lifetime. On the other hand, longer maturities may respond to a need for stability in the 
financing costs3. The main drawback of this capital structure definition is the difficulty to 
observe the maturities of private debt and those of assets in place. Thus, the relation between 
the firm value and maturity matching remains impossible to test for most companies. 
In summary, the allocation between debt and equity comes out to be the most adequate 
variable to test capital structure. Throughout the dissertation, capital structure will refer either 
to the debt-to-equity ratio or to the leverage ratio (debt over total assets). The leverage ratio 
                                                                                                                                                        
assumed to be different from existing ones (insiders) in most models. Otherwise, the separation of ownership and 
control is not problematic. 
3 See Myers (1977) to understand how matching debt and assets maturities could mitigate under-investment. 
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often serves to position the firm capital structure relative to a “optimal” or “target” value. 
When not else specified, components of the capital structure are market values. 
1.1.2 Independence between financing choices and firm value 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) – hereafter MM (1958) - are the first to formalise the relation 
between firm value, cost of capital and capital structure. They develop a model under a set of 
restrictive assumptions that does not represent a realistic environment for the firm. The 
outcome of their model depends strongly on these assumptions. However, their work provides 
a framework in which the manager can focus on the factors supposed to be the main 
determinants of optimal capital structure choices. The set of MM (1958) assumptions is 
summarised in Table 1.1. Inspired by Titman (2002), the total set of assumptions is split into 
two groups : one dealing with the independence of total cash flow toward capital structure 
choices; the other one presenting financial markets as complete and frictionless. 
According to the first group of assumptions, firms are assumed to be ordered in different 
business risk classes. Firms within the same business risk class have perfectly correlated 
corporate profits. Given that, total market value of firm i , , corresponds to the expected 
corporate profit by unit of time, 
iV
( iE X ) 4, divided by the cost of capital associated with 
business risk class ,  : k kr
( )i
i
k
E X
V
r
= , (1.1) 
The cost of capital, r , can be viewed as the expected return on assets required by investors 
for firms in the business risk class, k . It is similar for all firms in class . MM (1958) make 
further assumptions so that earnings used in the computation of firm value may not be 
affected by capital structure choices. Corporate profits and investors are not subject to any 
kind of taxes. The risk to go bankrupt exists but it assumed not to have a cost. Corporations 
evolve in perfectly competitive input and output markets. This last assumption prevents the 
actions of one firm to modify the cash flow stream of its competitors. 
k
k
                                                 
4 Assets of firm, , generate a perpetual stream of profits : i ,1 ,2 ,3 ,, , ,i i i iX X X X ∞" . iX  represents the profit per 
unit of time to th erpetuity, defined as : e p ,i i t
1
1lim
T
T t
X X
T→∞
=
= ∑ . 
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Table 1.1: The set of hypotheses underlying Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
 Assumption Implication 
Total cash flows are exogenous from capital structure choices 
A1.1 Firms are ordered according to risk classes. 
Firms among the same risk class have perfectly 
correlated cash flows 
Return on assets required by the market is constant 
for all firms in the same risk class. 
A1.2 No taxes of any kind Corporate profit, personal income and capital gains 
are not taxed. Profit can be allocated between the 
different types of investors without affecting the 
value of the securities. 
A1.3 No bankruptcy costs The firm value is not affected by the risk of 
bankruptcy. 
A1.4 Firms evolve in perfectly competitive markets The prices of firm inputs and outputs are given. The 
actions of one competitor cannot influence the others 
competitors. 
Financial market is complete and frictionless 
A1.5 Corporations issue common stocks or straight 
bonds that are priced on perfectly competitive 
markets 
Bonds earn their holder a fixed amount of the 
corporate profit while common stocks give right to 
an uncertain payoff. 
A1.6 No transaction costs Tractability of the return patterns. 
A1.7 Similar lending and borrowing interest rate 
available indifferently to private investors and 
corporations 
Investors can privately and costlessly replicate any 
financial structure chosen by a given corporation. 
A1.8 Infinite elasticity of the demand and supply of 
financial assets 
No price pressure in case of security issues. 
A1.9 Managers and investors have symmetric 
information about the firm quality and the 
stream of cash flows 
Managers and investors have identical expectations 
about the firm value and about the security prices. 
A1.10 Managers act to maximise the wealth of 
shareholders 
No conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders that affect the firm value. 
 
The second group of assumptions ensures that the financial market is complete and 
frictionless. Financing choices of corporations are restricted to straight bonds for debt and 
common stocks for equity. Holders of both securities have a claim on the firm cash flows. The 
bonds give right to a fixed component of the cash flow. The rest is distributed to the 
shareholders and it is uncertain. Securities are priced on perfectly competitive markets with 
no transaction costs, infinite elasticity of the demand and supply for financial assets and 
similar lending and borrowing interest rate available indifferently to private investors and 
corporations. According to that, investors are able to costlessly and privately replicate the 
payoff to any combination of debt and equity proposed by corporations. By issuing new 
securities, firms cannot offer investors patterns of return that they cannot obtain otherwise and 
prices cannot be pushed down by downward sloping demand curve. 
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Managers and investors have access to symmetric information about the value of assets in 
place and of new investment projects so that they may have similar expectations about 
security prices issued by corporations. Besides, investors act rationally using all their 
information to maximise their wealth. In addition, managers are assumed to always work in 
the interest of shareholders by maximising the market value of equity. They are not left the 
opportunity to retain a fraction of the firm profit to maximise their own utility, causing the 
market value of equity to decrease. 
In the specific framework designed by these assumptions, proposition I in 
MM (1958; p. 268) defines the cost of capital of any firm within a given business risk class as 
independent from its capital structure and equal to the cost of capital appropriate to a pure 
equity stream of its business risk class. Proposition II in MM (1958; p. 271) relates the cost of 
equity of a levered firm to its business risk class cost of capital. The expected yield of a share 
of “levered” stock is equal to its business risk class cost of capital plus a premium linked to 
the financial risk of the firm. The financial risk is measured by the debt-to-equity ratio 
expressed in market values. The premium per unit of financial risk corresponds to the 
difference between the cost of capital and the cost of debt. 
( )
i
i
iDkkiE E
Drrrr −+= , (1.2) 
where  is the cost of equity of the levered firm i , E ir
 D ir  is the cost of debt associated to firm i , 
  is the cost of capital appropriate to a pure equity stream of business risk class k . kr
  and  are, respectively, the market values of debt and equity. iD iE
The model of MM (1958) states that a firm cannot increase its value by adding more debt in 
its capital structure although the cost of debt is inferior to the cost of equity. The increased 
leverage brought by the additional debt causes the equity holders to face a higher level of 
financial risk. In turn, they will demand to be compensated for this increase in risk. The 
compensation takes the form of a higher required rate of return on equity. The adjustment of 
the cost of capital is regulated by an arbitrage process that leaves it unaffected by changes in 
capital structure. 
The main implication of MM (1958) is that managers should focus on implementing 
investment opportunities that increase the economic value of the firm instead of re-
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engineering the capital structure. In that sense, the cost of capital, , is important in the 
investment decision as it constitutes a marginal hurdle rate to value new investment projects. 
kr
1.1.3 Two perspectives on MM (1958) propositions 
Revisiting the Modigliani and Miller Theorem, Titman (2002) articulates the stream of 
research on capital structure according to two perspectives. First, from the point of view of 
capital demanders, the breakdown of the exogenous cash flow hypothesis makes cash flows, 
and thus firm value, dependent from capital structure choices. This situation leads managers 
to optimise the allocation between debt and equity in order to maximise the firm value. 
Research in this area includes the impact of taxes, bankruptcy costs and input and output 
markets on the static trade-off between debt and equity. The second perspective considers the 
point of view of suppliers of capital when the hypothesis about complete and frictionless 
markets no longer holds. Financial intermediaries or investors are then inefficient in re-
designing securities. Consequently, firms are forced to directly issue securities matching the 
investors’ needs otherwise they will not get external financings. Marginal financing decisions 
become more important than capital structure as a static instrument to maximise firm value. 
Breakdown of the exogenous total cash flow hypothesis 
When cash flows are no longer independent from capital structure choices, firms may 
increase their market value by optimising the allocation between sources of funds. In this 
case, demanders of capital determine unilaterally the amounts of debt and equity in their 
capital structure. Corporations make no effort to take into account the investors’ preferences 
in terms of financing sources. In fact, financial intermediaries are assumed to be more 
efficient than corporations in re-designing securities to meet investors’ criteria. Financial 
intermediaries buy the “basic” securities issued by corporations and combine them to sell 
“new products” that fulfil investors’ specific expectations in terms of payoffs or risk. 
The breakdown of the total cash flow independence hypothesis is at the origin of a stream 
of research based on the interaction between the static trade-off of debt and equity and firm 
value. These theories give rise to the notion of optimal capital structure which represents the 
allocation between debt and equity that maximises the firm value. Capital structure 
irrelevancy is challenged but not always refuted. Static trade-off models do not agree on the 
level at which a potential optimal capital structure exists. Is it at the individual firm level or at 
the industry level or only at the level of the whole economy ? 
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Breakdown of perfect “market conditions” 
Market frictions such as transaction costs, information asymmetry between managers and 
investors or conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders break down the arbitrage 
process of undoing costlessly any corporation capital structure. All marginal financing 
decisions are subject to a careful examination from investors who adjust their expectations 
about firm value accordingly. Specifically, this behaviour from investors affect the cost of 
financing. Corporations are no longer free to decide which type of securities to issue. For a 
given security, the rate of return required by investors is prohibitive and forces managers to 
forego investment opportunities unless they chose another financing source. 
Theoretical models in this area of research examine the impact of marginal financing 
decisions on the firm value and on the investment policy. Implications include either a 
hierarchy in the sources of funds, under or over-investment or the use of combined financing 
instruments. The latter element is easily observable. Beside common stock and public bonds, 
firms issue various securities associated to either equity, debt or a mixture of both. Registered 
shares, participation certificates, or preferred stocks constitute alternative equity-oriented 
securities. For debt, long-term and short-term bank loans, treasury bills, lease contracts 
complete straight public bonds. More sophisticated instruments includes an optional second-
stage financing such as units (warrant associated with either common stock or straight bond) 
and convertible bonds. The existence of these various types of securities outline the 
importance of market frictions in marginal financing decisions. It also denotes the awareness 
of corporation in responding to the investors’ demand. 
1.2 Static trade-off theories and optimal capital structure 
The static trade-off between debt and equity concerns two main theories of capital 
structure. First, taxes and bankruptcy costs affect corporate profit in a manner that do not 
contribute to increase firm value. Remember that firm total market value is computed by 
summing the discounted corporate profit that should be returned to providers of funds. In the 
MM (1958) framework, corporate profit is fully returned to bond and stockholders. Corporate 
taxes and bankruptcy costs reduce the part of corporate profit promised to investors. Hence, 
minimising their importance maximises the total market value of the firm. The models 
presented in sub-section 1.2.1 show how the allocation between debt and equity affects 
corporate profit after taxes and bankruptcy costs. 
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Second, when firms evolve in imperfect input and output markets, an action of one 
competitor may induce a reaction from other corporations in the industry. Although cash flow 
of a given firm is not directly affected by a competitor’s action, capital structure, if not 
optimal, may prevent any adequate reaction resulting in a decrease in market value or, in the 
worst case, in liquidation. Sub-section 1.2.2 briefly reviews selected models examining the 
interactions between capital structure and characteristics of input and output markets. 
1.2.1 Taxes and bankruptcy costs 
Taxes affect firms at different levels. Corporate profit is subject to a corporate tax rate that 
is equal, in most developed countries5, to a fixed percentage of earnings before tax but after 
interests. Tax rates range from 30 % to 45 %6 depending on the country and on the fact that 
profit is distributed or not. In case of corporate loss, firms are not refunded but they may carry 
forward the losses over a period varying across countries. Individual investors are also subject 
to taxation when they hold securities. Interests and dividends are taxed at the individual level. 
Some countries mitigate the effects of dividend double taxation (Germany for instance) while 
others do not (Switzerland). Income on financial assets are taxed at a progressive rate 
increasing with the income level of the individual. According to that, key elements in 
considering the influence of taxed on capital structure choices are marginal tax rates and not 
effective rates. Capital gains on securities are also taxed differently across countries. Overall, 
the tax rate applied on capital gains is inferior to the income tax rate. 
If leverage presents a corporate tax advantage, it also contains a drawback in terms of cash 
flows. The more levered is the firm, the greater becomes the risk of bankruptcy. Costs are 
associated with bankruptcy such as trustee or legal fees and costs of reorganisation. Like tax 
payments, these costs are taken from the profit intended to be returned to investors. They 
contribute to make firm value dependent of the allocation between debt and equity. 
1.2.1.1 Models with corporate taxes 
As corporate taxes are computed on earnings after interests, increasing debt financing 
reduces the fraction of corporate profit dedicated to tax payments. Corporate tax deductibility 
of debt interests creates a tax shield that increases the total market value of the firm, other 
                                                 
5 Switzerland was an exception with a progressive corporate tax rate based on capital intensity (ratio of equity 
over total assets). However, since 2001, corporate profit is taxed at a fixed rate ranging from 14 % to 29 % 
depending on the Canton. 
6 Source : Corporate taxes 2000 worldwide summaries published by PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
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things equal. Considering exclusively corporate taxes, the value maximising capital structure 
is the one that includes enough debt to eliminate the corporate tax liabilities. Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) correct their 1958 model by allowing corporate taxes. It has for effect to prevent 
the arbitrage process that causes capital structure irrelevancy. The after-tax profit distributions 
of two firms in the same risk class are no longer proportional if their capital structures differ. 
Furthermore, given the corporate tax advantage of debt, the total market value of any levered 
firm, LV , is always greater than that of the unlevered firm, V , within the same business risk 
class. 
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where  is the cost of capital for business risk class, , adjusted for the corporate taxes, τkr k
  is the marginal corporate tax rate. Cτ
The difference in value between levered and unlevered firms corresponds to the market value 
of corporate tax savings, DCτ , which is the present value of all future tax savings related to 
interest payments. Corporate tax savings are considered to be certain, thus they are discounted 
at the risk free rate. Then, firm value is given by a monotonic increasing function of leverage, 
which is not realistic. In the presence of non-debt tax shields such as depreciation, this would 
no longer be the case. 
Brennan and Schwartz (1978) extend the Modigliani and Miller (1963) model. They 
consider corporate taxes, risky debt and positive bankruptcy costs. The corporate tax 
advantage of debt is counterbalanced by the two negative effects when leverage increases. 
The fact that debt is risky introduces the probability that the firm default and goes bankrupt. 
The probability of default increases with the leverage ratio. At the same time, the probability 
that security holders will have positive residual claims decreases causing a negative impact on 
the firm value. Risky debt has another implication. It makes corporate tax savings risky. In 
case of default, the corporate tax advantage of debt disappears. Thus, the present value of 
corporate tax savings decreases when the leverage ratio increases. Bankruptcy costs have also 
a negative effect on firm value that increases with indebtedness. In fact, bankruptcy costs 
accentuate the negative effect of high leverage on firm value. The outcome of all these 
positive and negative effects on firm value is the appearance of an optimal capital structure at 
the individual firm level. When the leverage ratio is low, the corporate advantage of debt 
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dominates. Firm value increases with leverage up to the optimal debt level where negative 
effects of leverage exactly offset the corporate tax advantage. From this point on, increasing 
leverage would reduces firm value. 
Brennan and Schwartz (1984) introduce the investment policy (growth rate of assets) and 
the financing policy (growth rate of the face value of debt) as variables explaining the payoff 
of securities in the capital structure. From the set of feasible investment and financing 
policies, the manager will select the policies that maximise the market value of the 
outstanding stocks. The variations in market values of bonds and stocks are described by a 
system of differential equations. The aim of the research is to observe the impact of 
investment and financing policies on both capital structure and firm value. 
Unlike most of other capital structure models, leverage ratio is expressed in book values. It 
is given by the face value of issued debt divided by the total assets. This has for advantage to 
use a directly observable variable as a proxy for capital structure. The model shows that the 
optimal capital structure depends not only on the current profitability but also on the pre-
existing capital structure. Furthermore, under the optimal financing policy, the current capital 
structure depends on the past history of the firm profitability. The consequence is that even if 
two firms are currently and apparently similar, they will not have necessarily identical capital 
structures. If they have different histories, their optimal capital structures will differ. This 
finding outlines the limit of a static approach to determine the optimal capital structure. 
Moreover, even in the presence of corporate taxes, the value of the firm may not increase with 
leverage. In fact, firm scheduled values appear to be flat over a large range of capital 
structures. This finding supports the capital structure irrelevancy argument of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958). The reason brought up by Brennan and Schwartz (1984) is the combination of 
manager’s optimal behaviour (working in the interest of the shareholders) and investors’ 
rational expectations. If the firm market value is increasing with leverage, the manager finds it 
optimal to issue more debt immediately. However, investors have already integrated this 
action into their expectations of the firm value. Hence, the firm value cannot slope upward 
when leverage is increased. This result casts some doubt on the corporate tax savings effect 
or, at least, on the ability of the capital structure – firm value relation to detect it. 
1.2.1.2 Models involving personal and corporate taxes 
The limiting role of bankruptcy costs to leverage is not as important in practice as specified 
in the theory. This observation is made by Miller (1977; p. 262) or Warner (1977; p. 337) who 
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underline that the expected bankruptcy costs can be estimated at 1 % of the firm market value 
before bankruptcy. In counterpart, corporate taxes represent about 50 % of the net operating 
earnings. Following this rationale, bankruptcy costs are not able to explain the fact that some 
companies adopt a low levered capital structure. Investors' personal taxes on bond and equity 
income may induce a personal tax disadvantage to debt. The inclusion of personal taxes in the 
theory of capital structure can mitigate and even offset the corporate tax advantage of debt. 
Some investors (i.e. pension funds) are not subject to taxation. Then, they are indifferent to 
the kind of remuneration they receive on their investments (interests, dividends or capital 
gains). However, because of corporate taxes, the fraction of the cash flow they receive from a 
levered firm is greater than the one from an unlevered firm. Thus, tax-exempt investors will 
prefer highly levered firms. Investors who are subject to personal taxation would rather hold 
securities for which tax payments are the lowest. Consequently, investors in high tax brackets 
will prefer securities with income in form of capital gains. First, they can defer their tax 
payments by not realising the gains and second, the tax rate applied to capital gains may be 
more advantageous than the one applied to other securities incomes. 
Miller (1977) addresses to the interaction between debt and taxes on firm value. He 
considers that corporate profit is taxed at a constant marginal rate, Cτ . Stockholders are taxed 
on dividends and capital gains at a marginal rate, Eτ  while bondholders are taxed on interests 
at a marginal rate, Dτ . The market value of a levered firm can be re-written as : 
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where LG  is the gain in value associated to leverage involving corporate and personal 
taxes. 
As indicated by equation 1.4, the tax gain is no longer strictly non-negative. Its sign 
depends on the trade-off between the corporate tax advantage of debt and the personal tax 
disadvantage of it. Marginal personal tax rates are assumed to be progressive. Under this 
condition, there exists a personal tax rates level where the personal tax disadvantage of debt 
exactly offsets the corporate tax advantage : 
( ) ( ) ( ECD )τττ −−=− 111 . (1.5) 
At the aggregate level of the whole economy, debt is issued until the marginal tax rates 
reaches the Equation 1.5 equality. If more debt would be issued, some firms would consider 
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that debt financing is value decreasing and the equilibrium no longer holds. At the individual 
firm level, managers are indifferent between having debt or equity in their capital structure. 
All investors pay the same total amount in taxes (directly in the form of personal taxes or 
indirectly in corporate taxes) on every pre-tax unit of earnings. This is true whether earnings 
are distributed as interests on bonds or as dividends/capital gains on stocks. Under these 
circumstances, investors should also be indifferent about the capital structure choice. Like in 
MM (1958), the total market value of individual firms is exclusively determined by their 
operating activities and does not depend on their capital structure. 
The outcome of the model developed by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) contradicts that of 
Miller (1977). By allowing the presence of non-debt corporate tax shields such as 
depreciation and investment tax credit and by fixing a statutory upper limit to tax deductions, 
the model of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) states that for each individual firm, an optimal 
capital structure exists, which maximises the firm market value. The full utilisation of the debt 
tax shield becomes uncertain because of the presence of non-debt substitutes. This has for 
consequences to affect the effective marginal corporate tax rate, which becomes firm-specific 
and not constant as in Miller (1977). Simultaneously, equity financing becomes more 
attractive for firms that are the most sensitive to the risk of not fully using their debt tax 
shield. In fact, some firms that were indifferent about using debt or equity in the Miller (1977) 
framework, will prefer equity because of the uncertain interests tax deduction. Although it has 
an opposite outcome, the model of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) is a generalisation of 
Miller (1977). With non-debt tax shields equal to zero and no statutory limit about tax credit, 
both models lead to similar conclusions about capital structure irrelevancy at the individual 
firm level. 
Further theoretical models analyse the impact of corporate and personal taxes on the capital 
structure. They are developed upon the work of Miller (1977) and DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980). Their goal is to reconcile the empirical evidence with the theoretical 
predictions. If the net tax effect of debt is positive to the firm market value, the theory 
predicts that every firm will be levered. However, it is observed that many firms have adopted 
a zero debt capital structure. In their model, Kane, Marcus and McDonald (1984) include 
personal and corporate taxes, bankruptcy costs and a probability that the firm assets value 
falls to zero. First, they observe that the differences in bankruptcy costs across firms cannot 
explain the wide range of existing capital structure. Second, they show that if the net tax 
advantage of debt is small, firms deviating from the optimal capital structure will not suffer 
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from a significant loss in value. It means that as long as the gain in value associated with the 
optimal leverage ratio is small, firms are indifferent about their capital structure. This 
outcome fits with the conclusions of Miller (1977) and of Brennan and Schwartz (1984). 
When the net tax advantage of debt is equal to zero 
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assets value falls down to zero discourages an unlevered firm to issue any debt. In that sense, 
the model of Kane, Marcus and McDonald (1984) explains the fact that some firms do not 
have debt in their capital structure. Moreover, assuming that the net tax advantage of debt is 
small let other determinants of the capital structure play a more important role than taxes. 
Taggart (1980) extends the model of Miller (1977) by considering an incomplete capital 
market and special costs associated with corporate debt. The introduction of debt costs such 
as fees to negotiate the debt contracts can lead to systematic differences in capital structure 
across industries or across specific firm types. Under these conditions, firms are no longer 
indifferent about their capital structure choices. In addition, incomplete markets imply that 
investors cannot be categorised in exclusive and exhaustive tax brackets. In other words, 
investors do not have unanimous preferences relative to optimal capital structures. Even if the 
determination of an optimal capital structure involves the trade-off between tax savings and 
bankruptcy costs, additional features have to be taken into account which complicate the 
optimisation process. Consistent with Kale, Marcus and McDonald (1984), the model of 
Taggart (1980) has for consequence to reduce the importance of the tax savings and to give a 
rationale to the existence of unlevered firms. It also introduces the fact that there could exist 
an optimal (or thought as optimal) capital structure common to all firms in specific industries. 
All in all, the influence of taxes on capital structure choices is not straightforward. Some 
models maintain capital structure irrelevancy even in the presence of taxes. Other models 
predict the existence of firm-specific optimal allocation between debt and equity that 
maximises firm value. Finally, Taggart (1980) puts forward the hypothesis that optimal 
capital structure can be derived at the industry level. 
1.2.2 Influence of the product market 
In the previous models, capital structure has been analysed in a single firm framework with 
exogenous incidences on cash flows. When the hypothesis about perfectly competitive input 
and output market is relaxed, actions undertaken by one given firm could affect other firms, in 
terms of cost of financing or profitability. Hence, capital structure choices that may be 
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optimal to solve problems inside an individual firm are not automatically optimal when the 
whole industry is considered. Setting a debt level or choosing an investment project may not 
be independent of the strategic decisions taken by other firms in the same industry. This area 
of the literature outlines the importance of industry in capital structure choices. The degree of 
competition in the output market, product characteristics or production technologies are the 
capital structure main determinants at the industry level. 
1.2.2.1 Capital structure in a competitive imperfect market 
In oligopolies, changes in the output level of a given firm are assumed to affect output 
levels of competitors. If one firm decides to produce more, it is at the expense of the other 
firms in the industry. With a high leverage ratio, a firm must dedicate a higher fraction of its 
cash flow to pay interests. According to Brander and Lewis (1986), debt financing increases 
the level of risk the shareholders are ready to take in new activities or investments. A more 
levered firm is expected to adopt an aggressive output policy in order to generate more cash to 
pay the larger fixed interest payments. In that sense, capital structure has an impact on the 
output policy. The consequences for rival firms imply a reduction in their output which leads 
to lower profit. So, competitors commit to pursue more aggressive strategies by having more 
debt outstanding. In equilibrium, the outcome is that firms are worse off with leverage than 
without because they produce more than the optimal "all equity" equilibrium quantities. 
However, the competitive environment urges them to have more debt than firms in situation 
of monopoly. On the long-run, this situation is not sustainable. Excessive production leads to 
larger inventories, lower operating profit and bankruptcy for the weakest competitors. 
In order to prevent these long-term consequences of competition, firms in oligopolies are 
tempted by tacit collusion. Output levels and prices are set so that each competitor may 
survive. Maksimovic (1988) analyses what happens when tacit collusion is broken down and 
competitors engage themselves in a war price. His model shows that firms with less debt in 
their capital structure are better off because they have lower fixed cash payouts. Leverage is 
expected to decrease when the competition level increases. Thus, firms in oligopolies should 
have less debt outstanding than in other forms of competition. This outcome may appear 
opposed to Brander and Lewis (1986) but the relation between both models is not so 
straightforward. Brander and Lewis (1986) argue that leverage exacerbates competition 
(predation argument) which in turn, could have a negative effect on firm viability if tacit 
collusion is not reached. On the other hand, Maksimovic (1988) predicts that the level of 
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competition affects capital structure choices and that having more debt has also a negative 
effect on firm viability when tacit collusion is broken (survival argument). 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) model the predation argument of Brander and Lewis (1986) 
and the survival argument of Maksimovic (1988) in a multiple-period framework. A firm with 
financial contracting problem may suffer from a competitor’s aggressive output policy. 
Consider a firm, A, which financing strongly depends on its annual profit and another one, B, 
with no such concern. Firm B may have an incentive to produce more than its optimal level. 
Such a behaviour should have a negative impact on firm A profit (predation argument). In the 
next period, firm A may not be able to get financed (survival argument). As a consequence, 
firm B would be the only actor left on the market and could benefit from monopoly rents. In 
terms of capital structure, the less levered is firm A, the greater chance it has to survive the 
competition. This model also outlines the risk of leverage in case of strong competition. 
However, it makes no prediction about an optimal capital structure common to all firms 
within the industry. Capital structure choices are rather related to profitability and to financial 
flexibility. 
1.2.2.2 Product characteristics and the leverage ratio  
The level of debt also interacts with the product or service specification of quality. 
Titman (1984) argues that firms producing durable or unique goods have less debt because, in 
case of liquidation, the cost to customers is higher. If durable goods producers can enter in a 
credible contractual agreement with the customers about after-sales services, they can benefit 
from higher price for their products. In case of bankruptcy, the new owner is not compelled to 
fulfil the previous manager’s obligations. Therefore, a low debt level implies a lower 
probability of bankruptcy and gives a credible signal that the firm will be able to fulfil its 
contractual obligations. Firms with a high degree of product sophistication employ specialised 
and highly qualified human capital. In case of liquidation, this type of human capital cannot 
be transferred easily to another firm. In this case too, a lower debt level represents a positive 
signal that the firm cares about its longevity. It reduces the risk of unemployment for its 
specialised workers. 
Product sophistication and specialisation create implicit contracts between the firm and its 
customers, suppliers or rivals such as higher sale price, priority in parts and furniture supply 
or tacit collusion. Reneging on these contracts cannot lead the firm to be legally penalised but 
it could bear punishment costs. Maksimovic and Titman (1991) show that implicit contracts 
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benefit with priority to shareholders. Therefore, the more levered is the firm, the lower are the 
costs of reneging incurred by shareholders. The degree of product quality and/or specification 
induces firms to have less debt in their capital structure to let shareholders benefit from 
implicit contracts rents. Capital structure choices could be considered as a message to firm 
partners about the owners engagement to honour implicit contracts. 
If Titman (1984) implications of product characteristics on capital structure are valid for all 
firms within an industry, those of Maksimovic and Titman (1991) are restricted to higher 
quality producers. Inside a given industry, different levels of product quality could be found. 
According to that, capital structures may vary from one firm to another depending on the 
targeted degree of quality. 
1.2.2.3 Product market and industry-specific capital structure 
If the optimal capital structure problem is analysed in an industry framework characterised 
by multiple production technologies, the capital structure of an individual firm becomes 
irrelevant as shown by Maksimovic and Zechner (1991). The risk related to investment 
project cash flows is endogenously determined within the industry by the number of firms that 
choose a given project (the project includes the production technology). Numerous firms that 
select similar projects have lower production costs (low production technology) and are better 
hedged against variations in the costs of production. Conversely, investment projects with 
higher costs of production (high production technology) are chosen by fewer firms which 
have, hence, riskier cash flows. Debt provides incentives for assets substitution between 
creditors and owners. In equilibrium, firms with high leverage ratios choose to invest in risky 
projects (high technology) and those with low debt levels prefer safer projects (low 
technology). The aggregate amount of debt in the industry adjusts to the repartition between 
risky and safe projects and induces the investment decision so that the values of risky and safe 
projects may be equal. As a result, the financial structure of an individual firm influences the 
investment decision but not the value of the firm. The outcome of Maksimovic and 
Zechner (1991) contradicts the general trend in capital structure theories about input and 
output markets that firms in the same industry should have similar debt-to-equity ratios. 
Instead, Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) support capital structure irrelevancy advanced by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) on a perfect market and by Miller (1977) in the presence of 
corporate and personal taxes. 
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1.2.3 Optimal capital structure in summary 
In this section, the two main streams of static trade-off models result in three different 
outcomes in terms of relation between capital structure and firm market value. First, 
consistent with MM (1958), capital structure choices do not impact firm value in spite of 
taxes or/and input and output market imperfections. Models entering this category are 
summarised in Panel A of Table 1.2. The second possible outcome is that breakdowns of total 
cash flow independence lead to the existence of an optimal allocation between debt and equity 
for each individual firm. Capital structure models that maximise individual firm value are 
recapped in Panel B of Table 1.2. The third outcome relates capital structure to industry. 
Firms within the same industry are predicted to have similar allocations between debt and 
equity. Models with such outcome are shown in Panel C of Table 1.2. They mostly belong to 
the input/output market imperfection category, which is not surprising as industry 
classification is the criteria to order firms production activities. 
Table 1.2 : Implication of capital structure on firm value in static trade-off models 
 Authors Capital structure determinants Implication on firm value 
Panel A : Capital structure irrelevancy 
 Brennan and 
Schwartz (1984) 
Corporate taxes, bond indenture, active 
investment and financing policies 
None 
 Miller (1977) Corporate and personal taxes None 
 Kane, Marcus and 
McDonald (1984) 
Corporate and personal taxes, 
probability that assets value falls to zero 
Not large enough to adjust the capital 
structure 
 Maksimovic and 
Zechner (1991) 
Industry with multiple production 
technologies 
None 
Panels B : Optimal capital structure at individual firm level 
 Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) 
Corporate taxes Levered firms are worth more than 
unlevered firms for similar business risk
 Brennan and 
Schwartz (1978) 
Corporate taxes, risky debt and 
bankruptcy costs 
Optimal leverage ratio that maximises 
firm value 
 DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) 
Corporate and personal taxes, non-debt 
tax shields and statutory upper limit to 
tax credit 
Optimal leverage ratio that maximises 
firm value 
 Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990) 
Predation and survivorship arguments in 
competitive output markets 
Leverage ratio increases with 
profitability and internal financing 
capacity 
 Maksimovic and 
Titman (1991) 
Quality reputation and gains in long-
term partnerships with customers, 
suppliers and competitors 
Leverage ratio decreases for firms 
willing to show they care about 
maintaining high quality standards  
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Table 1.2 : continued 
 Authors Capital structure determinants Implication on firm value 
Panel C : Industry-specific capital structure 
 Taggart (1980) Corporate and personal taxes, 
negotiation fees for debt contract 
The importance of tax savings could be 
mitigated by industry-specific debt 
contract fees 
 Brander and 
Lewis (1986) 
Competition in oligopolies, risk of 
predation 
Firms tend to have more debt in 
competitive oligopolies 
 Maksimovic (1988) Competition in oligopolies, conditions 
to survive a war price 
Firms tend to have less debt if the risk 
of war price is important in the industry 
 Titman (1984) Product and production characteristics, 
collateral value of assets 
Leverage is less important in industries 
with specific product and specialised 
assets 
 
Static trade-off theories do not outline a clear relation between capital structure and firm 
value. An explanation could be that the relation between financing and firm value should not 
be considered in a static perspective but in a dynamic one. Capital structure at one moment in 
time corresponds to the sum of all past financing decisions taken by a firm. Needs for 
financing are recurrent and the environment of the firm changes with time. Under these 
circumstances, firm value may rather depends on marginal financing decisions. Furthermore, 
if optimal capital structure varies through time, costs are generated each time the allocation 
between debt and equity is modified. These costs may offset the gain in value given by 
sticking to the optimal capital structure. This rationale is not contradicted by the models of 
Brennan and Schwartz (1984) and Kane, Marcus and McDonald (1984). The first one relates 
capital structure to past capital structure choices and the second one outlines the costs of re-
balancing capital structure as an element preventing to stick continuously to an optimal 
allocation between debt and equity. 
1.3 Marginal financing decision models 
Marginal financing decision models describe the impact of a given financing choice on firm 
value and especially on market value of equity. Shareholders’ wealth becomes the centre of 
interest managers are focusing their efforts on. An optimal financing decision is the one that 
has a positive impact on equity market value. The models are based on frictions on financial 
markets that, roughly speaking, prevent investors and financial intermediaries to re-design 
basic securities issued by corporations into products that satisfy investors’ needs. It becomes 
more attractive for corporations themselves to directly design and issue specific securities. 
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The first category of market frictions includes transaction costs, different lending and 
borrowing interest rates or finite elasticity of demand and supply for securities. These 
frictions break the arbitrage process by generating a costly procedure for investors to undo 
corporations capital structure choices. The second market frictions is information asymmetry 
between firm insiders (managers, existing shareholders) and outsiders (potential providers of 
funds). This asymmetry creates an incentive for corporations to select their source of marginal 
financing according to the expected reaction of providers of funds. Information asymmetry 
framework is presented in sub-section 1.3.1. A third market friction occurs when managers 
use or are expected to use funds in a way that causes a prejudice to their providers. Sub-
section 1.3.2 deals with the influence of conflicts of interest and transaction cost economy on 
financing choices. These last two sub-sections involve theoretical models based on the 
breakdown of assumptions A1.9 and A1.10 in Table 1.1. In these contexts, marginal financing 
decisions are directly related to investment opportunities. Marginal financing models build on 
the need to finance investment projects. According to that, impacts on the firm value could 
come either from the financing decision or from the investment project. 
Sub-section 1.3.3 analyses the influence of corporate governance on external financing 
choices. Corporate governance defines the legal boundaries inside which market participants 
can organise and protect themselves against the risk of expropriation. Depending on how they 
feel protected, investors will prefer one security type to another or to concentrate themselves 
in large blocks. Corporate governance affects not only financing choices but also the 
ownership structure. 
1.3.1 Information asymmetry models 
According to the strong definition of efficiency, market prices are assumed to incorporate 
all the relevant information. If the set of information is common to all market participants, 
none of them is able to earn systematic abnormal profits. Information asymmetry appears 
when some agents acquire private information (not known by other market participants) 
allowing them to value assets more accurately. This superior information gives them an 
advantage when they trade and allow them to earn systematic profits. In the presence of 
asymmetric information, market prices are assumed to reflect all public information (semi-
strong definition of efficiency). Private information is revealed by the actions of better 
informed agents. Less informed market participants adjust their valuation of assets letting 
market prices integrate the newly released information. 
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To highlight the importance of information asymmetry for economic sciences in general and 
for corporate finance in particular, the attention should be drawn to the 2001 laureates of the 
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences : Professors Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz, “for their 
analyses of markets with asymmetric information”. George Akerlof initiated the research on 
such markets by pointing out the importance and implications that sellers are often better 
informed about product quality than buyers. Michael Spence analyses the conditions for better 
informed agents to truthfully and credibly transmit their superior information to less informed 
market participants. Finally, Joseph Stiglitz examines the position of less informed agents and 
how they can improve their situation. 
Information asymmetry has a cost. It lowers the number of trades and depresses market 
prices. Akerlof (1970) illustrates this cost in his description of  the market for “lemons”. The 
quality of used cars is the source of information asymmetry. The “true” quality (good or bad) 
is only known by sellers. Buyers must purchase the car to learn it. The market price for used 
cars is unique and lower than the intrinsic value of good quality cars. The first consequence is 
that sellers are not willing to sell undervalued good quality cars. “Lemons” drive good cars 
out of the market, reducing the number of trades. The second consequence comes from the 
impossibility to differentiate used car prices according to quality. Potential buyers pressure 
the market price down because of the presence of “lemons”. The decision of sellers to take 
good cars out of the market is based on a mechanism of adverse selection : a good action 
made for the bad reason. They could sell good quality cars but at an undervalued price. 
Consequently, sellers are better off abandoning their best products than bearing the cost of 
information asymmetry. In corporate financing theory, adverse selection has for consequence 
that managers (or existing shareholders) prefer foregoing profitable investment opportunities 
rather than selling under-priced securities.  
In order to avoid under-investment, managers have to communicate their private 
information. A credible signal associated to the investment/financing decision will reduce 
information asymmetry and allow fair financing costs. Corporations have at their disposal a 
large variety of signals that often correspond to discriminating financing combinations. In that 
sense, an efficient signal is a financing solution, which is optimal only for firms of a given 
quality. Through the selected financing solution, investors identify the firm quality and 
financing costs are adjusted consequently. Signalling models justify the existence of mixed 
securities, certification process and alternative flotation methods as tools for corporations to 
obtain a fair financing. 
 27
1.3.1.1 Information asymmetry creates a hierarchy in the financing sources 
According to Myers (1984), firms finance their investment projects according to a well 
defined hierarchy : self-financing (internal cash flow), risk-free debt, risky debt and, as a last 
resort, equity. This hierarchy of financing sources is known as the pecking order. Financing 
sources differ from each other by their sensitivity to information asymmetry. Managers 
possess private information that enable them to know the “true” value of securities that are to 
be issued to finance a profitable investment project. They work to maximise existing 
shareholders’ utility. Investors know the current market value of those securities, estimated 
relative to public information only. The difference between managers and investors’ value 
represent the cost of information asymmetry : 
( )V I I c− =  (1.6) 
where  is the “true” value of the securities to be issued (managers’ value), ( )V I
 I  is the investment initial expense that corresponds to the market value of the 
securities to be issued (investors’ value), 
  is the cost of information asymmetry. c
The cost of information asymmetry is particular in the sense that it could be either positive 
or negative. If private information is unfavourable, the cost of information asymmetry is 
negative. It means that securities are currently overvalued. Selling them is profitable to 
existing shareholders. In that situation, managers always issue the overpriced securities and 
undertake the investment project. If private information is favourable, the cost of information 
asymmetry is positive and securities are currently undervalued. Furthermore, the cost of 
information asymmetry could be greater than the net present value of the investment project. 
In this case, existing shareholders are better off if managers forego the investment 
opportunity. 
When investment projects are internally financed, outside investors are not needed. 
Information asymmetry is not a relevant problem. Every profitable investment opportunity 
that can be internally financed should be undertaken as it contributes positively to firm market 
value. For that reason, internal financing is systematically preferred to any other financing 
sources. Information asymmetry matters when an external financing deficit occurs. The 
sensitivity of security market value to the release of private information increases with its 
risk. Senior claim paying fixed interest as debt is less concerned about information asymmetry 
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problem than equity. The consequence is that debt financing is always preferred to equity 
financing. For debt, information asymmetry influences the perception of the probability to 
default, which in turn, alters the valuation process. Risky debt is then more subject to 
information asymmetry problems than risk-free debt and thus, risk-free debt is strictly 
preferred to risky debt. In terms of information asymmetry costs, risk-free debt could be 
considered as equivalent to internal financing. 
Adverse selection model 
The adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984) integrates the pecking order 
theory in a financing/investment decision model and outlines one of information asymmetry 
worst consequence : under-investment. High quality firms will reject profitable investment 
projects if they have to finance them by selling overpriced securities. In presence of 
information asymmetry, the market value of the firm is lower than it should be with 
symmetric information, other things equal. The model also predicts that announcements of 
equity financing decisions should lead the market to revise downwardly its expectations about 
the stock price. Market reactions to debt financing decisions are expected to be of lower 
magnitude. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) make four specific assumptions about information asymmetry 
and its consequences. First, managers have superior information about the value of assets in 
place and about the value of investment opportunities. This superior information allows them 
to know the “true” value of securities especially when it is not reflected in current market 
prices. Second, investment projects with negative net present value are ruled out. This 
assumption ensures that investment policy is profitable to all shareholders on a long-term 
horizon. Therefore, short-term implications of information asymmetry between existing and 
new shareholders are emphasised. Third, managers act in the interest of existing shareholders. 
In fact, they work to maximise the short-term utility of existing shareholders. The latter are 
assumed to be passive. They do not adjust their holdings in the firm capital after equity issues. 
They do not finance new investment projects. In that sense, managers maximise the intrinsic 
value of existing shares. Existing shareholders and managers are insiders of the firm and 
cannot be differentiated. Finally, financial slack (cash and marketable securities) is fixed and 
are common knowledge to managers and investors. However, it does not cover the initial 
investment and external funds must be raised to undertake the project. 
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Because of information asymmetry, securities are not priced by the market at their “true” 
value. It means that new investors never pay the exact price for their claims on firm value. If 
securities are undervalued, new investors acquire a fraction of the claim on assets in place and 
financial slacks dedicated to existing shareholders. On the other hand, the sale of overvalued 
securities will expropriate new investors from a fraction of their claim. The firm value 
dedicated to existing shareholders is a function of the “true” values of assets in place, , and 
investment net present value, , and of the required amount of external financing at current 
market price. Managers issue the securities and undertake the project if, and only if, the 
incremental value obtained by existing shareholders is greater than the fraction of assets in 
place and financial slacks going to new investors : 
a
g
( ) ( )( )1F a E gα α+ = − + ≡  issue-invest condition (1.7) 
where  is the fraction of equity held by new investors, α
  is the amount of financial slacks, F
  is the amount of external financing required by the investment project at current 
market price. 
E
The issue-invest decision is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The horizontal axis represents the 
“true” value of assets in place and the vertical axis the “true” net present value of investment. 
The grey region (issue-invest) corresponds to the pairs of  and  for which the issue-invest 
condition holds. The “under-investment” region involves the pairs of   and  for which 
existing shareholders are better off foregoing the investment project. In this case, all 
profitable investment opportunities are not undertaken. The firm finds itself in situation of 
under-investment. 
a g
a g
Managers are more likely to undertake projects when  is high and  is low. In other 
words, the attractiveness of an investment opportunity depends on its relative value to the 
assets in place. Other things equal, firms with high growth opportunities have more incentives 
to be externally financed. Furthermore, the issue-invest decision signals to the market that 
“true” values of  and  are above the issue-invest condition line. Securities are sold at a 
price that guarantee a gain for existing shareholders. Investors take this overvaluation into 
account when they revise downwardly the after-issue security price. The decrease in the 
market price of securities constitutes the cost of information asymmetry. According to the 
pecking order, this cost is lower for debt than for equity. Therefore, when external financing 
is needed, debt is always preferred to equity. If the cost of information asymmetry associated 
g a
a g
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with debt financing is too high, the investment opportunity is foregone. Under these 
circumstances, firms are not expected to rely on marginal equity financing on a regular basis 
during their lifetime. Their deficit in external financing should be highly correlated with their 
net use of debt financing. 
Figure 1.1 : The issue-invest decision in Myers and Majluf (1984) 
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stock price. 
Narayanan (1988) analyses the firm financing decision when information asymmetry is 
restricted to the value of investment projects. He also relaxes the hypothesis that firms always 
select positive net present value projects. The main outcome is that firms with unprofitable 
investment opportunities may survive in the presence of information asymmetry because they 
may be overvalued. Their survivorship is limited to their capacity to sell overpriced securities. 
The existence of overvalued bad quality firms has for consequence to downgrade the overall 
firm value, higher quality firms being undervalued. In other words, information asymmetry let 
unprofitable firms survive and the presence of such firms prevents private information to be 
fully released. In Narayanan (1988) framework, the pecking order holds and constitutes one 
way to limit the number of unprofitable firms. These firms cannot finance themselves 
internally or with risk-free debt – these sources of financing cannot be overvalued. When 
reliance to internal and risk-free financing is important in the economy, it becomes more 
difficult for unprofitable firms to remain unidentified. Better quality firms are the ones 
avoiding external risky financing. Investors are inclined to penalise firms issuing equity or 
risky debt to eliminate unprofitable firms that hide among them. 
The pecking order theory is restrictive in the sense that it does not authorise any financing 
flexibility. However, it is developed for the case where the financing policy is directly related 
to the investment policy. The need for financing is assumed to completely dependent of the 
investment project. The adverse selection models do not consider the rationale for an 
alternation of the financing sources in order to maintain a flexible financing capacity. In 
addition, the pecking order theory does not address the possibility of signalling costlessly the 
true value of the firm. It does not allow the firm to use a non-unique financing solution. 
Furthermore, for the pecking order to be valid, all firms must have access to any financing 
source. Young, high growth firms have no internal financing capacity and they cannot find 
investors ready to lend them cash. Because of high bankruptcy risk associated to high 
expected profits, investors are better off taking directly a stake in the capital. Equity 
constitutes the only financing source available to firms such as start-ups. Therefore, analysing 
their financing decisions relative to the pecking order is a nonsense. According to that, one 
could argue that the pecking order applies only to large mature firms and thus, it can be 
 32
refuted as a general theory. It must be noticed that the adverse selection model of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) predicts that small high growth firms are more likely to be financed with 
equity. However, it does not differentiate the valuation effect of those firms financing 
decisions from any other issuers. 
Contradictors to the pecking order 
Contradictors to the pecking order propose models where the pecking order financing 
hierarchy could be broken down in specific situations. Cooney and Kalay (1993) extend the 
adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984) by allowing negative net present value 
investment projects to be considered. The existence of negative net present value investment 
opportunities, even if they are not undertaken, causes some announcement effects to be 
positive. The issue-invest decision is taken when the cost of information asymmetry is inferior 
to the incremental value of investment. Managers work in the interest of existing 
shareholders. So, they will consider first projects with the highest incremental value. Investors 
cannot observe the “true” incremental value because of information asymmetry. Therefore, 
they should reward insiders to select the best projects instead of unprofitable ones. In that 
sense, the issue-invest decision convey a positive signal in terms of investment policy that 
could offset the negative signal about securities overvaluation. To put it another way, the 
predicted stock price reaction to equity issue announcements depends on the nature of the 
information asymmetry. When the expected value of new investment opportunities is 
important relative to the value of assets in place, the stock price reaction could become 
positive. Equity financing is no longer considered as the least advantageous source of fund 
and the pecking order is broken down. On the other hand, when the expected value of 
investment opportunity is small relative to that of assets in place, managers could find optimal 
to issue overpriced securities to finance slightly negative present value projects. 
When two subsequent investment projects have to be financed, Viswanath (1993) shows 
that it could be optimal for a firm to finance the first project with equity and to preserve its 
internal financing capacity for the second project. This financing policy contradicts the 
pecking order but it guarantees the undertaking of both projects. Managers could act that way 
because they expect prohibitive adverse selection costs if the second project would have to be 
financed with equity. They consider that the best interest of existing shareholders is in the 
realisation of both projects. The gain obtained by internally financing the first project and 
abandoning the second is smaller that the incremental value of both investment less the 
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information asymmetry cost due to equity financing of the first one. Implicitly, managers are 
assumed to lengthen the horizon over which they maximise existing shareholders’ utility. The 
model of Viswanath (1993) fits perfectly in a context of financing alternation. Sometimes, it 
could be optimal for the firm to issue risky securities to finance going concern investments 
and to preserve the cumulated retained earnings to finance future investment opportunities. 
This is especially true when the information about the assets in places is expected to increase 
in the future. In that sense, Viswanath (1993) introduces the notion of timing and of time-
varying information asymmetry. His model shows that deviating from the pecking order could 
be optimal under specific circumstances. However, the hierarchy of financing sources is not 
rejected in all the cases. 
Noe (1988) assumes that insiders have private information about the firm cash flow but 
which is not accurate enough to determine their “true” value. This residual uncertainty affects 
the valuation of risky debt. Debt value is equal to a fixed payment component plus an option 
to default on the debt contract. The value of the default option is higher for low quality firms. 
Consequently, some low quality firms should have incentives to issue mispriced debt 
pretending they are of better quality. If, at the same time, higher quality firms renounce to 
issue equity, the pecking order is broken down. The high quality firms prefer to forego the 
investment project instead of being pooled with other firm types. Assuming that insiders are 
not perfectly informed seems to be acceptable. For industries where cash flow depends on 
exogenous parameters, managers may not have a superior information than investors and the 
Noe (1988) argument could hold. 
1.3.1.2 Signalling the firm quality through a combined financing 
If better informed agents could credibly communicate private information to the market, the 
cost of information asymmetry would be reduced. To illustrate this argument, Ross (1977) 
proposes the level of debt in capital structure as a signal of firm quality. The manager is 
assumed to know the true distribution of returns but investors do not. He is also compensated 
according to the firm's securities valuation and penalised when the firm goes bankrupt. Higher 
quality firms earn higher profits and can bear larger interest payments than lower quality 
firms. Investors infer from higher leverage ratios that firms are more profitable and value 
them more than less levered firms. In order to maximise their compensation, managers set the 
leverage ratio at its highest level without going bankrupt. Heinkel (1982) relates firm value to 
credit risk and firm quality to the risk of debt. High quality firms have lower profit volatility 
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and have a large proportion of safer debt in their capital structure. Both models are examples 
of how reducing information asymmetry by signalling could increase firm value. However, 
they are based on the static trade-off between debt and equity and their implications cannot be 
easily differentiated from those predicted by other static trade-off theories. 
More sophisticated signalling models are developed to address the under-investment 
problem. Under-investment comes from the impossibility of the firm to credibly signal its 
quality or value to investors before the issue-invest decision. However, the model of Myers 
and Majluf (1984) and its extensions do not consider combined financing solutions. Brennan 
and Kraus (1987) propose that under-investment can be costlessly overcome if firms choose 
an appropriate financing strategy. Financing is considered as a communication device to let 
the investors know about the manager’s private information. The definition of financing refers 
to the complete set of financial decisions announced by a firm at one point in time. Financing 
can be a combination of new security issues with debt retirement or stock repurchase, one 
condition being that the net claim for cash must be positive. Managers have private 
information about the “true” value of different securities already outstanding or that can be 
issued. They work to maximise the “true” value of the securities held by existing 
shareholders. To reveal their private information, they select the financing solution for which 
the net proceeds equals the “true” value of the securities, the condition being that the net 
claim on cash equals the investment initial expense. The net payoff on the financing solution 
must be related to the issuer’s future earnings. Otherwise, the financing combination would 
not be informative. Investors infer from the financing solution the exact firm type and adjust 
their anticipations about securities prices accordingly. Misrepresenting would lead investors 
to infer an erroneous firm quality and thus they would misevaluate individual securities. The 
cost of this misevaluation would be borne by existing shareholders. Therefore, managers have 
no incentive to misrepresent. The value-revealing financing solution is not unique and may 
depend on the pre-existing capital structure. It can involve debt repurchase with equity issue 
or other more complex financial instruments such as warrants, or convertible debt coupled 
with equity issues. A firm with higher expected returns should include more debt repurchase 
in its optimal financing solution while lower quality firms would only issue equity.  
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) also propose a signalling model that ensures the 
undertaking of every profitable investment opportunity at a fair cost. As in Brennan and 
Kraus (1987), the optimal financing solution includes a security issue (stock, straight bond, 
convertible bond or a combination of them). The cash raised in excess of the investment 
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initial expense is spent in a stock repurchase. The signal involves the amount of investment 
and the mode of financing. Managers are assumed to have a stake in the firm equity and not to 
participate in the financing solution or the stock repurchase. Misrepresentation also implies a 
misevaluation of the securities by investors that will affect managers through their equity 
holdings. In fact, if issued securities are overvalued, the stocks are also overvalued when 
repurchased. If issued securities are undervalued, existing shareholders’ capital including that 
of managers are diluted to new investors. The costless optimal financing solution is the one 
for which the size of the stock repurchase completely offsets the information asymmetry costs 
of the securities issue. 
The conclusions of Constantinides and Grundy (1989) and Brennan and Kraus (1987) 
define the role of mixed securities such as convertible debt or units in reducing information 
asymmetry costs. They also support the idea that each security type has its own informative 
content embodied in its characteristics in terms of payoffs, conversion, exercise or repayment 
conditions. The variety of securities that can be directly issued by corporations helps investors 
to integrate insiders’ private information. This signalling method is endogenous to the firm 
and it is assumed to be costless. However, this last assumption does not hold in every 
situation. When it is not the case, signalling is still possible but it should involve a third party, 
namely a financial intermediary. 
The certification role of the underwriter 
To reduce information asymmetry costs and under-investment problem, firms can search 
for external certification about their quality. This signalling device has a cost for existing 
shareholders but it still could be an efficient solution to maximise the value of their shares. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) develop a model about certification involving three parties : 
managers, the investment banks and the investors. To undertake an investment project, 
managers have to rely on external financing – equity in this case. They have private 
information about the value of their firm. Investment banks are able to produce a noisy 
evaluation of the investment project, that is to acquire a fraction of managers’ private 
information. Investors have no access to private information before buying the shares. 
Managers can issue the shares directly to investors or sell them to the investment bank at a 
given fee. The investment bank becomes the underwriter only if managers agree on their 
noisy evaluation of the investment project. Investors consider the underwriter’s reputation as 
the signal of the firm quality. High reputation underwriters have more facility to sell new 
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stocks than low reputation banks. On one hand, this gives them incentives to build a good 
reputation by spending money investigating managers’ private information. On the other 
hand, investment banks get more underwriting contracts from issuers if they accept to sell 
overvalued securities. In this case, investment banks generate short-term profit by sparing 
investigation costs but loose the long-term benefit of good reputation. According to this game, 
investors trust more highly reputed underwriters. High quality firms searching for good 
certification will contact good reputation underwriters. The consequence is that information 
asymmetry costs are reduced when equity issues are underwritten by highly reputed 
investment banks. Information costs are then maximised for firms issuing equity directly to 
investors because only low quality firms have the incentive to do so. 
In the same line of thought, Giammarino and Lewis (1989) propose a model based on 
negotiations between the issuer and the underwriter in a market with asymmetric information. 
During the negotiation process, managers have to disclose at least part of their private 
information if they want to obtain a higher issuing price. The information revealing power of 
the negotiation process comes from the possibility given to the underwriter to refuse the 
issuing price proposed by the issuer. In most information asymmetry models, the issuing price 
is set by an auction mechanism. Giammarino and Lewis (1989) refutes the fact that the issuer 
faces an atomistic population of investors. In most cases, the issuer negotiates an underwriting 
contract with an investment bank. This situation gives more power to the “buyer” of stocks in 
forcing the issuer to reveal part of the private information before the deal is agreed. The 
issuing price is the signal of firm quality. The closer it is to the market price, the higher the 
quality of the issuer is expected to be. 
The subscription rights flotation method 
In previous models, existing shareholders are assumed to be passive. This hypothesis hints 
that the flotation method favours outside investors in accessing new securities and new equity 
in particular. Direct cash flotation method seems, therefore, the most adequate to fit in with 
the models assumptions. Not surprisingly, this flotation method is predominant in the United 
States where capital structure theories have been developed. Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) 
develop a model where they consider the flotation method as a signal of firm quality. Three 
flotation methods are confronted : underwritten public offerings, uninsured rights offerings 
and standby rights offerings. The model shows that low quality firms pool in the underwritten 
public offerings category avoiding the additional costs of signalling and failure. On the other 
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hand, highest quality firms find it optimal to differentiate from intermediate quality firms. 
They choose the standby rights flotation method. For a fee, an underwriter commits to 
purchase the issue even if the stock price falls below the issuing price at the expiration of the 
rights. In order to correctly price the standby agreement, the underwriter must know the firm 
quality. Thus, it run costly investigations to acquire the private information. This cost is 
passed on to the firm, which restricts this flotation method to firms that can bear it. In the eyes 
of investors, the standby rights issuing process grants the issuer with a high certification. 
Intermediate quality firms use uninsured rights as their issuing process. They bear the risk of 
failure is the stock price falls below the market price before the expiration date of subscription 
rights, which differentiates them from low quality firms. In addition, by setting the issuing 
price closer to the market price, they can send a more accurate signal to investors about their 
“true” quality. The model of Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) suggests that market reaction 
following standby rights offerings should be less severe than the reaction after, respectively 
uninsured rights offerings and underwritten public offerings. 
If existing shareholders’ take up is important, the buyers of securities become insiders. 
Managers maximising insiders’ wealth can no longer penalise providers of funds by selling 
overvalued securities. According to that, the issuing price can no longer be considered as a 
signal of quality. In Europe, subscription price in rights offerings equals, on average, 40-50 % 
of the market price while it reaches 91.7 % in the US7. However, nothing tends to prove that 
European rights offerings are riskier than their US counterparts in the sense of Heinkel and 
Schwartz (1986). Moreover, rights offerings are predominant in Europe and they are only 
marginal in the US. All in all, if the flotation method could play a role in reducing 
information asymmetry problems, information asymmetry cannot explain the differences 
between the US and Europe. 
1.3.1.3 An alternative information asymmetry model 
In models gravitating around Myers and Majluf (1984), managers act to maximise the short-
term value of existing shareholders’ claim by either selling overvalued securities or by 
signalling the firm quality to avoid under-investment. Managers’ financing decisions may be 
taken according to longer-term considerations even if it is still to maximise existing 
                                                 
7 See Bigelli (1998) for a review of European subscription rights and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) for the US 
figure. 
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shareholders’ wealth. Miller and Rock (1985) base their information asymmetry model on the 
investment/financing constraint : 
t t t tX I d E− = −  (1.8) 
where tX is the random profit from operations in period t, 
 It is the investment made in t, 
  is the dividend paid in t, td
  is the external financing in t. tE
Extrapolating from that constraint, external financing is needed only when expected future 
cash flows are inferior to the funds required by the investment policy. Miller and Rock (1985) 
assume that managers have private information about the expected value of future cash flow 
at the time they set the net financing policy (either to pay dividends or to raise external funds). 
Investors have less accurate information about the expected profit. They use the net financing 
policy as a signal about the future profitability of the firm. Managers are more inclined to 
raise external funds when they anticipate a downturn in the firm profitability. Any external 
financing decision is negatively perceived by investors. Opposite to the pecking order, no 
distinction is made between debt and equity financing. 
The signalling effect of the net financing policy is not completely dissipative. It reduces the 
information asymmetry but it does not fully reveal the managers’ private information. 
Managers have the opportunity to cheat by not using the entirety of the cash flow to invest but 
they could save a fraction of it to pay higher dividend. The market infers high current 
earnings and good prospects. Investors revise upwardly their expectations about the firm 
value. The managers’ misrepresentation leads to a momentary overpricing of the firm 
securities. Overvaluation is expected to last until the next earnings disclosure. This outcome 
of Miller and Rock (1985) suggests two important implications of information asymmetry. 
First, information asymmetry may be time-varying. For instance, it could increase with the 
time separating two earnings disclosures. This emphasises the notion of timing. Managers 
have the opportunity to time external financing decisions and equity issues in particular 
whether to benefit from a momentary overpricing of securities or to minimise information 
asymmetry costs. The second implication lies in the fact that external financing decisions are 
not fully revealing private information. If private information diffuses slowly, its abnormal 
effect on firm value could last longer than a couple of days. The initial revision in investors’ 
expectation about firm value would not be sufficient to match the “true” value. The valuation 
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effects of timing external financing decisions is discussed in Section 3 of Chapter 2 and long-
term implications of external financing decisions is presented and tested in Chapter 4. 
Dividend policy has a consistent role in reducing information asymmetry in Miller and 
Rock (1985). Firms paying dividends transmit a positive signal to investors. However, as the 
signal is not dissipating the entire information asymmetry, higher dividend payout ratios are 
accompanied by the abandon of profitable investment projects. In other words, firms have to 
sacrifice a fraction of their internal financing capacity to pay dividends ant to signal their 
quality when external funds are needed. Building on the work of Miller and Rock (1985), 
John and Williams (1985) and Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) propose signalling 
models with dividends. 
For John and Williams (1985), dividends are a credible signal of firm quality because it is 
costly, in the sense that investors are taxed on dividends. When they raise external funds to 
finance profitable investment, firms expose their existing shareholders to capital dilution 
problems (wealth losses and reduction in their control rights). Eliminating this twofold 
dilution is more valuable to firms with favourable prospects and thus, they have an incentive 
to signal their quality to the market. Therefore, acting in the interests of the existing 
shareholders, managers of higher quality firms would distribute taxable dividends and 
simultaneously raise new funds if outsiders could identify the dilution-related signal. Paying 
out dividends lead the outsiders to upwardly adjust their firm value expectations and to buy 
the issued securities at a higher price. The argument of costly dividend signalling should be 
emphasised in countries where dividends are doubly taxed (at the corporation level and at the 
individual level) and mitigated in countries that prevent dividends double taxation. 
Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) extend the model by increasing the number of signals. 
Dividends, investment level, equity issues or stock repurchases are signals subject to specific 
dissipative costs. However, managers can minimise the signalling cost by selecting a 
combination of individual signals and, at the same time, reveal a fraction of their private 
information. Again, the signal is noisy so that the investment level chosen by managers may 
not be optimal. It could be either under the symmetric information level or over it. In the latter 
case, managers could find optimal for existing shareholders to invest in negative net present 
value projects. When the nature of information asymmetry concerns mainly the value of 
assets in place, under-investment is predominant. The undertaking of unprofitable investments 
is more likely to occur when information asymmetry is about the value of investment projects. 
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The dividend signalling argument is mitigated by the observation of Fama and 
French (2001) that dividends payments has decreased over the past decades. In addition, the 
number of firms that do not pay dividends but that are still growing keeps on increasing. Such 
firms may not need external financing but a more plausible explanation would be that they 
use more efficient or less costly signals such as share repurchase, warrants, units or 
convertible bonds. 
1.3.2 Agency costs and transaction costs economics 
According to Coase (1937), the bounds of the firm (or of any organisation) are all the 
exchanges over which the market system is suppressed and replaced by an authority to 
administrate them. Including an activity within the organisation has an economic sense as 
long as the costs of direct authority are lower than the transaction costs on the market. 
Contractual relations are the essence of the organisation. They govern the relationships across 
the stakeholders of the organisation, which are subject to conflicting interests and 
opportunistic behaviours. 
Following this definition of the firm, the present sub-section addresses to the implications 
of incomplete contracting on the financing/investment decision. Incomplete contracting gives 
rise to two theories of the firm. In the agency theory, stakeholders have conflicting interests 
and incomplete contracting cannot prevent opportunistic behaviours – actions made by one 
stakeholder that expropriate other stakeholders from a fraction of their claim. It corresponds 
to the relaxing of assumption A.1.10 in Table 1.1. The most common conflict of interest is 
between managers and shareholders. It comes from the separation between ownership and 
control. Transaction costs economy presents debt and equity as governance structures that 
have different attributions in terms of monitoring managerial actions. Debt is more like a 
market governance where creditors are not implicated in the managerial decisions. They 
sanction default on interest payments by overtaking control on the firm assets. Transaction 
costs implied by this governance structure are low. Conversely, equity constitutes a relational 
governance structure that is more flexible than debt. Shareholders are directly implicated in 
monitoring managerial decisions. Such a governance structure demands more competence and 
commitment from providers of funds. It is more adequate for firms with intensive and specific 
production technologies or/and that are fast growing. Transaction costs induced by efficient 
debt contracting would be prohibitive. The optimal governance structure is the one that 
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minimises transaction costs and it depends on the degree of specificity of assets and 
production technologies. 
Agency theory and transaction costs economy compete in influencing marginal financing 
decisions. However, they agree on two points. First, both the resolution of conflict of interests 
and the implementation of a governance structure have a cost to the firm and this cost is borne 
by existing shareholders. Second, both theories do not leave investors indifferent to the type 
of securities that managers select to issue to finance investment projects. For that reason, they 
are presented through the dynamic perspective of marginal financing decisions. 
1.3.2.1 The agency theory and its implication on the capital structure choices 
In the eyes of Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 87), organisations are "legal fictions that serve 
as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals". The firm constitutes only 
one form of legal fiction among others (public administration, State government, non-profit 
organisation, public utilities, etc.). One characteristic of the firm is the existence of divisible 
residual claims on the assets and on the future cash flows generated by its activities. These 
claims can generally be sold on the sole behalf of its owner. The firm is considered as a group 
of individuals that interact. This notion of individuals in relation with each other is the 
foundation of the agency theory. Individuals have conflicting objectives and the essence of 
the firm is to provide a framework of contractual relations that put these objectives in 
equilibrium. 
The agency theory explains how conflicts of interests between stakeholders of the firm 
generate costs and reduce the firm market value. Furthermore, solutions to these conflicts of 
interests are costly and not able to eliminate completely the loss in value. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) address two types of conflicts, between managers and shareholders (agency 
costs of equity) and between shareholders and debt holders (agency costs of debt). 
When the manager abandons his ownership to outside shareholders, his objective diverges 
from maximising the equity market value of existing shareholders. The manager adopts an 
opportunistic behaviour that diverts resources dedicated to shareholders to the satisfaction of 
his own needs. In other words, as the manager’s interests are not fully aligned with those of 
shareholders, maximising his utility is no longer equivalent to maximising the utility of 
shareholders. The manager consumes perquisites that have a positive marginal effect on his 
utility but a negative net present value to the firm. Manager’s opportunistic behaviour results 
in reducing the absolute total market value of the firm. To counterbalance this effect, 
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providers of funds spend money in monitoring actions to realign the manager’s interests with 
theirs. Monitoring is efficient as long as the gain in firm value compensate the costs they 
generate. The sum of the loss in firm value and monitoring costs constitutes the agency costs 
of equity. 
A compensation schedule based on the manager’s performance mitigates his incentive to 
consume perquisites. In this case, his utility increases with his performance as a manager. He 
engages more resources in value-increasing activities and less in non-pecuniary perquisites. In 
addition, competition across managers limits the costs of obtaining managerial services. It 
reduces the cost of replacing a manager and thus, more pressure is put on him. The degree of 
business specialisation has an opposite role on agency costs. It favours manager’s 
entrenchment, allowing him to increase his private consumption, other things equal. In this 
case, the control of the manager’s work is more costly to implement as it requires a higher 
level of expertise. 
Capital structure choices also impact agency costs of equity. Fixed claims on debt contract 
force the manager to undertakes profitable investment in order not to default. In case of 
default, the manager would be replaced and this solution does not maximise his utility. Debt 
financing reduces the resources under the manager’s control and in turn, it reduces his 
consumption of value destroying perquisites. In the perspective of agency costs of equity, 
debt is viewed as a value increasing financing solution. According to Harris and Raviv (1990) 
debt give creditors the opportunity to perform a more accurate control of the liquidation 
decision. Liquidation is optimal when the value of the assets is greater outside the firm than 
contributing to its operating activities. For Stulz (1990), managers are reluctant to use debt 
financing because it limits their discretionary power over the firm internal resources. The 
shareholders may have incentives to force the managers to issue debt to limit their 
consumption of perquisites. Williams (1995) confront the positive effect of debt as a 
monitoring device and its negative effect in terms of bankruptcy risk. He suggests that firms 
using capital-intensive technologies are more inclined to use debt than firms using labour-
intensive technologies. All in all, the monitoring role of debt outlines the relevance of capital 
structure choices between debt and equity even when referring to the separation of ownership 
and control framework. 
The conflict of interests between shareholders and debt holders rises from a potential 
wealth transfer from debt holders to shareholders. Shareholders have control over investment 
decisions. The smaller is their participation in the firm capital structure, the greater is their 
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interest to undertake high-risk investment project. Debt holders have a fixed claim on the 
payoffs. If the project succeeds, they let shareholders benefit from the profits in excess of 
their fixed claim. In case of failure, they bear the costs because they do not get their money 
back. In presence of several investment projects with different risk levels, shareholders are 
able to increase the market value of equity by convincing creditors to finance a less risky 
project and then shifting to a riskier one. Debt becomes riskier. Its market value decreases and 
a fraction of it is transferred to shareholders as the market value of equity increases. The 
wealth transfer is not perfect and the total market value of the firm is reduced. In order to 
avoid the wealth transfer, creditors increase the cost of debt up to the risk level of the most 
risky investment project. Debt holders have the opportunity to include costly covenants in the 
financing contracts that prevent risk shifting. The sum of the loss in market value and 
monitoring costs constitute the agency costs of debt. These costs are increasing with the 
leverage ratio. 
Building a good reputation as borrower reduces the agency costs of debt and overall, it 
lowers the cost of debt. Diamond (1989) show that, to build their good reputation, borrowers 
undertake a stream of safer projects which guarantee them not to default. The longer the 
period without defaulting, the lower would be the cost of debt financing. Mature firms are 
expected to consider reputation as valuable. Younger, fast-growing firms would face a higher 
cost of debt and turn themselves to equity financing. In fact, fast-growing firms often need a 
second financing while the outcome of the first one is still unknown. Then, reputation 
building is more hazardous and less valuable. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) develop a model 
where managers care about building their own reputation of selecting investment projects that 
do not default. Managers are compensated according to their reputation. Their interests align 
with those of creditors as they benefit from choosing safer investment projects. As long as 
their investment decisions reduce the agency costs of debt, shareholders are satisfied as the 
market value of the firm is increased. 
1.3.2.2 The agency costs of free cash flow and external financing decisions 
According to Jensen (1986), managers have incentives to let firms grow beyond their 
optimal size. By doing so, they increase the resources under their control and can maximise 
their overall compensation. This rationale is based on the agency costs of equity. However, 
the free cash flow approach deals with flows instead of stocks. Managers are sensitive to the 
monitoring of capital markets when new funds are raised. They have a greater discretionary 
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power over internal funds that should be returned to investors. Free cash flow is the cash left 
in the hands of managers when all profitable investments have been undertaken. It allows 
managers to satisfy their private consumption needs and may be considered as one variable 
favouring over-investment. In that sense, the use of free cash flow is the source of a conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders. Managers want to keep them inside the firm 
under their control while shareholders want them to be taken out of the managers’ hands. 
Over-investment has a value-destroying effect to shareholders. That loss of value represents 
the agency costs of free cash flow. The creation of free cash flow depends on the firm 
activities or type. Jensen (1986, p. 659) argues that “product and factor market disciplinary 
forces are often weaker in new activities and activities that involve substantial economic rents 
or quasi rents”. Free cash flow is a crucial problem for mature value firms. The lack of 
growing opportunities associated with high profitability make that these firms often have 
economic rents and over long periods of time. Shareholders have incentives to implement 
monitoring devices that force managers to disgorge cash from the firm. Opposed to the 
pecking order, financial slacks have a negative connotation in this agency context. 
External financing policy has direct impacts on the incidence of free cash flow. Securities 
involve various payout contractual obligations that differentiate them in the eyes of investors. 
A relevant choice in marginal financing solution reduce the importance of free cash flow and 
mitigates the over-investment problem. Easterbrook (1984) advances dividends as a twofold 
instrument to monitor agency costs. Dividends are direct payments to shareholders that 
disgorge excessive cash out of the managers’ hands. On the other hand, not paying dividends 
implicitly lowers the leverage ratio. Risk shifting becomes more costly to shareholders and 
the firm should benefit from advantageous debt financing conditions. By diminishing the 
internal financing capacity, dividends compel firms to come back periodically to the market to 
get financed. The monitoring performed by new investors at the time of securities issues is 
assumed to be more efficient than the one of exiting shareholders. Besides, dividends involve 
several drawbacks. First, they are taxed at the individual level while they are not tax 
deductible at the corporation level. Second, the increase in external financing generates 
additional floating costs. Third, shareholders may not credibly compel managers to pay high 
dividend ratios over a long period of time. At any time, managers have the opportunity to cut 
off or reduce dividend payouts and then, increase the free cash flow. Furthermore, according 
to information asymmetry theory a decrease in dividend payments would be interpreted as a 
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bad signal about future profitability. Bajaj and Vijh (1990) and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994) 
document that firms reducing their dividend payouts incur a penalty.  
For sporadic direct payments to shareholders, a share repurchase could be a more 
appropriate instrument. It does not induce changes in the dividend policy and especially the 
negative effect of a dividend payout reduction. Moreover, it could be more attractive in terms 
of personal taxation. For instance, the capital gains it could generate are less taxed than 
dividends in the US, Japan, Switzerland and France. A share repurchase also has implication 
on the ownership structure of the firm. Brown and Ryngaert (1991) and Bagwell (1991) 
notice that shareholders selling back their stocks are not the ones in for control purposes. A 
share repurchase tends to concentrate the ownership structure giving more monitoring power 
to remaining shareholders. Dittmar (2000) and Vermaelen (1981) show that stock repurchases 
convey a signal about a temporary under-valuation of equity market value and are therefore 
well perceived by the market. Beside disgorging cash from the firm, a stock repurchase has a 
positive effect on remaining shareholders’ wealth. 
According to Jensen (1986), the most efficient way to take free cash flow out of managers’ 
hands over long periods of time is debt financing. Debt is more restrictive in the sense that 
managers have contractual obligations to pay fixed interests to creditors. To reach that 
objective, they have to restrict their investment policy to profitable projects that generate 
enough cash to pay back interests and principal. Creditors’ monitoring power comes from the 
fact that, in case of default, they will overtake control of the firm assets and fire managers. 
Depending on the ownership structure, shareholders may not have this power or could not 
exercise it as efficiently as in a bankruptcy procedure. Interests on debt are deductible from 
corporate taxes which give them another advantage relative to dividend payments. 
The efficiency of debt in reducing the agency costs of free cash flow is limited by the 
agency costs of debt and their consequences on both the investment policy and the cost of 
capital. Nevertheless, Jensen (1986) argues that, in the presence of free cash flow, more 
importance should be given to debt as a monitoring device than as a generator of agency 
costs. In that sense, the quality and the quantity of the growth opportunities have an direct 
influence on the agency costs of free cash flow. On one hand, fast growing firms have better 
and larger investment projects. For such firms, the risk of over-investment is less important 
than the risk of bankruptcy and equity financing should be considered as the best financing 
solution. On the other hand, for mature firms, free cash flow or unused borrowing capacity 
often lead to diversification in low-benefit activities. Therefore, takeovers and mergers in a 
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diversification strategy should rather be financed with debt to urge managers to produce their 
best efforts. 
Optional equity financing constitutes an alternative monitoring device. By compelling 
managers to use recurrent financing, units or warrants give their holders the opportunity to opt 
out. If they are not satisfied with managers’ actions, they may refuse to participate to the 
second-stage financing. In other words, the second-stage financing is conditioned by the stock 
performance. If performance is insufficient, warrants are not exercised and managers are not 
able to pursue their investment policy. The signal transmitted by the no-exercise of warrants 
prevents any alternative financing solution. In the case of convertible bonds, their optional 
clause protect investors against a change in the issuer’s risk. If risk shifting is a success, 
convertible bondholders, by exercising their option, will be able to claim the return in excess 
of interest payments. Shareholders will be forced to share their remuneration when their 
strategy becomes profitable. According to Green (1984) and Burlacu (2000), convertible 
bonds have a specific monitoring ability that is not related to the fact that they are hybrid, 
between debt and equity, but because they represent fully qualified financing instruments. 
These findings are opposed to the common idea that convertible bonds issues are disguised 
equity offerings (see Eckbo, 1986; among others). 
1.3.2.3 The contribution of institutional economics 
“The new institutional economics is preoccupied with the origins, incidences and 
ramifications of transaction costs. Indeed, if transaction costs are negligible, the organisation 
of economic activity is irrelevant since any advantage one mode of organisation appears to 
hold over another will simply be eliminated by costless contracting”. These sentences taken 
from Williamson (1979, p. 233) relate to the starting point of institutional economics : market 
failure. In case of market failure, participants to an economic activity are not able to 
implement costless complete contractual agreements that would prevent each party to adopt 
an opportunistic behaviour at any time during the agreement period. A corporate governance 
structure has to be designed to enforce the contractual agreement. This corporate governance 
structure is costly. Organisations become effective when their internal hierarchy allows to 
implement a corporate governance structure at a lower cost than in the open market. 
In transaction cost economics, individuals are assumed to be subject to bounded rationality 
and to be given to opportunism (Williamson, 1988; p. 569). Bounded rationality means that 
individuals are intended to be rational but in a limited way. In addition, when they are 
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permitted to adopt an opportunistic behaviour, they will do so and seek to satisfy their own 
interests first. Incomplete contracting is a consequence of bounded rationality and contractual 
hazards is a consequence of opportunism.  
Williamson (1988) explains the capital structure choices by the transaction cost economics 
rationale. Investment projects are characterised by their assets specificity. On one hand, an 
investment is said to be asset-specific when it is not easily transferable to a competitor, when 
it serves to produce unique goods or services or when it is located remotely. On the other 
hand, a general purpose investment is considered as a non-specific transaction. Debt and 
equity are defined as governance structure. Debt is the market-oriented governance structure. 
As long as borrowers do not default, creditors are not supposed to interfere in managerial 
decisions. Borrowers are sanctioned when they do not meet their financial obligations. Debt 
holders overtake control and the firm is liquidated. In that sense, debt is unforgiving and not 
flexible. Creditors are not informed about the business evolution unless default occurs. They 
cannot force the manager to adjust his actions before the situation irreversibly deteriorates. 
Debt governance structure is more appropriate to low-specificity assets or general purpose 
investments. As creditors realise various recovery in the degree to which the assets are re-
deployable, the value of their pre-emptive claims declines when the assets specificity 
increases. There exists an adverse relation between debt financing and assets specificity. The 
firm may sacrifice some value-enhancing specialised investments in favour of a greater 
facility of re-deployment. Investors bear an opportunity costs as the highest possible market 
value is not reached. 
When assets specificity becomes too high and investment projects too risky, debt fails as a 
governance structure. Investors’ monitoring must be more flexible and more implicated into 
managerial decisions. Equity represents a relational governance structure in which 
shareholders through the board of directors exercise an active control onto managers’ 
activities. Collecting information about the investment projects situation, enforcing changes in 
the management, adjusting projects to current environment conditions are actions available to 
equity holders or to their representatives. Opposite to debt financing, providers of funds are 
not supposed to wait for the investment project outcome to take the decision to quit or to 
pursue the firm activities. Continuous monitoring actions can be undertaken. To be efficient, 
the costs of implementing a relational corporate governance must be inferior to the 
opportunity costs generated by other less flexible corporate governance structures. 
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Convertible debt constitutes a specific governance structure that involves both characteristics 
of market and relational governance systems. In the transaction costs perspective, convertible 
debt is optimal when the risk related assets specificity becomes significant only in the future. 
Suppose an investment project that is specialised but the demand for the product is relatively 
safe for the next 5 years. Afterwards the demand will be subject to the evolution of the 
technology (the mobile phone industry in the late 90’s). Convertible bonds ensure that market 
rules apply in a first phase when management opportunism must be sanctioned instead of 
adapted. During the second phase, converting debt into equity makes it possible to adopt an 
intrusive supervision of the managerial decisions in order to perform the adaptations required 
by the unanticipated disturbances.  
When uncertainty is concentrated in the implementation and development phase of the 
investment project like in the pharmaceutics industry, a relational governance structure is 
better appropriate and equity financing is optimal. As the uncertainty about the outcome 
vanishes, assets are more easily re-deployable and market-like rules become more adequate. 
Investors do not have to spend additional costs in supervising the managerial decisions. The 
threat of default suffices. One financing solution could be a share repurchase financed with 
debt. 
1.3.2.4 Agency problems or transaction costs ? 
The fact that individuals are expected to adopt opportunistic behaviours implicitly relates 
transaction costs economics and the agency theory. However, their approaches differ both in a 
conceptual way and in their predictions about capital structure choices. First, in the agency 
theory, managerial discretion results in a conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders. The unit of analysis is the individual. An optimal contract is the one that aligns 
the interests of managers with those of shareholders. All in all, shareholders bear a large part 
of the total agency costs8. Assuming that financial markets are efficient, they have incentives 
to issue specific securities that minimise the ex-ante agency costs. In other words, capital 
structure choices are determined before any opportunistic behaviour is noticed and securities 
to be issued should integrate its expected impact into their prices. Transaction cost economics 
has the transaction as the unit of analysis. Because of bounded rationality, incomplete ex-ante 
contracts cannot prevent opportunistic behaviours. In this rationale, market fails to eliminate 
                                                 
8 Moral hazard has a negative impact on the overall level of managers’ compensation. In that sense, managers 
also bear a fraction of the total agency costs. 
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the likelihood of uninsurable opportunism. Thus, the focus is put on selecting the governance 
structure that minimises the costs due to unanticipated disturbances throughout the life of the 
transaction. These costs are determined ex-post. Since market may fail, they cannot be 
anticipated and integrated ex-ante in the security prices. 
The implications of agency theory and transaction cost economics on the capital structure 
choice are compared in Kochhar (1996; p. 719, Table 1). On one side, free cash flow is the 
asset under governance (agency theory). On the other side, all firm resources are under 
governance (transaction cost economics). According to the agency theory, debt has the 
governance ability to solved conflicts of interests about the use of free cash flow. Firm market 
value is hence preserved at its optimal. Transaction costs economics relates the governance 
structure to assets and investment specificity. Free cash flow only counts for a fraction of the 
assets under governance and may not be the predominant matter in marginal financing 
decisions. In that sense, “it [transaction cost economics] may provide a more complete 
picture” (Kochhar, 1996; p. 719). 
In terms of investment strategies, transaction cost economics predicts that specialised assets 
favour related diversification and equity financing. Synergies can be found with the specific 
governance structure. Transaction costs are minimised and diversification in related business 
has a positive incremental market value. Conversely, unrelated diversification creates a 
natural hedge for cash flow. This phenomenon is emphasised when assets specificity is low 
and easily transferable across businesses. Market failure is less likely to occur. Thus, market 
governance of debt is more appropriate in terms of transaction costs. Strategic considerations 
in terms of investment comes from the degree of assets specificity and implies, ex-post, the 
most accurate governance structure through the financing solution. 
The agency theory of free cash flow suggests that debt financing should prevent managers 
to diversify in activities where their level of expertise is low. The cash disgorging effect of 
debt incurs diversification in related activities to maintain profitability. Managers fear to 
undertake value-decreasing investments such as acquisitions in unrelated businesses. By 
relying on debt financing, managers bond themselves to a specific investment strategy. 
Potential agency costs of free cash flow determine ex-ante a financing solution that, in turn, 
constrain managers’ action. According to Gibbs (1993), an increase in the leverage ratio 
should be associated with an increase in the degree of related diversification. This prediction 
is opposed to that of transaction cost economics. 
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Transaction cost economics and agency theory deal with governance structures and 
investors’ monitoring power. Both are sensitive to the securities holders’ ability to plainly 
exercise their rights. Debt holders must be able to overtake control on firm assets in case of 
default or to take part in a restructuring process. Shareholders must have their rights protected 
against the risk of expropriation by managers. Members of the board of directors must 
represent the interests of all the shareholders. They also must be able to force managers to 
disclose all the pertinent information and to distribute earnings according to each claimant’s 
rights. 
1.3.3 Corporate governance and external financing 
Corporate governance includes all measures available to stakeholders to protect their rights 
onto their claims in the firm. Two main concepts are widely diffused : shareholder value and 
stakeholder society. The concept of shareholder value deals with the protection of investors’ 
rights and more specifically with the protection of shareholders’ rights in order to maximise 
the market value of equity. It represents the Anglo-Saxon view of corporate governance. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) survey and describe the main mechanisms that protect investors’ 
rights. They distinguish internal from external mechanisms. The first internal corporate 
governance device is an incentive-based compensation scheme for managers. When the 
interests of managers are aligned on those of shareholders, managerial decisions are more 
likely to maximise shareholder value. For that mechanism to be efficient, the performance 
measure the compensation scheme is developed upon must be highly correlated with the 
quality of managerial decisions. Managers receive a remuneration that is variable for a large 
part. They may find it optimal to manipulate financial data of the firm in order to smooth their 
performance over time. Shareholders must pay attention to managers’ opportunism and 
exercise their monitoring by selecting independent auditors and additional external financial 
expertises. Shareholders’ monitoring power is concentrated in their voting rights. By electing 
the members of the board of director, they choose their representatives, the ones who defend 
their interests against the risk of expropriation from managers. Takeover threat backs up the 
monitoring power of shareholders. Unsatisfied shareholders can sell their stocks to bidders 
who, when they acquire the majority of control rights can replace the inefficient management 
team. 
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External corporate governance involves the legal mechanisms that protect investors. Legal 
protections of the shareholders’ rights9 include a one share one vote restriction, the 
authorization of proxy voting, voting by mail or the constraint to use pre-emptive rights in 
equity issues. Cumulative voting or proportional representation for the election of the board 
constitute additional shareholders’ protection. In the US, minority shareholders are given 
more power as they can undertake class actions or as they can force the manager to 
repurchase their shares when they object one of his decisions. Even more important than the 
variety of legal protections is the quality of their enforcement. Actually, legal procedures 
could be long, expensive or even in some countries forbidden to foreign investors. A legal 
protection that is written in the books but not applicable is not different from no protection at 
all. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997; 1998) argue that the degree of 
shareholders’ legal protection varies across countries according to the legal system origin. 
This difference explains why Anglo-Saxon common law countries use more equity financing 
than German or French civil law countries. When their sample is restricted to most developed 
countries, differences in external financing choices become less noticeable. These countries 
belong to various legal families but they are all characterised by a high quality of law 
enforcement. 
If the degree of legal protection has a controversial role in explaining external financing of 
private firms, it could affect the ownership structure. When legal protection is dedicated to the 
rights of minority shareholders, ownership structure may be more diffused. On the other hand, 
shareholders tend to concentrate themselves into large blocks if they feel less protected by the 
legal system. Concentration increases the pressure they can exercise onto managers. The 
attractiveness of one financing source is defined by the trade-off between the costs induced to 
exercise an efficient monitoring and the gain in value generated by the improved controlling. 
In that sense, a high degree of shareholders’ legal protection could lower the overall cost of 
equity and make this source of financing more attractive to investors. 
The option given to creditors to overtake control over the assets in case of default also 
needs to be enforced by legal protections. Default is an easy verifiable violation of the debt 
contract. Courts have an objective situation to base their decision on. In that sense, the legal 
protection of creditors is often more effective than the one of shareholders. However, the 
bankruptcy process may be long and expensive for the creditors who, sometimes, prefer to 
                                                 
9 For detailed explanations of shareholders’ legal protections see LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) 
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renegotiate outside of the legal actions. Their negotiation power is enhanced, the harder the 
bankruptcy law is to the defaulting firm. Nevertheless, once the bankruptcy has been 
pronounced, the allocation of the assets between the different creditors is subject to further 
conflicts of interests. In other words, it may be easier for a creditor to sue a corporation but 
receiving what he thinks deserving is fastidious, expensive and uncertain. Consequently, the 
creditors’ rights are costly and sometimes inefficiently enforced. A simplification of the 
bankruptcy procedure could improve its efficiency. Large creditors like banks have their 
monitoring power strengthened as for large shareholders. At the extent, they may be able to 
take advantage of their increased control rights. They may earn rents from their control over 
industrial firms. They are able to force the firm into repeated transactions that let them 
generate high amounts of fees. The debt structure of the firm is subject to similar implications 
of the legal system as for the ownership structure of equity. First, better overall legal 
protection of creditors increases the attractiveness of debt financing. Second, legal protection 
also affects the concentration of creditors. 
In a shareholder value perspective, an efficient governance structure is the one that allows 
providers of funds to obtain the return on investment they deserve according to the risk they 
bear. It should prevent managers or any single group of investors to expropriate the other 
providers of funds. The optimal governance structure is expected to minimise the costs of 
opportunistic behaviours which in turn maximises the market value of the firm through 
optimal capital structure choices. 
Tirole (2001, p. 2) criticises the traditional view about corporate governance reflected in 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). He argues that :”For most economists and legal scholars, the 
debate is more about how to implement the shareholder value than about its legitimacy”. 
Corporate governance is often restricted to the set of instruments implemented to assure 
suppliers of finance, and especially shareholders, to get the return on their investment. Much 
less attention is given to other stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, the local 
community, and so forth. Continental Europe countries and Japan are more sensitive to a 
stakeholder society concept. The aim of the firm is larger than just profit maximisation. Thus, 
governance structures must extend to take into account the interest of all the stakeholders. 
Managers have to spend their effort optimising stakeholders’ general welfare that includes 
shareholder value but is not restricted to it. 
To compare both shareholder value and stakeholder society approaches, consider the 
optimal incentive-based compensation scheme for managers. According to shareholder value, 
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stock or operating performance may constitute appropriate benchmark for shareholders’ 
interests. With stakeholder society, the compensation scheme must be based on performance 
measure that involve heterogeneous interests of various stakeholder groups. Furthermore, the 
interests of given shareholders such as local community or employees are not easily 
measurable. Therefore, implementing a compensation scheme that aligns managers’ interest 
with those of all stakeholders and that measures the contribution of managers’ action to each 
stakeholder welfare appears to be an impossible challenge. The most convincing solution 
would be a flat remuneration. In fact, in continental Europe, the fixed component of 
managers’ remuneration is more important than in the US. The drawback of flat remuneration 
is that it favours the private consumption of managers. 
The main problem with stakeholder society governance structure is the allocation of control 
rights. Because of the large numbers of parties, control rights should be diffused across 
stakeholders. Shareholders can no longer be a counterpart to managers discretionary power. In 
other words, control rights can be unified in the hand of managers or diffused across groups 
with opposite interests. When control rights are given to managers, the decision process 
works but its outcome is more likely to privilege managers’ own satisfaction at the expenses 
of all stakeholders. Diffused control rights often induce deadlocks in the decision making 
process. No party has enough power to win the decision but altogether, stakeholders can 
prevent any decision to be taken. This situation is worst collectively than any kind of 
expropriation by one stakeholder. In the shareholder value context, control rights are given 
either to managers or to shareholders. The cases that lead to decision process deadlocks are 
less numerous than with more stakeholder groups. For firms less subject to agency problems 
or with non-specific assets, any stakeholder, including shareholders, is better off with control 
rights in the hands of managers. Market governance structure is appropriate. On the other 
hand, fast growing firms or firms with specialised assets will need a relational corporate 
governance structure. These firms are better off with control rights unified in the hand of 
shareholders, which is less likely to occur in a stakeholder society framework. Furthermore, 
during economic downturns, the decision process needs to be fast and efficient. Suppliers of 
finance are the most appropriate stakeholders to exercise the control rights. In times of 
economic prosperity, deadlocks in the decision making process are also damageable but 
stakeholders incur less risk of expropriation if they let control rights in the hands of managers.  
Both Tirole (2001) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) underline the importance of the firm 
general environment and corporate governance system when corporate decisions are analysed 
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in an agency context. The nature and the magnitude of interest conflicts depend on who has 
the control rights and how efficient is the legal protection of the stakeholders. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) describe the actors susceptible to perform a corporate governance and what are 
the instruments at their disposal. They try to rely on objective factors and implicitly restrict 
corporate governance to the concept of investor (shareholder) value. Tirole (2001) extends 
corporate governance to the stakeholder society and shows its limits in term of efficient 
decision making process. The optimal governance structure has to take the positive aspects of 
shareholder value such as efficient control over managers’ action and the long-term benefit of 
satisfying all stakeholders. 
La Porta et al. (1998) advocate the supremacy of US governance structure that favours 
equity financing by better protecting shareholders against expropriation. They legitimate their 
argument by relating the development of equity markets to the origin of the legal system. In 
that perspective, Anglo-Saxon common law countries offer a better protection of shareholders 
rights than other legal systems based on civil law. However, proclaiming that shareholder is 
king in the world of shareholder value does not make any sense. Furthermore, recent 
bookkeeping scandals in the US (Enron, WorldCom or Xerox for instances) raise some doubts 
about the supremacy of the US shareholders’ legal protection system. The announced and 
self-acclaimed transparency of balance sheets and P&L statements, the most severe 
accounting standards or the constraining public disclosure requirements have not prevented 
the pre-cited companies to manipulate billions of USD10, to inflate their profit or to cover 
their over-indebtedness. They show instead that aligning managers’ interests exclusively on 
those of shareholders may lead to a perverted game in which shareholders loose. On the other 
hand, bookkeeping scandals are not restricted to the US. The Swissair “crash” in 
Switzerland (2001) or the Crédit Lyonnais scandal in France (1992-1993) illustrate that such 
collapses occur whatever the origin of the legal system. 
Differences across institutional contexts exist and they constitute a challenge for capital 
structure models. A model developed to explain external financing decisions relative to the 
US institutional setting may not be valid in another contexts. Therefore, tests of capital 
structure choices on any market outside the US is worth some interests and contribute to the 
better understanding of the interactions between capital structure determinants and firm value. 
                                                 
10 WorldCom has overstated its earnings of 3.8 billion USD, over five quarters from January 2001. Enron has 
understated its debt of several hundreds of million USD. Xerox has to restate 6.4 billion USD of revenues 
because they immediately booked revenues from long-term leases of copiers (Sources : Time Magazine editions 
of December 10, 2001 and July 8, 2002. 
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1.4 Theoretical implications of capital structure choices on the firm value 
1.4.1 Limitations to test static trade-off theories 
Static trade-off theories relate the allocation between debt and equity at one given moment 
in time to the market value of the firm. Because it is static, direct tests of this relation are 
impossible to perform. Instead, the fact that firms adopt their value maximising leverage ratio 
is postulated. Then, the influence of capital structure determinants on the leverage ratio is 
tested across firms. In other words, tests of static trade-off theories may indicate which 
determinants better explain capital structure choices but they cannot measure their 
contribution to increase market value. 
Both streams of static trade-off theories are based on the general conditions of the firm 
environment. Corporations cannot influence the tax system they are subject to. Production 
technologies, assets specificity or competition degree in the output market are matters of long-
term strategic decisions that may evolve but that would not be drastically and frequently 
modified. According to that, optimal capital structure choices concerning these theories are 
more likely to stable as long as the environment conditions do not change. To put it another 
way, as long as no tax reform occurs, optimal capital structure choices have no reasons to be 
deeply altered. Unless the firm completely re-deploy its activities, the degree of assets 
specificity or the level of competition have only few chances to incur deep disruptions leading 
to significant re-allocations of financing sources. 
Tax reforms allow to isolate the impact of taxes on capital structure choices. Givoly, Hayn, 
Ofer, and Sarig (1992) study the firms response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the US. 
They observe that firms modify their capital structure in accordance with DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) predictions. In addition, they show that capital structure changes in years not 
concerned by the tax reform are not related to tax considerations. The importance of taxes as a 
determinant of capital structure is emphasised by the work of Scholes, Wilson and 
Wolfson (1990) on tax reform affecting the US commercial banks industry, that of Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) on the G-7 countries and that of Vanthienen and Vermaelen (1986; 1987) on 
tax reforms in Belgium. Outside periods surrounding tax reforms, the influence of taxes 
seems to be overwhelmed by other determinants11, which is consistent with the predictions of 
Brennan and Schwartz (1984) and Kane, Marcus and McDonald (1984). All other things 
                                                 
11 See Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) or Titman and Wessels (1988). To their discharge, the focus in these 
studies is not put on taxes but the tax variable is added to take into account potential marginal effects. 
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equal, the net effect of taxes on the capital structure appears to be small and the Miller (1977) 
relation could hold. Nevertheless, when a tax reform modifies the Miller (1977) relation, 
firms adapt their capital structure according to new marginal tax rates. Graham (2000) 
estimates that the corporate tax benefits of debt for US firms are worth about 10 % of the firm 
value. This proportion reduces to 4.3 % when personal taxes are taken into account. However, 
the most interesting finding is that, on average, firms do not use their full tax benefits of debt. 
In fact, by issuing the optimal quantity of debt (until marginal tax benefits start to decrease), 
they could increase their value through the doubling of their tax benefits. These results 
reinforce the idea that tax effect optimisation may not be the priority of firms when they 
undertake marginal capital structure choices. 
If corporate tax systems in developed countries tend to be harmonised, strong differences 
still exits in the way to compute the profit subject to taxes. Each country seems willing to 
maintain specific tax deductions, different cases of tax exoneration, or to allow various 
accounting manipulations12. Beside standard State corporate taxes, several countries adopt 
additional local and/or specific taxes that could strongly impact the overall corporate tax rate. 
The outcome is that tax system implications on profit determination may induce serious 
biases in international comparisons of capital structure based on tax considerations. 
Tax reform is an easily identifiable event which characteristics are observable. In the case 
of input/output markets theories, comparable events would be a modification in anti-trust 
laws, inclusion or suppression of monetary or non-monetary barriers to enter a market or an 
innovation in production technologies. However, if these events could isolate and thus, 
analyse the effects of static trade-off theories, they are not able to measure their impacts on 
the firm value. 
1.4.2 On the existence of a target debt ratio 
One way to take into account the history of the financing decision is to control for the 
existence of a target debt ratio. Brennan and Schwartz (1984) suggest that the pre-existing 
capital structure has an influence on the financing policy and on the current optimal capital 
structure. Their argument support the idea of an historical target debt ratio. A target debt ratio 
can be defined as an optimal capital structure that takes into account the time dimension. The 
target is not meant to be reached exactly but constitutes a long term trend. A modification of 
                                                 
12 See Corporate Taxes 2000 Worldwide Summaries published by PriceWaterhouseCoopers  for a detailed 
international review of corporate taxes and accounting practices. 
 57
the capital structure is costly. Thus, it should be undertaken only when it is necessary in terms 
of impact on the firm value and when the amounts engaged are consequent. 
The dynamic process of sticking to the target debt ratio can be described as follow. Given a 
starting capital structure, the investment policy will be as much as possible internally 
financed, which decreases the leverage ratio (accumulation of retained earnings). When the 
leverage ratio is too low (i.e. to fully benefit from the corporate tax advantage of debt), debt is 
issued either to finance a large investment project or to buy back some equity (pure capital 
structure change). A third possibility could be that the debt issued is used to finance going 
concern investments that are usually internally financed. In this case too, the financing 
purpose is only a matter of capital structure. Debt financing can consist either in large issue of 
bonds or in smaller amounts of bank loans (short- or long-term). Banks generally allow credit 
lines to industrial firms. When firms reach the upward limit of their credit line, they can issue 
equity. It will lower the leverage ratio and in turn, it could increase the credit limit. 
The alternation in the financing sources available to the firm is one way to stick to a target 
debt ratio. According to the static trade-off models that support the existence of an optimal 
capital structure, the closer to its target ratio the firm is, the more valued it should be. On the 
other hand, alternating the financing sources could simply represent a way to guarantee a 
financial flexibility in case of urgent need of cash. If this explanation is true, pure capital 
structure changes should have no impact on the firm value. 
If a target debt ratio exists, should it be firm-specific or industry-specific ? The answer is 
twofold according to the purpose of the target ratio. First, if the target debt ratio proxies the 
optimal capital structure, the target should be firm-specific in the sense that the underlying 
static model leads to a unique optimal allocation between debt and equity (i.e. in DeAngelo 
and Masulis, 1980). The firm specificity of the target debt ratio comes from the definition of 
the marginal corporate tax rate and from the non-debt tax shields that are endogenous to the 
firm. Sticking to its own target debt ratio allows the firm to stay close to its maximum market 
value. Otherwise, if the target ratio is considered as the allocation between debt and equity 
that guarantees financial flexibility, it can be industry-specific. Outsiders to the firm (e.g. 
banks) will consider industry specific target ratios as norms of the financial health of the firm. 
The models of Taggart (1980) or Titman (1984) are not rejecting the existence of an industry-
specific optimal capital structure. 
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Maintaining a target debt ratio implies that incremental financing choices should be 
analysed instead of the levels of debt. An incremental financing choice is the discrete choice 
of one source of financing. The financing policy is no longer studied in terms of levels that 
include all the financial history of the firm but in terms of marginal decisions that only 
concerns the present situation. Furthermore, investors react to the marginal financing 
decisions and adjust their expectations about the security prices. Therefore, the incremental 
approach to analyse the capital structure choices allows direct tests of the impact of the 
financing policy on the firm market value. The method consists in measuring the abnormal 
stock price reaction to the announcement of the marginal financing decision. 
Hull (1999) investigates stock-for-debt transactions in the US using a target debt ratio to 
distinguish operations that get closer to the target from those to move away from it. The target 
debt ratio is an industry norm. It consists in the median leverage ratio of firms in the same 
industry. Hull (1999) shows that firms moving toward their target debt ratio exhibit less 
negative stock price reaction than firms that move away from it. These findings give evidence 
to the existence of a target debt ratio and they are consistent with the optimal capital structure 
theory. They also support the fact that industry matters when it comes to optimal capital 
structure. 
Almazan and Molina (2000) confront the capital structure theories related to competition 
and output market. They use the dispersion of capital structures in an industry as the 
independent variable. Industry technological heterogeneity is negatively correlated with the 
dispersion of capital structures which contradicts the prediction of Maksimovic and 
Zechner (1991). Higher industry concentration is associated with higher financial dispersion 
which is opposed to the predictions of Brander and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988) and 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). The only branch of the theory that is empirically supported is 
the liquidation hypothesis of Titman (1984). Technical heterogeneity among firms in an 
industry reduces the transferability of the production devices. Thus, capital structure 
homogeneity inside an industry is positively associated with higher liquidation value. 
1.4.3 Marginal financing decisions and firm value in summary 
Academic literature about marginal financing decisions does not dissociate financing 
decisions from investment decisions. A marginal financing decision is a relevant matter in 
terms of impact on firm value only if it serves to finance an investment opportunity. 
Otherwise, capital structure irrelevancy as in MM (1958) applies. All in all, the introduction 
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of market frictions results in a loss to firm market value. This loss can be “materialised” by a 
sub-optimal investment decision : foregoing profitable projects or/and undertaking value-
decreasing projects. It can also affect market prices through the adjustment of the rate of 
return required by investors. Marginal financing decisions can be viewed as solutions to 
minimise or eliminate the potential loss in firm value. They are more like value-preserving 
actions than value-enhancing ones. Table 1.3 summarises the models presented in this section. 
Table 1.3 : Theoretical implications of marginal financing decisions 
 Authors Models rationale Models predictions 
Panels A : Information asymmetry – Pecking order 
 Myer and Majluf (1984) Information asymmetry – adverse 
selection 
Under-investment 
Sales of overpriced securities 
Equity issue announcement should be 
followed by a stock price decrease 
Debt financing is less subject to adverse 
selection costs than equity issues 
 Krasker (1986) Information asymmetry – creation of 
financial slacks 
The size of the financing proceeds 
increases with the degree of information 
asymmetry 
The valuation effect following equity 
issues should increase with the size of 
the offering 
 Naranayan (1988) Information asymmetry restricted to the 
value of investment projects 
Sales of overpriced securities allow 
unprofitable firms to survive 
Ascending in the pecking order 
increases the risk of financing 
unprofitable investments 
 Cooney and 
Kalay (1993) 
Inclusion of unprofitable investment 
projects and the positive selection 
argument 
A high expected value of investment 
projects relative to the value of assets in 
place reduces the adverse selection costs 
and may break down the pecking order 
Some equity issues could have a 
positive valuation effect on stock prices 
 Viswanath (1993) Pecking order in a recurrent financing 
scheme 
Depending on the nature of information 
asymmetry, breaking down the pecking 
order could avoid under-investment 
when subsequent projects are 
considered 
Valuation effect of equity issues are 
expected to be less pronounced when 
firms announce recurrent investments 
 Noe (1988) Private information is noisy Firms of lower quality may issue risky 
debt while in the same situation higher 
quality firms refuse to issue equity and 
under-invest.  
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Table 1.3 : continued 
 Authors Models rationale Models predictions 
Panel B : Information asymmetry – Signalling 
 Ross (1977) Information asymmetry and managers’ 
compensation scheme 
Debt is a signal of firm quality 
The more levered, the more valued the 
firm is 
 Heinkel (1982) Information asymmetry, credit risk and 
firm value 
Firm quality is related to the risk of debt 
Higher quality firms have more and 
safer debt 
 Brennan and 
Kraus (1987) 
Financing combinations are costless 
signal of firm quality 
Firms avoid under-investment by 
selecting discriminative financing 
solution unavailable to lower quality 
firms. 
 Constantinides and 
Grundy (1989) 
Mixed financing solutions that balance 
the effects of sale repurchase of 
mispriced securities 
Firms undertake every profitable 
investment project and finance them 
with a net issue of securities that is 
neutral to firm value 
 Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1994) 
Underwriter’s certification as signal of 
firm quality 
The fairness of equity issue pricing is 
related to the underwriter’s reputation 
 Giammarino and 
Lewis (1989) 
Negotiated price in equity issues 
between issuers and underwriters 
Underwriters acquire private 
information to negotiate a fair issuing 
price 
 Heinkel and 
Schwartz (1986) 
Flotation method in equity issues to 
signal firm quality 
Highest quality firms choose standby 
rights offerings. 
Intermediate quality firms choose 
uninsured rights offerings and 
differentiate from each other by setting 
the highest issuing price they can bear 
Lowest quality firms choose 
underwritten public offerings 
 Miller and Rock (1985) Information asymmetry is about the 
ability of the firm to sustain its 
investment policy with internal funds 
External financing decisions are bad 
new about the firm future profitability. 
In addition, they are not fully revealing 
private information. Only future 
earnings disclosures will do it. 
 John and 
Williams (1985) 
Dividend signalling model about firms 
future profitability 
Dividend is a credible signal because it 
is costly. 
Firms raising external funds while 
paying dividends convey a positive 
signal about their future financial 
situation 
Trade-off between the positive effect of 
dividends as a signal and the negative 
effect of sacrificing internal financing 
capacity 
 Ambarish, John and 
Williams (1987) 
Multiple signals Dividend, investment level, equity 
issues and stock repurchase are signals. 
Managers combine them in order to 
minimise the signalling costs 
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Table 1.3 : continued 
 Authors Models rationale Models predictions 
Panel C : Agency costs 
 Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) 
Conflicts of interests between managers, 
shareholders and creditors affecting 
investment choices and increasing the 
cost of financing 
Outside equity financing increases the 
agency costs of equity. Debt financing 
favour a wealth transfer from creditors 
to shareholders. 
Solving these conflicts is costly and 
reduce the market value of equity 
 Harris and Raviv (1990) Creditors exercise a more accurate 
monitoring as they can force liquidation 
or restructuring better than shareholders 
High liquidation value and level of 
assets tangibility favour debt financing 
Highly-levered firms promise higher 
yields on their financial assets 
 Stulz (1990) Shareholders minimise the agency costs 
of equity by forcing managers to issue 
debt 
Numerous and high quality growth 
opportunities favour equity financing 
The costs of managerial discretion is 
positively correlated with the volatility 
of cash flow. Actions that reduce the 
volatility of cash flow is expected to be 
value enhancing 
 Williams (1995) Opposite effects of debt toward firm 
value : positive as reducing agency costs 
of equity, negative as increasing 
bankruptcy costs 
Capital intensive production 
technologies favour debt financing 
while labour intensive production 
technologies favour equity 
 Diamond (1989) A good reputation as borrower reduces 
the agency costs of debt and implies the 
undertaking of safer investment projects 
Mature firms are expected to have more 
debt and young firm more equity 
 Hirshleifer and 
Thakor (1992) 
Managers can optimise their position 
inside the firm by building a reputation 
of not defaulting which will satisfy both 
shareholders and creditors if total 
agency costs are minimised 
Firms with a product long certification 
or development process should have 
more debt 
 Jensen (1986) Agency costs of free cash flow 
Free cash flow favours over-investment 
Debt financing is the most efficient way 
to disgorge cash over long periods 
Mature value firms are expected to be 
financed with debt 
Rapidly growing firms are expected to 
be equity-financed 
 Easterbrook (1984) Dividends favour equity financing in a 
context of agency costs of free cash 
flow 
A high dividend policy favours equity 
financing 
Repeated equity issues should be better 
perceived by the market 
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Table 1.3 : continued 
 Authors Models rationale Models predictions 
Panel C : continued 
 Green (1984) Convertible debt is a financial 
instrument with specific characteristics 
that could mitigate agency costs 
Issues of convertible debt are expected 
to have a positive effect on firm value 
 Burlacu (2000) Convertible debt can have equity-like, 
debt-like or specific optional 
characteristics. Only the latter is 
expected to have specific effect on 
agency costs 
Convertible bond with a strong optional 
characteristic is expected to have a 
positive effect on firm value 
Panel D : Transaction costs 
 Williamson (1988) Debt represent a market-like corporate 
governance structure while equity is a 
relational corporate governance 
structure 
Firms are expected to finance non-
specific assets with debt and specific 
assets with equity 
 Kochhar (1996) Transaction cost economics is a wider 
concept than agency costs of equity 
The leverage ratio is negatively 
correlated to the degree of 
diversification relatedness 
 
Unlike the determinants of static trade-off theories, market frictions conditioning marginal 
financing decisions evolve continuously within and outside the firm. While taxes and 
input/output markets conditions do not lead them to constantly adjust their leverage ratio by 
doing debt-for-equity or equity-for-debt swaps, information asymmetry and agency costs 
problems oblige corporations to manage and adapt each marginal financing decision in order 
to optimise their investment policy and in turn, their value-creating process. Firms could 
simultaneously stick to a mid or long-term target debt ratio and deviate from it on the short-
run to select the financing solution with the lowest cost. When short-term deviations move the 
debt ratio too far from its target, firms re-balance their capital structure. In a short-cut vision, 
all capital structure choices predicted by theories can be categorised between pure capital 
structure matters to adjust for breakdowns in the exogenous cash flow hypothesis and 
marginal investment/financing co-decision matters to take financial market frictions into 
account. 
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Chapter 2 :  Valuation effects of external financing decisions 
In this chapter, I review the empirical evidence about the impact of external financing 
decisions on the firm market value. Four major questions are addressed. Are the financing 
decisions taken according to the existence of a target debt ratio ? Are valuation effects of 
securities issue announcements explained by information asymmetry or by agency costs ? 
Because information asymmetry as well as the intensity of conflict of interests may be time 
varying, do managers time their financing decisions ? Do they try to take advantage of 
windows of opportunity or do they consider global economic conditions and growth 
opportunities when they issue securities ? Finally, is the institutional setting a key factor to 
explain the stock price reaction to external financing decision announcements ? More 
precisely, I am interested in understanding whether firms rely on specific flotation methods or 
sell particular financial assets because of the institutional context. 
Among external financing decisions, equity issues come out as the most convenient 
operations to observe and to analyse. First, they have to be approved by the shareholders’ 
meeting and, in some countries like France, by an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. 
Second, managers are often given the authorisation to issue equity over a several-year period. 
They are able to time the operation, that is to decide exactly when and at what conditions the 
operation has to be realised. Third, several flotation methods may be used but any issuing 
process is well defined by legal and/or supervision authorities. Standardised information 
concerning the operation modalities has to be publicly disclosed. This implies that important 
dates such as the official announcement date or the realisation date are easily identifiable 
relative to other financing decisions like bank loans or alternative private financings. Fourth, 
equity issues are available to every type of firms unlike straight bonds or convertible bonds 
that may be restricted to larger corporations. In that sense, they allow comparisons between a 
wide range of firms so that they may offer a better test of capital structure theories. Fifth, 
most countries oblige corporations to announce the use of the equity issue proceeds, which 
allows to differentiate pure capital structure operations from those to finance a new 
investment project. With debt financing, this distinction is less obvious to perform. Actually, 
because of the finite maturity, an important fraction of new debt issue is dedicated to rolling 
over previous borrowings that are at maturity. These operations could not be considered as 
new capital structure choices. They only reflect decisions taken in the past. These reasons 
motivate the fact that the review of empirical studies about capital structure choices is focused 
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on equity issues. Other financing decisions are addressed as points of reference. Moreover, 
equity issues seem more appropriate to compare information asymmetry and agency costs 
implications as well as the timing argument. 
Section 1 overviews national practices of raising equity on the major financial markets and 
the importance of equity markets as a financing source. The aim is to outline the role of 
potential institutional characteristics in explaining differences in capital structure choices 
across countries as predicted by LaPorta et al. (1997; 1998). Financial markets are getting 
integrated over the last two decades. This shows through their organisations that tend to be 
more and more alike. Two examples would be the adoption of two major segments - one for 
larger and more established companies, the other for smaller, fast-growing firms that want to 
be listed to benefit from a larger panel of investors – and the standardisation of listing 
requirements and of supervision authorities. Financial markets integration has for effect to 
eliminate differences coming, for instance, from the origin of national legal systems. 
Section 2 surveys the impact of securities issue announcements on stock prices and 
confronts the explanatory power of capital structure theories. For equity issues, a distinction is 
made according to the flotation method : straight cash offerings predominant in the US vs. 
offerings with subscription rights most commonly used in Europe. Average stock price 
reactions to common equity issue announcements in the US are negative, about –2 % to –3 % 
on a two-days interval. The evidence is mixed on European or Japanese markets. The results 
may vary according to the flotation method or to the nature of the issue. The reaction to the 
announcement of other securities issues (units, convertible bonds and straight bonds) may 
also differ depending on the market. 
Information asymmetry is assumed to be one major cause of external financing decision 
valuation effect. Empirical evidence about the informational content of security issue 
announcements is reviewed in Section 3. Managers’ private information gives them a better 
knowledge of the firm value and of security prices. In that sense, information could be about 
the stream of future cash flow or about the discount factor that is to apply. If equity issue 
announcements are informative, price changes they generate should be explained by 
variations either in post-issue earnings or in systematic risk. The section concludes by 
addressing two questions about information asymmetry. Do financial analysts earnings 
forecasts contribute to reduce information asymmetry and explain the valuation effect ? Or, 
are investors able to anticipate the financing decision and its impact on stock prices ? 
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In Section 4, the timing argument of external financing decisions is addressed. Timing may 
not be considered as a stand-alone theory of capital structure choices. It naturally comes from 
information asymmetry and agency costs models when external financing decisions are 
analysed according to a time dimension. When information asymmetry is time-varying, it 
creates windows of opportunity for managers to issue equity or debt. Windows of opportunity 
could be viewed as periods during which security prices are overvalued but it could also be 
defined as periods of lower information asymmetry. According to the first definition, 
managers maximise the short-term value of existing shareholders’ equity while with the 
second definition, they favour the undertaking of every profitable investment projects. The 
agency implication on timing is related to quantity and quality of growth opportunities 
available to the firm. Over-investment is exacerbated when the level of growth opportunities 
is low. Equity issues are subject to higher agency costs. Conversely, when economic 
conditions are better, managers are faced with more profitable investment projects and are 
less incited to consume perks. The main consequence of timing is that capital structure is 
more likely to represent the cumulating of external financing decisions than a deliberate 
allocation of debt and equity. In other words, past marginal external financing decisions based 
on timing considerations could better explain capital structure than current determinants. 
Section 5 is dedicated to three aspects that represent external visions on capital structure 
choices. First, I review a selection of studies that analyse the simultaneous influence of 
various determinants on capital structure in either a single institutional setting framework or 
in international comparisons. Second, the focus is put on determinants of marginal financing 
decisions. What factors do favour equity issues rather that debt issues ? Third, practitioners’ 
point of view is considered. It is interesting to notice that practitioners’ major preoccupations 
are not systematically in lines with those of academicians. In particular, practitioners appear 
to be concerned about financial flexibility and indirectly about the survivorship of their firms 
in a proportion that cannot be translated by any theoretical model. This observation gives 
some hints about managers’ time horizon being not as short as assumed by the theory. 
The last section of the chapter summarises the empirical evidence. The effort is put on 
outlining the main hypotheses, the most appropriate explanatory variables and the commonly 
approved interpretations of the results. Beside synthesising the current state of empirical 
research on capital structure, this approach justifies the foundations of the two empirical 
studies presented in the next chapters. 
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2.1 Influence of the institutional setting on equity financing 
According to the degree of shareholders’ legal protection, LaPorta et al. (1997; 1998) 
shows that equity markets are more developed in countries with legal systems based on 
common law. This section addresses to the question of equity financing but through three 
different perspectives. First, the institutional setting defines equity issue procedures and 
regulates the access to public capital. Different rules may also explain potential differences in 
equity markets development. Second, aggregate financing sources are examined across 
countries with the largest equity market capitalisations at the end of year 200013. These 
countries are, respectively, the US, Japan, the UK, France, Germany and Switzerland. 
Although they appear in the top five, France and Germany are considered to have less-
developed equity markets (see LaPorta et al., 1997). Third, the institutional context may 
create country-specific factors that influence the decision to issue equity. The goal of equity 
issues could no longer be matters of capital structure choices or investment financing 
decisions. Those country-specific factors do not enter in the measures of shareholders’ legal 
protection implemented by LaPorta et al. (1998). 
2.1.1 How do firms raise equity in most developed countries ? 
Once a firm is listed, its access to further equity financing is partly conditioned by the 
Seasoned Equity Offering [hereafter SEO] process. In order to protect them against capital 
and ownership dilution, existing shareholders are granted pre-emptive rights that allow them 
to subscribe with priority to new equity issues. Pre-emptive rights take the form of short-lived 
warrants that their holders can exercise and subscribe to the SEO or they can sell them on the 
market to new investors. Issuers generally sign an underwriting contract with an investment 
bank or with a syndicate of investment banks. Three types of contract are available. In the 
uninsured rights offering process, the underwriter place the new shares in the public but it has 
no contractual obligation to place all of them. The offer may not be completed or only 
partially completed. The standby rights agreement bonds the underwriter to buy the shares 
that have not been placed at the end of the subscription period. With the fully underwritten 
rights offering process, the underwriter buys all the shares from the issuer at a discount price 
and places them to the existing or new shareholders. The underwriter bears all the risk if the 
stock price falls below the issuing price. Rights offerings constitute chronologically and 
                                                 
13 Source : http://www.swx.com 
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legally the common flotation method throughout the world. However, it has remained 
predominant only in European countries. 
Rights offerings protect existing shareholders but they could limit the capital access to a 
smaller investors’ base. Direct cash offerings or public offerings were introduced to improve 
and accelerate the equity issuance process. The pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders are 
waived and the new shares can be sold directly to new investors or to other firm participants 
such as employees. Direct cash flotation methods involve private placement, best effort 
agreement and firm commitment contract. In a private placement, the issuer sell the new 
shares directly to specific investors or individuals. With the alternative methods, the issuer 
signs a contract with an underwriter. A best effort agreement is the pendant of an uninsured 
rights offering contract. The underwriter does its best to place the shares but has no obligation 
on the remaining stocks. With a firm commitment contract, the underwriter buys all the shares 
and sell them afterwards to the public like in a fully underwritten rights offering contract. 
Although direct cash flotation methods are available in all countries with a developed equity 
market, they overtake the predominant position only in the US and in Japan. 
Administrative procedures to issue equity do not vary much across major equity markets. 
The issuer must receive the authorisation to raise new equity from the Shareholders’ Meeting. 
The authorisation runs over a 5-year period in Germany and France for rights offerings. This 
period is reduced to two years for public offerings in France. Two years is also the 
authorisation period in Switzerland for any flotation method. The authorisation includes the 
maximum number of share to be issued, the type of securities and whether the pre-emptive 
rights have been waived or not. While the authorisation is running, the board of directors is 
free to realise the operation at any time. For that, a registration form containing the issue 
modalities must be filed to the competent supervision organ (SEC in the US, FSA in the UK, 
COB in France14; Germany and Switzerland have auto-regulated stock exchanges). Once the 
issue modalities have been accepted, the firm publishes an issuing prospectus and the equity 
issue has to be publicly and officially announced in newspapers (television or radio 
broadcasts as well, in the US). 
According to the US Security Act of 1933, the registration form must entail the issuer’s 
description, the underwriter’s name, the type and quantity of new shares, the intended use of 
the proceeds, the issuing price or its formula, the expected gross and net proceeds, recently 
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audited balance sheet and P&L statements and names and holdings of large existing 
shareholders. These requirements can be found in almost all legislations. Only differences 
will be presented. The UK requirements are similar to the US ones. German legislation is less 
intrusive especially about the use of the proceeds and large existing shareholders’ blocks. 
Germany presents two characteristics worth mentioning. First, the bank system is based on 
universal banks. This has for consequence that each German firm develops a privileged 
relationship with one given bank, its “Hausbank”. The “Hausbank” is, simultaneously, the 
main creditor, an important shareholder and the principal financial adviser. Naturally, the 
“Hausbank” takes the lead of the underwriting syndicate. This close relationship between the 
bank and the issuer implies a positive effect as the bank has a deep knowledge of its client’s 
financial situation and management strategy. However, it also generates a negative effect. The 
issuer becomes dependent from its “Hausbank” for its financial decisions. This situation 
prevents competition between potential underwriters and it could lead the “Hausbank” to 
increase its fees15. The second German characteristics lies in the stock exchange organisation. 
Standard requirements apply only to a segment of the German stock exchange, the Official 
Market. On the other segments, legal requirements, if they exist, are vague. Information about 
the issuer and about the shares to be issued must be the ones necessary to enable the public to 
make proper assessments about the issuer financial situation and securities16. Consequently, 
major German firms are listed on the Official Market and are subject to standard requirements 
as other international firms. Minor firms such as family-owned companies remain on the other 
segments and avoid disclosing financial information. The Swiss legislation is close to the 
German one, especially relative to legal requirements, which are similar to those of the 
German Official Market. 
French equity issuing process is more constraining than in Anglo-Saxon countries. The 
authorisation to issue is given by the Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting at the qualified 
majority of two thirds. Once the operation has been approved by the COB, an official 
announcement is made in the “Bulletin des Annonces Légales Officielles” (BALO) and an 
issuing prospectus which includes standard legal requirements is published. 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 SEC is for Security Exchange Commission, FSA for Financial Services Authority and COB for Commission 
des Opérations de Bourse. 
15 Bühner and Kaserer (2002) find no evidence of an economy of scale in the underwriting business in Germany. 
Though, large universal banks should bear less risk in underwriting a SEO because of the greater monitoring 
power and the reduced information asymmetry. The lack of difference in their underwriting fees relative to 
smaller investment banks supports the “Hausbank” premium hypothesis. 
16 Stock Exchange Act, section 73, paragraph 2; Law on the Prospectus for Securities Offered for Sale, section 7, 
paragraph 2 
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Rights flotation method implies a longer issuing process because of the subscription rights 
trading period. This period is legally defined, from at least ten business days in France up to 
twenty-one days in the UK. Standby agreement is the most commonly used contract in 
Europe. However, 29 % of French rights offerings are uninsured17 according to the French 
law which is restrictive concerning the companies authorised to deliver the legal standby 
guaranty. When a non-legally approved firm commits itself to purchase the remaining shares, 
the operation is officially declared uninsured, which should mitigate the high proportion of 
uninsured offerings. 
In direct cash offerings, existing shareholders are subject to capital dilution. The issuing 
price has to be set lower but as close as possible to the market price to reduce the wealth 
transfer. This implies that the procedure should be short in order to avoid that the market price 
falls below the issuing price, which causes the automatic cancellation of the offering. In the 
US, public issues take place within twenty-four hours after the issuing price setting. UK 
procedure states that the issuing price in public offerings should not be inferior to 90 % of the 
middle market price at the announcement date. In Germany, the issuing discount is not 
bounded but practitioners consider that a discount between 3 % and 5 % is acceptable. 
However, the size of the public offer is limited to 10 % of the existing capital. Bühner and 
Kaserer (2002) observe that, for firm commitment offerings, the period between the board 
decision to issue equity and the date when the firm cashes the money lasts about 20 days, 
which is not much shorter than with rights offerings (between 30 and 50 days). In addition, 
they find that the average discount in firm commitment offerings reaches 9 % instead of the 
expected 5 %. These observations may explain why German firms have not abandoned rights 
offerings in favour of firm commitment cash offerings18. 
In France, even if existing shareholders waive their subscription rights, they may subscribe 
to the offering with priority during a pre-defined period. In a public cash offering, the issuing 
price is set as being at least equal to 95 % of the average of 10 successive daily market prices 
among the 20 business days preceding the start of the subscription period. The firm 
commitment agreement obliges the underwriter to support the stock price over the 
subscription period. According to Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002), the average issuing price 
of French public offerings corresponds to 98 % of the prevailing stock price (for rights 
                                                 
17 See Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002, p. 296, Table I), 57 uninsured rights offerings over a total of 197 rights 
offerings. 
18 Bühner and Kaserer (2002) observe that among 120 offerings made on the Official Market between 1993 and 
1998, only 5 are firm commitment cash offerings. 
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offerings the average issuing price equals 78 % of the market price). This rigidity in the 
setting of the issuing price makes public cash offerings risky relative to rights offering. 
2.1.2 Importance of equity markets in the economy 
The main financing sources are internal funds (retained earnings), private debt such as bank 
loans (short- and long-term), public debt such as bonds and public equity. Table 2.1 presents 
the contribution of each financing source to total financing for five major economies (US, 
UK, Japan, Germany and France) during a 12-year period (1984 to 1995). Figures are given in 
percent of the aggregate financing of non-financial corporations19. The last column shows the 
12-year average. 
Internal financing is the main source of financing for all countries in Table 2.1. On average, 
it covers more than half of the corporations financing needs. US firms have the greatest use of 
internal financing with 61.1 % of their total financial resources. German firms turn out second 
with 55.5 % and the other countries have about 50 % of their financing coming from internal 
funds. In the US, internal financing is more important than external financing in eleven of the 
twelve years. For German firms, it is the case in nine years. The UK, Japan and France 
present different pattern. External financing exceeds internal financing at least in half of the 
years (eight years in France, seven in Japan and six in the UK). However, for these countries, 
internal financing predominates during the 90’s. These findings deserve one comment. 
Contradicting LaPorta et al. (1997; 1998), Anglo-Saxon firms rely strongly on internal 
financing although their legal system should favour external financing. France and Japan, 
until the 90’s, made a greater use of external financing, which is also opposed to LaPorta et 
al. (1998) predictions. 
Bank loans constitute the second financing source in every country except the US where 
public debt is more important. This may be explained by the fact that the reliance of US firms 
to bank loans decreases from 1990 on and is several times negative (repayments exceed 
borrowings). However, the pattern is similar in European countries and Japan. Net bond 
issues are the third financing source of corporations in Japan, Germany and France. They are 
the lowest in the UK where the government bond market is very active. In exception of the 
US market, the reliance to bonds financing seem to fluctuate over time. It tends to decrease in 
                                                 
19 Data are taken from the Monthly Financial Statistics and Financial Statements of Non-Financial Entreprises 
publications of the OECD; in exception of the equity issues proceeds for France which are taken from the SBF 
publication : L’Année Boursière. This period corresponds to the sample period used in chapters 3 and 4. 
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the UK, Japan and France while it increases in Germany. Overall, debt (private and public) 
represents the second important source of financing in all five countries. 
Table 2.1 : Financing sources of a sample of large economies between 1984 and 1995 
    1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995   Average  
Panel A : United States                
 Internal financing (%) 52.6 53.4 43.7 52.7 53.3 59.0 71.2 84.4 73.6 68.1 63.3 58.3  61.1  
 Bank loan (%) 31.8 22.6 24.3 16.1 18.8 18.8 11.4 -24.4 -9.6 -4.5 11.2 16.5  11.1  
 Public bond (%) 12.1 18.6 24.2 23.5 22.5 17.1 12.9 25.8 21.8 19.9 17.5 17.4  19.4  
 Equity financing (%) 3.5 5.4 7.8 7.6 5.4 5.1 4.5 14.1 14.2 16.5 8.0 7.8  8.3  
Panel B : United Kingdom               
 Internal financing (%) 63.6 40.9 38.6 29.9 26.4 25.6 41.0 57.7 80.9 72.6 75.2 63.7  51.4  
 Bank loan (%) 24.8 39.4 40.4 39.6 63.1 62.9 53.8 22.1 4.9 1.6 7.5 29.3  32.4  
 Public bond (%) 2.1 3.3 3.1 2.0 2.6 3.9 -0.4 0.9 0.9 0.3 -1.8 -2.2  1.2  
 Equity financing (%) 9.6 16.4 18.0 28.5 7.9 7.6 5.5 19.3 13.2 25.4 19.1 9.1  15.0  
Panel C : Japan                
 Internal financing (%) 39.9 45.6 35.2 37.6 40.1 35.7 40.1 50.5 52.2 59.0 88.9 85.4  50.9  
 Bank loan (%) 33.8 34.7 31.8 29.2 31.5 35.3 38.1 33.1 26.7 24.9 12.2 -1.5  27.5  
 Public bond (%) 22.4 16.2 30.1 26.7 20.6 17.1 16.6 14.8 20.4 14.3 -4.3 14.1  17.4  
 Equity financing (%) 3.8 3.5 3.0 6.5 7.8 11.9 5.2 1.6 0.7 1.8 3.2 2.0  4.2  
Panel D : Germany                
 Internal financing (%) 58.3 53.2 60.0 65.4 69.4 48.6 55.2 48.6 57.3 51.6 57.4 40.5  55.5  
 Bank loan (%) 24.3 26.1 16.3 14.0 29.9 32.3 19.3 28.6 22.0 14.3 9.7 23.6  21.7  
 Public bond (%) 14.9 16.2 16.4 15.9 -2.6 13.9 21.4 20.9 18.6 31.7 28.9 31.3  19.0  
 Equity financing (%) 2.6 4.5 7.3 4.7 3.3 5.2 4.1 1.8 2.2 2.4 4.0 4.6  3.9  
Panel E : France                
 Internal financing (%) 20.8 21.5 35.4 39.2 38.9 30.4 32.8 36.6 61.9 80.8 94.8 98.4  49.3  
 Bank loan (%) 48.5 28.8 -4.7 27.3 35.3 48.6 46.4 42.0 16.9 -7.3 -1.6 -1.1  23.3  
 Public bond (%) 28.6 45.0 40.7 28.5 24.0 18.7 16.5 17.1 17.0 16.1 -2.7 0.3  20.8  
  Equity financing (%) 2.1 4.7 28.6 5.0 1.8 2.3 4.3 4.2 4.1 10.4 9.6 2.4   6.6  
Data are taken from the OECD publications : Monthly Financial Statistics and Financial Statements of Non-
Financial Entreprises. Equity issues proceeds data for France are taken from the annual publication of the SBF : 
L’Année Boursière. Internal financing is the percentage of the aggregate self-financing capacity over all non-
financial firms to total financing. Bank loan represents the percentage of private debt financing to total financing. 
Flows of private debt are measured by the net annual flows on short-term and long-term bank loans taken from 
the aggregate flow of funds statement of non-financial firms. Public bond is the percentage of public debt to total 
financing. Flow of public debt correspond to the net flows on corporate bonds (issues less repayments). Equity 
financing is the percentage of equity issue proceeds to total financing. Net flows are considered for debt because 
of the roll-over on bank credits and bonds. On the other hand, no such roll-over exists on outside equity or 
internal financing (no maturity on these funds). 
 
Outside equity is the least employed financing source relative to both total financing or 
external financing. The UK and the US have the highest percentages as expected by the origin 
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of their legal system. Nevertheless, France with 6.6 % does not come far behind the US 
(8.3 %). France is recognised by LaPorta et al. (1998) for having the lowest degree of 
shareholders’ legal protection. Japan and Germany are last with only 4.2 % and 3.9 % of their 
financing coming from equity issues. When only external funds are considered, the difference 
due to legal systems are more pronounced. Equity financing represents about 30 % of external 
financing in the UK and 22 % in the US. Again, the score of France is honourable with 13 % 
but it falls to about half of the US figure. Over the period 1993 to 1995, equity financing is 
even the main external financing source. This last finding shows that France may be filling 
the gap relative to Anglo-Saxon countries. Although they belong to legal system with greater 
investors’ protection than France, Japan and Germany exhibit a proportion of equity financing 
which is less than 9 % of their external financing. Moreover, equity financing is not gaining 
from other external financing sources during the last years.  
Overall, figures in Table 2.1 are supportive of the pecking order. Internal financing is 
preferred, respectively, to debt (private before public) and to outside equity. In other words, 
firms rely more on financing sources which are less subject to information asymmetries. 
Differences in the breadth of external financing markets due to the origin of legal systems are 
not given much credit when only the largest economies are considered. It may come from the 
high degree of legal enforcement found in these countries20, which mitigates differences in the 
level of investors’ legal protection. 
2.1.3 Country-specific vs. common factors to explain equity financing 
Capital structure choices are decisions taken at the individual firm level. Theories of capital 
structure suggest that bankruptcy costs, taxes, information asymmetry, agency conflicts, 
transaction costs and input/output markets characteristics play a prominent role in 
determining the optimal investment/financing strategies. These determinants are common to 
all firms. Nonetheless, the institutional setting may also modify the managers’ decision 
process and diverts financing operations from their primary role. Country-specific factors 
could hence lead managers to misrepresent capital structure choices. I review examples of 
country-specific institutional characteristics that influence the decision to issue new equity. 
The primary role of an equity public issue is to whether raise funds to finance investment 
projects or to re-balance the capital structure. Under given circumstances, the neutrality of 
subscription rights towards both capital and ownership dilution allows the alteration of the 
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motives to offer equity. Specificities of the tax system in Germany and Switzerland caused 
managers to conduct equity issues for tax-motivated reasons instead of financial reasons. 
Legal restrictions about the minimum face value of shares in Italy and Switzerland induce 
firms to offer additional stocks at a low issuing price to perform quasi-splits. The necessary 
condition for these country-specific operations to occur is the existence of pre-emptive rights 
granted to existing shareholders. Effectively, the motives to realise such operations are to 
satisfy the existing shareholders and not to increase the firm performance. 
Germany introduced a tax reform that becomes effective in the fiscal year 2002. Before 
that, the taxation of distributed earnings presented two characteristics that could have 
influenced the decision to issue new equity. First, distributed earnings (dividends) were taxed 
at the firm level but at a preferred rate relative to retained earnings (30 % vs. 40 %). Second, 
in order to avoid the double taxation of corporate earnings, a full imputation system was in 
place at the shareholder’s level. The shareholders benefit from a tax credit equal to the entire 
corporate tax amount, which results in no individual taxation of dividends21. This particular 
tax system could have induced German companies to distribute a large part of their earnings, 
which, sometimes, could prevent these firms to maintain a sufficient internal financing 
capacity. Thus, they were forced to issue new equity in order to refund part of the cash 
distributed through dividends. According to Miller and Rock (1985), a public offerings of 
equity signals that the internal financing capacity is not sufficient to support the investment 
policy. The theory predicts a negative impact of equity financing on the firm market value 
unless the firm pay out large dividends. In the case of Germany, the firm realises the equity 
issue because it has previously paid out large amounts of dividends. The dividend payment – 
equity refund operation is then optimal in terms of corporate taxes because of the preferred 
tax rate applied to distributed earnings. If a seasoned equity offering is conducted for these tax 
motives, the effect should be non-negative on the firm market value. Nonetheless, the equity 
issue decision is not based on financing motivations. The 2002 tax reform abandons the use of 
differentiated tax rates on corporate earnings. The full imputation system is replaced by a 
half-income system. Half of the dividends received by the shareholders are considered as an 
income and thus taxed. This introduces a double taxation on half of the dividends. However, 
the new system makes cross-border investment within the European Community members 
                                                                                                                                                        
20 See LaPorta et al. (1998 ; p. 1142, Table 5). 
21 See Rivier (1994, p. 134) for detailed explanations of the full imputation tax system.  
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more attractive22. The fact that distributed earnings are taxed at the same rate as retained 
earnings eliminates the incentive for German firms to realise dividend payment – equity 
refund transactions. 
The Swiss tax system was reformed in July 1992 although its main concept remained 
unchanged. A classical tax system applies, which generates a double taxation of distributed 
earnings. First, corporate earnings are taxed at the firm level. Then, dividends are taxed again 
at the individual level at a 35 % withholding rate. In the mean time, capital gains are free of 
taxes for individuals. Thus, Swiss companies are inclined to either retain earnings or 
distribute stock dividends to avoid the double taxation of corporate earnings. Before its 
reform, the Swiss tax system presented characteristics that could have influenced the 
frequency at which firms issued equity. Actually, stock dividends were not considered as a 
capital gain but as an income. They were subject to the withholding tax. In order to provide 
their shareholders with a substitute for stock dividends, Swiss companies offered new stocks 
at a low issuing price23. Existing shareholders had the opportunity to either subscribe to the 
offering and sell the stock later or to directly sell their subscription rights. In both cases, the 
capital gain was not taxed. Since the tax reform, stock dividends have been taxed on the face 
value instead of on the market value, which has eliminated the need for a substitute. 
A second feature of the Swiss institutional framework, which was valid for Italy also was 
the high minimum face value of the stocks. The benefits of stock splits were limited because 
the minimum face value was rapidly reached. Under these circumstances, an equity offer with 
a low issuing price relative to the market price has a quasi-split effect24. The market reaction 
to such financial operations is not driven by investment/financing considerations but by 
liquidity or dividend yield effects. Apart from lowering the market price, a quasi-split could 
generate an increase in the dividend yield if the dividend per share is maintained at its pre-
issue level. 
The rigidity of the issuing price setting in French public cash offerings can be foregone by 
issuing units instead of common stocks. Units are offered as one unique financial instrument 
but the shares and the warrants are traded separately once the shares are listed. As the unit 
issuing price includes the price of the warrant, it is more difficult to value or, in other words, 
                                                 
22 The argument is taken from a publication of the Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2001). 
23 The average issuing price to market price ratio for Swiss SEOs equals 40 % (Loderer and Zimmermann, 
1988). 
24 The average issuing price to market price ratio for Italian SEOs equals 42 % (Bigelli ; 1998). By comparison, 
the ratio for French SEOs is 78 %. France has no such high minimum face value. 
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easier to undervalue. The inclusion of the warrant assures the completion of public cash 
equity offers (Chollet and Ginglinger, 2001). 
Country-specific factors may also account to explain why the predominant flotation method 
has remained rights offering in the UK, France and Germany where changes in their 
legislation should have favoured public cash offerings. In the US, firms have almost 
abandoned the rights offering process. In Japan, rights offerings diminish in favour of cash 
public offerings. However, the most important difference in the external financing practices of 
Japanese firms is their strong reliance to convertible debt issues. 
All in all, differences in institutional setting across countries with the most developed 
equity markets tend to be attenuated over time. Nevertheless, country-specific factors may 
still influence financing choices or the motives behind a given security issue. Most of 
empirical tests about the valuation effect of marginal financing decisions have been 
performed on the US market. Replicating these tests on another market could be useful and it 
could improve the validation of one model instead of another. The French market offers an 
appropriate alternative experimentation framework. First, France has a civil-law legal system, 
which is said to be the most different from the US system in terms of shareholders legal 
protection. Second, equity financing decisions are not polluted by tax system specificities like 
in Germany or Switzerland. Third, the number of equity issues is large enough to allow the 
formation of specific sub-samples in order to confront capital structure theories. 
2.2 Stock price reaction to external financing announcements 
Market abnormal reaction to security issue announcement measures the valuation effect of 
a marginal change in the capital structure. Most empirical studies use the classical event-study 
methodology introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). At the announcement date, 
the realised return is compared to a benchmark (market return or market model return). 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, information should be integrated into stock 
prices instantaneously. Thus, the valuation effect is generally computed over a week (or less) 
around the announcement date. Daily abnormal returns are cumulated over this interval to 
form the total stock price reaction that could be imputed to the marginal financing decision. 
The most commonly used computation interval is a 2-day cumulative abnormal return (2-day 
CAR) starting at the announcement date. This measure of the valuation effect is retained 
throughout the section. When the sample average CAR is statistically significant from zero, 
the stock price is said to react abnormally to the event. In other words, the marginal change in 
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capital structure has a statistically significant impact on the firm market value. The next step 
consists in explaining the valuation effect. For that, 2-day CAR are cross-sectionnally 
regressed on a set of explanatory variables according to the theories to be tested. 
2.2.1 Valuation effect of equity issues 
Stock price reactions to equity issue announcements are examined according to, first, the 
flotation method and then, to the institutional setting (US vs. Japan and Europe). This process 
has for goal to isolate the explanatory power of any given theory. It will then be possible to 
compare its relevance across institutional settings and flotation methods. For each flotation 
method, a table summarises the main findings of the reviewed studies. 
2.2.1.1 Public direct cash offerings 
A negative stock price reaction to announcements of public cash equity offerings is 
documented by Asquith and Mullins (1986), -3.00 %; Masulis and Korwar (1986), -3.25 %; 
and Mikkelson and Partch (1986), -3.56 %25. This negative announcement effect is confirmed 
in all empirical investigations on the US market (see Table 2.2 for a selected review). Asquith 
and Mullins (1986) attribute the negative market reaction to both a negative signal about the 
firm future prospects and a downward sloping demand for the shares. The downward sloping 
argument is well accepted by practitioners. As Asquith and Mullins (1986, p. 61)  put it : 
“Financial executives, investment bankers and many regulators argue that selling equity 
causes a firm’s stock price to fall. Their view, labelled by Scholes (1972) as the price pressure 
hypothesis, contends that an increase in the supply of shares causes a decline in a firm’s stock 
price because the demand curve for shares is downward sloping”. The price pressure 
hypothesis is also supported by the findings of Diltz, Lockwood and Min (1992). 
Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) propose an alternative technical explanation to the 
negative stock price reaction. They observe the intra-day stock price reaction at the exact time 
when the equity issue announcement is released. The 15-minute post-announcement average 
return is equal to -1.34 % and the stock price decline over the 3 hours surrounding the 
announcement is equal to -2.44 %. The stock price recovers a large part of its decline during 
the 20 days following the issue date. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
stock price is temporarily lowered to allow investors to integrate the change in their portfolio 
                                                 
25 See Smith (1986) for a survey of the empirical evidence. 
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holdings implied by the issue at a lower cost. The transaction costs do not penalise investors if 
the stock price is lowered. 
The overall negative valuation effect to equity offering announcements is consistent with 
information asymmetry predictions. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), equity offerings 
are expected to follow a period of good stock performance. The stock return momentum (or 
stock price run-up) at the time of the announcement is negatively related to the valuation 
effect in Masulis and Korwar (1986), Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991), Choe, Masulis and 
Nanda (1993) and Denis (1994). Investors interpret the pre-SEO stock return momentum as a 
proxy of managers’ private information about the value of the firm. The higher the stock price 
run-up, the greater is the probability that the issue is overpriced. This finding is in favour of 
the pecking order theory which is also given empirical support by the results of Mikkelson 
and Partch (1986). The latter observe that the stock price reaction to announcements of equity 
and convertible debt issues are more negative than the one of straight debt offerings. 
In line with Krasker (1986) information asymmetry model, Asquith and Mullins (1986), 
Masulis and Korwar (1986), Dilz et al. (1992) and Choe et al. (1993) oberve a negative 
relation between the size of the issue and the valuation effect. However, this finding is also 
consistent with the price pressure hypothesis. Kalay and Shimrat (1987) confront both 
explanations (information asymmetry and price pressure) by examining the impact of equity 
issue announcements on stock and bond price simultaneously. The valuation effect is negative 
for both securities, which supports information asymmetry hypothesis. Actually, price 
pressure would be neutral to bond prices. 
Residual variance of the stock returns could constitute an alternative measure of 
information asymmetry about the firm market value. Dierkens (1991, p. 186) relates that the 
market-explained fluctuations of the stock price are the only information shared by managers 
and market participants about the firm value. Thus, the residual variance is expected to denote 
the magnitude of managers’ private information. However, she outlines the fact that the 
residual variance may include further kind of uncertainty shared by the managers and the 
market, such as industry-specific developments. A negative relation between this variable and 
the stock price reaction is found by Dierkens (1991) and Denis (1994). The standard deviation 
of stock returns or their residual variance are not directly observable. They are estimated and 
hence, they are subject to error in variables problems; see Greene (1997), chapter 9, p. 440. 
For that reason, their significance in explaining cross-sectional stock price reactions must be 
considered with care. 
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Variations in managers’ holdings around equity issues convey information about a potential 
stock price overvaluation. Masulis and Korwar (1986) observe that the negative stock price 
reaction to SEO announcements is more severe when offerings involve a decrease in 
management holdings. Gombola, Lee and Liu (1997) document a significant insider net 
selling in the month immediately after the SEO announcement although the stock price 
reaction is negative. They argue that the issuing stock is still overpriced even after the 
announcement price decline. Thus, they consider that the stock price drop is a cheap insurance 
against the risk of illegal insider trading prior to the announcement. Their findings support the 
adverse selection hypothesis. In order to check if firms issue overpriced equity, Lee (1997) 
examines the trading behaviour of top executives prior to the offering. The stock price 
reaction is negative at the SEO announcement and is not sensitive to the different trading 
strategies of top executives. However, Lee (1997) concludes that it is less recommended to 
invest in firms issuing primary offerings. Top executives’ trading strategy (net purchase is a 
positive signal and net sale is a negative signal) seems to be useful in estimating the quality of 
secondary seasoned offerings (involving the sale of new and existing shares). Beside 
signalling a potential stock price overvaluation, variations in managers’ holdings could also 
have an agency costs effect. Lower holdings give more incentives to managers to spend 
resources in satisfying their own utility. Fields and Mais (1994) observe that, in 75 % of the 
cases, management holdings decrease after an equity issue. 
The greatest influence of agency costs on the firm value should be observed through the 
relation between growth opportunities and the stock price reaction to equity issue 
announcements. Denis (1994) examines the explanatory power of different proxies for the 
quantity and quality of growth opportunities such as book-to-market ratio, Tobin’s Q, 
dividend yield, the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales or the return on equity. He documents a 
significant positive relation between growth opportunities variables and the SEO valuation 
effect. For all levels of growth opportunities, the stock price reaction is negative but the 
decline is less severe for high growth issuers. This phenomenon can be attributed to the 
reduction of the agency costs of equity. A growth firm faces many profitable investment 
opportunities. Hence, the manager’s incentive to over-invest or to consume perks is reduced. 
Denis (1994) finds that high growth firms are significantly smaller, younger and of higher risk 
compared to other issuers. In addition, they are less levered. In spite of being significant, the 
explanatory power of growth opportunities is only marginal. If the value of growth 
opportunities is small relative to the value of assets in place, market reaction could be 
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dominated by an information asymmetry effect about the value of assets in place. 
Nevertheless, the influence of agency costs is confirmed by the results of Dierkens (1991) 
about the positive relation between market-to-book ratio and the valuation effect, those of 
Dilz et al. (1992) about the negative relation between the increase in outside equity and the 
valuation effect and those of Mikkelson and Partch (1986) about the positive relation between 
capital expenditures and the valuation effect. In the same line of thought, Chung and 
Jo (1996) document a positive relation between the number of financial analysts following the 
firm and its value. Financial analysts provide efficient monitoring of corporate performance. 
They help motivate managers to work in the interest of shareholders and thus, they contribute 
to reduce the agency costs of equity. 
McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (2000) consider that the choice of the underwriting 
bank as a monitoring role as well as a certification role. In that sense, contracting a high 
prestige underwriter should reduce agency costs and have a positive effect on the stock price. 
Although the certification role of the underwriter is related to an agency costs explanation, the 
rationale of McLaughlin et al. (2000) is valid in the signalling context of Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1994). McLaughlin et al. (2000) observe no significant difference between 
valuation effects according the quality of the underwriter. However, high prestige investment 
bankers underwrite larger offerings, offerings made by growth and/or larger firms. These 
issuers could search for better certification because they should be more sensitive to agency 
costs problems. 
Table 2.2 : Stock price reaction to announcements of public cash SEOs 
Authors Market Sample of Primary 
offerings 
Announcement 
2-day CAR 
Significant explanatory variables 
Asquith and 
Mullins (1986) 
US 01.1963-12.1981 
128 offerings 
 
-3.00 % 
Size of the issue (-) 
Run-up (+) 
Masulis and 
Korwar (1986) 
US 01.1963-12-1980 
388 offerings 
 
-3.25 % 
Size of the issue (-) 
Momentum (-) 
Market momentum  (+) 
Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986) 
US 01.1972-12.1982 
80 offerings 
 
-3.56 % 
Capital expenditure (+) 
Kalay and 
Shimrat (1987) 
US 01.1970-12.1982 
185 offerings 
 
-3.45 % 
Information asymmetry 
Bayless and 
Chaplinsky (1991) 
US 01.1974-12.1983 
337 offerings 
 
-2.90 % 
Momentum (-) 
Post-issue perf. (+) 
Market momentum (-) 
 80
Table 2.2 : continued 
Authors Market Sample of Primary 
offerings 
Announcement 
2-day CAR 
Significant explanatory variables 
Dierkens (1991) US 01.1980-12.1983 
197 offerings 
 
-2.40 % 
Market-to-book (+) 
Specific risk (-) 
Few disclosures (-) 
Dilz, Lockwood and 
Min (1992) 
US 01..1980-12.1988 
234 offerings 
 
-2.40 % 
Size of the issue (+) 
Agency costs (+) 
Choe, Masulis and 
Nanda (1993) 
US 01.1963-12.1983 
669 offerings 
 
-2.62 % 
Size of the issue (-) 
Debt ratio change (-) 
Ownership concentration (+) 
Momentum (-) 
Market momentum (+) 
Fields and 
Mais (1994) 
US 01.1980-12.1986 
95 offerings 
 
-2.14 % 
Inside ownership (-) 
Denis (1994) US 01.1977-12.1990 
435 offerings 
 
-2.49 % 
Momentum (-) 
Market momentum (+) 
Specific risk (+) 
income growth (+) 
Jung, Kim and 
Stulz (1996) 
US 01.1977-12.1984 
192 offerings 
 
-2.70 % 
Market-to-book (+) 
 
Cornett, Mehran and 
Tehranian (1998) 
US 06.1983-12.1991 
70 voluntary 
80 involutary 
 
-1.62 % 
-0.39 % 
Involuntary issues are not motivated 
by managers’ private information 
McLaughlin, 
Safieddine and 
Vasudevan (2000) 
US 01.1980-12.1994 
649 offerings 
 
-2.90 % 
High prestige underwriter (+) 
Kang and 
Stulz (1996) 
Japan 01.1985-12.1991 
185 offerings 
 
+0.51 % 
Firm size (-) 
PER (-) 
Leverage ratio (+) 
Gajewski and 
Ginglinger (2002) 
France 01.1986-12.1996 
22 offerings 
 
-0.42 % 
 
Italic means significant at a 10 % level, bold at a 5 % level and bold italic at a 1 % level. Normal in the stock price 
reaction column means statistically insignificant. The last column entails the significant explanatory variables in 
multivariate cross-sectional regressions run on the announcement abnormal return. The sign in parentheses shows the 
sign of the significant coefficient. The size of the issue is measured either by the relative number of new issued shares, 
by the relative amount to be offered or by the offer proceeds. “Momentum” means the stock price cumulative return 
computed over a pre-announcement period. “Market momentum” is the cumulative return on a market index over a pre-
announcement period. “Market-to-book” represents the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
“Specific risk” is the residual variance of the stock return computed prior to the announcement. “Few disclosure” is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 when the number of public information disclosures prior to the announcement is said 
to be low. “Debt ratio change” represents the change in the leverage ratio implied by the stock offering. For any 
additional information about the explanatory variables, refer to the original texts. 
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Masulis and Korwar (1986) observe that the stock price decline is less severe if the issue is 
announced after a period of good performance by the market. In other words, when the market 
is doing well, the bad signal conveyed by the equity financing decision appears to be 
attenuated. The adverse selection costs may be reduced by the good overall perspectives. The 
results of Choe et al. (1993) and Denis (1994) confirm the positive relation between market 
momentum and the valuation effect. However, they attribute it to an agency costs reduction 
effect. A good performing market denotes of better economic conditions and should favour 
the undertaking of profitable investment projects. 
If the US empirical evidence agrees on a negative stock price reaction to announcements of 
public cash equity offerings, non-negative reactions are observed in France by Gajewski and 
Ginglinger (2002). Their sample is small as this flotation method is not predominant on the 
French market. The public cash procedure to issue equity in France is more risky because of 
the priority subscription period given to existing shareholders and should signal a better 
quality. The fact that the issuing price is set very close to the market price (98 % of the market 
price for uninsured public offerings and 94 % for underwritten public offerings; see Gajewski 
and Ginglinger, 2002; p. 297, Table II) confirms that this flotation method should be 
restricted to higher quality firms. 
In Japan, according to Kang and Stulz (1996), announcements of public cash offerings 
exhibit a positive stock price reaction (+0.51 %). This announcement effect is negatively 
related to both the issuer size and the price earning ratio. The impact of the price earning ratio 
is consistent with the adverse selection theory. Firms with a high price earning ratio are more 
likely to be overvalued and thus they are expected to issue overpriced equity. This Japanese 
price earning pattern is similar to the US pre-issue stock price run-up. In addition, the positive 
reaction is stronger for small issuers. Large Japanese firms experience similar market 
reactions as US firms. The stock price reaction is positively related to the leverage ratio 
measured by the loans divided by the total assets. More levered firms that issue equity are 
expected to adjust their debt ratio. This operation tends to be better perceived by the market. 
The positive stock price reaction that occurs at the announcement date is, however, offset by a 
stock price drop at the issuing date. This pattern is not explained by the fact that Japanese 
banks support the stock price during the issuing period. Kang and Stulz (1996, p. 137) 
attribute the Japanese-specific stock price reaction to the behaviour of Japanese managers 
who are not as concerned about mispricing of existing securities as American managers seem 
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to be. Japanese managers may adopt a longer-term vision instead of a short-term shareholder 
value concern. 
2.2.1.2 Offerings with subscription rights 
US rights offerings announcements exhibit less negative reaction than public cash offerings 
announcements. The reaction remains significantly negative for standby rights offerings 
(-1.03 %) but it is no longer significant for uninsured rights offerings. Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992) show that the average direct flotation costs of uninsured rights offerings are 
significantly lower than that the costs of standby rights offerings which in turn are cheaper 
than firm-commitment public cash offers. Though, rights offerings nearly disappear since 
1980 in the US. One explanation could be an adverse selection problem. If the current 
shareholders’ take up is low, a rights offering is subject to the same adverse selection cost as a 
public cash offering. Outside shareholders infer that the stock price is overvalued at the time 
of the issue. Depending on the level of shareholders’ take up, the rights offering flotation 
method and standby rights in particular offers no advantage in terms of reducing the costs of 
adverse selection. Furthermore, when the ownership dispersion increases, so does the reliance 
to public cash offerings, rights offerings being restricted to issues with a large blockholder 
subscription pre-commitment. 
Like in the US, rights offerings are marginally used by Japanese firms (see Table 2.3 for 
details about the number of rights offerings). Kang and Stulz (1996) report an average 
positive valuation effect of 2.21 %. Cooney, Kato and Schallheim (2003) examine separately 
both rights flotation methods used by Japanese firms : the fixed-price and the formula-price 
methods. The positive announcement effect (1.56 %) is restricted to fixed-price offerings 
where the price is set several days before the subscription period, at a discount price relative 
to the current market price. The issuing price discount is negatively related to the 
announcement effect. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that Japanese 
underwriters provide a certification about the true price being at least as great as the offer 
price. It is also supportive of Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) prediction and of the price setting 
hypothesis of Giammarino and Lewis (1988). In a formula-price offering, the issuing price is 
set closer in time to the subscription period and the offering is automatically cancelled if there 
is a significant decline in the market stock price. Hence, this flotation method is less risky for 
the underwriter and presents a lower level of certification. 
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In European countries, rights offering is the predominant flotation method, which creates a 
fundamental difference relative to the US and Japan. Overall, the stock price reaction to rights 
offerings announcements is positive or non-negative. However, it may depend on the 
contractual placement agreement, whether the issue is underwritten or uninsured. The main 
findings of the reviewed studies are summarised in Table 2.3. Positive valuation effects are 
found in the UK by Marsh (1979) who uses monthly data and finds an abnormal return of 
+2.1 % over the month following the announcement. Because of the data frequency, the 
abnormal reaction cannot be strictly attributed to the event announcement.  
In Norway, Bohren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) find that a positive valuation effect to 
announcements of uninsured rights offerings (+1.55 %) while the stock price reaction is not 
significant for standby rights offerings. The difference between both announcement effects is 
significant. Direct flotation costs of uninsured rights offerings are lower than underwritten 
standby contract fees. Though, standby rights offerings are more numerous. This fact is 
attributed to the expected shareholders’ take-up which is negatively related with the 
probability of underwritten standby rights offerings. The shareholder activism acts like a 
positive signal. When insiders subscribe to the offering in a large proportion, they inform the 
market about their positive expectations about the firm future performance. This is especially 
true if important inside shareholders increase their relative holdings despite of optimal 
portfolio diversification considerations. Besides, Bohren et al. (1997) observe that the 
valuation effect is negatively related to the size of the issue and to the stock return 
momentum. These finding are consistent with information asymmetry theories and with the 
US evidence about public offerings.  
Tsangarakis (1996) tests a price setting hypothesis on the Greek market for equity rights 
issues. Rights offerings are differentiated according to the issuing price discount. Small 
discount offerings exhibit an average positive but insignificant valuation effect, while large 
discount offerings experience a significant positive stock price reaction of 5.39 %. The 
difference between both groups is not statistically significant. These findings are not 
consistent with the predictions of Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) about the signalling role of the 
issuing price. 
Apart from the group of countries showing a globally positive valuation effect to rights 
equity offerings announcements, Switzerland, Germany and Italy form another group where 
equity issuers do not experience overall significant abnormal stock price reaction when they 
announce rights offerings. In Switzerland, Loderer and Zimmermann (1988) observe a non-
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significant positive reaction during the month following rights offerings announcements. 
They explain it by the legality of insider trading and the use of rights offering that reduce 
agency costs and information asymmetry between managers and the capital market. In fact, 
the manager sets the issuing price in such a way that the post-issue market price reflect the 
true value of the firm. Furthermore, Swiss firms have the opportunity to issue three classes of 
shares giving different control right properties to their holders. Caramanolis, Gibson and 
Tuchschmid (1996) allow the different classes of shares to show specific announcement 
effects. They document that only the class of shares with the most voting rights power, when 
issued by partially controlled corporations, experiences a slightly significant positive 
valuation effect. This finding is attributed to the reduction of agency costs and/or the benefit 
of corporate control. The corporate control position of dominant shareholders does not 
interfere with the fund raising activity because of the rights flotation method and because of 
the potential restriction on the transfer of the registered share voting rights. However, 
country-specific factors such as the substitution role of equity issues for stock dividends or the 
quasi-split effect are not addressed in this study although they represent alternative ways to 
differentiate equity offerings and to test the neutrality of subscription rights. 
Although no overall abnormal market reaction is noticed for German rights offerings, 
Gebhardt, Heiden and Daske (2001) observe significant valuation effects when they split their 
sample according to firm types or ownership structures. Offerings made by financial 
corporations exhibit a significantly negative stock price reaction of –0.58 % whereas non-
financial issuers experience positive valuation effect of 0.64 %. Non-financial firms undergo a 
severe certification process when their offering is underwritten by their “Hausbank”. In that 
sense, the positive market reaction could be explained by this certification argument. 
Furthermore, the issuing price discount could be viewed as signal of quality as predicted by 
Heinkel and Schwartz (1986). When the sample of non-financial issuers is split according to 
firm size. Small issuers show a positive stock price reaction of 1.47 % whereas large issuers 
experience no significant reactions. The “Hausbank” certification process is more informative 
for small firms that are more likely to be listed on market segments with less constraining 
legal requirements. Family controlled issuers as well as those controlled by financial 
institutions exhibit a positive stock price reaction. These firms are assumed to face less 
agency costs problems because of their concentrated ownership. Moreover, if controlling 
shareholders exercise their rights, they contribute to reduce adverse selection problems. They 
would have no interest in selling overpriced securities to themselves. Conversely, managerial 
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firms experience a slightly significant stock price decline, which is consistent with the agency 
theory predictions. A non-negative valuation effect is observed for issuers that include 
information about dividends and earnings in their issuing prospectus. This result is consistent 
with the dividend paying – equity refund argument. However, no cross-sectional tests are 
made about the explanatory power of dividend payments on the announcement effect or on 
the issuing frequency. 
In Italy, Bigelli (1998) finds no abnormal announcement effect for offerings with rights. 
Though, Italian firms issue equity with a large discount (50 % to 60 % of the market price) 
which generates a quasi-split effect (a permanent stock price decline). In addition, most of 
Italian rights issues combines stock dividends and cash offerings. The quasi-split effect is 
emphasised for combined offerings because it implies, for a constant dividend per share ratio, 
an increase in the dividend yield. If quasi-split effect is the main motive to the equity issue 
decisions, the announcement valuation effect cannot be interpreted as capital structure choice. 
Consequently, information asymmetry and agency costs variables do not explain cross-
sectional variations in the announcement abnormal returns. The positive stock price reaction 
to combined offerings announcement (+2.77 %) is only explained by the magnitude of the 
quasi-split effect and by the increase in the dividend yield it proxies. 
Unlike in other European countries, announcements of rights offerings in France and the 
Netherlands generates significant negative stock price reaction. Gajewski and 
Ginglinger (2002) document an average 2-day valuation effect of –1.11 % for uninsured 
rights offerings and of –0.74 % for standby rights offerings; the valuation effect of uninsured 
rights remains significantly negative over a 5-day interval from the announcement date on. 
These results contrast with the absence of abnormal reaction to public offering 
announcements. The valuation effect is negatively related to the size of the offering and to the 
stock return momentum. These findings are supportive of information asymmetry. When the 
offering proceeds serve to finance an identified acquisition, the stock price reaction is 
improved. Ownership structure and ownership changes after the issue have implications on 
the stock price reaction. For closely controlled issuers, existing shareholders’ take up is 
negatively related to the announcement effect. In this case, a lower shareholders’ take up 
reduces the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. For firms without a 
majority shareholder, existing shareholders’ take up has a positive influence on the stock price 
reaction as it signals a better quality. 
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Table 2.3 : Stock price reaction to announcements of rights SEOs 
Authors Market Sample of Primary 
offerings 
Announcement 
2-day CAR 
Significant explanatory 
variables 
Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992) 
US 01.1963-12.1981 
41 standby rights 
26 uninsured 
 
-1.03 % 
-1.39 % 
Significantly less negative 
than announcement effect 
of public offerings 
Cooney, Kato and 
Schallheim (2003) 
Japan 02.1974-08.1991 
555 offerings 
 
+0.63 % 
Flotation method (-) 
Expected discount (-) 
Kang and Stulz (1996) Japan 01.1985-05.1991 
28 offerings 
 
+2.21 % 
 
Marsh (1979) UK 07.1962-12.1975 
254 offerings 
+2.10 % 
monthly 
 
Bohren, Eckbo and 
Michalsen (1997) 
Norway 01.1980-12.1993 
74 uninsured 
114 standby 
 
+1.55 % 
-0.23 % 
 
Size of the issue (-) 
Momentum (-) 
Tsangarakis (1996) Greece 01.1981-12.1990 
20 small discount 
20 large discount 
 
+2.58 % 
+5.39 % 
 
Gebhardt, Heiden and 
Daske (2001) 
Germany 01.1981-12-1990 
129 non financial 
61 financial 
 
+0.64 % 
-0.58 % 
Positive for small and 
privately controlled non-
financial firms 
Loderer and 
Zimmermann (1988) 
CH 01.1973-12.1983 
122 offerings 
+2.00 % 
Monthly 
 
Caramanolis, Gibson 
and Tuchschmid (1996) 
CH 01.1980-12.1992 
97 offerings 
 
+0.70 % 
 
Bigelli (1998) Italy 01.1980-12.1994 
46 offerings 
 
-0.75 % 
 
De Jong and 
Veld (2001) 
NL 01.1977-12.1996 
51 offerings 
 
-1.46 % 
Return on assets (+) 
Size of the issue (+) 
Acquisition (+) 
Over-investment (-) 
Gajewski and 
Ginglinger (2002) 
France 01.1986-12.1996 
57 uninsured rights 
140 standby rights 
 
-1.11 % 
-0.74 % 
Size of the issue (-) 
Momentum (-) 
Acquisition (+) 
Share concentration (+) 
Italic means significant at a 10 % level, bold at a 5 % level and bold italic at a 1 % level. The last column entails 
the significant explanatory variables in multivariate cross-sectional regression run on the announcement abnormal 
return. The sign in parentheses shows the sign of the significant coefficient. The size of the issue is measured 
either by the relative number of new issued shares, by the relative amount to be offered or by the offer proceeds. 
“Momentum” means the stock price cumulative return computed over a pre-announcement period. For any 
additional information about the explanatory variables, refer to the original texts. 
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In the Netherlands, the negative stock price reaction to rights offerings announcements 
(-1.46 %; see de Jong and Veld, 2001) is explained by agency costs considerations. 
Managers’ entrenchment and the risk of over-investment exacerbate the stock price decline. 
When managers announce an equity issue together with the completion of an acquisition, it 
has a positive impact on the stock price reaction. Investors being able to judge the use of the 
proceeds are less inclined to consider it as over-investment. On the other hand, information 
asymmetry and adverse selection are rejected as explanations of the valuation effect. The 
stock price reaction is positively related to the return on assets and to the size of the issue, 
which is converse to the information asymmetry predictions. 
2.2.1.3 Public or rights equity offerings, what is the difference ? 
Marginal financing decision models assume passive existing shareholders and predict a 
negative impact of equity issues announcement on the firm value. Public cash offerings made 
by US firms fit that context perfectly. Therefore, information asymmetry and agency costs 
variables have a high explanatory power. Although it is not clear which model dominates the 
others, both theories are given some support. When public cash offerings made in another 
institutional context are considered, the valuation effect is no longer compatible with theories 
predictions. It is positive in Japan because Japanese managers are less concerned with short-
term maximisation of equity market value. They care more about their leverage ratio than 
about selling overpriced securities. No valuation effect is observed in France because the 
direct cash flotation method is restricted to higher quality firms and conveys a positive signal 
that offset adverse selection and agency costs. 
The explanatory power of marginal financing decision models is even more weakened with 
rights offerings. Existing shareholders may not be passive and the implications of adverse 
selection are strongly reduced. Shareholders’ take-up becomes an important variable in the 
context of agency problems. Information asymmetry is still present but signalling takes over 
on adverse selection. Underwriter’s certification, underwriting contracts or issuing discounts 
are more appropriate to explain positive or non-negative stock price reactions. Institutional 
specificities in Switzerland and Italy dominate capital structure or financing choices in the 
equity issue decision process. Only when the valuation effect is on average negative, 
“standard” explanatory variables get back some significant power as it is the case in France 
and in the Netherlands. 
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This overview of empirical evidence underlines the importance of well defining the 
experiment framework. Hypotheses to be tested must be set according to the institutional 
context and then interpretations of the results will be meaningful. For direct comparison with 
the US evidence, the market of French rights offerings seem to constitute the most adequate 
support. This observation is consistent with the examination of the institutional specificities 
made in the previous chapter. 
2.2.2 Impact of other securities issues on the firm value 
Theories of capital structure predict particular stock price reactions not only to equity offer 
announcements but also to announcements of other securities issues. For instance, Myers and 
Majluf (1984) argue that offerings of straight bonds should generate less adverse selection 
costs than equity issues. Miller and Rock (1985) present the reliance to external financing as a 
bad signals about future earnings. According to those models, the announcement of any 
external financing solution should generate a negative stock price reaction. Offerings 
combining a cash component and a conditional offering involves a monitoring device that 
should be well perceived by the market. Theories of the agency costs of equity or of free cash 
flow predict a positive reaction to the announcement of a debt offering. The examination of 
the announcement effect of other securities issues could help understanding the explanatory 
power of a given theory of capital structure. It has been shown previously that it is not an easy 
thing to do when only new equity issues are considered. The findings of the articles reviewed 
in this section are summarised in Table 2.4. 
2.2.2.1 Units offerings 
An issue of units is a two-stage financing. Cash is first raised at the issuance of the security 
and then, in a second step, conditioned by the stock performance, cash can be raised over a 
period defined at the offering of the warrants. The two-stage financing mechanism involves a 
reduction in the agency costs at the time of the issue. Relying to a two-stage financing implies 
that there is a risk for the second financing to be cancelled (the warrants are not exercised). 
Therefore, choosing this type of financing should signal good prospects about the firm and its 
investment strategy. Both hypotheses predict the announcement effect of unit offerings should 
be less negative than announcements of pure equity financing. Byoun (2002) documents a 
negative valuation effect for announcements of US unit offerings (-1.97 %). The market 
reaction to units offering announcements is significantly less negative than that of common 
stock offerings over the same period (-2.68 %). The stock price reaction to unit offerings 
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announcements is negatively correlated with the pre-announcement stock return momentum, 
with the pre-announcement stock return volatility and with the book-to-market ratio, which is 
consistent with the US evidence about common stock offerings and with information 
asymmetry and agency costs predictions. However, the coefficient for the size of the issue and 
for the underwriter’s prestige have the opposite sign relative to SEO evidence, which makes 
units issues different from common stock offerings. In addition, the valuation effect is 
inversely related to the fraction of warrant in the offering. This last finding mitigates the 
monitoring role of optional equity financing. Unit offerings are realised by firms that are 
smaller, younger, with less prestigious underwriter and with a larger growth potential than 
common equity issuers. For these firms, unit offerings may constitute an easier way to obtain 
equity financing, precisely because of the signalling and agency costs advantages. In other 
words, firms choosing units offerings are penalised by the market but at a lower degree than if 
they would have issued common stocks. 
Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002) examine the announcement effect of unit offerings on the 
French market. Units are issued through rights or public flotation methods but both types 
exhibit insignificant announcement effect. This non-negative valuation effect could be due to 
a signalling effect. Higher quality firms may choose to issue equity with a two-stage financing 
procedure in order to benefit from the second income of cash that is conditioned by the firm 
performance. In a parallel research, Chollet and Ginglinger (2001) shows that French units are 
issued, partly, to prevent the cancellation of common public cash offerings. Because they can 
be under-priced, units offerings allow issuers to avoid the price setting rigidity of common 
stock public issues. At the same time, the proportion of the equity sold through the warrant 
can be viewed as a monitoring device. Consequently, units under-pricing is positively related 
to the future implied SEO size. These results support the hypothesis that issues of units signal 
the firm’s quality to new investors and that it has high growth opportunities. 
2.2.2.2 Convertible bonds offerings 
In the US, announcements of convertible bond issues generate negative stock price 
reactions. Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Eckbo (1986) and 
Hansen and Crutchley (1990) all agree on a stock price decline ranging from –1.25 % to 
-2.13 % and statistically significant at a 1 % level. Information asymmetry finds support as an 
explanatory variable to the announcement effect. The issue of convertible bonds occurs when 
the stock price is overvalued. However, Dann and Mikkelson (1984) mitigates this adverse 
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selection effect as they do not document different reactions according to the use of the 
proceeds. Financing an investment project and refunding debt do not influence the market 
reaction. In Mikkelson and Partch (1986), the relative amount collected by the issue is 
negatively related to the stock price reaction, which is consistent with Krasker (1986). 
Eckbo (1986) argues that his results are inconsistent with theories of optimal capital structure 
which predict a positive effect on the market value for leverage increasing operations. 
Nonetheless, the overall stock price decline to announcements of convertible bonds issues is 
less severe than the one observed at the announcement of equity issues. This is consistent with 
the pecking order theory. The US evidence rejects the signalling aspect of mixed securities 
issues proposed by Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Constantinides and Grundy (1989). Issues 
of convertibles bonds are rather considered by the market as disguised and delayed equity 
offerings, which is attested by the market reaction at their announcements. US results are 
supported by Abhyankar and Dunning (1999) who also observe a significant negative 
valuation effect at the announcement of convertible bonds offerings in the UK. 
The evidence is converse in Japan. Kang and Stulz (1996) document a positive market 
reaction. Unlike in other countries, convertible debt is the main source of external financing 
during the 80's for Japanese firms. Opposite to the US evidence, Japanese managers issue 
convertible bonds when their firm is undervalued, maybe to avoid the sale of undervalued 
equity. In their point of view, issuing convertible bonds signals good financial perspectives. 
Unlike in the previous studies, Burlacu (2000) differentiates French convertible bonds 
according to their similarity with debt or equity. The convertible price sensitivity to a change 
in the value of the underlying stock serves to rank issues of convertibles into three different 
groups: debt-like convertibles for those being the least sensitive, equity-like convertibles for 
the most sensitive ones and mixed convertibles for the ones with an average sensitivity. The 
equity-like convertibles exhibit a significant negative stock price reaction which is consistent 
with the US evidence. The debt-like convertibles do not experience any significant market 
reaction and mixed convertibles show an average positive announcement valuation effect. 
Burlacu (2000) observes that issuers of mixed convertibles are undervalued. For them, the 
optional component signal the quality of their financial perspectives. In that sense, they adopt 
a similar behaviour as Japanese issuers. The market reaction to announcements of debt-like or 
equity-like convertibles issues is negatively related to the relative size of the issue and to the 
magnitude of financial slack, which supports the existence of an adverse selection effect. This 
adverse selection effect is greater the stronger the equity-like component is. In the case of 
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mixed convertibles, the relative size of the issue and the magnitude of financial slack are also 
significantly related to the announcement effect but the sign of the relations is positive, which 
underlines the difference between mixed convertibles and the other types. The findings of 
Burlacu (2000) may be viewed as supportive of the signalling devices of combined financing 
solution in the sense of Brennan and Kraus (1987). Actually, in the mixed category, the 
convertible is an integrated complex financial instrument that is neither equity-like nor debt-
like. 
2.2.2.3 Straight public debt offerings 
The overall stock price reaction to announcements of straight public debt issues (straight 
bonds) is not significantly different from zero. The institutional setting does not seem to 
influence the market perception of such events. Similar results are obtained on the US market 
(Dann and Mikkelson, 1984; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Eckbo, 1986), on the Japanese 
market (Kang and Stulz, 1996) and in the Netherlands (de Jong and Veld, 2001), which is a 
French civil law origin country. Examined independently from other external financing forms, 
the absence of market reaction to debt financing decision is consistent with the capital 
structure irrelevancy and contradicts positive predictions of Ross (1977) for signalling the 
firm quality and Jensen (1986) for the reduction of free cash flow or negative predictions of 
Miller and Rock (1985) for signalling bad earnings perspectives. However, when considered 
with announcement effects for equity and convertible bonds, the non-negative market reaction 
to bond issue announcements supports the pecking order theory. 
Table 2.4 : Stock price reaction to announcements non-equity financing 
Authors Market Sample of financing 
operations 
Announcement 
2-day CAR 
Significant explanatory 
variables 
Panel A : unit offerings 
Byoun (2002) US 01.1980-12.1997 
251 offerings 
 
-1.97 % 
Size of the issue (+) 
Underwriter prestige (-) 
Book-to-market (-) 
Optional size (-) 
Stock return volat. (-) 
Momentum (-) 
Gajewski and 
Ginglinger (2002) 
France 01.1986-12.1996 
17 rights units 
42 public units 
 
+0.23 % 
-0.51 % 
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Table 2.4 : continued 
Authors Market Sample of financing 
operations 
Announcement 
2-day CAR 
Significant explanatory 
variables 
Panel B : convertible bonds 
Dann and 
Mikkelson (1984) 
US 01.1970-12-1979 
132 issues 
 
-2.31 % 
 
Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986) 
US 01.1972-12.1982 
33 issues 
 
-1.97 % 
Size of the issue (-) 
Eckbo (1986) US 01.1964-12.1981 
75 issues 
 
-1.25 % 
 
Hansen and 
Crutchley (1990) 
US 01.1975-12.1982 
67 issues 
 
-1.45 % 
Stock price reaction to 
convertible bonds 
announcements is 
significantly less negative 
than for SEOs 
Abhyankar and 
Dunning (1999) 
UK 01.1982-12.1996 
129 issues 
 
-1.21 % 
Callable maturity (+) 
Kang and Stulz (1996) Japan 01.1985-12.1991 
561 issues 
 
+0.83 % 
Firm size (-) 
Loans/assets (-) 
Burlacu (2000) France 01.1981-12.1998 
187 issues 
 
-2.69 % 
Financial slack (-) 
Size of the issue (-) 
Stock component (-) 
Convertible type (+) 
Panel C : straight bond issues 
Dann and 
Mikkelson (1984) 
US 01.1970-12-1979 
150 issues 
 
-0.37 % 
 
Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986) 
US 01.1972-12.1982 
172 issues 
 
-0.23 % 
 
Eckbo (1986) US 01.1964-12.1981 
422 issues 
 
-0.06 % 
 
Kang and Stulz (1996) Japan 01.1985-12.1991 
13 issues 
 
+0.85 % 
 
De Jong and 
Veld (2001) 
NL 01.1977-12.1996 
137 issues 
 
+0.51 % 
 
Italic means significant at a 10 % level, bold at a 5 % level and bold italic at a 1 % level. The last column entails 
the significant explanatory variables in multivariate cross-sectional regressions run on the announcement 
abnormal return. The sign in parentheses shows the sign of the significant coefficient. Refer to the original texts 
for additional items. 
 
In addition to public debt offerings, Mikkelson and Partch (1986) examine the 
announcement effect of private borrowing arrangements. They observe a significant positive 
market reaction of 0.89 % to announcements of credit agreements whereas private placement 
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of debt and term loans do not generate significant announcement effect. When the intended 
use of the proceeds is neither debt refinancing nor capital expenditures financing, the 
announcement effect is significantly positive. This finding may be consistent with an optimal 
capital structure argument if the primary motive to issue debt is to increase the leverage ratio. 
2.2.3 The announcement effect of a debt-for-equity or equity-for-debt swap 
When marginal financing decisions are publicly announced, investors' reaction can be 
observed through the security market price response. Analysing the market reaction to pure 
capital structure change announcements makes it possible to confront the two main 
hypotheses of the static trade-off theory. Pure capital structure changes represent the direct 
trade-off of one type of security against another (i.e. debt-for-equity swap). On one hand, if 
the capital structure irrelevancy holds, exchanges of one security type against another should 
not generate any variation in the firm market value. On the other hand, if an optimal capital 
structure exists, a significant market reaction should be observed. The direction of the market 
reaction depends on the hypothesis to be tested. 
Masulis (1980) analyses the announcement effect of pure capital changes in the US. Pure 
capital changes include debt for common stocks exchanges, preferred for common stocks 
exchanges and debt for preferred stocks exchanges. Debt includes convertible and straight 
bonds. The tests cover three hypotheses : 1) a corporate tax effect, 2) a bankruptcy costs effect 
and 3) a wealth redistribution effect. The wealth redistribution effect differs from the other 
effects in the sense that it does not generate a change in the total market value. What is gained 
by one type of security is lost by the other. Corporate tax effect and bankruptcy costs effect 
generate variations in the total market value of the firm. 
Increasing leverage announcements generates significant positive returns on common 
stocks whereas decreasing leverage announcements causes negative returns. Evidence is 
found to the corporate tax effect which overcomes the potential bankruptcy costs effect. 
Opposite price changes are found across the different types of security which supports the 
wealth redistribution effect. Miller’s (1977) argument about the weak explanatory power of 
bankruptcy costs is confirmed as no direct evidence about this effect is found. The significant 
corporate tax effect supports the existence of a relation between capital structure and firm 
value. The evidence is mixed about the existence of an optimal capital structure. Actually, 
decreasing leverage operations generate losses in total firm value. This implies that some 
financing decisions are not taken in order to get closer to a value maximising debt ratio. 
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Millon Cornett and Travlos (1989) also examine debt-for-equity and equity-for-debt 
exchange offers in the US. They reach to the same stock price reactions as Masulis (1980). 
However, the straight and convertible bond price reactions (respectively insignificant and 
positive for debt-for-equity and both negative for equity-for-debt) are inconsistent with the 
wealth redistribution hypothesis. Hull (1999) relates stock price reaction to pure capital 
structure changes to an industry effect. His results are consistent with the existence of a target 
debt ratio at the industry level. 
2.3 Informational content of security issues announcements 
Information asymmetry is one of the most cited explanation for the stock price reaction to 
external financing announcements, especially in the US setting. The size of the issue, the pre-
issue stock price run-up as well as the residual variance have often significant coefficients in 
the multivariate analysis framework of the announcement effects. However, two elements 
mitigate the role of information asymmetry. First, competitive theories also have a significant 
explanatory power; e.g. agency costs. Second, the explanatory variables used as proxies for 
information asymmetry could support alternative hypotheses; e.g. the size of the issue could 
denote a price pressure reaction. The examination of the informational content of security 
issue announcements should outline the exact role of information asymmetry as an 
explanatory factor of the capital structure choices. External financing announcements could 
convey information about two elements : corporate earnings and the discount factor. For a 
negative stock price reaction, corporate earnings are expected to decrease after the 
announcement or business risk is expected to increase. The next two sub-sections review 
some of the main empirical findings about the informational content of security issues 
announcements. The last sub-section deals with the contribution of financial analysts’ 
earnings forecasts in reducing information asymmetry. 
2.3.1 About expected earnings 
Hansen and Crutchley (1990) analyse the equity vs. debt financing decision according to 
the operating performance. Earnings decline after any financing solution and this decline 
persists on the long-run. The size of the decline is positively related to the size of the issue. 
Industrial firms raise external financing to supplement prolonged earnings decreases. On 
average, the amount raised is sufficient to offset five years of poor operating performance. It 
is interesting to notice that the timing of the equity and debt issues differ. Common stocks are 
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offered before the firm enter into a significant earnings downturn. This gives evidence to the 
managers' ability to issue overvalued security when they have superior information about their 
firms perspectives. Conversely, straight bond issues occur when the earnings downturn is 
already known by the investors. This is consistent with the agency hypothesis that debt issues 
are more likely to take place when growth opportunities are poor in order to increase the 
monitoring over the manager's actions. The bonds issue announcements do not convey bad 
news to the market since it already knows that the firm is in an earnings downturn. 
If equity issue announcements convey information about the expected earnings, the 
announcements should imply revisions in analysts earnings forecasts. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the revisions should be related to the stock price reaction. These arguments are 
given evidence by Jain (1992) and Brous (1992). Jain (1992) takes the analysts' forecasts from 
the I/B/E/S data tape. He observes a positive relation between the negative average revision in 
earnings forecasts and the stock price decline at the SEO announcement. This result supports 
the information asymmetry hypothesis about future earnings. The equity issue provides a 
signal that expected earnings are currently overvalued. Brous (1992) also finds that SEO 
conveys bad news about the future earnings perspective. In addition, he compares the 
analysts’ revisions of short-term and long-term earnings forecasts. Before the SEO 
announcement, both forecasts are abnormally raised. This finding is consistent with the 
previously documented positive abnormal stock returns prior to the SEO. Following the issue 
announcement, only short-term forecasts are revised downward and positively correlated with 
the stock price reaction. Long-term forecasts about the earnings growth remain unchanged. 
These findings are consistent with the temporary overvaluation of the firm's equity predicted 
by the adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984) that allows managers to issue 
overpriced stocks. 
The findings of Brous (1992) should draw the attention on the opportunity for the managers 
to overstate corporate earnings before announcing an equity issue. If earnings have an 
informative role about the stock price, managers could be able to manipulate earnings in such 
a way to cause the pre-issue stock price run-up. Several studies corroborate the earnings 
manipulation argument. For Rangan (1998), earnings management consists in shifting income 
from future periods, typically by borrowing future income to increase earnings around the 
offering. Consequently, earnings decrease afterwards as the part of "borrowed" income is 
reduced in the books. Rangan (1998) finds that the earnings manipulation occurs in the SEO 
quarter and in the quarter immediately following. No proof of manipulation is found in the 
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quarter preceding the issue. As expected, the operating performance decreases in the year 
following the issue and the magnitude of this decline in operating performance is positively 
related to the manager's manipulation. The stock market is not able to take the earnings 
manipulation into account when it prices the firm's equity. The mispricing allows the manager 
to issue overvalued securities. The earnings manipulation is significantly related to the 
negative announcement effect. However, when the reversal in the earnings releases occurs 
during the subsequent year, the market still corrects the stock price downward. Information 
asymmetry is not totally eliminated by the equity issue announcement and investors cannot 
infer the true value of the firm. Earnings manipulations and their implication on the sale of 
overpriced equity are confirmed by Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998). Earnings are artificially 
increased before the equity issue while cash flows from operations are declining. The pattern 
is reversed after the issue. Cash flows are improving but they are not sufficient to sustain the 
net income at its highest level.  
Shivakumar (2000) observes similar earnings patterns around equity issues but abnormal 
stock price reactions to earnings releases show that investors are not fooled by earnings 
manipulations. If managers overstate earnings before an equity issue, investors anticipate this 
action and undo it at the offering announcement, explaining the stock price decline. The 
abnormal stock price reaction to earnings releases before the offering is positive. At the 
offering announcement, abnormal returns are negative and no abnormal stock price reaction is 
found at earnings disclosures made after the issue although earnings are decreasing. Because 
of information asymmetry, investors cannot identify which managers manipulate earnings. 
Thus, they rationally anticipate all offerings the same way. This investors' response gives 
incentives to unwilling managers to overstate earnings as well. Contrary to Teoh et al. (1998) 
and Rangan (1998), investors are able to fully correct the stock price at the announcement 
date. One reason, not addressed by Shivakumar (2000), for the absence of abnormal reaction 
to post-offering earnings releases could be that financial analysts revise downwardly their 
earnings forecasts informing investors about the earnings downturn. 
2.3.2 About the discount factor 
Other things equal, an equity offering is expected to lower the leverage ratio and the 
issuer’s financial risk. Accordingly, future earnings or cash flows should be discounted at a 
lower rate. From that “mechanical” point of view, equity β  should decrease after the offering 
and the stock price should increase. If the use of the proceeds modifies the business risk, the 
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impact on the discount factor could be reversed. In other words, an investment project that is 
more risky than current activities could result in an increase in both assets and equity β . This 
increase in equity β  may explain the stock price decline after a SEO announcement. In that 
sense, Healey and Palepu (1990) examine the relation between the stock price behaviour and 
changes in the business risk around US equity issues. They observe that managers issue 
equity when they anticipate an increase in the β  of the firm assets. This change in the assets 
β  lets the equity β  increase as well. The effect caused by the assets β  modification is 
greater than the one implied by the reduction of the financial risk. The implied increase in the 
equity β  is, on average, consistent with the stock price decline at the SEO announcement. 
The information about the change in the firm systematic risk is specific to issuers since other 
firms in the same industry do not experience similar β  and financial leverage changes. 
Furthermore, Healey and Palepu (1990) do not find evidence of significant revisions in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts after the equity issue. Information conveyed by the SEO 
announcement is then strictly about changes in the business risk. 
β
Discount factor implications to explain stock price abnormal reaction should be dealt with 
care. The discount factor is estimated and not directly observed. Thus, it is subject to error in 
variables problems. In addition, the estimation of the discount factor is also an asset pricing 
matter and it is sensitive to asset pricing model specification. Denis and Kadlec (1994) 
examine the relation between trading activity, the measurement of the stock price reaction to 
events and the change in systematic risk around US equity issue announcements. Opposite to 
Healey and Palepu (1990), they do not find evidence of changes in systematic risk 
surrounding these announcements once the estimation model has been corrected for stock 
price adjustment delays. To correct for these potential biases, daily stock returns should be 
regressed on lagged, contemporaneous and lead market returns in the manner of Fowler and 
Rorke (1983). When more than five leads and lags are used, changes in equity β  around 
equity issue announcements become insignificant. Moreover, changes in equity  are 
consistent with those implied by the leverage ratio modification. 
Bayless, Price and Monroe Smoller (1994) contradict the findings of Denis and 
Kadlec (1994). Using a Dimson (1979) estimation procedure, they observe that the average β  
of US equity issuers increases significantly after the financial decision announcement (from 
1.07 to 1.22). This result is consistent with Healey and Palepu (1990). According to Bayless 
et al. (1994), the average financial conditions of the issuing firms declines after the offering. 
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There is a significant decrease in sales growth, asset growth, operating income growth, 
operating income, cash to total assets, free cash flow and capital expenditure. These findings 
suggest that the money raised by the issue is not allocated optimally. Financial leverage 
declines after the issue, which should lead to a decrease in the equity beta. However, it is not 
the case. Equity issues could be viewed as a signal that managers anticipate a riskier earnings 
stream and therefore, they reduce the leverage ratio. This rationale is supported by the 
negative stock price reaction and the declining financial conditions of the firm. 
2.3.3 Contribution of financial analysts in reducing information asymmetry 
In presence of information asymmetry, financial analysts’ earnings forecasts could 
constitute a way to transmit part of the private information to the investors. Financial analysts 
maintain privileged relationships with managers. They are the most entitled actors to collect 
private information at low costs. They should have the professional skills to notice managers’ 
attempt to manipulate earnings. In that sense, financial analysts should contribute to reduce 
information asymmetry between the managers and the market. D’Mello and Ferris (2000) 
examine the role of financial analysts according to the quantity of information they convey to 
the market and according to the quality of this information. The quantity of information is 
proxied by the number of analysts following a given firm and the quality is estimated by the 
volatility of earnings forecasts in the consensus. Equity issuers that benefit from the largest 
quantity of information experience a less negative stock price decline at the SEO 
announcement than issuers that are followed by fewer analysts. Issuers cannot be 
differentiated according to the quality of information. However, the dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts may not be an accurate proxy for information asymmetry because of infrequent and 
non-simultaneous revisions in earnings forecasts. 
Several authors raise some doubts about financial analysts being the most efficient vehicle 
to transmit information to the market. Lim (2001) argues that analysts could find it optimal to 
positively bias their earnings forecasts in order to gain management and information access. 
He finds that the forecasts bias is greatest for companies that are small, covered by fewer 
analysts, with more volatile payoffs, that experience poor stock performance or negative 
earnings surprises. At the same time, the forecasts bias is negatively related to the size of the 
brokerage firm and to the analyst's experience. These findings support the hypothesis that 
analysts trade off positively biased forecasts against an improved access to manager and 
future information. By doing so, they expect their forecasts to gain in accuracy over the 
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following periods. Therefore, the analyst's behaviour is driven by the will to reduce the 
information asymmetry between the firm and the market even if to do so, he must bias his 
forecasts. 
Carleton, Chen and Steiner (1998) and Hayward and Boeker (1998) outline the conflicts of 
interests between financial analysts’ departments and investment banking activities within the 
same institution. In universal banks, these conflicts of interests are expected to be even more 
emphasised as the client is offered a wider range of financial services. For Carleton, Chen, 
Steiner (1998), the motivation to capture underwriting work causes the investment 
recommendations of brokerage/investment banks to be overly optimistic about clients or 
potential clients financial perspectives. Analysts’ trading recommendations should help to 
attract new underwriting contracts or to keep clients satisfied. Financial analysts are torn 
between issuing accurate earnings forecasts and emitting positively biased recommendations. 
Hayward and Boeker (1998) show that corporate finance departments have more power than 
analysts departments because their contribution to the bank profit is greater and because they 
are more represented in the institution top management – the second explanation being partly 
dependent of the first one. Hence, investment banking departments are able to overrule 
financial analysts’ independence and force them to issue better ratings about existing or 
potential clients26. To moderate the corporate finance dominance, analysts' departments have 
to gain in reputation. Alternatively, an active job market for financial analysts could 
strengthen their independence. By issuing accurate forecasts, analysts increase their 
reputation27, which gives them access to higher position, more prestigious banks and larger 
remuneration. However, even in the US where career concerns and job market activity for 
security analysts should help them resist to external pressure, conflicts of interest are at the 
advantage of investment banking activities. In Europe, Bolliger (2001) shows that the job 
market of analysts does not value their track-record. Therefore, financial analysts have no 
incentives to produce accurate earnings forecasts to seek for top positions. Reputation 
concerns do not counterbalance the potential pressure from investment banking department. 
                                                 
26 The firing of a Credit Suisse financial analyst that issued sell recommendations on Swissair, before the Swiss 
airline company collapsed in 2001, illustrates the conflict of interests and its implication on analysts’ career. 
Crédit Suisse was one of Swissair main creditors and a large shareholder as well. 
27 See Hong and Kubik (2000) for a study on US security analysts job market. 
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2.3.4 Informational content of security issues in summary 
The informational content of security issue announcements has been analysed in terms of 
information asymmetry about the firm value. The firm market value is defined as the sum of 
the discounted future cash flows. Thus, the signal included in the external financing decision 
deals with either the stream of future cash flows or the discounting factor. The evolution of 
earnings and earnings forecasts proxies the informational content about cash flows. Changes 
in systematic risk measure the informational content about the discounting factor. Table 2.5 
summarises the empirical studies reviewed in this section. All these researches are based on 
US data, for which information asymmetry is one of the significant explanations of the 
marginal capital structure choices. 
Equity issues are found to occur before a downturn in corporate earnings. Furthermore, 
some evidence has been given that abnormally good earnings have been disclosed just prior 
the offering announcements. These findings are consistent with the adverse selection model of 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and the signalling model of Miller and Rock (1985). It has also been 
discussed that earnings may be subject to manipulations by managers in order to overvalue 
the stock price at the time of the equity issue. This argument assumes a great level of 
information asymmetry because investors are not able to detect the stock overpricing and the 
earnings manipulations before the equity issue is announced. Financial analysts through their 
earnings forecasts should help lowering this level of information asymmetry but they are 
subject to conflicts of interests that could lead them to over-estimate their forecasts. By doing 
so, they may even contribute to the overpricing pattern. 
Evidence about the information content about risk is mixed. Other things equal, an equity 
issue should decrease the leverage ratio and hence the level of systematic financial risk. The 
empirical findings contradict this assumption. The equity beta increases after the issue or does 
not change. The results about beta changes depend on the estimation procedure of the 
coefficient of systematic risk. A part (if not all) of the increase could be due to infrequent 
trading and price adjustment delays. 
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Table 2.5 : The informational content of security issues announcements 
Authors Market Sample Results 
Panel A : information about corporate earnings 
Hansen and 
Crutchley (1990) 
US 364 equity, 
convertibles and 
straight bonds 
offerings 
1975 and 1982 
Negative abnormal earnings after all types 
of issues 
Equity issues are made before the earnings 
downturn while straight debt issue are made 
during the downturn 
Jain (1992) US 269 equity issues 
1978 and 1983 
Revisions of financial analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are related to announcement 
returns of equity issues 
Brous (1992) US 350 equity issues 
1976 and 1985 
Decrease in short-term earnings forecasts 
after an equity issue 
No change in long-term forecasts 
Rangan (1998) US 230 equity offerings 
1987 and 1990 
Earnings management around the equity 
issue explains the earnings changes and the 
stock price reaction 
Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998) 
US 1265 equity offerings 
1976 and 1989 
Issuers overstates their earnings by 
manipulating discretionary accruals  
Shivakumar (2000) US 1222 equity issues 
1983 and 1992 
Earnings management around equity issues 
but no abnormal market reactions to 
subsequent earnings disclosures 
Panel B : information about risk 
Healey and Palepu (1990) US 96 equity issues 
1966 and 1981 
Equity issues announcements convey 
information about an increase in assets and 
equity betas which is specific to the issuing 
firm 
Denis and Kadlec (1994) US 792 equity issues 
1984 and 1989 
Betas do not change around equity issue if 
estimated properly 
Bayless, Price and Monroe 
Smoller (1994) 
US 2391 equity issues 
1974 and 1992 
Beta increases around equity issues even if 
they are estimated properly 
Panel C : Financial analysts’ contribution 
D’Mello and Ferris (2000) US 576 equity issues 
1977 and 1988 
Equity financing announcement effects are 
more negative for firms followed by fewer 
financial analysts (more subject to 
information asymmetry) 
 
Equity issues are event that could be, at least partly, anticipated by investors. The total 
economic valuation effect of equity issue decisions involves the expected value that investors 
give to managers’ private information. Conditional event study methodology is able to take 
into account that private information value. If it significantly explains stock price reactions to 
equity issue announcement, then the event is proved to have an informational content. 
Otherwise, the valuation effect should be attributed to other determinants of capital structure 
choices. Guo and Mech (2000) apply a conditional event study methodology to the equity 
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issue announcements. They find that the issue decision is taken in periods of low information 
asymmetry and that earnings disclosures, stock split declarations and dividend 
announcements help investors anticipate equity issues. However, the anticipation power of 
their model remains low and no clear distinction can be made between anticipation and 
private information effects. Their conditional approach is interesting although their model 
specification is open to criticism, especially on how they model the impact of private 
information on the announcement stock price reaction28. 
2.4 Timing of security issues 
The hypothesis of timing security issue decisions finds its justification in both information 
asymmetry and agency costs theories. High quality firms may forego profitable investment 
opportunities if they have to finance them by issuing undervalued securities. If they have the 
opportunity to postpone these projects, they could avoid under-investment by timing their 
investment-financing decisions in periods when adverse selection costs are lower, when 
information asymmetry is reduced. One condition for the timing hypothesis to hold is that 
information is time-varying. In the first sub-section, two empirical studies are reviewed that 
deals with the impact of time-varying information asymmetry on the timing of financing 
decisions. 
Business cycle may also influence the timing of security issues. During periods of 
economic expansions growth opportunities are more numerous. Investment projects have a 
greater chance of success or to be profitable. According to that, the risk of over-investment is 
reduced as well as the agency costs of equity. In the same way, information asymmetry about 
investment opportunities is less severe, which lowers the adverse selection costs. Managers 
should be less reluctant to issue equity during expansion phases of the business cycle. The 
implication of business cycle on security issue decisions are examined in the second sub-
section. 
Firms may be inclined to take similar financing decisions at the same time, creating hot 
issue periods for equity or for debt. A manager, noticing that many firms in his environment 
issue equity, may be influenced to realise such an operation. These hypotheses are addressed 
in the third sub-section with the ability of financial analysts to create hot issue periods by 
                                                 
28 By letting the variance of private information be firm-specific, Guo and Mech (2000) make assumptions about 
the sign and the magnitude of the estimated value given to that private information that are not in accordance 
with the work of Acharya (1988; 1993) and Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams (1990.) 
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being over-optimistic about their growth forecasts. In the fourth sub-section, the timing of 
financing decision is analysed in a long-term or historic perspective as current capital 
structures seem to be better explained by past financing choices than by contemporaneous 
determinants. The section concludes with a summary of managers’ timing ability and 
consequences on firm value. 
2.4.1 Equity issues clustering in periods of low information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry models of marginal financing decisions assume that managers have 
private information, that they base their investment-financing decision on that private 
information and that the announcement of the decision reveals their private information to the 
market. Information asymmetry is implicitly supposed to be constant over time, at least until 
private information is released. Dierkens (1991) describes the information environment of the 
firm. Managers and investors share the same information about market-wide uncertainty. 
However, managers cumulate private information over time which is conveyed sooner or later 
to investors through one of the following manners : First, it is assumed that investors 
automatically learns about firm-specific information after a given delay, . Second, managers 
are forced to reveal their private information on a periodical basis (disclosure requirements). 
Third, managers voluntary reveal private information by announcing a given event. Figure 2.1 
is inspired by the Figure 2 in Dierkens (1991, p. 185) and illustrates the information 
environment of the firm. Information asymmetry, 
L
IA , appears on the vertical axis. 
Figure 2.1 clearly shows the impact on time-varying information asymmetry. Information 
asymmetry is at its lowest level immediately after private information releases such as 
earnings or turnover disclosures. It reaches its maximum level when investors automatically 
start to learn about private information. From that point on, additional private information still 
arrives to managers but its effect on the information asymmetry level is compensated by the 
automatic learning process. Voluntary private information disclosures made between two 
legally required releases lowers the average level of information asymmetry. Managers have 
the ability to time their financing decision according to the level of information asymmetry 
but they can also modify this level by releasing voluntarily more or less private information. 
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Figure 2.1 : Information environment of the firm with time-varying asymmetry 
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that this delay introduces a risk of evaporation. Adverse selection costs are small soon after 
dividends or quarterly earnings releases. In order to avoid the sale of undervalued stocks, 
managers are more likely to wait for periods of low information asymmetry to announce 
equity issues. Managers of high quality firm balance the benefit of postponing the issue to a 
favourable information asymmetry period against the risk of project evaporation. The shorter 
the time until the next periodical information release, the worthier becomes the delaying of 
the issue-invest decision. For lower quality firms, timing is not a concern. The risk of 
evaporation is greater and managers are more tempted to issue overpriced securities. All in 
all, Korajczyk et al. (1992) predict that equity issues are more likely to be concentrated after 
plausible information releases and that market reactions should be more severe for issues that 
occur outside of these favourable information asymmetry periods. 
Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991) find support of their model. US Firms tend to issue 
equity soon after quarterly earnings disclosures rather than late after. They avoid to issue 
equity during the few weeks after the fourth quarter earnings announcement. They prefer 
waiting for the release of the audited annual report, published several weeks after the last 
earnings release and considered as more informative (certification by the independent 
auditors). The stock price reaction to equity issue announcements is negatively related to the 
time between the last quarterly earnings release and the announcement date. This relation is 
supportive of the timing hypothesis. Evidence is also given to the informational content of 
earnings releases. On average, earnings releases in the year prior to the equity issue convey 
good news and generate a larger stock price reaction than those made in the year following 
the issue. This finding could indicate that equity issue may be timed after a period of good 
performance, which is consistent with the pre-issue stock price run-up predicted by Myers and 
Majluf (1984). 
2.4.2 Business cycle and external financing decisions 
The relation between external financing decisions and the business cycle is addressed by 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) in an imperfectly competitive financial market. Managers 
have superior information about security prices and they are given the choice to issue debt or 
equity according to general economic conditions. All things being equal, the decision to issue 
equity or debt to finance an investment project depends on how existing shareholders’ wealth 
is affected by the financing decision. Firms of higher quality would prefer debt financing as 
they could signal their current under-valuation on the stock market. Firms of lower quality 
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choose equity financing because they are currently overprice on the stock market. Global 
economic conditions have three direct implications on external financing decisions. First, the 
need for external financing is more important during expansion phases of the business cycle 
than during recessions, even for a constant level of investment profitability. Second, if 
investment projects payoffs are assumed to be increasing with economic conditions, equity 
issuers will face lower adverse selection costs and lower agency costs of free cash flow during 
business cycle up turns. Consequently, more firms choose equity financing as they anticipate 
better announcement valuation effects. In other words, equity issues are expected to increase 
more than debt issues when economic conditions are growing. Third, total market 
capitalisation increases during economic expansion phases. This increase accelerates the 
issue-invest decisions and the number of external financing decisions is positively correlated 
with the growth rate in the economy. 
Inspired by the predictions of Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), Choe, Masulis and 
Nanda (1993) propose a testable model describing the influence of business cycle on external 
financing decisions. They assume that the relative magnitudes of adverse selection costs, 
agency costs and flotation costs depend on global economic conditions and that managers 
base their investment-financing decisions on these costs. During business cycle expansion 
phases, the market value of assets in place is expected to be higher and the number of 
profitable investment opportunities more important. For any external financing solution, 
adverse selection costs should be lower. The risk of over-investment should be reduced and 
flotation costs should be less expensive because the issue market is more active and less risky. 
Other things equal, equity issuers are predicted to benefit from larger costs reduction than 
debt issuers. Consequently, equity issues should be more numerous than debt issues and the 
stock price reaction to equity issue announcements should be less severe than during 
economic recessions. Opposite outcomes are expected during business cycle contraction 
phases. Firms relying on external financing are predicted to incur greater adverse selection, 
agency and flotation costs and equity issuers should suffer from worst issuing conditions. In 
order to test their model, Choe et al. (1993) analyse the frequency of equity offerings relative 
to debt offerings in periods of business cycle expansions or contractions. As expected, they 
observe that equity issues are concentrated in expansion phases. Business cycle variables have 
a significant explanatory power in accounting for the magnitude of stock price reaction. The 
stock price reaction to equity issue announcements is less negative in periods of economic 
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expansions. Conversely, debt issues are relatively more numerous in peak-to-trough business 
cycle phases. 
2.4.3 Equity offerings clustering in “hot” issue periods 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) explain the fact that equity issues are clustered in selected 
periods by the presence of windows of opportunity. “Hot” issue periods are periods during 
which a large aggregate amount of new equity is issued. Their argument states that when the 
total amount raised by equity issues is important, adverse selection costs for the marginal 
equity issuer are expected to be low, encouraging firms to select this financing source. 
Investors may perceive the number of operations as a signal that the information asymmetry 
level is currently low. Between 1968 and 1990 on the US market, 53 % of the SEO proceeds 
are raised in “hot” issue markets that represent only 25 % of the whole period. The stock price 
reaction to SEO announcements is always negative but it is less severe if the operation occurs 
in a “hot” issue period. From an economic standpoint, offering equity during hot issue 
markets reduces the negative impact on the firm value by up to 233 basis points. The gain in 
value exceeds the direct flotation costs paid by the issuer. This outlines the importance of a 
good timing in issuing equity and supports the hypothesis that higher quality firms may find it 
profitable to postpone their equity  financing decision to periods of lower information 
asymmetry degree. 
The measure of “hot” and “cold” issue periods is not based on economic considerations. In 
order to check the robustness of the results of Choe et al. (1993), Bayless and 
Chaplinsky (1996) examine the conformity of their cold issue periods with the NBER “peak 
to trough” periods. They observe that 62 % of the periods do not overlap. “Hot” and “cold” 
issue periods are not substitute for the business cycle explanation of equity issue timing. 
However, both explanations are not mutually exclusive. The level of information asymmetry 
could depend on firm specific factors such as private information releases specific to a given 
firm in the manner of Dierkens (1991). It could depend on the business cycle as shown by 
Choe et al. (1993). It could also depend on factors common to all firms in the market or in the 
industry, these last factors being responsible for the “hot” issue periods according to Bayless 
and Chaplinsky (1996). However, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) do not identify any factor, 
which constitutes the main drawback of their rationale. 
Rajan and Servaes (1997) examine financial analysts’ earnings forecasts to explain “hot” 
issue periods in the IPO market. They observe that the clustering of IPOs in selected periods 
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can be partially explained by financial analysts’ long-term earnings growth forecasts and 
more specifically by their over-optimism. The number of IPOs realised in a given quarter is 
positively related to the long-term growth forecasts of firms that were introduced during the 
year preceding that given quarter. The explanatory power of analysts’ forecasts is not affected 
by the inclusion of control variables such as market-to-book ratio or economic conditions. 
These findings give evidence that managers time their IPO decision on windows of 
opportunity based on favourable growth forecasts made for firms of similar condition. 
The rationale of Rajan and Servaes (1997) about the timing of IPOs can be transposed into 
the SEO context to explain “hot” issue markets. Equity issue could be concentrated in periods 
when the analysts' growth forecasts are really good, especially those about firms that issued 
equity recently. This hypothesis is consistent with the fact that firms with high growth 
opportunities are more inclined to be financed with equity. Furthermore, it proposes an 
observable variable to explain “hot” and “cold” issue markets. In that sense, it complements 
the work of Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996). 
Dereeper (2002) examines the window of opportunity argument on the French market. He 
observes that French equity issues are concentrated in “hot” issue periods that can be 
determined by the number of operations and by the aggregate proceeds. This finding is 
consistent with Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996). “Hot” issue periods coincide with the 
publication of annual reports (end of the second quarter for 90 % of the firms). Beside the 
“economic” window of opportunity proposed by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and the 
“market” window of opportunity proposed by Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), 
Dereeper (2002) argues that managers could time their equity issue decisions relative to a 
“technical” window of opportunity. The “technical” window of opportunity has something in 
common with the timing argument of Korajczyk et al. (1991). Managers have incentives to 
realise their operations soon after the disclosure of an audited financial report. By doing so, 
they economise on audit costs and on negotiation costs with the COB. French practitioners 
agree on the importance of the “technical” argument to explain the timing of equity issues29. 
In the US, Korajczyk et al. (1991) reject the “technical” window of opportunity because the 
stock price reaction pattern favours the hypothesis of the informational content of audited 
report instead of a logistic explanation.  
                                                 
29 See the interviews with investment bankers in Dereeper (2002). 
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Dereeper (2002) finds that stock market reactions to equity issue announcement are 
insignificant during “cold” issue periods while they are significantly negative during “hot” 
issue periods. The explanation of this unexpected finding lies in the structure of the French 
market. Because of the smaller size of the French market relative to the US or the UK 
markets, issuing in a “hot” market is not advantageous. Being in competition with other 
equity offers enhances the difficulty to place the shares. French issuers have an incentive to 
differentiate themselves from each other by isolating their equity offerings. The ability to 
attract potential subscribers’ attention is more important than adverse selection or agency 
considerations. This observation outlines once more the difference relative to the institutional 
setting and to market characteristics. 
2.4.4 Long-term implications of the timing of external financing decisions on capital 
structure 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) analyse the timing of net equity issues. They base their study on 
a sample of US non-financial firms that get listed between 1968 and 1998. For each of these 
firms, they trace the history of capital structure as well as the variables that determine the 
capital structure choice. Using firms with a known IPO date allows to observe the whole 
capital structure evolution. 
Market-to-book ratio is used to measure the market timing opportunities. A high market-to-
book ratio encourages equity issue because of the current high valuation of the stocks. On a 
more general level, firms are expected to be financed with the security that has the lowest 
current cost of capital, yet the most valued. Indeed, Baker and Wurgler (2002) observe that 
low-leveraged firms usually raise funds when their valuation is high while high-leveraged 
firms do it when they are low-valued. Not only current market-to-book ratio has an important 
influence on the capital structure but its influence lasts over one decade. Current capital 
structure is mostly explained by the weighted-average30 of past market-to-book ratios. In 
other words, a 10-year-old market-to-book ratio has often more influence on the current 
capital structure than any other contemporary determinants. 
These finding have to be interpreted with care because they do not fit with static trade-off 
theories of capital structure. Tax, information asymmetry, agency costs or assets and products 
specificities are predicted to let the capital structure deviate only temporarily from its 
                                                 
30 The past market-to-book ratios are weighted according to the relative importance of their contemporary net 
equity and debt issues; see Baker and Wurgler (2002, p. 12; equation 3) for the detailed explanation.  
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optimum. Persistent, if not permanent, effects are not addressed. Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
propose as an explanation the fact that the current capital structure is the direct outcome of all 
past financing decisions. If the financing decisions are taken exclusively according to timing 
considerations, the influence of timing opportunities become permanent. In the previous sub-
sections, it is shown that equity issues are timed when adverse selection costs are lower or 
when the business cycle is in an expansion phase. Both of these situations imply a higher 
stock valuation which is consistent with the cumulative timing hypothesis. An alternative 
explanation would be that managers irrationally perceive a stock mispricing. Thus, they 
would issue equity when they consider that the stock price is overvalued and repurchase 
stocks when they think it is under-valued. The outcome of this study is that no optimal capital 
structure exists. 
2.4.5 The timing arguments in summary 
Table 2.6 summarises the empirical findings reviewed in the section. Evidence is given to 
the existence of time-varying information asymmetry. Managers tend to time their equity 
issue decisions according to periods of low level of information asymmetry. Conflicting 
results have been found about the ability of the business cycle to influence the timing 
decisions of equity issues. Macroeconomic variables influence the choice between debt and 
equity but cannot explain the equity financing decision alone. Windows of opportunity exist. 
These periods favour equity issues in the sense that the adverse selection costs associated with 
the announcements of the offerings are reduced. For IPOs, windows of opportunity are 
partially explained by long-term growth perspective forecasted by financial analysts. 
Furthermore, capital structure seems to correspond to the outcome of past attempts to time the 
equity market instead of a value-maximising tool. 
Table 2.6 : The timing of equity issues 
Authors Market Sample Results 
Panel A : Time-varying information asymmetry 
Dierkens (1991) US 197 equity offerings 
1980 and 1983 
Information asymmetry proxies explain part 
of the stock price reaction to equity issue 
announcements 
Equity issue announced shortly after 
earnings releases experience less negative 
announcement effect 
Korajczyk. Lucas and 
McDonald (1991) 
US 1247 equity issues 
1978 and 1983 
Equity issues tend to follow credible 
information releases 
The price drop at the equity issue 
announcement increases with the time since 
the last information release 
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Table 2.6 : continued 
Authors Market Sample Results 
Panel B : Timing of equity issues and business cycle 
Choe, Masulis and 
Nanda (1993) 
US 669 equity issues 
1971 and 1991 
Equity issues are more numerous relative to 
debt offerings in economic expansion 
phases 
Equity issue announcement effect is less 
negative in economic upturn 
The costs of adverse selection are 
negatively related with the economic 
conditions 
Panel C : Clustering of equity issues in “hot” markets 
Bayless and 
Chaplinsky (1996) 
US 1881 equity issues 
1974 and 1990 
Announcement effect of equity issues is 
less negative during “hot” issue periods 
“Hot” and “cold” issue periods are 
independent from macroeconomic 
characteristics but are related to firm-
specific characteristics 
“Hot” issue periods correspond partially to 
periods of reduced information asymmetry  
Dereeper (2002) France 452 equity issues 
1984 and 1999 
“Cold” markets announcement effects are 
not significant. “Hot” markets ones are 
negative 
Number of issues and aggregate proceeds 
explain “Hot” and “cold” markets  
French market structure explains why 
issuing outside from “hot” markets could be 
advantageous 
Panel D : Long-term implications of market timing 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) US 2839 firms with IPO 
between 
1968 and 1998 
Low-leveraged firms raise funds when their 
valuation is high. High-leveraged raise 
funds when their valuation is low. 
Fluctuations in market valuations have 
large effects on capital structure that persist 
for at least a decade 
 
Windows of opportunity to issue equity have been considered as periods during which 
issuing conditions are improved for investors, when adverse selection and agency costs are 
reduced. From the manager’s point of view, the opportunity to sell overpriced security may 
appear to overwhelm optimal investment considerations. Assume private information is only 
partially released at the equity issue announcement. The penalty costs imposed by investors to 
equity issuers may not take into account the entire overvaluation. A branch of the literature 
about long-term stock underperformance following an equity issue attributes this 
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underperformance to the ability of managers to take advantage of such windows of 
opportunity. This subject will be analysed in more details in Chapter 4. 
2.5 What do we learn about capital structure ? 
The institutional setting seems to influence both the market perception of marginal 
financing decisions and the motivations of managers to issue a given type of securities. The 
first raw evidence about the market reaction to equity issue announcements is that the impact 
is negative in France, the Netherlands and the US, and non-negative – if not positive – 
elsewhere in the world. The difference between these countries cannot be attributed to the 
flotation methods alone, as both US public and rights offerings experience negative 
announcement stock price reaction. In the US, information asymmetry between managers and 
the market induces the former to time their equity issues. Equity offerings are concentrated 
within periods of lower information asymmetry level. Outside the US, ownership structure 
seems to play an important role in explaining the absence of negative reactions. In addition, 
important inside shareholders’ take up associated with the neutrality of the subscription rights 
mitigate the impacts of information asymmetry and agency costs. 
This section is dedicated to the analysis of capital structure choices. Selected empirical 
studies about capital structure determinants in a single institutional setting or in international 
comparisons are reviewed in the first sub-section. Beside valuation effects and their main 
determinants, capital structure choice are dictated by other factors such as industry, size, 
product specificities. The second sub-section addresses to the determinants of the external 
financing decision. What factors do influence the choice to issue equity instead of debt ? In 
other words, is it possible to anticipate a given marginal financing decision ? In the last sub-
section, the point of view of practitioners is examined. More attention is paid to which extend 
they rely on theoretical predictions in their capital structure choices. 
2.5.1 Influence of capital structure determinants 
The influence of capital structure determinants is analysed by observing the leverage ratios 
of sample of firms at one moment in time and by testing whether these ratios are correlated to 
a set of variables that proxy for the selected theories. In that sense, capital structure choices 
are examined in a static perspective and no conclusion can be drawn about impact on the firm 
value. Studies reviewed here are ranged in two categories. The first category involves works 
on capital structure determinants based on a single institutional setting. Determinants include 
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industries, size, taxes, information asymmetry, assets specialisation or agency considerations. 
A summary of their main findings is presented in Table 2.7. The second category of studies 
presents international comparisons of capital structures across G-7 countries or across 
developing countries. Their aim is to verify if capital structure determinants valid in the US 
institutional setting are also pertinent worldwide. They constitute a challenge to the 
universality of capital structure theories vs. country-specific explanations. 
2.5.1.1 Single institutional setting analysis 
Industry comes out to be a major capital structure determinant. In the US, Bradley, Jarrell 
and Kim (1984; p. 869) regress leverage ratios of 851 firms on 24 industry dummies. They 
find a regression R2 of 54 %, which means that more than half of the cross-sectional variance 
in leverage ratios are explained by industries. Variations in leverage across industries are on 
average greater than the variations within industries. These results are supported by Schwartz 
and Aronson (1967) and to a less extent by Ferri and Jones (1979). In fact, Ferri and 
Jones (1979) document a persistent distribution in capital structure only for selected industries 
such as oil and gas. In France, Dubois (1985) does not observe a significant relation between 
industry and capital structure. Flath and Knoeber (1980) observe that US firms in regulated 
industries have more debt in their capital structure. The explanation could be that regulated 
firms have a lower probability of risk shifting in their investment policies. The same 
observation is made by Gul (1999) for Japanese regulated firms. Castanias (1983) shows that 
firms in industries with higher historical rates of failure use less debt. They maintain higher 
cash flow-to-long-term debt ratios and smaller leverage ranges around the industry mean. 
These findings about the influence of industry on capital structure choices are consistent with 
the existence of an industry target debt ratio. In that sense, industry could be a general 
variable that covers several determinants common to all firms in the sector. 
Capital structure irrelevancy states that firm value is independent from capital structure 
choices. It is determined by the assets profitability adjusted for the level of business risk. 
Dubois (1985), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Gul (1999) observe that leverage ratio is 
negatively related to profitability. These findings are opposed to the monitoring and signalling 
role of debt. Profitable firms should be more sensitive to free cash flow problems and use 
more debt. Furthermore, profitable firms are expected to signal their quality by being more 
levered. According to Dubois (1985), assets profitability is the most important determinant of 
French firms capital structure. This finding is consistent with Brennan and Schwartz (1984). 
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The result of Titman and Wessels (1988) supports the pecking order in the sense that if 
profitability proxies the ability to create financial slacks, profitable firms should rely less on 
debt financing. For US firms, leverage is negatively related to business risk which is 
consistent with the financial distress hypothesis. Cash flows or earnings volatility increases 
the risk of default and should be negatively associated to debt as it is documented by Ferri and 
Jones (1979), Flath and Knoeber (1980) and Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984).  
Firm size affects capital structure choices but the sign of its influence varies across 
countries. In the US, on one hand, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Gupta (1969) find a 
negative relation between the leverage ratio and firm size. For Titman and Wessels (1988), 
the relation is stronger between short-term debt and firm size. On the other hand, Ferri and 
Jones (1979) observe that larger firms have mixed capital structures while smaller firms are 
either highly levered or almost unlevered. The access to debt financing seems to be 
determined by market conditions and by past performance. Gul (1999) in Japan and 
Lasfer (1995) in the UK document a positive relation between leverage and firm size. This 
finding is consistent with the transaction costs hypothesis that larger firms can negotiate a 
lower cost of debt. In addition, if size is associated with diversification, they are expected to 
benefit from more stable cash flows. Overall, the difference between the US and other 
countries outlines the influence of the institutional setting on capital structure choices. 
Agency considerations also impact financial structure decisions. Chatterjee and 
Scott (1989) show that the use of long-term debt is motivated by an agency effect. 
Shareholders hope to benefit from a wealth transfer from unprotected creditors. This 
phenomenon is emphasised for firms subject to low transaction costs and a high degree of 
information asymmetry. For Bradley et al. (1984), expenditures in advertising and R&D are 
negatively related to leverage. These expenditures proxy managers’ discretional power. Thus, 
the sign of the relation is consistent with the monitoring role of debt in an agency context. 
Furthermore, debt forces managers to take actions when financial distress is imminent. 
Ofek (1993) shows that levered firms react faster to a deterioration in their financial situation. 
In Japan, Gul (1999) finds that leverage ratios are negatively related to growth 
opportunities. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that high-growth firms are less 
subject to over-investment problems. In the UK, the findings of Lasfer (1995) indicate that 
agency theory has a greater explanatory power than taxes. The level of debt is greater for low 
growth firms whatever the measure of the leverage ratio. Firms with potential free cash flow 
problems have more debt on the long-run while firms without free cash flow problems have 
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less debt on the short-run. Dubois (1985) documents for French firms that growth is positively 
correlated with short-term debt and negatively correlated with the leverage ratio computed in 
market values. These results are supportive of the Myers (1977) where capital structure is 
expressed in terms of financing source maturities. Only Gupta (1969) observes that the total 
debt to total assets ratio is positively correlated with firm growth. For Spanish firms, De 
Miguel and Pindado (2001) show that the influence of agency costs is subordinated to the 
level of information asymmetry. When this level is low, firms favour debt financing to 
mitigate free cash flow problems and they privilege private debt when agency costs of debt 
are more important. In Italy, Bianco and Casalova (1999) document that, because investors 
suffer from a low level of legal protection against expropriation, firms are financially 
constrained. They have to form pyramidal organisations to create an internal capital market. 
The reliance to internal market financing is exacerbated by growth opportunities. 
Titman (1984) prediction that leverage is expected to decrease with the degree of assets 
intangibility or with products uniqueness is given evidence by Chatterjee and Scott (1989), 
Titman and Wessels (1988) and Bradley et al. (1984). These results also support the 
transaction costs hypothesis that the degree of assets specialisation should be positively 
related to the presence of equity in the capital structure. For Titman and Wessels (1988), 
product uniqueness represent the capital structure determinant with the most explanatory 
power. Dubois (1985) also observes that the proportion of tangible fixed assets is positively 
correlated with the leverage ratio expressed in market value but the sign is reversed when the 
leverage ratio is expressed in book value. Indeed, the sign of the correlation is sensitive to the 
measure of capital structure (book or market values, with or without trade receivables). The 
influence of taxes is recognised in Kale, Noe and Ramirez (1991) who find that the relational 
form between leverage ratio and business risk is driven by corporate and personal taxes 
considerations as predicted by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). Taxes have a marginal 
explanatory power in Bradley et al. (1984), Chatterjee and Scott (1989) and De Miguel and 
Pindado (2001). 
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Table 2.7 : Cross-sectional determinants of the capital structure 
Authors Market Capital structure Main findings 
Schwartz and 
Aronson (1967) 
US 1928 and 1961 
4 broad industries 
Equity to total financing 
Equivalent within industries and different across. 
Differences across industries sharpen with time 
Gupta (1969) US 1961-62 
Total debt to total assets 
Size negatively related to debt financing 
No relation between industry growth rate and capital 
structure at the industry level but a positive relation 
exists at the firm level 
Ferri and 
Jones (1979) 
US 1974 and 1976 
233 firms 
Debt to total assets 
Slight relation between industry and capital structure 
Large firms mixed capital structure, small firms either 
highly or less levered 
Negative relation between business risk and debt 
Negative relation between operating leverage and debt 
Flath and 
Knoeber (1980) 
US 1957-64 and 1965-72 
38 industries 
interest payments to 
earnings 
Negative relation between operating risk and leverage 
but not significant 
Firms in regulated industries issue more debt 
Castanias (1983) US 1977 
21 industries 
Long-term debt to total 
assets 
Leverage is negatively correlated with historical failure 
rate in the industry 
Firms in riskier industries have smaller leverage ranges 
and are better covered (higher cash flow to long-term 
debt ratio) 
Bradley, Jarrell and 
Kim (1984) 
US 1962-81 
851 firms 
mean long-term debt 
divided by the sum of 
mean long-term debt and 
equity 
Industry classification explain 54 % of the leverage 
ratio changes 
Leverage is negatively related to business risk 
Leverage is positively related to non-debt tax shields 
Leverage is negatively related to advertising and R&D 
expenditures 
Titman and 
Wessels (1988) 
US 1974-82 
469 firms 
long-term, short-term and 
convertible debt divided 
by market or book values 
of equity 
Leverage is negatively related to uniqueness of the 
products 
Short-term debt is negatively related to firm size 
Leverage ratio in market value is negatively related to 
profitability 
Chatterjee and 
Scott (1989) 
US 1977-79 
238 firms 
Present value of interest-
paying debt to sales, total 
assets or market value 
Leverage is positively related to potential wealth 
transfer from unprotected creditors 
The net tax effect does not offset the wealth transfer 
effect on leverage 
Leverage is positively related to fixed assets 
Kale, Noe and 
Ramirez (1991) 
US 1984 and 1985 
233 firms 
debt interest to cash flow 
Business risk is related to leverage through a U-shaped 
functional form 
The shape of the functional form comes from tax 
implications at both corporate and personal levels 
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Table 2.7 : continued 
Authors Market Capital structure Main findings 
Ofek (1993) US 1983-87 
358 firms 
Debt divided by the sum 
of debt and market value 
of equity 
Positive relation between leverage and operational 
actions in case of poor market performance 
Managerial firms react slowly to financial distress 
Debt has a positive influence in preserving the going 
concern value of the firm 
Dubois (1985) France 1979 
118 firms 
Debt divided by assets in 
book value 
Debt divided by the sum 
of debt and market value 
of equity 
Leverage is negatively correlated with profitability 
Short-term debt is positively correlated with growth 
Leverage ratio in market value is negatively correlated 
with growth 
Leverage in book value is negatively correlated with 
tangible fixed assets 
Leverage in market value is positively correlated with 
tangible fixed assets 
Lasfer (1995) UK 1972 to 1983 
88 firms 
Long-term debt divided by 
the sum of long-term debt 
and book value of equity 
Long-term debt divided by 
the sum of long-term debt 
and market value of equity
Leverage is not affected by tax variables 
Leverage is negatively related to growth rate 
Firms with free cash flow problems have more debt on 
the long-run 
Firms without free cash flow problems have less debt 
on the short-run 
Leverage is positively correlated with size 
Leverage is positively correlated with systematic risk 
on the short-run 
Gul (1999) Japan 1988 to 1992 
5308 observations 
Debt to market equity 
Debt to book equity 
Leverage is negatively related to growth opportunities 
Leverage is positively related to size 
Leverage is negatively related to profitability 
Leverage is greater for regulated firms 
Bianco and 
Casavola (1999) 
Italy 1993 
1385 firms (listed/private) 
Infra-group net debt 
Firms that suffer from tighter financial constraints on 
the external capital market receive more funds from the 
internal capital market of the group. 
Infra-group debt is positively related to growth 
opportunities and negatively related to cash flow 
De Miguel and 
Pindado (2001) 
Spain 1990 to 1997 
133 firms 
Long-term debt divided by 
the sum of long-term debt 
and market value of equity
In the presence of information asymmetry, leverage is 
negatively related to cash flow 
In the absence of information asymmetry, leverage is 
positively related to cash flow 
Leverage is negatively related to non-debt tax shields 
 
The pecking order theory is given some evidence by Titman and Wessels (1988) even if it 
is not their main concern. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) 
propose direct tests of the pecking order. For Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), the pecking 
order explains capital structure better than the static trade-off model. Their test is based on a 
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sample of mature firms for which the pecking order may be well specified. Frank and 
Goyal (2003) use a larger sample. They observe that net equity financing tracks the financing 
deficit more closely than net debt financing. This finding is opposed to the pecking order 
predictions. The financial deficit is the need for external financing computed between two 
fiscal years. When they restrict their sample to larger firms, they find some aspects of the 
pecking order but they are not sufficient to validate the existence of a financing hierarchy. 
2.5.1.2 International analysis 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) examine the capital structure of firms located in G-7 countries31 
in 1991. They observe that United Kingdom and Germany have the lowest leverage among 
the G-7 countries. Other countries do not experience great differences in leverage. Japanese 
firms are found to rely more on external than internal financing. For the other countries, the 
fraction of external financing relative to total financing ranges from 23 % for the US to 36 % 
for the UK. Again, no clear distinction can be made among the G-7 countries in exception of 
Japan. The dominant source of external financing is debt, except for France. The net equity 
issuance in the US is negative between 1984 and 1991. 
In order to check whether the determinants of capital structure in the US keep their 
explanatory power when confronted to international data, Rajan and Zingales (1995) perform 
cross-sectional tests where the leverage ratio is regressed on a set of control variables for the 
year 1991. These variables include the tangibility of assets, the market-to-book ratio, the size 
of the firm measured by the log of sales and the return on assets. All determinants are 
significant for US firms and with the theoretically predicted sign. The negative relation 
between growth opportunities and leverage is observed in all countries. When significant, the 
determinants in other countries have the same sign as in the US. Overall, the determinants of 
capital structure found significant in the US also exhibit an explanative power in other G-7 
countries although it is not as clearly noticeable. These findings support the preliminary 
results about the direct comparison of the capital structure measures. 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) extend the international comparison of the capital structure 
determinants. They observe a sample of 132 countries in 1997. Their sample includes both 
developed and developing countries. Their focus is put on explaining the international capital 
flows to developing countries. They use three variables of financing : debt financing, equity 
financing and foreign direct investments. They find that equity financing is directly related to 
 119
the degree of trade openness in developing countries. Among developing countries, transition 
economies rely more on debt financing. The ratio of privatisation proceeds-to-GDP explains 
why, in some countries, equity has increased more than debt financing. More open and more 
advanced developing countries raise more external financing. The degree of trade openness 
stimulates all forms of external financing. Foreign direct investment is attracted by the 
presence of natural resources and privatisation programs. The size of the country and the 
stock market capitalisation are important variables to attract foreign equity financing. 
Booth, Aivazian, Demiguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) compare the capital structure of 
10 developing countries32 to the evidence found in the G-7 countries by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995). The first difference between developing and developed countries is the lower 
ratio of long-term debt found in developing countries. In cross-sectional tests of the 
determinants of capital structure, the coefficients for size, asset tangibility and profitability are 
similar in developing and developed countries. Overall, theoretical models that explain the 
capital structure choices in developed countries have also an explanatory power in developing 
countries. For instance, the fact that, in developing countries, the more profitable the firm, the 
lower is the debt ratio is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis. Moreover, it outlines 
the role of information asymmetry as a determinant of the financing decisions. Highly 
profitable firms in developing countries seem to rely more on internal financing. Their 
managers like those in developed countries could be inclined to benefit from the discretional 
power over free cash flow to spend it in private consumption instead of paying it back to 
investors.  
The results of Booth et al. (2001) need to be considered carefully. More differences occur 
across developing countries than across G-7 countries. Determinants do not systematically 
have the expected sign and their general impact in explaining the capital structure remains 
low. These findings emphasise the combined role of universal determinants of capital 
structure and country-specific factors to explain financing decisions internationally. 
International comparisons are also subject to potential biases due to different accounting 
standards. Correcting for these biases is a matter of data availability and subjective 
interpretation. Details about the term structure of debt cannot always be obtained. The same is 
true for a clear distinction between financial and trade credit indebtedness. Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                                                        
31 G-7 countries include the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Canada 
32 Their developing countries include Brazil, Mexico, India, South Korea, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, 
Turkey and Zimbabwe. 
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international studies of capital structure outline the existence of “universal” determinants 
explaining, at least partially, the allocation between debt and equity. 
2.5.2 Factors affecting equity vs. debt financing decisions 
Factors affecting marginal financing decisions should help to understand what determinants 
motivate managers to issue debt instead of equity or vice-versa. Investors try to anticipate 
managers’ actions ? In that sense, what variables should they consider to improve their 
expectations. Timing is an important determinant of financing decision. Information releases, 
global economic conditions, earnings and growth forecasts are observable variables that 
should contribute to form investors’ anticipations. Discrete choice methodologies such as 
Probit or Logit regressions are used to estimate the probability a firm has to issue debt instead 
of equity and to determine what factors significantly influence this probability. The main 
findings of the reviewed studies are summarised in Table 2.8. 
Not surprisingly, static trade-off, information asymmetry, agency costs and timing 
influence managers’ choices about external financing. In most cases, different theoretical 
explanations are not mutually exclusive. Static trade-off contributions in estimating the 
probability of a given security issue occur through the existence of a target debt ratio, the 
degree of assets specialisation and taxes. In the US, MacKie-Mason (1990) find that non-debt 
tax shields like investment tax credit and tax-loss carry-forward are negatively related to the 
probability to issue debt. Similar non-debt tax shields effect is documented by Saà-
Requejo (1996) on the Spanish market. Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) show that the probability 
to issue debt increase with the amount of tax payments. Evidence about the influence of a 
target debt ratio is found by Marsh (1982) in the UK and by Saà-Requejo (1996) in Spain. 
When firms deviate from their target debt ratio, they are expected to issue the securities that 
bring their ratio close to the target. Marsh (1982) measures the deviation from the target debt 
ratio by the difference between current ratio and its 10-year average. He does not use an 
industry target as theory and evidence about static capital structure determinants could 
indicate. Consistent with Titman (1984) prediction and Titman and Wessels (1988) findings, 
MacKie-Mason (1990) and Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991) observe that the degree of assets 
intangibility is positively related to the probability to issue equity. 
Stock return momentum is positively related to the probability to issue equity. This finding 
is common to MacKie-Mason (1990), Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991), Jung et al. (1996) in 
the US and to de Jong and Veld (2001) in the Netherlands. It outlines the role of information 
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asymmetry and specifically the role of adverse selection in managers’ external financing 
decision process. The presence of financial slacks in de Jong and Veld (2001) and a greater 
assets profitability in Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991) and Saà-Requejo (1996) favours debt 
financing as it is predicted by the pecking order. The size of the issue proxies the level of 
information asymmetry. According to Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991) and de Jong and 
Veld (2001), larger issues are expected to be realised in form of debt offering in order to 
reduce the costs imputed to information asymmetry. 
For Jung et al. (1996), agency theory explains financing decisions better than the pecking 
order or timing, although information asymmetry and timing variables may have a significant 
influence on the probabilities to issue debt or equity. Firms with poor investment 
opportunities have an incentive to depart from the pecking order and to select equity instead 
of debt financing. By doing so, they reduce the disciplinary role of debt and are able to invest 
in low profitability projects. Jung et al. (1996) reject the timing hypothesis because they do 
not find that equity issuers under-perform after of the issue as it would be the case if market 
and global economic conditions deteriorate afterwards. The influence of agency theory is 
expressed through the market-to-book ratio. A higher market-to-book ratio denotes of more 
growth opportunities. It is positively related to the probability of issuing equity. Additional 
evidence about agency implications are presented by MacKie-Mason (1990) who finds that 
the presence of uncommitted cash favours debt financing and by de Jong and Veld (2001) 
who observe that firms subject to over-investment problems are more likely to issue equity. 
Timing of security issues affects the financing decision through the performance of the 
stock market or the level of interest rates (see Marsh, 1982; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1991), 
and through the level of global economic indicators (see Jung et al., 1996). Stock market 
momentum influences positively the probability to issue equity whereas debt issues are 
anticipated when interest rates are low. Consistent with Choe et al. (1993), better perspectives 
about global economic conditions favour equity financing. Marsh (1982) outlines the relation 
between the existence of “hot” issue markets and the probability to issue. The “hot” issue 
market implication is valid for both debt and equity financing. An active SEO market 
increases the anticipation of equity issues whereas the probability of debt issue is positively 
linked to the aggregate level of debt financing. 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991) observe that the stock price reaction to security offer 
announcements is significantly explained by the expected issuer’s type. Firms that issue debt 
when they are expected to issue equity experience a positive stock price reaction. When not 
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anticipated, a debt issue conveys good news to the market. Firms that issue equity when debt 
is expected exhibit a deeper stock price decline. These findings are consistent with the 
pecking order. In addition, they underline the importance of market anticipations when 
considering the informational content and the valuation effect of security issue 
announcements. 
Table 2.8 : Determinants of the marginal financing decision 
Author Market Samples Determinants of the financing decision 
Mackie-Mason (1990) US 1747 security issues 
1977 and 1987 
Uncommitted cash favours debt 
Non-debt tax shields favour equity 
Earnings volatility favours equity 
Fraction of tangible assets favours equity 
Stock return momentum favours equity 
Bayless and 
Chaplinsky (1991) 
US 489 debt offerings 
337 equity issues 
1974 to 1983 
Size of the issue favours debt 
Assets profitability favours debt 
Decrease in interest rates favours debt 
Stock return momentum favours equity 
Fraction of tangible assets favours equity 
Financial distress favours equity 
Stock market momentum favours equity 
Jung, Kim and 
Stulz (1996) 
US 276 bond issues 
192 equity issues 
1977 and 1984 
Tax payments favour debt 
Market-to-book ratio favours equity 
Leading economic indicators favour equity 
Stock return momentum favours equity 
Marsh (1982) UK 399 debt issues 
349 equity issues 
1959 and 1974 
Existence of target debt ratio 
Deviation from target debt ratio 
“Hot” debt or equity markets 
Low interest rates favour debt 
Stock market momentum favours equity 
Saà-Requejo (1996) Spain 188 firms 
1984 and 1988 
Deviation from target debt ratio 
Non-debt tax shields favour equity 
Information asymmetry favours private 
financing 
Firm size favours public financing 
High past debt ratio favours public debt 
de Jong and 
Veld (2001) 
Netherlands 137 debt issues 
110 equity issues 
1977 and 1996 
Financial slacks favour debt 
Stock return momentum favours equity 
Size of the issue favours equity 
Over-investment favours equity 
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Saà-Requejo (1996) extends the analysis of the factors affecting the financing decision to 
the choice between private and public funds. His results indicate that managers care at least as 
much about the provider of the funds (private or public) as about the type of financing (debt 
or equity). A greater level of information asymmetry increases the probability of private 
financing. The negotiation process between managers and private financiers is more efficient 
in forcing the former to reveal their private information. Larger firms are anticipated to rely 
more extensively to public financing than smaller ones. If the firm is tracked as a highly 
levered firm, its financing choice is influenced toward public debt. The findings of Saà-
Requejo (1996) are representative of the dual explanation to capital structure choices. Some 
factors are universal like information asymmetry. Besides, the institutional setting has specific 
implications. In the case of Spanish firms, bankruptcy law mitigates the bargaining power of 
managers in negotiating restructuring plans relative to the US law. Furthermore, Spanish tax 
code allows many types of non-debt tax shields, which increases the tax savings influence in 
the financing decisions. 
2.5.3 What do practitioners think about capital structure ? 
In standard tests of capital structure, problems may arise from error in variables, model 
misspecification or inaccurate proxies. With a survey, the point of view expressed by the 
practitioners is not objective. It denotes opinions instead of actions. In addition, the conflicts 
related to the separation of ownership and control are under-estimated as well as the fact that 
private information could lead to strategic behaviours from managers that they are not willing 
to communicate. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) survey 392 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) of US firms in 
1999 about the cost of capital, capital budgeting and capital structure. I focus on the capital 
structure decisions. The sample includes small (sales less than 100 millions USD) medium 
and large firms (sales greater than 1 billion USD). According to other criteria such as PER, 
industry, long-term debt ratio or credit rating, the sample also covers a wide range of firms. 
Beside Graham and Harvey (2001), other US surveys include Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) 
and Norton (1991) whose samples consist of, respectively 176 and 98 Fortune 500 companies 
that responded in 1986, and Pruitt and Gittman (1991) with 114 of the 1000 largest US firms 
in 1988. Their main findings are reported to complement those of Graham and Harvey (2001) 
and to control for a time pattern in the managerial practices and concerns. Bancel and 
Mittoo (2002) survey 87 CFOs of European firms, coming from sixteen different countries 
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about their determinants of capital structure choices. Their study is articulated to allow 
comparisons with that of Graham and Harvey (2001). The questionnaires were sent between 
the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002. 
CFOs were asked separate questions about debt, equity, debt maturity, convertible debt, 
target debt ratios, credit ratings and actual debt ratios. The review of the CFOs’ opinions is 
organised by wide concepts such as the existence of a target debt ratio, financial flexibility, 
debt financing and equity financing. The main results of the European survey are exposed at 
the end of the sub-section. 
When asked if they are concerned about a target debt ratio, only 10 % of the CFOs 
surveyed by Graham and Harvey (2001) declare trying to stick to a strict target debt ratio and 
34 % to a somewhat tight target ratio or range. Large firms are more likely to stick to a tight 
target debt ratio. The existence of a target debt ratio is characterised by the concern about 
credit rating and by an industry norm. Sticking to a given capital structure helps preserving or 
increasing the credit rating assigned by rating agencies. CFOs refuse considering debt as an 
incentive to maintain or increase the output level. When firms stick to a target debt ratio, it is 
considered in book values because it is less subject to temporary variations. CFOs do not refer 
to tax considerations to set an optimal debt ratio. This result is contested by Norton (1991) 
who observes that taxes are of primary importance in determining capital structure. 
Norton (1991) realises his survey in 1986 during the major US tax reform, which can explain 
the influence of taxes. 
The importance of a target debt ratio is also contested by the results of Pinegar and 
Wilbricht (1989). They observe that only 47 out of 176 firms declare sticking to a target debt 
ratio while the other 121 firms say following a financing hierarchy. In addition, managers 
declare that they consider investment and financing decisions simultaneously. They focus on 
the projected cash flow of the assets to be financed and on their risk to take their financing 
decisions. Therefore, the stock price reaction to financing decision announcements should 
reflect changes in the anticipated operating performance, which is partly consistent with the 
empirical evidence. Overall, little evidence is given to the existence of a target debt ratio 
although industry clustering exists. 
In Graham and Harvey (2001), one important concern of CFOs is to maintain the highest 
level of financial flexibility. Financial flexibility consists in keeping unemployed capacity in 
every financing source. It leads CFOs to deviate from the pecking order but it is consistent 
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with the timing hypothesis. Financial flexibility is particularly important in case of debt 
financing. CFOs seem to use debt financing in order to save some retained earnings for 
periods when external financing conditions are poor. Timing long-term debt in periods of low 
interest rates also reduces the need to refinance in bad times. Thus, the maturity of debt plays 
a role in maintaining the financial flexibility. The influence of equity issues on financial 
flexibility is limited to adjusting the debt ratio when it becomes too high. This phenomenon 
introduces an indirect evidence that CFOs are concerned about managing their debt ratio. 
Both Norton (1991) and Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) underline the concern given to 
financing flexibility. According to Norton (1991), financial flexibility is reflected in the 
managers’ preferences for financial solutions with less covenants. In Pinegar and 
Wilbricht (1989), managers declare maintaining the financial flexibility in order to ensure the 
long-term survivability of the firm. They take it into account when they plan their financing 
strategy. Besides financial flexibility, managers care about issuing correctly priced securities 
and they work on maximising the price of outstanding securities. A trade-off may then appear 
between long-term considerations of financial flexibility and short-term concerns about 
security prices. 
Beside financial flexibility, the main factors affecting debt policy are : credit rating, 
earnings and cash flow volatility, insufficient internal funds and interest rates. These factors 
are considered as important or very important by more than 40 % of the CFOs surveyed by 
Graham and Harvey (2001). The importance given to credit rating and business risk shows 
that firms are concerned about the risk of default when the adopt their debt policy. Credit 
rating is especially valued by large, highly levered, not regulated and dividend-paying firms. 
Insufficient internal funds affecting the debt policy is consistent with the pecking order. 
However, associated with the level of interest as a measure of debt issue timing, it supports 
the financial flexibility concern. Bankruptcy or distress costs, the monitoring role of debt or 
free cash flow disgorgement are not retained as important determinants of the debt policy. 
CFOs consider convertible debt as back-door equity and they use it as a delayed equity issue. 
This practice is perfectly anticipated by investors on the US market. The stock price reaction 
to convertible bond issue announcements is close to the one following equity issue 
announcements. CFOs also consider that convertible debt can attract investors who are unsure 
about the company’s risk. This is especially true for small firms with large managerial 
ownership which are expected to face more information asymmetry. 
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According to Pruitt and Gittman (1991), the most cited determinants of debt financing are 
the current debt-to-equity ratio, the capital investment requirements, the market interest rates, 
the level of cash flows and the available working capital. These results outline the influence 
of the pre-existing capital structure, of the market conditions and of the internal financing 
capacity. Hence, they are supportive partly of the static trade-off theory and partly of the 
pecking order and timing. Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) observe that maximising the market 
price of securities is the main determinant for the issuance of straight debt while the 
survivability of cash flow is the one for convertible debt. 
Earnings per share dilution, the magnitude of equity under or over-valuation, recent stock 
price increases, providing shares to employees and diluting holdings of certain shareholders 
represent the main factors affecting equity financing. They are considered as important or 
very important by more than 50 % of the CFOs surveyed by Graham and Harvey (2001). The 
importance given to earnings dilution is somehow surprising. Theory predicts that earnings 
are not diluted if the firm earns the required return on the use of the funds. Firms that care the 
most about earnings dilution in case of equity financing are large, paying dividends or 
regulated. When the CEO has a higher degree of education (MBA or more), he or she is less 
concerned about earnings dilution. Timing seems to play an important role in the equity 
financing. Equity under or over-valuation comes in second after earnings dilution and the 
empirically well documented pre-issue stock price run-up comes in third. These results are 
consistent with the adverse selection argument that firms that could be undervalued wait for a 
period of strong price increase to issue overpriced equity. They are also supportive of the 
cumulative timing explanation to capital structure choices presented by Baker and 
Wurgler (2002). 
Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) also outline the importance of the ownership structure in the 
equity financing decision. Avoiding ownership dilution is the main concern of managers 
when they issue outside equity. Pruitt and Gittman (1991) observe the ranking of the 
determinants of equity financing. Capital investment requirements come in first, which 
denotes the link between investment and financing policies. Though, the current debt-to-
equity ratio is ranked second, which underlines the concern about an optimal capital structure. 
The current market share price, the level of cash flow and the market interest rates are the 
next most cited determinants. They reflect that managers care about market conditions and 
internal financing when they decide to issue outside equity, which is consistent with both a 
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financing hierarchy and a time-varying information asymmetry that could break the financing 
hierarchy. 
According to Bancel and Mittoo (2002), capital structure determinants across Europe are 
similar to those in the US. Debt financing decisions are based on considerations about 
financial flexibility and credit rating. Short-term debt is issued until long-term rates decline 
and long-term debt becomes advantageous. In that sense, European CFOs show as much 
concern about timing their financing decisions as their US counterparts. Matching the 
maturity of debt with that of assets is also of relevant importance. Earnings per share dilution 
and stock current over or under-valuation are the main determinants of equity financing 
decisions. Like for debt, timing is important. Financial flexibility shows through the concern 
of maintaining a target debt ratio. Convertible debt issues are considered as delayed equity 
issues by most of the surveyed European CFOs. This financing sources is generally used 
when equity is under-valued. Overall, consistent with the US evidence, moderate support is 
given to static trade-off. CFOs are concerned about trade-off only once in a while. This may 
be due the fact that trade-off conditions do not change much over time. CFOs pay more 
attention to market conditions when they make their financing decisions. Agency theory, 
pecking order and industry norms are given only little evidence in Europe. 
The similarity between European and US determinants of capital structure choices could be 
misleading. Bancel and Mittoo (2002) document substantial differences within European 
countries. Financial flexibility, tax advantage of interest deductibility, the matching of debt 
and assets maturities and the timing of short-term debt are the factors with the greatest 
differences across countries. The origin of the legal system seems to play a role in the external 
financing decision process. However, the quality of legal environment cannot explain those 
differences by itself. On one hand, French and German civil law countries have similar 
responses on debt and equity policies although their legal systems differ. In fact, their 
responses are significantly different only concerning the use of short-term debt to wait for 
advantageous long-term borrowing conditions. On the other hand, English law countries 
exhibit different responses to the US sample of Graham and Harvey (2001) especially about 
the tax advantage of interest deductibility and about the matching of debt and assets 
maturities. Overall, the differences across European countries do not appear to be driven by 
firm-specific or industry-specific considerations. 
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2.6 Empirical evidence in summary 
When observed, negative stock price reactions to equity issue announcements are explained 
by information asymmetry, agency and timing variables. Institutional setting is the main cause 
for non-negative valuation effects. The influence of institutional setting appears through 
specific ownership structure, larger shareholders’ take up, motivations to issue different from 
financing/investing decisions, different corporate governance practices or different managers’ 
objectives. 
Figure 2.2 : Hypotheses to explain the valuation effect of SEO announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stock price reaction to SEO announcements ?
Static trade-off 
 
Target debt ratio 
 
Deviation from industry 
median leverage ratio (+) 
Information asymmetry
 
Private information 
Adverse selection 
 
Specific risk (-) 
Size of the issue (-) 
Number of analysts (+) 
Stock return momentum (-)
Agency problems 
 
Over-investment 
 
Free cash flow (-) 
Book-to-market ratio (+)
Timing 
 
Market momentum (+) 
Credit spread (-) 
Term spread (-) 
Stock return momentum (-) 
 
Anticipation of the event 
 
External financing deficit (+)
Timing variables 
 
Valuation effect of private 
information ? 
Informational content of equity issue announcements ? 
Earnings 
 
Earnings forecasts revisions (+) 
Earnings forecasts dispersion (-) 
Discount factor 
 
Change in systematic risk (+) 
Theories are represented in bold characters; hypotheses are in italics 
and explanatory variables are normal. The sign in parentheses is the 
expected sign of the relation between the stock price reaction and the 
explanatory variable. 
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Figure 2.2 illustrates the main theories and hypotheses that explain stock price reactions to 
SEO announcements. Even if static trade-off is not given much credit in the empirical 
literature, deviations from an industry target debt ratio constitutes a control variable for 
industry clustering in capital structure choices. The explanatory power of information 
asymmetry and agency costs finds a greater support in the US, in France and in the 
Netherlands. The presence of information asymmetry implies the release of managers’ private 
information about future earnings or about the risk level of new investment projects. 
Simultaneously, information asymmetry associated with agency costs concerns could lead 
managers to time their equity issue. Timing implies that given conditions exist that favour 
equity offerings. If they can identify the factors that proxy these favourable conditions, 
investors may be able to anticipate the issue and its informational content. Applying a 
conditional methodology to the explanation of the announcement effect allows to estimate the 
contribution of private information to the valuation effect. By doing so, it could be possible to 
differentiate information asymmetry effect from both agency and timing effects. 
The concern of CFOs about preserving the financial flexibility introduces the concept of an 
alternative use of financing sources. This concern could come from a longer managers’ 
horizon than the one predicted by marginal financing decision models. The goal of CFOs 
appears to be the maintain of the lowest possible long-term cost of capital. CFOs may find it 
optimal to use debt financing even if at that time internal financing is sufficient and cheaper. 
By doing so, they preserve the internal financing capacity for periods of higher costs of debt. 
From time to time, CFOs have to issue equity to preserve their debt capacity as well. The 
motivations behind these operations are not the financing of a new investment project but they 
are pure capital structure operations. Their announcement is not supposed to include any 
private information about the value of investment opportunities. It should not constitute a bad 
signal about the inability of future earnings to sustain the investment policy. If these capital 
structure operations could be identified and separated from financing/investing ones, different 
stock price reaction could be noticed. Nonetheless, the fact that given equity issues may not 
be informative about investment opportunities does not mean that these operations are not 
timed. They should occur when the cost of equity is low, when the stock market is performing 
well, and when the issuer’s stock price is not undervalued. 
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Chapter 3 :  Stock price reaction to equity issue announcements 
revisited 
The aim of this chapter is to cover most aspects of the SEO announcement valuation effect. 
Is the negative stock price reaction a characteristic to all issuers or is it restricted to a given 
type ? What theories have the greater explanatory power ? If SEO are informative events, 
what does the information deal with ? Future cash flow or risk ? In addition to that standard 
methodology, I implement a conditional methodology in order to take into account the fact 
that the event could be partially and progressively anticipated by the market. It should reflect 
to what extent the announcement valuation effect is a surprise to the investors. The originality 
of this methodology lies in the selection process of a non-event sample that should outline the 
anticipation effect.  
The review of theoretical models in Chapter 1 outlines, roughly summarising, two main 
strands. First, following Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure choices should be 
irrelevant to firm value. Second, when the equity financing decision is related to an 
investment project, investors could modify their expectations about the firm market value. 
The modification is induced by the event implications in terms of information asymmetry and 
agency problems. The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 2 gives support rather to the 
latter strand and it introduces the notion of timing, to mitigate that negative announcement 
effect. However, no particular effort is spent in differentiating operations that finance a 
specific investment project from the ones that are a pure capital structure matter. These pure 
capital structure operations are consistent with the CFOs opinion that financial flexibility is 
one major concern when planning the financing policy. Equity issues could be realised not to 
finance a new investment project but to improve the capital structure. The offering proceeds 
would then be spent in going concern investments or to repay debt. I build the “use of the 
proceeds” argument on this typology of equity issue motives. It relates the intended use of the 
funds raised through the equity offer to the impact of that financing decision on the firm 
value. 
“Capital Structure” offerings group a wide range of motives to issue equity : repaying debt, 
improving the capital structure, preserving a full financing capacity to seize every profitable 
investment opportunity in the future, increasing the cash and enlarging the shareholders’ 
basis. Marginal financing decisions taken for such motives fit well in the capital structure 
irrelevancy framework. If  an optimal capital structure exists, an equity issue that moves the 
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debt ratio closer to the target should have a positive impact on the firm value. However, 
Brennan and Schwartz (1984) and Kane et al. (1984) argue that the optimal allocation 
between debt and equity may not be a fixed ratio but a range within it marginal financing 
decisions do not imply a significant change in the firm value. Consequently, one could 
reasonably expect announcement of “Capital Structure” equity issue to have no effect on the 
stock price. 
“Financing New Investment” offerings are the operations realised to finance a specific 
investment project. For such equity issues, the information released at that time addresses to a 
capital structure matter as well as to the investment opportunity. Thus, the announcement 
effect can differ from the one observed from pure capital structure changes. Information 
asymmetry could be greater because it concerns both the value of assets in place and the 
project NPV. The adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984) is developed on the 
assumption that the SEO proceeds serve to finance an investment project. Thus, the stock 
price reaction to “Financing New Investment” offerings announcements is expected to be 
negative if information asymmetry and adverse selection are its determinants. According to 
the agency theory, the investment project may not be optimal for shareholders. It could suit 
better the managers’ interests. In that case also, the stock announcement valuation effect is 
expected to be negative. 
Capital structure irrelevancy and the static trade-off theory on one side, information 
asymmetry and agency theory on the other side justify that the stock price reaction to equity 
offerings announcement could be different relative to the use of the proceeds. Timing 
considerations, especially those about market and macro economic conditions, are expected to 
affect both types of operations. Indeed, if a downturn in the economy is expected, all firms’ 
future earnings are more inclined to decrease and an equity issue could be appropriate to 
compensate for the future loss in the internal financing capacity. It maintains the financing 
flexibility during the downturn phase for “Capital Structure” issuers. It allows the financing of 
a specific project when the internal financing capacity is expected to be insufficient for 
“Financing New Investment” issuers. Controlling for the use of the proceeds allows a better 
analysis of the determinants of the marginal financing decision on the firm market value. 
Section 3.1 presents the French SEO market : the sample formation, the issuers’ 
characteristics and a test of seasonality in the French equity issues market. Section 3.2 
addresses to the estimation of the SEO announcement valuation effect. A standard cross-
sectional analysis is performed to verify what theories contribute to explain the stock price 
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reaction. The focus is put on examining the informational content of the equity issues 
announcement and its timing. The presence of static trade-off and agency costs effects are 
also controlled for. Section 3.3 is dedicated to the implementation and to the results of the 
conditional event study. Concluding remarks about the short-term analysis of the equity 
financing impact on firm value appear in Section 3.4. 
3.1 The French SEO market 
3.1.1 Sample formation 
Rights offerings of common stocks is the most commonly used method to issue equity in 
France. Besides, two-third of French public offerings involve an international placement 
which make them different from rights offerings. The issue of units – a mix of common stock 
and warrants – is also more likely to introduce a bias in the computation of the stock price 
reaction. Because of the difficulty to value the warrant, units offerings may be used to make 
the public offering process less risky (see Chollet and Gajewski, 2001). Public and units 
offerings are worth to be studied separately from rights offerings of common stocks. 
However, the data requirements eliminate too many of these operations to form samples of 
relevant size. 
Between January 1984 and December 2000, French firms realise 436 rights offerings of 
common stocks (“All rights” sample). To be included in the final sample, issuers must be 
present in the AFFI database for operations realised before July 1, 1991 and in Datastream33 
for operations made from July 1, 1991 on34, from which daily prices, dividends, market value 
and volumes are collected. Each issuer must have data available at least from one year before 
the operation until one year after. Firms with more than 50 % of missing daily returns are 
excluded. A daily return is defined as missing when both the daily price variation and the 
volume of trades are equal to zero. Information about the issue modalities and the use of the 
proceeds are taken from the issuing prospectus35. When these data are unavailable at the 
COB, the SBF and at the firm itself, the operation is eliminated. Balance sheet and profit and 
loss statements must be available for the last five fiscal years. This requirement is reduced to 
                                                 
33 I thank D. Isakov (HEC-Genève) for the access to the database. 
34 Before the nineties, the number of French firms included in Datastream is low and it involves only the largest 
companies, less than a hundred. The AFFI database covers 863 firms in June 1991 against 746 in Datastream. At 
this point in time, the transition from one base to the other can be made without affecting the continuity of 
returns time series for both event and matching firms. 
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three years for firms listed on the Nouveau Marché. The final “Short-term” sample includes 
198 operations with 98 for pure capital structure matters (“Capital Structure” [CS]) and 100 
for financing a new investment project (“Financing New Investment” [FNI]). 
Table 3.1 : Formation of the French rights offerings samples 
  Sample Observations 
 All operations 1984-2000  649 
 Issues of certificates of investment - 39 
 “All equity” issues  610 
 Units offerings, both cash and with rights - 93 
 Direct cash offerings of common stocks - 64 
 Rights offerings of stocks combined with a capital reduction - 17 
 “All rights” sample  436 
 Operations excluded because of issuing prospectus unavailability - 155 
 Operations excluded because of missing book data - 32 
 Operations excluded because of more than 50 % of missing daily returns - 51 
 “Short-term” sample  198  
 Offerings in the “Short-term” sample realised between 1984 and 1986 - 26 
 Operations with missing I/B/E/S data - 62 
  “I/B/E/S” sample   110   
All operations, their type and their dates are identified from the annual SBF report 
“L’Année Boursière”, except for the year 2000 when they are taken from the “Commission 
des Opérations de Bourse” (COB) communicates (available at http://www.cob.fr). Market 
data are taken from the AFFI database for operations prior to June 1991 and from 
Datastream for operations realised since June 1991. Book data come from the “Dictionnaire 
Dafsa Desfossés des Sociétés”. I/B/E/S data are taken from the International History Tape. 
 
The use of financial analysts data reduces the sample in two ways. First, the I/B/E/S 
international history tape covers French firms only from January 1987. Second, not all issuers 
have earnings forecasts available in the database. Therefore, when earnings forecasts are 
concerned, the sample entails 110 operations (53 CS and 57 FNI). Table 3.1 summarises the 
detailed sample formation. 
The yearly distribution of French equity issues is presented in Panel A of Table 3.2. It is 
high between 1984 and 1987 for both “All equity issues” and “All rights” columns. From 
1988 on, the annual number of rights offerings range between 12 and 21, except for 1991 (35 
operations) and 1994 (44 operations). The Panel B of Table 3.2 shows that equity offerings 
are realised mostly between April and June (almost 40 % of the rights issues) and in the last 
                                                                                                                                                        
35 I thank Grégoire Henriotte at the COB and Marc Douëzi at the SBF for their help in collecting the issuing 
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quarter of the year (31 % of the rights issues). The second quarter of the year includes most of 
the Shareholders’ Annual Meetings, which often coincide with the Extraordinary Meetings. 
Thus, it is not surprising to observe numerous SEO concentrated during this period. 
Table 3.2 : Equity issues in France from 1984 to 2000 
    
“All equity” 
issues 
“All rights” 
sample 
“Short-term” 
sample 
“I/B/E/S” 
sample 
Panel A : Yearly distribution of equity issues     
 1984 37 34 7 -- 
 1985 47 41 9  
 1986 63 46 10 -- 
 1987 50 44 16 9 
 1988 20 18 9 5 
1989 26 21 13 9 
 1990 26 18 9 3 
 1991 50 35 18  
 1992 31 20 9 6 
 1993 33 19 8 3 
 1994 57 44 24  
 1995 19 14 7 5 
 1996 22 18 11 10 
 1997 18 14 12 
 1998 28 12 10 6 
 1999 28 18 11 9 
2000 48 16 13 5 
Panel B : Intra-year repartition  
 January 28 17 15 8
 February 33 23 11 7 
 March 34 15 9 6 
 April 41 19 7 
 May 56 49 34 22 
 June 115 81 28 16 
July 55 39
  
--
 
13
15
25
 
 
33
 11 8 
 August 21 14 2 1 
 September 42 30 16 7 
 October 65 48 26 15 
 November 44 18 9 
 December 57 43 9 4 
   
 Total 610 436 198 110  
63
                                                                                                                                                        
reports. 
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Table 3.2 : continued 
    
“All equity” 
issues 
“All rights” 
sample 
“Short-term” 
sample 
“I/B/E/S” 
sample   
Panel C : Industry repartition     
 Natural resources and construction 54 42 14 6 
 Food 16 13 7 5 
 Transformation industries 62 45 20 9 
 Manufacturing industries 114 75 39 22 
 Transports 30 23 10 4 
 Communication and internet 15 4 2 2 
 Retail 47 31 21 13 
 Bank and insurance 90 68 22 13 
 Real estates 35 28 14 6 
 Other financial companies 55 44 17 4 
 Services 79 55 30 25 
 Utilities, services to the community 13 8 2 1 
    
 Total 610 436 198 110 
Equity issues as well as the issuing dates are taken from the annual SBF report “L’Année Boursière”. The 
samples are formed according to the process described in Table 3.1. The industry classification is the 
Worldscope one-digit SIC codes to which Transport, Bank and insurance, Real estates, and Utilities and services 
to the community are added. 
 
The repartition of French issuers across industries is presented in Panel C of Table 3.2. It is 
based on the industry classification of Worldscope one-digit SIC codes. Four additional 
categories are created. Transport is separated from communication and internet. Banks and 
insurance companies as well as real estates are differentiated from other financial firms. 
Finally, utilities and services to the community (medical care facilities or laboratories and 
educational services) are taken out of other private services. Manufacturing industries, Banks 
and insurance companies, and Services are the most represented industries. When the sample 
of rights issuers is compared to the industrial structure of the entire French economy, no 
significant difference is observed ( 2χ  test p-value of 0.37). 
 136
Table 3.3 : Differences across samples 
  
“All equity” vs. 
“all Rights” 
 “All rights” vs. 
“Short-term” 
 “Short-term” vs. 
“I/B/E/S” 
  
  
 p-values 
sample  sample  Sample   
 Yearly distribution 0.10 0.40 0.71 
 Intra-year repartition 0.87 0.60 0.66 
  Industry repartition 0.69 0.41 0.51  
Sample formation is described in Table 3.1. p-values of 2χ  test are in italic. 
 
Since the size of the samples has been reduced because of data unavailability, biases could 
have been introduced. Potential differences across samples relative to the three variables, 
yearly distribution, intra-year repartition and industry repartition are tested. Table 3.3 presents 
the 2χ  test p-values. None of the p-values are close or inferior to the 5 % level. The excluded 
observations do not significantly affect the composition of both “Short-term” and “I/B/E/S” 
samples. 
3.1.1.1 Characteristics of the French equity issuers 
Table 3.4 entails the descriptive statistics of “All equity” issues and the three rights 
offerings sample. In Panel A, mean and median issuer size, BM ratio, offering size and issuing 
discount are displayed. As the required amount of information about the issuers increases, the 
mean and median size increase as well, which is not surprising. Analysts are more likely to 
follow large firms. Thus, the “I/B/E/S” sample exhibits a median market capitalisation that is 
almost twice the one of the “All rights sample”. Differences between mean and median values 
indicate that samples distributions are highly skewed to the right. Market value of equity is 
the denominator of both BM ratio and relative offering size, which explains why both 
variables decrease when the proportion of large firms in the sample increases. The average 
issuing discount of 22 % is consistent with the findings of Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002). 
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Table 3.4 : Descriptive statistics of French equity issuers 
      Obs. 
Issuer size 
(millions FRF)
 BM ratio  Relative size of the offering 
  Issuing discount  
 All equity issues (1984-2000) 610        
  mean  5364 0.86 0.42 0.18 
  median  795 0.50 0.24 0.16 
 “All rights” sample (1984-2000) 436        
  mean  3998 0.85 0.43 0.22 
  median  626 0.53 0.20 0.21 
 “Short-term” sample (1984-2000) 198        
  mean  6639 0.77 0.37 0.20 
  median  910 0.51 0.18 0.20 
 “I/B/E/S” sample (1987-2000) 110        
  mean  10103 0.70 0.31 0.20 
  median  1145 0.55 0.17 0.22 
The issuer size is given by the market value of equity at the pre-SEO month taken from Datastream. The book-
to-market (BM) ratio is computed as the last pre-SEO fiscal year book value of equity divided by the market 
value of equity at the pre-SEO month. The book value of equity is taken from the “Dictionnaire Dafsa-Desfossés 
des Sociétés”. The relative size of the offering is the raw SEO proceeds divided by the market value of equity at 
the pre-SEO month. The raw proceeds is taken from the issuing prospectus. The issuing discount is equal to 
1 issuing price
last market price
−  and it is taken from the SBF report “L’Année Boursière”. 
 
A closer examination of the characteristics of issuers in the “Short-term” sample is shown 
in Table 3.5, the focus being put on potential differences relative to the use of the proceeds. 
The Panel A resumes data about market capitalisation, book-to-market ratio, the offering size, 
and the issuing discount. The first four columns show means and medians of both sub-
samples while the last column exhibits their difference in medians. No differences are 
detected according to the use of the proceeds. The average “Capital Structure” issuer is 
similar to the average “Financing New Investment” issuer. 
In Panel B of Table 3.5, data about issuers’ financial structure are exposed. The debt-to-
assets ratio, the cash-to-assets ratio and the cash flow-to-assets ratio are computed, at the end 
of the pre-SEO fiscal year, with accounting data taken from the Dictionnaire Dafsa Desfossés 
des Sociétés. “Capital Structure” issuers appear to be significantly more levered than 
“Financing New Investment” firms. They also have less cash and less cash flow.  
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Table 3.5 : Characteristics of the “Short-term” sample of rights offerings 
    "Capital Structure"  
"Financing New 
Investment"   Difference  
  98 observations 100 observations  CS - FNI 
    mean  median  mean  median   median  
Panel A : General characteristics      
 Issuer size (millions FRF) 5344  654  6959  1070  -416  
          (-1.17)  
 Book-to-market ratio 0.84  0.56  0.68  0.50  0.04  
          (0.58)  
 Relative size of the offering 0.32  0.22  0.43  0.16  0.06  
          (1.32)  
 Issuing discount 0.19  0.19  0.21  0.21  -0.02  
          (-0.58)  
Panel B : Financial characteristics          
 Debt-to-assets ratio 0.32  0.29  0.24  0.21  0.08 a 
          (3.10)  
 Cash-to-assets ratio 0.06  0.03  0.08  0.06  -0.03 a 
          (-3.36)  
 Cash flow-to-assets ratio 0.02  0.03  0.08  0.09  -0.06 a 
          (-4.78)  
Panel C : Systematic risk characteristics          
 E OLSβ  0.80  0.73  0.73  0.71  0.02  
          (0.15)  
 A calculatedβ  0.34  0.27  0.44  0.36  -0.09  
          (-1.56)  
 E OLSβ∆   -0.18  -0.13  0.19 a 0.12 b -0.25 a 
  (-1.09)  (-0.61)  (2.58)  (1.80)  (-2.29)  
 E calculatedβ∆  -0.17 a -0.06 a -0.09 a -0.04 a -0.02  
  (-4.02)  (-6.06)  (-7.05)  (-8.80)  (-0.62)  
 E OLS E calculatedβ β∆ − ∆  -0.01  0.04  0.28 a 0.18 a -0.14 b 
    (-0.09)   (0.40)   (3.76)   (2.60)   (-1.86)   
a significant at the 1 % level, b significant at the 5 % level 
The issuer size, the book-to-market (BM) ratio, the relative size of the offering and the issuing discount are 
defined in Table 3.4. Financial characteristics are expressed in book values taken from the “Dictionnaire Dafsa-
Desfossés des Sociétés”. Following Fowler and Rorke (1983), E OLSβ  is estimated from a market model with five 
leads and five lags on the market return, over the pre-SEO period [-255;-6]. A calculatedβ  is computed with the 
Hamada (1972) relation (without tax). E OLSβ∆  is the difference in beta between pre and post-SEO estimation 
periods. E calculatedβ∆  is the variation in equity beta implied by the SEO, other things equal. T-stats are given in 
parentheses below mean values, z-stat appear in parentheses below median values and Wilcoxon rank test 
statistics are given in parentheses below median differences in the last column. 
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These findings appeal three remarks. First, the equity issue for the “Capital Structure” 
sample is expected to lower the leverage ratio, to improve cash and to compensate for a lower 
cash flow. Consequently, it is consistent with either the pecking order and the financial 
flexibility argument. Second, on average, “Financing New Investment” issuers select an 
equity offering while other financing sources seem to be available to them. Following Myers 
and Majluf (1984), they should be more penalised by the market when they announce their 
financing decision. Third, because they differ in leverage, “Capital Structure” and “Financing 
New Investment” issuers could have different equity systematic risk coefficient. This 
distinction has to be checked carefully when interpreting the stock price reaction to the 
offering announcement. 
Systematic risk characteristics of equity issuers are exposed in Panel C of Table 3.5. The 
market model equity beta, E OLSβ , is estimated, following Fowler and Rorke (1983), with five 
leads and five lags over a 250-day period [-255;-6] prior to the SEO announcement. This 
methodology allows to take into account that information diffuse slowly into stock prices (see 
Denis and Kadlec, 1994). The equity beta is not different across issuer’s types. Neither is the 
assets beta, A calculatedβ , calculated with the Hamada (1972) relation (without tax) : 
1E A
D
E
β β = + 
  (3.1) 
where Eβ  is the systematic risk of equity, 
 Aβ  is the unlevered firm systematic risk or the firm business risk, 
  is the book value of financial debt, D
 E  is the book value of equity. 
More interesting is the variation in equity systematic risk around the SEO announcement. 
The estimated variation in equity beta, E OLSβ∆ , represents the difference between the equity 
beta estimated after the SEO announcement, over the period [+6;+255] and the equity beta 
estimated prior to the announcement. The estimated equity beta increases significantly after 
the announcement only for “Financing New Investment” issuers, this variation being 
significantly greater that the one of “Capital Structure” issuers. At the same time, the variation 
in equity beta implied by the change in the financial structure following the equity issue is 
significantly negative for both issuer’s types. The difference between the estimated and the 
calculated variation in equity beta is not different for “Capital Structure” issuers while it is 
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significantly positive for “Financing New Investment” issuers. These findings are consistent 
with the fact that the new investment project financed with equity increases the business risk 
of “Financing New Investment” issuers in a proportion greater than the implied reduction in 
the financial risk. Not presented here, the equity issue announcement does not convey any 
information about the specific risk since its estimate is not affected by the estimation period 
(prior to or after the SEO announcement). 
In summary, “Capital Structure” issuers seem to be more restricted on alternate financing 
sources than “Financing New Investment” ones. Otherwise, they do not appear to be different. 
In that sense, the use of the proceeds seems to capture the difference in financial structure. It 
may also constitute a good indicator to discriminate the two strands of capital structure 
theory, capital structure irrelevancy and valuation impact of marginal financing decisions. 
When it is explicitly notified, equity appears to be dedicated to the financing of risky 
investment projects. Furthermore, “Financing New Investment” issuers deliberately select 
equity financing although they are less levered and have more cash and cash flow than 
“Capital Structure” issuers. Thus, one could expect “Financing New Investment” issuers to be 
more exposed to adverse selection or agency problems. 
3.1.1.2 The dateline of the issuing process 
The French equity issuance process is regulated by the Code de Commerce, Livre II, 
Chapître V, articles L225-127 to L225-149. The Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is the 
only competent organ to authorise a SEO. The decision must be taken at the qualified 
majority of 2/3. The board of directors is given the authorisation to realise a SEO within a 
5-year period. Current shareholders are granted subscription rights on a pro-rata basis. Once 
the authorisation has been voted, the board of directors decides when and at what conditions 
the equity issue will take place. An issuing prospectus has to be elaborated and submit to the 
“Commission des Opérations de Bourse” (COB). Once the COB has given its approval (visa 
COB), an official announcement is made in the “Bulletin des Annonces Légales Officielles” 
(BALO36) and the prospectus is publicly available from the issuer and the members of the 
underwriters’ syndicate. The subscription period for a rights offering must last at least ten 
business days . This period can be shortened as soon as all the rights have been exercised or 
that the issue is fully subscribed. There is also a legal minimum period of seven days between 
the BALO date and the issue itself. 
                                                 
36 The BALO is the weekly official journal of French legal announcements. 
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One central problem in event studies is the selection of the announcement date. When does 
the market integrate the information conveyed by the event into the stock price ? In the case 
of French SEO, two official dates are available : the visa COB date and the BALO date. The 
visa COB date precedes the BALO date by at least one and up to nineteen days (median 
equals four days). Therefore, the COB date is preferred to the BALO as the first 
announcement date. The visa COB is also the first announcement that includes the complete 
modalities of the issue. Media may have published news about the operation but this kind of 
communications has two drawbacks. First, it is rarely complete. The exact proceeds, the 
issuing price, the modalities of the subscription rights are not known. Second, the operation 
has not been approved by the COB, which means that every information is susceptible to be 
modified. Of course, these press releases help investors anticipate the event. However, the 
main informational content remains in the visa COB announcement. 
Figures about the timeline of the “Short-term” sample are presented in Table 3.6. Panel A 
shows that about 70 % of the issues are realised within the year following the EM decision. 
Less than 15 % of the operations occur during the second year. The last 15 % are distributed 
among years 3 to 5. These figures indicate that managers, to a large extend, do not wait for 
years before realising the SEO. No differences are noticeable between both issuers’ type. 
Panel B of Table 3.6 describes the median length of the different periods during the issuing 
process. The median time between the EM authorisation and the visa COB equals 162 days, 
showing that half of the operations are done within a 6-month period after the shareholders’ 
approval. 
The median time between the visa COB and the first day of the subscription rights are 
traded lasts twelve days, which roughly corresponds to the median number of days between 
the visa COB and the publication in the BALO (four days) plus the legally required seven 
days between the BALO date and the first trading day of the rights. The median rights trading 
period is twenty calendar days while the minimum legally required period is ten trading days. 
All in all, the median time between the authorisation to issue and the end of the subscription 
rights trading period counts 194 days. Rights offerings are not decided and implemented very 
quickly. In that sense, they are less likely to constitute real surprises for investors. These 
characteristics make them even more interesting to examine through a conditional event study 
methodology. 
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Table 3.6 : Timeline of the “Short-term” sample of rights issuers 
    “Short-term” sample 
“Capital 
Structure” 
“Financing New 
Investment” 
 
Panel A : Percentage of offerings occurring during the  
 first year after EM 69.84 70.49 69.23
 second year after EM 14.29 14.75 13.85
 third year after EM 8.73 9.84 7.69
 Fourth year after EM 3.97 1.64 6.15
 fifth year after EM 3.17 3.28 3.08
Panel B :Length of the different periods of the issuing process (days) 
 
Median time between EM and 
visa COB date 162 162 162 
 
Median time between visa COB 
and first trading day of the rights 12 12 11 
 
Median length of the rights 
trading period 20 20 21 
EM is the date of the Extraordinary Meeting when the authorisation to raise new equity is voted. Visa 
COB date is the day when the COB approves the equity issue. The rights trading period corresponds 
to the time when subscription rights can be traded or exercised 
 
3.1.2 Seasonality in the French SEO market 
Hot market seems to be a characteristic of US SEO; see Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996). 
Equity issues are not uniformly distributed over time. The purpose of this section is to control 
for the presence of seasonality in the French SEO market. Then, if the phenomenon is 
detected, financial analysts’ earning forecasts are used to attempt to explain it in the manner 
of Rajan and Servaes (1997) for IPO. 
3.1.2.1 Frequency of rights offerings 
The frequency of rights offerings is examined through the number of operations aggregated 
within half-year horizons and divided by the number of firms listed on the French market at 
the end of the previous year. Half-year numbers of SEO are normalised to avoid any bias due 
to the growth of the number of listed firms throughout time. The SEO frequency is given as a 
percent of the listed companies. The period between January 1984 and December 2000 is split 
into thirty-four 6-month periods. The half-yearly frequencies of both issuer’s types samples 
are illustrated in Figure 3.1. Firms may take advantage of hot issue markets to concentrate 
their operations, creating time dependencies across events. 
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Figure 3.1 : Half-yearly frequency of French equity issues with rights 
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If seasonality exists on the French SEO market, equity issues should not be uniformly 
distributed over time. The fact the most shareholders’ Extraordinary Meetings are held during 
the first half of the year, on the same day as the General Meeting could also introduce a 
seasonality effect, as it is suggested by the intra-year repartition shown in Panel B of Table 
3.2. Results of the tests about the presence of seasonality are presented in Table 3.7. 
Operations in the “Short-term” sample are not uniformly distributed (first row of the Table). 
When the sample is split according to the use of the proceeds, only “Financing New 
Investment” issues are not distributed uniformly. However, the difference between both sub-
samples is not significant. The same pattern is observed for the repartition between first and 
second half of the year (second row of the Table). In this case, the difference between samples 
is almost significant at the 5 % level. 
Table 3.7 : Tests of the issuing frequency on the French market 
   p-values "Short-term" sample 
"Capital 
Structure" 
"Financing New 
Investment" CS - FNI
  
 Uniformly distributed ? 0.001a 0.688 0.004a 0.852 
  No half-year effect ? 0.004a 0.493  0.001a 0.061  
a significant at the 1 % level, b significant at the 5 % level 
P-values are computed from unilateral chi-square tests. The first row test if equity issues are uniformly 
distributed over the 1984 – 2000 period. The second row tests if the number of equity issues realised in the first 
half of the year is equal to the number of the second half. 
 
 144
The seasonality of “Financing New Investment” could come from the fact that they are 
concentrated within the first half of the year. These equity issues are expected to face a higher 
costs of adverse selection and information asymmetry. Therefore, managers could attempt to 
mitigate these costs by timing the issue soon after the release of the audited yearly financial 
statements that mostly occurs within the same period. However, this explanation is not unique 
and the seasonality could be due to economic conditions or hot issue periods. These 
hypotheses are tested in the next sub-section. 
3.1.2.2 Financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and SEO seasonality 
Macroeconomic conditions affect the timing of the equity financing decision; see Choe et 
al. (1993), Kaplin and Levy (2001), Korajczyk and Levy (2003). To test the seasonality of 
French equity issues, the series of half-year aggregate numbers of SEO is used as the 
dependent variable. The period starts July 1987 because of the non-availability of earnings 
forecasts data prior to 198737. The series of half-year SEO numbers is regressed on lagged 
macro indicators and measures of financial analysts’ over-optimism. The macro indicators 
include the stock market past performance, Mrunup , the credit spread, , and the term 
spread, . The stock market past performance is the buy and hold return computed over 
the 6-month period preceding that of the SEO. It is positively related to the business cycle and 
thus, the greater it is, the more issues there should be. The credit spread is the average 
difference between 10-year French corporate bond yield and 10-year French government bond 
yield
credit∆
term∆
38 taken over the half-year period preceding that of the SEO. It is interpreted as a proxy 
for the current economic conditions39. The higher it is, the greater is the chance to be in a 
downturn phase of the economy. As shown by Choe et al. (1993), equity issues tend to be 
concentrated in the expansion phase of the business cycle. Thus, one can expect the credit 
spread to be negatively correlated with the number of equity issues. The term spread is the 
average difference between the 10-year French government bond yield and the 1-month Euro 
FRF interest rate taken over the half-year period prior to that of the SEO. It is assumed to 
reflect the GDP growth rate. The larger the term spread is in a given 6-month period, the more 
numerous the equity issues should be in the next six months. 
                                                 
37 The tests realised in the previous sub-section about the distribution of SEO are not affected by the reduction of 
the period. 
38 Time series of macro indicators are taken from Datastream. 
39 See Oertmann (1997) for a survey of the global economic conditions proxies. 
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Can the SEO seasonality be explained by financial analysts’ earnings forecasts ? Can the 
over-optimism of financial analysts about the prospects of the issuer, its industry or the 
market in general create hot issue periods ? From the issuer’s standpoint, taking advantage of 
the analysts’ over-optimism could facilitate the placement of the new shares and/or allow a 
higher issuing price. Thus, optimistic earnings forecasts could influence the timing of the 
equity issue decision. In addition to macro indicators, three measures of financial analysts’ 
over-optimism40 are included in the test of seasonality. The first one, , represents the 
degree of over-optimism dedicated to the issuer itself; the second one, 
3FSI
3ISI , proxies the 
degree of over-optimism within the issuer’s industry; and the third one, 3MSM , represents 
the degree of over-optimism at the market level. They are computed as follows : 
,
1
1 ,
313
k
n s
, 13s n s
n n s
F
FSI SI
k P−
=
= −∑ −  (3.2) 
where  is the last 3-year earnings forecasts about issuer n, prior to the SEO 
announcement in half-year period s, 
,3n sF
  is the stock price corresponding to , ,n sP ,3n sF
  is the median 3-year earnings forecast relative to the industry of issuer n, 
over the half-year period s-1 and divided by its corresponding median price, 
, 13n sSI −
  indicates the number of operations in the half-year period s. k
13sISI −  is computed by replacing  in Equation 3.3 by the last industry median 3-year 
earnings forecast prior to the SEO announcement and  by the corresponding industry 
median price. To obtain 
,3n sF
,n sP
13sMSM − ,  in Equation 3.3 is replaced by the last overall 
market median 3-year earnings forecasts prior to the SEO announcement and  is 
replaced by the overall market median 3-year earnings forecast over the half-year period s-1 
(both forecasts are divided by their corresponding median price). 
,3n sF
, 13n sSI −
Because the dependent variable (the number of SEO realised in the half-year period ) is 
truncated to zero, Tobit regressions are used. The model is as follows : 
s
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1s s s s snbseo a a Mrunup a credit a term a AOO ε− − −= + + ∆ + ∆ + + s−
                                                
 (3.3) 
 
40 Data about financial analysts’ earnings forecasts are taken from the I/B/E/S international history tape. 
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where snbseo  is the number of SEO in half-year period s divided by the number of firms 
listed on the French market at the end of the previous year, 
 1sAOO −  is either 13sFSI − , 13sISI − , 13sMSM − , 
 (0, )s sNε ∼ σ  is an error term. 
The results of the Tobit regressions are presented in Table 3.8. Panel A entails the 
parameters estimates for the “Short-term I/B/E/S” sample. Panels B and C present, 
respectively, results for the “Capital Structure I/B/E/S” and the “Financing New Investment 
I/B/E/S” samples. Overall, the results are inconclusive about the seasonality of French SEO. 
Macro indicators are not significant, except for the credit spread in the “Capital Structure 
I/B/E/S” sample that is significantly negative. “Capital Structure” operations tend to be 
frequent after a 6-month period during which economic conditions are high. This is consistent 
with the fact that SEO are more likely to occur in expansion phase of the business cycle. 
“Financing New Investment” offerings are not concentrated relative to past economic 
conditions. This finding could indicate that the timing of such operations is made relative to 
the investment opportunity and that it is firm-specific. Financial analysts’ over-optimism is 
never significantly related to the number of SEO. 
Table 3.8 : Tobit regressions to test the seasonality of French SEO 
    a0
  Mrunup  ∆credit  ∆term  FSI3  ISI3  MSM3  adj. R2   
Panel A : "Short-term I/B/E/S" sample           
 Issuer 0.0080a 0.0005 -0.0748 -0.0759 -0.0149     0.08 
  (9.14) (0.10) (-0.94) (-1.35) (-0.55)       
 Industry 0.0072a 0.0003 -0.0957 -0.0280   0.0079   0.07 
  (6.84) (0.06) (-1.20) (-0.57)   (0.47)     
 Market 0.0073a -0.0004 -0.0857 -0.0317     0.0240 0.08 
  (8.55) (-0.08) (-1.06) (-0.66)     (0.77)   
Panel B : "Capital Structure I/B/E/S" sample         
 Issuer 0.0041a 0.0010 -0.0679b -0.0282 -0.0004     0.17 
  (11.11) (0.49) (-2.04) (-1.12) (-0.05)       
 Industry 0.0039a 0.0010 -0.0792b -0.0208   -0.0028   0.15 
  (8.93) (0.49) (-2.16) (-0.95)   (-0.25)     
 Market 0.0037a 0.0009 -0.0702b -0.0184     0.0112 0.17 
  (10.08) (0.43) (-2.00) (-0.89)     (0.83)   
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Table 3.8 : continued 
    a0
  Mrunup   ∆credit  ∆term  FSI3  ISI3   MSM3  adj. R2  
Panel C : "Financing New Investment I/B/E/S" sample         
 Issuer 0.0042a 0.0010 -0.0347 -0.0182 -0.0072     0.03 
  (6.07) (0.25) (-0.48) (-0.47) (-0.42)       
 Industry 0.0034a 0.0009 -0.0303 -0.0252   0.0118   0.10 
  (4.79) (0.26) (-0.57) (-0.73)   (1.36)     
 Market 0.0039a -0.0010 -0.0194 -0.0332     0.0105 0.04 
   (6.41)  (-0.27)  (-0.34)  (-0.94)          (0.42)     
 a significant at the 1 % level, b significant at the 5 % level 
The dependent variable is the number of SEO realised within a half-year period divided by the number of firms listed on 
the French market at the end of the previous year. The period is taken from the second half of 1987 to the last six months of 
2000. Data are half-year average taken over the six months prior the SEO half-year. Mrunup is the market return buy and 
hold return over the six months preceding the SEO half-year. ∆credit and ∆term are respectively the credit spread (10-year 
corporate bond yield minus 10-year government bond yield) and the term spread (10-year government bond yield minus the 
1-month FRF Euro rate). FSI3 measures the difference between the issuer’s last 3-year earnings forecast prior to the SEO 
and the last six months industry median. ISI3 measures the difference between the last industry median 3-year earnings 
forecast and the last six months industry median. MSM3 measures the difference between the last overall (market) median 
3-year earnings forecast and the last six months overall (market) median. Z-stat are given in parentheses. 
 
The findings indicate that French equity issues are not timed according to hot issue periods 
derived from the business cycle or from over-optimism about future earnings. They are 
consistent with Dereeper (2002) who argues that French managers time their equity issuers 
out of windows of opportunities to avoid the competition with equity issues from other firms. 
The reduction of information asymmetry could prevail to explain the concentration of equity 
issue during the first six months of the year. The lack of significance of the explanatory 
variable could also come from the splitting into 6-month periods. However, reducing the 
length of the periods increases the number of cases with no issues, which affects the results as 
well. 
3.2 Valuation effect estimation on stocks 
3.2.1 Methodology 
Market model prediction errors are used to estimate the abnormal stock return at the equity 
issue announcement. Two problems arise when estimating the model parameters. The first 
one is related to missing data41 which is corrected by the method introduced by Heinkel and 
                                                 
41 The reader should recall that firms with more than 50 % of missing data over the estimation period are 
excluded from the final sample. 
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Kraus (1988). The parameters are estimated by a weighted least square regression with the 
weights equal to the square root of the number of days over which the return is computed. The 
second one comes from the event itself and it is related to the selection of the estimation 
period. As shown in Table 3.5, the equity offering modifies the equity β  of “Financing New 
Investment” issuers. In order not to be negatively biased, abnormal returns are estimated from 
a post-announcement estimation period, [+6;+255], starting 6 days after the announcement 
and covering 250 trading days. Daily returns are logarithmic returns computed with closing 
price adjusted for capital structure changes42. The market-model type regression is the 
following43 : 
5
, , , , ,
5
i
i
A
i t i i M t i j i j t i t
j A
R R dα ,β η
+
= −
= + + +∑ ε  (3.4) 
where ,i tR  is the return of stock i on day t , 
 ,M tR  is the market return (on the SBF 250 index) on day t , 
  is the announcement day (visa COB date) for issuer i , t  iA 0=
  is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when , ,i j td j t=  and 0 otherwise, with 
{ }5; 255+t∈ − , 
  is an error term. (, 0,i t iNε ∼ )σ
The dummy variables methodology is used because it presents the advantage that the 
prediction errors and the standard errors are directly obtained as coefficient estimates, ,i jη , of 
the model. Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) argue that the standardised cross-section 
method is appropriate to adjust to the variance effect induced by the event. Statistical tests are 
computed according to this technique. To assess the robustness of the results, a non-
parametric statistics, the generalised sign test proposed by Cowan, Nayar and Singh (1990) is 
also employed. 
In order to allow information conveyed by the SEO announcement to be fully integrated 
into the stock prices, the analysis period, over which the announcement valuation effect is 
computed, is extended to several days. Daily abnormal returns are cumulated over this 
analysis period. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are estimated simultaneously as the 
                                                 
42 Refer to Section 3.1.2.1 of this Chapter for the detailed data sources. 
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market model parameters with a dummy variable taking the value nd1  during the analysis 
period and zero otherwise, nd  being the number of days the CAR is computed on. The CAR  
estimate is directly given by the dummy variable coefficient. This methodology jointly 
estimates the components of the CAR . It eliminates the cross-dependences across  that is 
reluctant to the use of one single model to estimate each  separately. The second 
advantage lies in the elimination of errors coming from different prediction horizons when 
separately estimated  are cumulated. The standard deviation of the CAR  is given by the 
standard deviation the dummy variable parameter. The CAR  is estimated with the following 
model : 
AR
AR
AR
, , , ,i t i i M t i i nd t i tR R CAR dα ,β ε= + + +  (3.5) 
where  is a dummy variable taking the value 1/  if t  is included in the CAR 
horizon of  days and zero otherwise. 
, ,i nd td nd
nd
Statistical tests of the  include the standardised t-statistic of Boehmer et al. (1991) and 
the generalised sign test of Cowan et al. (1990). 
CAR
Two main hypotheses are tested. The first one addresses to the existence of an abnormal 
stock price reaction to announcements of SEO with rights in France : 
0
0
1 : 0 . 1 : 0
1 ' : 0 . 1 ' : 0
j A j
nd A nd
H AAR vs H AAR
H CAAR vs H CAAR
= ≠
= ≠
 (3.6) 
where  is the average abnormal return on day tAAR [ ]5; 5j∈ − + , 
  is the average cumulative abnormal return over the horizon . ndCAAR nd
The second hypothesis is based on the “use of the proceeds” argument : 
0 , , , ,
0 , , ,
2 : . 2 :
2 ' : . 2 ' :
j CS j FNI A j CS j FNI
nd CS nd FNI A nd CS nd FNI
H AAR AAR vs H AAR AAR
H CAAR CAAR vs H CAAR CAAR
≤ > ≤ > ,
                                                                                                                                                        
 (3.7) 
The significance of the mean differences between both “use of the proceeds” samples is 
given according to a t-statistics and the one of median differences according to a Wilcoxon 
rank test. 
43 Abnormal returns are also estimated using a one-lagged market return and/or over a pre-announcement period 
[-255;-6]. Results, not shown here, are not significantly modified by the changes in the estimation technique. 
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3.2.2 Announcement abnormal returns 
Daily abnormal returns are computed from five days prior to the announcement day to five 
days after. Mean and median of market prediction errors are presented in Table 3.9 with their 
corresponding statistical tests. In addition, cumulative abnormal returns computed on three 
different horizons are shown in the last rows of Table 3.9. The CAR  horizons are two, three 
and five days starting from the announcement day. Beside the different time intervals, the 
stock price reaction is computed separately for three samples : “Short-term”, “Capital 
Structure” and “Financing New Investment”. The last two columns of Table 3.9 show the 
differences in means and medians between the “Capital Structure” and the “Financing New 
Investment” samples. 
Daily abnormal returns are not statistically significant before the announcement day44, for 
any sample. Mean abnormal returns on day 0, +1 and +2 are significantly negative for the 
“Short-term” sample, ranging from –0.33 % to –0.55 %. Median abnormal returns are 
significantly negative on day 0 and +2. When equity issues are separated according to the use 
of the proceeds, the negative stock price reaction is restricted to the “Financing New 
Investment” sample ( with mean AR of -0.55 %, -0.66 % and –0.95 % on, respectively, days 
0, +1 and +2). As expected by the “use of the proceeds” argument, the announcement of a 
“Capital Structure” offering has no impact, on average, on the stock price. After day +2, no 
abnormal returns are significantly different from zero for any samples. “Capital Structure” 
mean prediction errors are significantly greater than those of “Financing New Investment” 
issuers on days 0, +1 and +2 while median differences are only significant on days 0 and +2. 
This finding is consistent with the assumption that an equity offering realised for pure capital 
structure purposes does not convey any additional information about the firm value. 
                                                 
44 The significance of the AR(-4) in the “Financing New Investment” sample is due to an outlier (AR(-4) = 10 %). 
When it is not taken into account, the AR(-4) coefficient becomes insignificant at a convenient level 
(t-stat = 1.70). 
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Table 3.9 : Stock price reaction to SEO announcements 
    "Short-term" sample, 198 observations 
"Capital Structure", 
98 observations 
"Financing New 
Investment", 
100 observations 
CS sample – FNI sample
    mean   median   mean  median  mean  median  mean   median  
 AR(-5) 0.18  -0.05  0.39  -0.12  -0.02  -0.05  0.41  -0.06  
  (0.93)  (-0.71)  (1.16)  (-0.30)  (-0.10)  (-0.60)  (1.04)  (-0.01)  
 AR(-4) 0.17  0.14  -0.12  0.12  0.45 b 0.15  -0.57  -0.04  
  (0.93)  (1.72)  (-0.44)  (1.11)  (2.05)  (1.41)  (-1.61)  (-0.90)  
 AR(-3) 0.07  0.03  0.04  -0.02  0.11  0.05  -0.07  -0.06  
  (0.38)  (0.28)  (0.12)  (-0.10)  (0.46)  (0.60)  (-0.19)  (-0.04)  
 AR(-2) -0.09  0.09  -0.06  0.16  -0.12  -0.01  0.06  0.17  
  (-0.40)  (1.14)  (-0.18)  (1.73)  (-0.40)  (0.00)  (0.12)  (1.42)  
 AR(-1) -0.10  0.02  -0.06  0.13  -0.15  -0.04  0.09  0.17  
  (-0.62)  (0.14)  (-0.23)  (0.91)  (-0.68)  (-0.60)  (0.26)  (0.83)  
 AR(0) -0.33 b -0.11 b -0.11  -0.04  -0.55 b -0.21 b 0.45 b 0.17 a
  (-2.38)  (-2.01)  (-0.89)  (-0.50)  (-2.52)  (-2.26)  (1.81)  (2.00)  
 AR(+1) -0.37 b -0.06  -0.08  -0.05  -0.66 b -0.12 b 0.58 a 0.07  
  (-2.27)  (-1.72)  (-0.84)  (-0.30)  (-2.34)  (-2.04)  (2.01)  (1.42)  
 AR(+2) -0.55 b -0.14 b -0.15  -0.03  -0.95 b -0.22 b 0.80 a 0.20 b
  (-2.15)  (-2.16)  (-0.68)  (-0.50)  (-2.59)  (-2.47)  (2.23)  (1.85)  
 AR(+3) 0.25  0.03  0.44  0.07  0.07  -0.01  0.37  0.08  
  (1.14)  (0.57)  (1.28)  (0.91)  (0.24)  (0.00)  (0.84)  (1.13)  
 AR(+4) 0.24  -0.06  -0.16  -0.24  0.64  0.26  -0.80  -0.50  
  (0.98)  (-0.28)  (-0.44)  (-1.73)  (1.92)  (1.41)  (-1.61)  (-1.30)  
 AR(+5) 0.29  0.02  0.31  -0.05  0.27  0.11  0.04  -0.15  
  (1.19)  (0.28)  (0.78)  (-0.10)  (0.94)  (0.60)  (0.08)  (-0.30)  
 CAR(0,+1) -0.71 b -0.30 b -0.19  -0.08  -1.22 a -0.77 b 1.03 b 0.69 b
  (-2.55)  (-2.08)  (-0.89)  (-0.50)  (-2.75)  (-2.47)  (1.67)  (1.88)  
 CAR(0,+2) -1.26 b -0.46 b -0.33  -0.19  -2.16 a -0.80 b 1.83 a 0.61 a
  (-2.39)  (-2.37)  (-0.19)  (-0.91)  (-2.89)  (-2.47)  (2.16)  (2.06)  
a significant at the 1 % level,  b significant at the 5 % level 
Mean and median values are given in percents. Abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
around the SEO announcements are calculated with the following model : the parameters are estimated over a 
250-day period after the announcement [+6;+255] with a WLS regression according to the Heinkel and 
Kraus (1988) methodology; t-stats (given in parentheses below means) are computed by normalising abnormal 
returns by their standard deviations as in Boehmer et al. (1991). A generalised sign test (given in parentheses 
below medians) is presented in order to assess the robustness of the results. The correspondent statistics is 
computed as in Cowan (1992). The significance of the differences in mean and median between both use of the 
proceeds sample are checked according to, respectively, a t-statistics and a Wilcoxon rank test (given in 
parentheses below mean and median differences). 
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Results about the cumulative abnormal returns deserve two comments. First, the entire 
stock price reaction to the SEO announcement is reflected in the 3-day CAR, , 
which is expected since the daily abnormal returns are significantly negative on these days. 
The second comment addresses to the “use of the proceeds” argument that is given strong 
evidence. The significance of the 3-day mean and median CAR is restricted to the “Financing 
New Investment” sample. Furthermore, the stock price reaction of these issuers is 
significantly worse than that of “Capital Structure” issuers. 
(0, 2)CAR +
The stock price reaction observed here is globally similar to the results of Gajewski and 
Ginglinger (2002, p. 306, Table VI). The main difference is the significance of their longest 
CAR (a 5-day horizon starting from the announcement day). The sample of rights offerings in 
Gajewski et al. covers the 1986-1996 period and their market model parameters45 are 
estimated over a pre-announcement period [-220;-21]. In order to allow a better comparison, I 
compute a 2-day and a 5-day CAR restricting the “Short-term” sample to the 1986-1996 
period and using a pre-announcement estimation period [-255;-6]. The 2-day CAR (-0.64 %) 
is significantly negative. Although not significant at the 5 % level, the 5-day CAR (-1.06 %) 
exhibits an t-stat of -1.88. These findings are close to those of standby rights offerings in 
Gajewski et al. Overall, the changes in estimation technique have only slight impacts on the 
magnitude and significance of the stock price reaction. 
3.2.3 Where does the valuation effect come from ? 
3.2.3.1 Explanatory variables of the valuation effect 
As presented in Figure 2.2 at the end of the previous Chapter, three theoretical backgrounds 
are in competition to explain the stock price reaction to SEO announcements : static trade-off, 
, information asymmetry,  and agency costs, . Based on information asymmetry 
and agency considerations, a fourth explanation emerges : timing, TG . Proxies for the 
different theoretical trends are used as explanatory variables to the stock price reaction. 
Deviation from a target debt ratio controls for the static trade-off theory. The variable 
 represent the difference between the financial debt to assets ratio of the issuer at the 
end of the last fiscal year before the announcement and the industry median ratio. The higher 
above the target is the issuer’s debt ratio, the better should be considered the SEO that drives 
TO
targe∆
IA AC
t
                                                 
45 Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002) uses a Dimson (1979) method with two lags and two leads on the market 
return to compute their mean excess returns. They do not estimate their model with weighted least squares to 
correct for the missing data problem. 
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the ratio closer to its target. Thus,  is expected to be positively correlated with the 
stock price reaction. 
target∆
FCF
,i testment
Among potential variables that proxy information asymmetry, I retain, following 
Dierkens (1991), the issuer’s specific risk, , represented by the volatility of the 
market model residuals estimated over the pre-announcement period [-255;-6]. The greater 
the specific risk, the more negative should be investors’ reaction to the SEO announcement. 
Adverse selection is one of information asymmetry major implications. The issuer’s stock 
price runup before the offering announcement is considered by the information asymmetry 
literature as a proxy for adverse selection costs; see Myers and Majluf (1984). It is measured 
as the buy and hold return on the issuer’s stock over the period [-255;-6]. It is expected to be 
negatively correlated with the announcement valuation effect. Indeed, it should increase with 
the potential overvaluation of the stock price. Additional variables such as the size of the 
offering and the number of financial analysts that follow the issuer also constitute proxies for 
the degree of information asymmetry. However, since they are less correlated with the stock 
price reaction than other information asymmetry variables in a univariate framework, they are 
not included in the multivariate analysis
specific
46. 
Proxies for the agency costs impact on the stock price reaction include the book-to-market 
(BM) ratio and the free cash flow, . The BM ratio is an estimate of the issuer’s growth 
potential. It represents the quality and quantity of growth opportunities. The better is the 
growth potential, the lower the impact of managers’ moral hazard on the firm value is 
expected to be. Hence, the BM ratio should be negatively correlated with the announcement 
valuation effect. The measure of free cash flow is taken at the end of the fiscal year preceding 
the SEO announcement. The raw free cash flow is normalised by the total assets. It proxies 
the fraction of internal financing left in the managers’ hand after all profitable investment 
opportunities have been undertaken. The greater is the free cash flow, the higher should be the 
agency costs and the lower the stock price reaction. Formally, the free cash flow is computed 
as follows : 
, 1 , 1 1
, 1
i t i t
i
i t
CF dividend inv
FCF
Assets
− −
−
− −
=  (3.8) −
                                                 
46 The correlation between the 3-day CAR and, respectively the size of the offering and the number of analysts is 
–0.11 and 0.02, while the correlations for the specific risk and the stock price runup are –0.49 and –0.45. 
Limiting the number of explanatory variables in the multivariate analysis makes the result more robust, 
especially given the size of the samples. 
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where  is the operating cash flow of issuer, , during the last fiscal year prior to the 
SEO announcement, 
, 1i tCF − i
  is the dividends paid by issuer, , during the last fiscal year prior to the 
SEO announcement, 
, 1i tdividend − i
  is the variation in fixed tangible assets for issuer, , during the last 
fiscal year prior to the SEO announcement, 
, 1i tinvestment − i
  is the total assets of firm, i , at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the 
SEO announcement. 
, 1i tAssets −
Two additional financing variables are tested. The first one is a measure of the external 
financing deficit, . It is computed as follows : exfindef
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
, 1
i t i t i t i t
i
i t
dividend investment CF Cash
exfindef
Assets
− − −
−
+ − −
=
−  (3.9) 
where  is the amount of cash stated in the balance sheet of issuer, i , at the end of 
the last fiscal year prior to the SEO announcement. 
, 1i tCash −
The second variable measures the deficit in equity financing, equi . It corresponds to 
the external financial deficit variable less the variation in financial debt during the last fiscal 
year prior to the SEO announcement.  
tydef
, 1
, 1
i t
i i
i t
Debt
equitydef exfindef
Assets
−
−
∆
= −  (3.10) 
where  is the variation in financial debt of issuer, i , during the last fiscal year 
prior to the SEO announcement. 
, 1i tDebt −∆
The variables ,  and equi  should help clarifying the impact of agency 
costs. Indeed, free cash flow contributes to increase the financial slack. Therefore, its 
explanatory power could also be related to information asymmetry as argued by Myers and 
Majluf (1984). The variable, , is more accurate in controlling for a financial slack 
effect. The more negative it is, the greater is the amount of cash available to the firm. 
According to the pecking order, this cash should be used with priority to finance new 
investment projects. The sign of the ex  impact on the stock price reaction is expected to 
be positive. The variable, equi , takes into account the debt policy of the firm. It proxies 
the equity financing deficit and it should also control for the pecking order. The stock price 
FCF exfindef
ex
ty
tydef
findef
findef
def
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reaction should be less negative, the greater is the need for equity financing. Given that, 
 is expected to be positively correlated with the stock price reaction. equitydef
CLI
                                                
Timing variables are macro indicators that help investors to estimate the general economic 
conditions, current and future. The stock price reaction is expected to be less negative if the 
issue occurs in an upturn phase of the business cycle. However, if the equity offering is 
realised when a downturn in the economy is anticipated, the financing decision could signal 
that the proceeds are dedicated to compensate future low earnings. The stock market past 
performance, Mrunup , should be positively correlated with the stock price reaction. A high 
market runup is interpreted as a good signal about the degree of information asymmetry, 
adverse selection and even about the quality of growth opportunities. 
The credit spread, ∆ , and the term spread, ∆ , are defined in Table 3.8. Because 
bond yields and interest rates are easily and rapidly observable, both variables are taken with 
a 1-month lag. In other words, the spreads used as timing proxies cover the month preceding 
the SEO announcement. The credit spread is an indicator of current economic conditions. The 
wider it is, the greater is the chance to be in a downturn phase of the business cycle. 
Therefore, it is expected to be negatively correlated with the stock price reaction. Conversely, 
the term spread reflects the GDP growth rate and it should be positively correlated with the 
announcement valuation effect. Indeed, the better the expected economic conditions, the more 
positive should be the timing effect on the investors’ reaction.  
credit term
An alternative macro indicator is considered as a timing variable : the OECD47 Composite 
Leading Indicator. It is released with a 3-month delay This lag is taken into account when the 
variable is introduced in the multivariate analysis. The series retained in the analysis is the 
short-term indicator, the 6-month lead rate of change in the Composite Leading Indicator, 
. It indicates whether the short-term forecasted conditions are optimistic (positive) or 
pessimistic (negative). According to that, the stock price reaction should be positively 
impacted by the  variable. The term spread is one of the CL  component. Both series are 
positively correlated (
CLI I
, 0.37term CLIρ∆ = ), which implies that they are used separately in the 
cross-section analysis. Table 3.10 summarises the explanatory variables, their definition and 
their expected coefficient sign. 
 
47 Data source : http://webnet1.oecd.org/EN/documents/0,,EN-documents-509-15-no-1-no-0,00.html. The 
components of the CLI are also listed on the OECD website. 
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Table 3.10 : Explanatory variables of the announcement valuation effect 
Theory Variable Expected sign Definition 
“Static Trade-
Off”, TO  
itarget∆  + Deviation from the industry median leverage ratio (debt 
over assets in book values) 
“Information 
Asymmetry”, 
 IA
ispecific  
irunup  
- 
- 
Issuer’s specific risk estimated over the 250 trading days 
prior to the announcement day 
Issuer’s stock price runup computed over the 250 trading 
days prior to the announcement day 
“Agency Costs”, 
 AC
“Agency Costs” 
vs. “Pecking 
Order”, in AC  
iBM  
iFCF  
iexfindef  
iequitydef  
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
Book-to-market ratio at the end of the month preceding 
the SEO announcement 
Free cash flow at the last fiscal year end prior to the SEO 
announcement 
External financing deficit at the last fiscal year end prior 
to the SEO announcement 
Equity financing deficit at the last fiscal year end prior to 
the SEO announcement 
“Timing”, TG  iMrunup  
icredit∆  
iterm∆  
iCLI  
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
Stock market runup computed over the 250 trading days 
prior to the announcement day 
Credit spread (difference in yield between 10 year French 
corporate bonds and 10-year French government bonds) 
at the end of the month prior to the SEO announcement 
Term spread (difference in interest rate between 10-year 
French government bonds and 1-month Euro FRF rate) at 
the end of the month prior to the SEO announcement 
The 6-month lead rate of change in the OECD Composite 
Leading Indicator taken with a 3-month lag relative to the 
SEO announcement 
 
3.2.3.2 Information asymmetry, agency or timing ? 
The cross-section regression entails the variables that proxy the four competing theories. A 
dummy variable, UOP , equal to 1 when issuer, i , belongs to the “Financing New 
Investment” sample and 0 otherwise, is added to control for the “use of the proceeds” 
argument. Coefficient are estimated with OLS, standard errors being corrected according to 
White (1980) when necessary. The 3-day CAR starting from the announcement date, 
, is the dependent variable. The regression equation is the following : 
i
(0, 2)CAR +
0 1(0, 2)i iCAR UOPα α ε+ = + × + + + + +i i i ia'TO b'IA c'AC d'TG i
i
 (3.11) 
where  is a dummy variable equal to 1 for “Financing New Investment” issuers and 
0 otherwise, 
iUOP
  are vectors of explanatory variables defined in Table 3.10, , , ,i i iTO IA AC TG
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  are vectors of parameters, , , ,a b c d
  is an error term ∼ . iε ( )0, iN σ
Coefficient estimates are presented in Table 3.11. The first three columns show the results 
of the “Short-term” sample. The “agency” regression includes the free cash flow variable as a 
control for agency costs. In the “slack” regression, the free cash flow variable is replaced by 
the external financing deficit and the “equity” regression features the equity deficit instead. 
As heteroskedasticity is high in the “Short-term” sample regressions, issuers are split 
according to their use of the proceeds. The last six columns of Table 3.11 show the results of 
the “Capital Structure” [CS] and “Financing New Investment” [FNI] samples. It is worth 
noticing that standard errors in the CS sample do not need to be corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. Panel A of Table 3.11 entails the results according to the timing variables, 
Mrunup ,  and , while in Panel B, the term spread is replaced by the CL  
variable. 
credit∆ term∆ I
The trade-off theory does not have any explanatory power to the stock price reaction since 
the  coefficient is not significant, although it has the expected positive sign. When the 
“Capital Structure” issuers are analysed separately, the distance from the debt target ratio 
becomes significant in the “agency” equation of Panel A. In the remaining equations, the 
t-stats increase as well but not enough to become significant at a convenient level. It shows 
that the static-trade-off theory is more likely to explain the stock price reaction at the 
announcement of pure capital structure operations. Both variables of information asymmetry, 
 and , are significant and have the expected sign for the “Short-term” sample. 
In other words, the stock price decline at the SEO announcement is greater for issuers with 
higher specific risk and that have experienced a larger stock price runup. These findings are 
consistent with information asymmetry predictions. When separated across uses of the 
proceeds, the explanatory power of information asymmetry is restricted to the “Financing 
New Investment” issuers, showing that only these SEO announcements convey private 
information about the firm value. 
target∆
cificspe runup
Overall, the book-to-market ratio has no effect in explaining the announcement valuation 
effect. Unexpectedly, when examined separately, the “Financing New Investment” sample 
exhibits a significantly positive coefficient, which is not consistent with agency theory 
predictions. This result underlines the marginal role of agency costs comparing to information 
asymmetry. 
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Table 3.11 : Cross-sectional analysis of the SEO announcement effect 
    “Short-term” sample CS sample 
    “agency” “slack” “equity” “agency” “slack” “agency” “slack” “equity”
Panel A : Timing variables ( , ∆ , ∆ )     
  0.006 0.002  0.006  -0.002  -0.007 -0.008 -0.008
FNI sample 
“equity”
Mrunup credit term
0α
UOP
target∆
specific
runup
BM
FCF
exfindef
equitydef    0.001     -0.043     0.051  
      (0.03)         (1.62)  
 Mrunup  0.073 a 0.073 a 0.073 a 0.056  0.053 0.053 0.076 b 0.066  0.069  
  (2.99)  (3.04)  (3.01)  (1.62)  (1.61) (1.62) (2.10)  (1.78)  (1.84)  
 credit∆  -1.521 a -1.507 a -1.520 a -1.109 b -1.250 a -1.287 a -1.304 b -1.443 b -1.446 b
  (-3.57)  (-3.61)  (-3.61)  (-2.57)  (-2.74) (-2.76) (-1.99)  (-2.13)  (-2.20)  
 term∆  -0.166  -0.176  -0.165  0.201  0.085 0.145 -0.094  -0.197  -0.140  
  (-0.79)  (-0.86)  (-0.79)  (0.75)  (0.32) (0.54) (-0.37)  (-0.75)  (-0.53)  
  
2.adj R  0.27  0.28   0.27  0.23  0.13  0.12  0.46   0.44   0.46  
   
   -0.004  0.005  
(0.82)  (0.29)  (0.78)  (-0.25)  (-0.82) (-0.87) (-1.03)  (-0.39)  (0.62)    
-0.011  -0.011  -0.011            
 (-1.62)     
-0.001  -0.005 -0.049  -0.046  
   (-2.74) (-2.65)  
-0.005 b  b 
 (0.91) (0.82)   (-1.12)
  (-3.80)   
  
  
(-1.62)  (-1.59)          
 b 0.040 0.036 0.015  0.008  0.021  0.015  0.018  0.016  0.036 
(0.82)  (0.97)  (0.81)  (1.99)  (1.75) (1.64) (0.46)  (0.24)  (0.60)    
  -10.84 a -9.75 b b -10.84 -3.51  -2.58 -2.60 -14.69 b  b a -16.75  -20.65
(-2.72)  (-2.29)  (-2.57)  (-0.95)  (-0.67) (-0.68) (-2.15)  (-2.20)  (-2.82)    
  -0.030 b  a a a  a a-0.030  -0.030 -0.003 -0.044
(-2.60)   (-0.07)  (-0.27) (-0.41) (-3.07)  (-2.93)  (-2.89)  
b0.016 0.0150.003  0.004  0.003  -0.005  -0.005 0.017   
(0.81)   (-1.27) (-1.00) (2.48)  (2.35)  (2.19)    
a   0.089      -0.002      -0.180  
(-0.06)     (1.70)        
   -0.029      -0.046    -0.009     
(-1.19)      (-1.48)    (-0.24)      
   
(-1.51)
a significant at the 1 % level,  b significant at the 5 % level 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
T-stat are given in parentheses. 
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Table 3.11 : continued 
    “Short-term” sample CS sample FNI sample 
    “agency” “slack” “equity” “agency” “slack” “equity” “agency” “slack” “equity”
Panel B : Timing variables ( Mrunup , ∆ , CL ) credit I         
 0α  0.010  0.006  0.011  0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005  -0.001  0.009  
  (1.29)  (0.74)  (1.33)  (0.43) (-0.27) (-0.23) (-0.64)  (-0.09)  (0.98)  
 UOP  -0.012  -0.011  -0.012           
  (-1.76)  (-1.72)  (-1.75)           
 target∆  0.012  0.014  0.013  0.028 0.033 0.030 0.013  0.007  0.020  
  (0.64)  (0.79)  (0.69)  (1.51) (1.51) (1.37) (0.40)  (0.21)  (0.59)  
 specific  -10.60 a -9.62 b -10.92 a -3.49 -2.60 -2.77 -14.49 b -16.77 b -20.79 a
  (-2.79)  (-2.36)  (-2.69)  (-0.96) (-0.67) (-0.71) (-2.19)  (-2.31)  (-3.05)  
 runup  -0.028 b -0.028 a -0.028 b 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.047 a -0.045 a -0.042 a
  (-2.64)  (-2.77)  (-2.64)  (-0.02) (-0.21) (-0.35) (-3.12)  (-3.07)  (-2.93)  
 BM  0.004  0.004  0.003  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.016 
b 0.015 b 0.014  
  (0.85)  (0.94)  (0.81)  (-1.14) (-0.95) (-0.90) (2.30)  (2.10)  (1.91)  
 FCF  0.000     
      
-0.027  -0.044   
 (-1.18) (-1.56) (-0.26) 
  0.008  -0.035
 (0.35) (-1.35)  
   -0.172 a  0.091     
(0.01)   (-3.57)   (1.77)     
 exfindef         -0.010   
             
         0.055  
           (1.78)  
 0.076 a 0.076 0.052
  .59) (1.60) (2.62)
-1.511
-0.002 0.002 -0.001  
(-1.42)
a 0.076 a 0.054 0.052 0.080 a 0.076 a 0.075 b
(3.61)  (3.64)  (3  (1.60) (1.59) (2.83)  (2.66)   
  a -1.496 a -1.509 a -1.208 a -1.323 a -1.358 a -1.273 b -1.400 b -1.409 b
  (-3.66)  (-3.67)  (-3.68)  (-2.85) (-2.86) (-2.88) (-1.99)  (-2.11)  (-2.20)  
 CLI  -0.002 b  b - b -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.002  
  (-2.58)  (-2.61)  (-2.63)  (-1.23) (-1.26) (-1.09)   (-1.39)  (-1.46)  
  2.adj R  0.29  0.30  0.30  0.23  0.14  0.13  0.47   0.45   0.47  
equitydef  
Mrunup  
credit∆  
a significant at the 1 % level,  b significant at the 5 % level 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
The dependent variable is the 3-day CAR. UOP  is the use of the proceeds dummy. The deviation from the 
industry median debt ratio, , proxies the static trade-off theory. Information asymmetry variables include 
the volatility of market model pre-announcement residuals, 
target∆
specific , and the stock price runup before the 
announcement, . The influence of agency costs is tested by the book-to-market ratio, , and by the free 
cash flow, 
runup BM
FCF . Both variables,  and , represent the external financing deficit and the 
equity financing deficit that control for financial slack and pecking order effects. Timing is proxied by the 
market runup prior to the announcement, 
exfindef equitydef
Mrunup , the credit spread, , and the term spread,  or 
the 6-month lead rate of change in the OECD Composite Leading Indicator, CL . T-stat are given in 
parentheses. 
credit∆ term∆
I
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The magnitude of free cash flow does not influence the announcement valuation effect, 
except for the “Capital Structure” sample. For these issuers, the presence of free cash flow 
could signal to the market that an equity issue is not the optimal operation to manage their 
capital structure. To lower their debt ratio, they could use the free cash flow to repay debt. 
The overall findings about free cash flow outline the marginal role of the agency theory in 
explaining the investors’ reaction to SEO announcements. The variables ex  and 
 are not significant either. The presence of financial slack (ex  being negative) 
does not significantly pressure down the stock price reaction. Conversely, the SEO 
announcement is not better perceived when equity is the most needed ( equi  being 
positive). The overall results of regressions “agency”, “slack” and “equity” are similar and so 
are their adjusted 
findef
tydef
equitydef findef
2R . 
With information asymmetry, timing appears to have a strong explanatory power. SEO 
realised after a period of good market performance are better perceived (significantly positive 
coefficient for Mrunup ). However, the explanatory power of past market performance is 
reduced for “Capital Structure” issuers. Current economic conditions also influence positively 
the stock price reaction. This pattern is illustrated by a negative coefficient for the  
variable. Expected economic conditions proxied by  in Panel A and by  in Panel B 
do not contribute to explain the announcement valuation effect in the sense predicted by the 
theory. The term spread coefficient is negative and insignificant. Moreover, the CL  variable 
is significantly and negatively related to the 3-day CAR at the “Short-term” sample level. The 
significance is eliminated when both uses of the proceeds are analysed separately, indicating 
that it could be due to the heteroskedasticity. 
credit∆
term∆ CLI
I
Unlike information asymmetry, timing seems to affect both issuer’s types, although the 
significance of the coefficients is higher for “Financing New Investment” issuers. When 
jointly tested, the timing coefficients ( Mrunup ,  and ∆ ) are not different 
between issuer’s types
credit∆ term
48. By comparison, information asymmetry coefficients (  and specific
                                                 
48 Wald tests on the coefficients are performed from the regression : 
i
i i+
where  equals 1 if issuer  belongs to the “Capital Structure” (“Financing New Investment”) sample. 
The hypotheses on the coefficients are the following : 
P-values of the F-stat Wald test are 0.78 for timing coefficients and 0.01 for information asymmetry coefficients. 
0 1(0, 2)i i i i i
i i i
CAR UOP CS FNI CS FNI
CS FNI CS FNI
α α
ε
+ = + × + × + × + × + ×
+ × + × + × + ×
CS i FNI i CS i FNI i
CS i FNI i CS i FNI i
a 'TO a 'TO b 'IA b 'IA
c 'AC c 'AC d 'TG d 'TG
 
( )i iCS FNI i
0
0
timing, : vs. :
information asymmetry, ' : vs. ' :
A
A
H H
H H
= ≠
= ≠
CS FNI CS FNI
CS FNI CS FNI
d d d d
b b b b
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runup ) are significantly different between “Capital structure” and “Financing New 
Investment” issuers, at the 1 % level. 
In the “Short-term” sample regressions, the coefficients of the UOP  dummy variable is 
negative but not significantly different from zero at a convenient level. This outcome 
indicates that the difference in abnormal returns between both uses of the proceeds is 
explained by the other control variables. According to that, the use of the proceeds should be 
considered as a raw summary of various characteristics related to the issuer’s type. It does not 
contain specific information that investors cannot observe elsewhere. 
In their cross-section analysis, Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002, Table VIII, p. 312) test with 
priority the influence of the flotation method and the shareholders’ take up on the stock price 
reaction. The stock price runup prior to the announcement and a use of the proceeds dummy 
are the explanatory variables common to both studies. The negative impact of the stock price 
runup on the announcement abnormal return is consistent with the results of Gajewski and 
Ginglinger (2002). They find highly significant negative coefficients of similar magnitude as 
those reported in Table 3.11 (-0.024 vs. –0.030). For the use of the proceeds, they obtain 
significantly positive coefficients, which is opposed to the “use of the proceeds” argument. 
They argue that the simultaneous announcement of the financing source and the investment 
project reduces information asymmetry and moral hazard. Their sample includes direct cash 
offerings that are associated, in 55 % of the cases, with the announcement of a specific 
investment project. Direct cash offerings announcements do not generate abnormal stock 
price reaction. Therefore, their inclusion could explain the difference observed for the use of 
the proceeds dummy49. The absence of static trade-off, agency and timing variables has for 
consequences significant regression constants and lower adjusted 2R  (up to 0.15 against 
0.27/0.30 in Table 3.11). 
In summary, information asymmetry and timing are given strong support while only a 
marginal influence of the agency theory and none for the static trade-off are detected. 
Information asymmetry is restricted to “Financing New Investment” issuers, which is 
consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984) framework. Indeed, in the adverse selection model, 
the equity issue decision is indissociable from an investment project and information 
asymmetry affects the value of existing assets and that of the investment project. The impact 
                                                 
49 In addition, the source the use of the proceeds is collected from is not indicated, which could also explain part 
of the difference. 
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of timing is allocated between both issuers’ types. The stock price reaction is particularly 
influenced by current economic conditions and also by past market performance. Expected 
global economic conditions are not found to have the predicted explanatory power. The next 
step is to analyse what information is conveyed by the SEO announcement, especially for 
“Financing New Investment” operations. If private information is about future earnings, 
revisions in earnings forecasts around the announcement should be significantly related to the 
stock price reaction. 
3.2.3.3 What is the contribution of financial analysts 
In the presence of information asymmetry, the SEO announcement conveys the managers’ 
private information about the firm value to investors. A further test of the announcement 
valuation effect consists in verifying if the signal is about earnings. For that purpose, a 
multivariate analysis is run on the “Short-term I/B/E/S” sample with two additional 
explanatory variables : the revision of the earnings forecast after the issue announcement and 
the dispersion in the earnings forecasts at the time of the SEO announcement. Not only the 
significance of the new variables would be interesting but so would be the impact of their 
inclusion onto the significance of the other explanatory variables, especially those that proxy 
information asymmetry and timing. 
As a preliminary remark, the switching from the “Short-term” to the “Short-term I/B/E/S” 
sample and the implied reduction in the number of observations does not affect significantly 
the announcement valuation effect. The average 3-day CAR of the “Short-term I/B/E/S” 
sample is equal to -1.56 % , significant at the 1 % level. The average valuation effect of the 
“Capital Structure I/B/E/S” and the “Financing New Investment I/B/E/S” samples are equal 
to, respectively, –0.69 % (not significant at a convenient level) and –2.36 % (significant at the 
1 % level). The difference in stock price reaction between both sub-samples is significant at 
the 5 % level. Moreover, the cross-section analysis presented in Table 3.11 but performed on 
the I/B/E/S samples leads to similar results50. Therefore, differences that would be found after 
the inclusion of the earnings forecast variables cannot be imputed to the sample size 
reduction. 
                                                 
50 Results are not presented here for the sake of brevity. The risk specific and the stock price runup are 
significantly negative except for the “Capital Structure I/B/E/S” sample. The book-to-market ratio is positive 
only for “Financing New Investment” issuers. The market runup and the credit spread are also significant with 
proper signs. 
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The revision of the earnings forecasts is computed with 3-year earnings forecasts. One 
reason is that 3-year earnings forecasts are less sensitive to marginal news about the issuer’s 
financial situation that could contaminate 1-year forecasts. In that sense, revisions of 3-year 
forecasts should be more relevant in isolating the signal of the event on future earnings. The 
second reason addresses to the timing hypothesis. If equity issues are timed before a downturn 
in earnings and to compensate for future decreases in the internal financing capacity, the 
downturn should be on a long-term basis. Indeed, temporary low earnings should not incline 
managers to raise additional cash. According to that, 3-year earnings forecasts constitute the 
longest forecast horizon with sufficient data available for French firms in I/B/E/S51. The 
revision measure, 3RIF , is adjusted by the median industry revision52. It is calculated as 
follows : 
, 6 , , 6 ,
,
, ,
3 3 3
3 i t i t i t i ti t
i t i t
F F I I
RIF
P IP
+ +− −
= −
3
2 (3.1 ) 
where  is the 3-year earnings forecast available for issuer, , six months after the 
SEO announcement
, 63i tF + i
53, 
  is the last 3-year earnings forecast available for issuer, ,  prior to the SEO 
announcement, 
,3i tF i
  is the stock price at the time of the pre-announcement forecast, ,i tP
 , 6 , ,3 , 3 and 3i t i t i tI I IP+  are the corresponding industry median 3-year forecasts and 
price. 
If the SEO announcement is informative about a future earnings decline, the 3RIF
ent. If infor
the explanatory power of the 
 variable 
should be positively correlated with the stock price reaction. The use of the proceeds allows a 
deeper analysis about the informational content of SEO announcem mation 
asymmetry concerns the value of the new investment project, 
3RIF  variable should be restricted to the “Financing New Investme
SEO announcement could convey information in the sense of Miller and Rock (1985), that is 
the equity issue is realised to compensate for a decline in future earnings. In that case, 
                                                
nt” issuers. However, the 
 
51 The long-term growth rate forecast is available for only 70 of the 110 issuers in the “Short-term I/B/E/S” 
sample. 
52 Adjusting the earnings forecast revision by its industry median prevent its impact on the stock price reaction to 
be due to an industry effect. It guarantees that this impact is issuer-specific. 
53 As shown by O’Brien (1988), only 20 % of earnings forecasts are revised in a given month. Therefore, waiting 
for six months after the announcement ensures that earnings forecasts about issuers have been revised. 
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earnings forecasts revisions should be significant for all offering types. Timing would be the 
main determinant of the equity issue decision but it would be firm-specific and not economy-
wide. The reason is that the stock price reaction is not influenced by the expected global 
economic conditions; see the  and  variables in Table 3.11. The inclusion of the term∆ CLI
3RIF
CA
 variable should have only a lim on the explanatory power of timing variables. 
i 3
i
ited effect 
+i ib'IAi i + a'TO
,iC TG
3iDIF
0,N σ
The dispersion in 3-year earnings forecast is taken from the last consensus forecast 
available before the SEO announcement. Like the measure of earnings forecast revision, it is 
adjusted by its industry median. The greater is the dispersion, the less accurate is the earnings 
forecasts. The dispersion also decreases when the number of forecasts within the consensus 
increases. In that sense, it proxies information asymmetry. A lower dispersion should induce a 
lower degree of information asymmetry and, in turn, a less negative stock price reaction. 
The regression model is an extended version of Equation 3.10, including both earnings 
forecast variables and it expresses as follows : 
0 1(0, 2)R UOPα α ε+ = + × + + + +i i ic'AC d'TG e'EF  (3.1 ) 
where ,  are dummy variable and vectors of explanatory 
variables as defined in Table 3.10, 
iUOP , ,i iTO IA A
  is the vector containing the issuer, , earnings forecast variables iEF i 3iRIF  
(industry median adjusted revision in 3-year earnings forecast around the SEO 
announcement) and  (the industry median adjusted dispersion in pre-SEO 3-
year earnings forecasts), 
  are vectors of parameters, , , , ,a b c d e
  is an error term ∼ . iε ( )i
Results are presented in Table 3.12. Since the replacement of  by CL  does not alter 
the explanatory power of other variables, only the results with  are reported. The first 
three columns show the coefficients of the “Short-term I/B/E/S” sample, each column 
referring to, respectively, the “agency”, “slack” and “equity” regressions. Figures about the 
use of the proceeds samples are reported in the remaining columns. As expected, the 
term∆
term∆
I
3RIF  
variable has a positive coefficient that is significant for the “Short-term I/B/ES” sample. 
However, the explanatory power of the earnings forecast revisions is restricted to the 
“Financing New Investment” operations when the issuer’s types are analysed separately. 
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Table 3.12 : Informational content of SEO announcements related to earnings 
    “Short-term I/B/E/S” sample* “CS I/B/E/S” sample* “FNI I/B/E/S” sample* 
    “agency” “slack” 
-0.005
“equity” “agency” “slack” “equity” “agency” “slack” “equity”
 0α  -0.009  -0.012  -0.010  0.000  -0.004 -0.014  -0.016  -0.012  
  (-0.95)  (-1.16)  (-0.97)
  
 (0.03)  (-0.24) (-0.32) (-1.40)  (-1.43)  (-1.36)  
 UOP  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003          
  (-0.31)  (-0.28)  (-0.33)            
 target∆  -0.005  -0.002  -0.008  0.018  0.024 0.023 -0.004  -0.012  -0.025  
  (-0.21)  (-0.08)  (-0.35)  (0.62)  (0.84) (0.79) (-0.15)  (-0.46)  (-0.88)  
 specific  0.78  1.18  1.07  -9.43  -9.01 -9.20 -1.26  0.37  0.46  
  (0.33)  (0.49)  (0.46)  
-0.047 -0.043 -0.043  
1.33)  
-0.001 004  0.003  
(0.98) (0.96) (-0.16)  (-0.08)
(-1.22)  (-1.15) (-1.21) (-0.37)  (0.09)  (0.13)  
 -0.046 b  b -0.047 b -0.031  -0.027 -0.030 -0.042    
  (-2.23)  (-2.23)  (-2.22)  (-1.62)  (-1.42) (-1.45) (-1.42)  (- (-1.27)  
 BM  0.007  0.007  0.007  -0.003  -0.001 0.004  0.
  (0.98)    (-0.08) (0.56)  (0.54)  (0.36)  
 FCF  0.021      
  (0.39)     
 
 
  
-0.114    0.115      
   (-2.13) b   (1.49)    
 exfindef    -0.026      -0.012    -0.050   
    (-0.97)      (-0.28)    (-1.24)    
 equitydef      -0.013     -0.024    -0.023  
     (-0.47)     (-0.52)    (-0.73)  
 Mrunup  0.079  0.079  0.080  0.049
-0.461
(-0.49) 
0.048
 (-0.64) (0.07) 
(2.86) (2.84)
0.002
0.051  0.047 0.090  0.093  0.096  
  (1.70)  (1.68)  (1.70)  (0.92)  (0.84) (0.86) (1.16)  (1.12)  (1.11)  
 credit∆  -0.766  -0.769  -0.797  -0.702  -0.648 -0.722 -0.402  -0.346   
  (-1.82)  (-1.84)  (-1.87)  (-1.63)  (-1.34) (-1.40) (-0.61)   (-0.65)  
 term∆  -0.226  -0.277  -0.259  -0.062  -0.039 -0.048   -0.171  -0.132  
 (-0.55)  (-0.69)   (-0.15)  (-0.09) (-0.11)  (-0.24)  (-0.18)  
 3RIF  0.339 a 0.332 a 0.338 a 0.102  0.089 0.083 0.645 b 0.655 b 0.666 b
   (2.86)   (0.92)  (0.74) (0.69) (2.40)  (2.28)  (2.09)  
 3DIF  -0.024 b -0.023 b -0.022   -0.001 0.003 -0.184  -0.158  -0.214  
  (-2.11)  (-1.96)  (-1.91)  (0.08)  (-0.03) (0.13) (-0.53)  (-0.42)  (-0.54)  
  
2.adj R  0.32  0.33   0.32  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.50   0.49   0.47  
runup  
a significant at the 1 % level,  b significant at the 5 % level 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
The dependent variable is the 3-day CAR. UOP  is the use of the proceeds dummy. Static trade-off, information 
asymmetry, agency and timing variables are defined in Table 3.10.  is the industry median adjusted 3-year 
earnings forecast revision around the SEO announcement.  is the industry median adjusted dispersion in 
3-year earnings forecasts prior to the SEO announcement. T-stat are given in parentheses. 
3RIF
3DIF
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The SEO announcement conveys private information about the future earnings of one 
issuer type and that information addresses the value of the investment project. This finding 
contradicts the Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002) argument that announcing a specific use of 
the proceeds lowers the degree of information asymmetry. In fact, information asymmetry is 
concentrated in the investment project. Another characteristic of “Financing New Investment” 
issuers is consistent with that explanation. Panel C of Table 3.5 reports that the business risk 
of “Financing New Investment” issuers increases after the SEO announcement. The 
explanation is that the new project contributes to that increase. Accordingly, investors could 
consider the SEO announcement as a turning point at which the private information is 
revealed and is transformed simultaneously into a greater uncertainty and lower expected 
earnings. That rationale presents the investment opportunity as a high risk negative NPV 
project. In other words, the project could generate very high profits if it succeeds but the 
probability of success is low. The investment project have many characteristics in common 
with start-up, including the constraint to be financed with equity. 
The dispersion in earnings forecasts prior to the SEO announcement has some limited 
explanatory power. The significance of the  coefficient is restricted to the “Short-term 
I/B/E/S” sample. It has the predicted negative sign. The greater is the earnings forecasts 
dispersion, the more severe is the stock price decline. When offerings are split according to 
the use of the proceeds, the significance of the  variable disappears
3DIF
3DIF 54. All in all, 
investors do not consider that a lower dispersion corresponds to a lower degree of information 
asymmetry. Not presented here, the variation in the earnings forecasts dispersion around the 
SEO is not significantly different from zero. The SEO announcement does not lead financial 
analysts to make more accurate forecasts. 
The inclusion of the earnings forecast variables has for consequence to eliminate the 
significance of the risk specific for the “Short-term I/B/E/S” and the “Financing New 
Investment” samples. The significance of the stock price runup is also affected. At the “Short-
term I/B/E/S” sample level, coefficients of the runup are still significant but at a lower level. 
However, they become insignificant when both issuers’ types are analysed separately. When 
information asymmetry coefficients are jointly tested to be equal to zero, the null hypothesis 
is not rejected (p-value of 0.30 for both “Short-term I/B/E/S” and “Financing New 
Investment” samples). These findings suggest that both specific risk and stock price runup are 
                                                 
54 The significance of the “Short-term I/B/E/S” sample could be due to the presence of heteroskedasticity in the 
standard errors. 
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appropriate measures of the degree of information asymmetry. They also confirm that the 
private information is about future earnings and that it is “Financing New Investment” issuer-
specific. Indeed, financial analysts use the SEO announcement as a signal to revise their 
earnings forecasts. 
The impact of timing vanishes when earnings forecast variables are tested. The credit 
spread and the market runup loose their significance. The hypothesis that all three timing 
variable coefficients are jointly equal to zero is not rejected for both “Short-term I/B/E/S” and 
“Financing New Investment I/B/E/S” samples, p-values being equal to, respectively, 0.37 and 
0.29. This finding indicates that the revisions in earnings forecasts also integrate the valuation 
effect of timing. 
All in all, earnings forecast revisions around the SEO announcement help to explain the 
stock price reaction. They substitute for information asymmetry and timing effects. The 
earnings forecast revision is an ex-post control variable. It cannot be observed before or even 
at the time of the SEO announcement. It controls that the information conveyed by the 
announcement is about future earnings. The findings also show that the fraction of the 
announcement valuation effect explained by the earnings forecast revisions was previously 
explained by pre-announcement specific risk, stock price runup, past market performance and 
credit spread. At this point, testing whether financial analysts use information asymmetry and 
timing measures to adjust their earnings forecasts would be interesting. Consider the 
following ad hoc model : 
0 1 2 3 4 53i i i iRIF specific runup Mrunup credit termδ δ δ δ δ δ ε= + + + + ∆ + ∆ + i 4 (3.1 ) 
If the ex-post earnings forecast revisions are a substitute for ex-ante information asymmetry 
and timing variables, the  coefficients should be significantly different from zero (negative 
for information asymmetry variables and , and positive for past market performance 
and expected economic conditions). Results are presented in Table 3.13 for the “Short-term 
I/B/E/S”, “Capital Structure I/B/E/S” and “Financing New Investment I/B/E/S” samples. 
δ
credit∆
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Table 3.13 : Determinants of earnings forecast revisions around the SEO announcement 
    “Short-term I/B/E/S”  “CS I/B/E/S”  “FNI I/B/E/S”   
 0δ  -0.002  -0.013  0.008  
  -0.35  -1.65  1.71  
 specific  -6.753 a -4.988  -5.006 b 
  -2.98
-0.038
 -1.22  -2.05  
 runup  -0.019 b 0.013   a 
  -2.32  0.74  -4.16  
 Mrunup  0.048 b 0.016  0.078 b 
  
-2.17 
1.327
 
  45 
1.96  0.44  2.61  
 credit∆  -0.491  -0.122  -0.906 b 
  -1.39  -0.23   
 term∆  0.672 a a 0.317  
 2.92  3.55  1.23  
2.adj R  0.21   0.16   0.   
a significant at the 1 % level,  b significant at the 5 % level 
The dependent variable is the industry median adjusted 3-year earnings forecast revision, 
. Information asymmetry and timing variables are defined in Table 3.10. T-stat are given 
in parentheses. 
3RIF
 
At the “Short-term I/B/E/S” sample level, the magnitude of the earnings forecast revisions 
is explained by the pre-announcement specific risk, stock price runup, market performance 
and term spread. All coefficients have their predicted sign. It is worth noticing that the 
expected economic conditions have a significant influence on the earnings forecast revisions. 
When issuers are split according to the use of the proceeds, revisions after a “Capital 
Structure” offering are explained only by the term spread, the expected economic conditions. 
In the case of “Financing New Investment” issues, specific risk, stock price runup, market 
runup and credit spread are significant. This simple model is meant to explore potential 
determinants of earnings forecast revisions after a SEO announcement. The results indicate 
that a link exist between the ex-ante proxies for both information asymmetry and timing and 
the ex-post revisions in earnings forecasts. This link should explain why the ex-ante variables 
loose their significance in Table 3.12. 
A question remains unanswered. The economic effect of the equity financing decision is 
measured at the announcement date but what is the fraction of this effect that is not 
anticipated by the market ? To say it differently, does the SEO announcement really convey 
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private information ? Or is the market able to anticipate this information ? In this case, what 
variables do explain the stock price reaction at the announcement ? Answers to these 
questions could be brought by running a conditional event study. 
3.3 A conditional methodology to test announcement effects 
Malatesta and Thompson (1985) define the economic impact of an event as the difference 
between the firm value knowing the event is occurring and the firm value knowing the event 
will never occur. The economic impact is equivalent to the present value of the cash flows 
generated by the event. The announcement of the event eliminates the uncertainty about the 
event modalities. In that sense, the announcement valuation effect is restricted to the change 
in firm value directly coming from the elimination of that uncertainty. The economic impact 
and the announcement valuation effect cannot be equivalent, unless the event is perceived as 
impossible by investors. 
Standard event study methodology involves two problems related to the previous 
observation. First, following Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams (1990), standard OLS 
estimators of the announcement valuation effect are inconsistent when the event is voluntarily 
decided by managers, as it is the case for SEO. Rational managers initiate the SEO only when 
it provides some corporate or personal benefit so that they would conduct the equity issue 
only when their private information has a positive net value. At the same time, rational 
investors are expected to use both the voluntary event announcement and managers’ 
incentives to infer the net present value of private information. 
Second, following abnormal returns are related to the issuers’ characteristics not only 
through the announcement but also through the investors’ anticipation of the event. Indeed, 
investors use the firm characteristics to estimate the event probability of occurrence. As 
noticed by Campbell, Lo and McKinlay (1997), the link between the firm characteristics and 
the investors’ anticipation of the event introduce a selection bias. Therefore, the residuals of 
the standard cross-section analysis are not independent from the firm characteristics, 
represented by the explanatory variables.  
Both problems are addressed by Acharya (1988, 1993), Eckbo et al. (1990), and 
Prabhala (1997). These authors show that the use of a limited dependent variable 
methodology allows to derive consistent estimators of the event valuation effect. 
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3.3.1 Truncated regression model 
The conditional model is derived from Eckbo et al. (1990) and adapted for the specificities 
of equity issues. The decision that leads managers to realise a SEO is based on the 
information they possess and that is not fully available to the market. Let  denote firm 
evaluation of the NPV of announcing an equity issue. Managers realise the SEO only when 
the announcement NPV is non-negative. While investors cannot directly observe , they 
know a set of public variables that help them estimate . The SEO announcement NPV to 
managers is modelled as follows : 
i
iy i  
iy
iy
0iy η= + ≥iγ'X  (3.1 ) 5
where iγ'X
inform
 represents the investors' expectation of  conditional on prior public 
ation , with K
iy
iX ( ),1 ,' 1, , ,i ix x=iX " , and γ  being a vector of coefficients, 
 iη  is the NPV of managers’ private information, when the announcement is made. 
The variable iη  is assumed to be distributed normally, ( )20,N ησ . 
When the SEO is announced, investors infer that iη ≥ − iγ'X . Then, the expected NPV of 
the announcement conditional on managers’ rationality is given by : 
( ) ( ) ( )( )ii i i i i
z
E y E
zη
φη η η≥ − = + ≥ − = +
Φi i i i
γ'X γ'X γ'X γ'X σ 6 (3.1 ) 
where iz
ησ
=
iγ'X  is the standardised value of public information, 
 ( ) ( )( )21 21
2
iz
iz eφ
π
−
= , the standard Normal density function of , iz
 , the standard Normal cumulative function of ; in other 
words, the probability to issue equity, anticipated by investors. 
( ) ( )
iz
i iz zφ
−∞
Φ = ∫ idz iz
The ratio ( ) ( )izφ Φ
iz−
iz  is the expectation of a standardised normal variable that is truncated 
below at . Thus, the announcement abnormal effect ( ), given that the event is 
voluntary and given Equation 3.15, can be re-defined as : 
iAE
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( )
( )
i
i
i
z
AE q
zη
φ
σ iζ= + +Φiα'X  (3.1 ) 7
where  is the fraction of the announcement valuation effect imputable to the set of 
public information 
iα'X
iX
55, α  being a vector of coefficients, 
 ( )( )
i
i
z
zη
φ
σ
Φ
 is the unanticipated stock price reaction imputable to managers’ private 
information,  
  is a coefficient measuring the sensitivity of the unanticipated stock return to 
private information. 
q
 (0,i N )ζζ σ∼  is an error term. 
In terms of Equation 3.10, α  corresponds to the list of explanatory variables 
corresponding to the various theories ( ). The 
term  represents the non-truncated residuals, replaced in Equation 3.16 by the sum 
i'X
0 1 iUOPα α+ × + + + +i i ia'TO b'IA c'AC d'TGi
iε
( )
( )
i
i
i
q ησ
z
z
φ ζ+
Φ
. In this conditional methodology, the expected unanticipated valuation effect 
is assumed to be proportional to the private information released in the event. Two main 
hypotheses are tested. First, the significance of the coefficient  indicates that the private 
information effect is not fully anticipated at the time of the SEO announcement. In other 
words, the announcement of the financing decision still conveys some private information 
about the firm value. Second, the significance of the coefficients in α  shows which theory 
impacts the announcement valuation effect once the selection bias is taken into account. 
q
3.3.2 The estimation procedure 
Managers initiate the equity offerings only if the announcement NPV, given their private 
information, is non-negative. Otherwise, they do nothing. In the cross-section analysis, the 
managers’ behaviour implies that the residuals distribution is truncated. Coefficients corrected 
for this truncation bias can be estimated with Maximum Likelihood, with Non-Linear Least 
Squares and with a two-stage procedure. This last estimation method, proposed by 
Heckman (1979), is used by Acharya (1988 and 1993) and Guo and Mech (2000). It has been 
                                                 
55 The set of public information in Equation 3.16 is not constrained to be equivalent to the one in Equation 3.14, 
see Greene (1984, p. 974 and following). 
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shown to have nice statistical properties in small samples, which is not the case for Maximum 
Likelihood and Non-Linear Least Squares, see Prabhala (1997). However, it requires a “Non-
Event” sample that includes firms that do not issue equity, for which the announcement NPV 
is supposed to be negative ( iη < − iγ'X ).This “Non-Event” sample is used in the first stage in 
order to estimate the probability to issue equity. The two-stage procedure is described below. 
3.3.2.1 Formation of a non-event sample 
A non-event firm should be one for which the event announcement NPV is negative. The 
value of managers’ private information is not worth enough. Since private information is not 
observable, the definition of the non-event firm is reduced to a firm that could conduct a SEO 
but that does not. French issuers must receive the authorisation to issue equity from the 
shareholders’ Extraordinary Meeting (hereafter EM). This authorisation runs over five years. 
The call of the EM and its agenda is published in the “Bulletin des Annonces Légales 
Obligatoires”. Although it is not legally required, EM are often called on the same date as the 
Ordinary Meeting. April is the month when most of the Ordinary Meetings are called. From 
the April’s editions of the BALO between 1984 and 2000, a sample of 730 authorisations to 
issue equity is collected. The authorisations are asked by 300 different firms in all industrial 
sectors. 
Since it has received the authorisation, the management is free to decide when to issue. It 
can also decide not to issue during the whole period. I consider firms that received the 
authorisation to issue but that do not realise the operation within two years after the EM as 
potential non-event firms. The 2-year period is chosen because 85 % of equity issues occur 
within this horizon56. Furthermore, it is long enough to let managers initiate the operation if 
their private information is favourable. At the same time, it is not too long so that the market 
could still anticipate the event. After two years, the issuance probability perceived by the 
market is assumed to decrease rapidly.  
To be included in the final non-event sample, potential non-event firms are matched with 
issuers on the industry and on the announcement date. For each issuer, firms that are in the 
no-issue period and that are in the same industry are considered as non-event firms. They 
receive a “pseudo announcement” date which is the one of their issuing counterpart. This 
“pseudo announcement” date serves as reference date to fix the non-event in time and allows 
                                                 
56 See Table 3.6 for the descriptive statistics about the SEO timeline. 
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to collect the relevant data concerning the non-event firm. Data requirements for non-event 
firms are similar to those for issuers (except for the issuing prospectus). Consequently, the 
final non-event sample (NE) includes 583 observations. 
Descriptive statistics of the “Non-Event” sample are presented in Table 3.14 as well as 
those of the “Short-term” sample. The last column reports the difference in medians between 
both samples. “Non-Event” firms are significantly larger than issuers (median market 
capitalisation of 3672 millions FRF vs. 889 millions FRF). This finding is not surprising since 
it is consistent with the SEO literature indicating that equity issues are realised mainly by 
small firms57. In terms of book-to-market ratio, the difference between issuers and “Non-
Event” firms is not significant. One could expect equity issuers to have more growth 
opportunities than non-event firms. However, almost half of equity issuers realise the 
operation for non-investing purposes and should not have a different book-to-market ratio. 
When the comparison is made between “Non-Event” firms and “Financing New Investment” 
issuers, the median book-to-market is not different either (not shown here). This result is 
consistent with the fact that “Financing New Investment” issuers are not high growth firms 
but they finance high-risk investments with equity. 
Table 3.14 : Descriptive statistics of the non-event sample 
    "Non-Event"  "Short-term"   Difference  
  583 observations 198 observations  NE - ST 
    mean  median  
3672
mean  median   median  
 Issuer size (millions FRF) 20890   6159  889  2783 a 
          (8.97)  
 Book-to-market ratio 0.67  0.49  0.76  0.52  -0.03  
      
  
  
    (-0.40)  
 Debt-to-assets ratio 0.24  0.21  0.28  0.27  -0.06 a 
          (-2.58)  
 Cash-to-assets ratio 0.12  0.08  0.07  0.04  0.04 a 
        (5.09)  
 Cash flow-to-assets ratio 0.07  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.01  
                (1.34)   
a significant at the 1 % level, b significant at the 5 % level 
Wilcoxon rank test statistics are given in parentheses. Variables are defined as in Table 3.6. 
 
Equity issuers are more levered and have less cash than “Non-Event” firms. These 
differences are mainly due to the “Capital Structure” issuers, since “Non-Event” firms and 
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“Financing New Investment” issuers have statistically similar debt ratio and liquidity ratio. In 
terms of cash flow, no difference is noticed between issuers and non-issuers. When issuers are 
split according to the use of the proceeds, “Financing New Investment” issuers are found to 
have significantly larger cash flows (median difference of 0.02 with a Wilcoxon rank test 
statistic of 2.12) than “Non-Event” firms, while “Capital Structure” issuers have significantly 
lower cash flows (median difference of -0.04 with a Wilcoxon rank test statistic of -4.11). 
These findings are consistent with the fact that “Financing New Investment” issuers have 
alternative financing solution to external equity and that “Capital Structure” issuers are more 
financially constrained. 
3.3.2.2 The first stage, the probability to issue 
The first stage of the procedure consists in estimating the probability to issue equity. 
Variables used to anticipate the equity issue decision are the explanatory variables of the 
cross-section analysis plus the firm size given by the logarithm of the market value taken at 
the end of the month prior to the SEO announcement (or pseudo announcement for “Non-
Event” firms). The size is added because it underlines a great difference between both 
samples. Hence, investors could use it as one major variable to anticipate the event. The larger 
the firm, the lower should be the probability to issue. Other potential explanatory variables are 
described in Table 3.10. To summarise, the following Probit model is estimated : 
0 1j j jI MV yξ γ γ ξ= + = + + + + + +j j j jγ'X a'TO b'IA c'AC d'TGj 8 (3.1 ) 
where the subscript, j , characterises all firms that belong to the union of “Short-term” 
and “Non-Event” samples, 
 yI  is a dummy variable equal to 1 for equity issuers and 0 otherwise (for non-event 
firms), 
 jX  is the vector of explanatory variables; 1 jMV =  j j j j jX ' TO ' IA ' AC ' TG ' , 
jMV  is the logarithm of firm, j , market value taken at the end of the month prior 
to the SEO announcement, 
)
 
 (0,y N ξξ σ∼  is an error term. 
                                                                                                                                                        
57 See Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000), Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000), Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and 
Stehle, Ehrhardt and Przyborowsky (2000) among others. 
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The probability to issue equity for firm, j , is computed using the maximum likelihood 
estimators of the γ  coefficients such as : 
ˆ
ˆ jp
ξσ
 
= Φ  

jγ'X  (3.1 ) 9
)
with  being the standard normal repartition function. Φ
Without losing generality, the volatility of private information can be set to 1 and thus, the 
estimated probability is given by ( ˆˆ jp = Φ jγ'X . This probability is then corrected for the 
unequal sampling bias as in Guo and Mech (2000). Indeed, the fractions of firms in both 
samples relative to their populations are not equal and this could bias the raw probability. The 
probability is corrected in the following manner : 
( ) ( )
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ1
jc
j
e e
j j
ne e
p
p S Np p
S N N
=
+ −
−
 (3.2 ) 0
  is the total number of SEO with rights during the period, 
i
where  is the number of observations in the “Short-term” sample, eS
  is the number of observations in the “Non-Event” sample, neS
eN
  is the total number of firms on the French market during the period. N
3.3.2.3 The second stage, the valuation effect of private information 
The Probit equation uses the combined data of the “Short-term” and “Non-Event” samples 
to estimate the probability to issue equity. In the truncated regression, only the data about the 
issuers are considered. The probabilities to issue of firms  are retained, where  indicates 
that the firm belongs to the “Short-term” sample. The truncation adjustment ratio is computed 
as follows : 
j = i
( )1 ˆ
ˆ
c
j i
i c
j i
p
private
p
φ −
=
=
 Φ
=
 1 (3.2 ) 
The iprivate  variable can be interpreted as the announcement valuation effect of private 
information. The greater is the value of private information, the lower the stock price reaction 
should be. Hence, the sign of the iprivate  variable is expected to be negative. In the second 
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stage of the procedure, the coefficients of the explanatory variables, including iprivate , are 
estimated with OLS. The regression is the following : 
2
runup
CLI  vari
0 1(0, 2)i i i iCAR UOP q privateα α ζ+ = + + + + + + × +i i i ia'TO b'IA c'AC d'TG  (3.2 ) 
If the SEO announcement conveys unanticipated information about the firm value, the 
coefficient  should be significant. Otherwise, the announcement valuation effect should not 
be explained by information asymmetry. Other explanatory variables being significant mean 
that their influence persists after controlling for the investors’ anticipations. 
q
3.3.3 Anticipation and valuation of private information 
The results of three Probit regressions are presented in Table 3.15. The first model 
(“agency”) includes the measure of free cash flow, while the second and third use, 
respectively,  and  as proxies for the financing constraints. For the sake of 
brevity, only the results with the term spread variable are shown
exfindef equitydef
58. 
The smaller is the firm and the higher above the debt target ratio, the more expected is the 
equity issue. The coefficients of both variables, MV  and , have the expected sign and 
are significant. The results about the information asymmetry variable are mixed. The degree 
of specific risk plays no role in the anticipation of the equity financing decision. Conversely, 
the stock price runup prior to the SEO announcement is positively and significantly related to 
the probability of issuance. In that sense, the role of the stock price runup has more to do with 
timing than with information asymmetry. Firms that have experienced a strong stock 
performance are more expected to issue equity. This timing measure is firm-specific and does 
not automatically depend on market and macro economic conditions. To pursue with timing, 
the past market performance does not influence the probability to issue. The 
target∆
M  variable 
is never significant. The better are the current global economic conditions, the greater is the 
probability to issue equity (the coefficient of  is significantly negative). As expected, 
equity issues are more inclined to be realised when a downturn in the economic conditions is 
anticipated (the coefficient of  is also significantly negative). 
credit∆
term∆
                                                 
58 The results with the  variable are qualitatively the same, except for the coefficient of the able 
that is only significant at the 10 % level. 
CLI
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Table 3.15 : Probit regressions outcome to estimate the probability of issue 
    "agency"  "slack"  "equity"   
 0α  1.02 a 1.11 a 1.08 a 
  (4.39)  (4.67)  (4.58)  
 MV  -0.21 a -0.20 a -0.20 a 
  (-7.62)  (-7.44)  (-7.42)  
 target∆  0.77 b 0.62 b 0.77 b 
  (2.56)  (2.06)  (2.59)  
 specific  1.50  -1.48  -1.22  
  (0.09)  (-0.07)  (-0.06)  
 runup  0.47 a 0.47 a 0.47 a 
  (3.02)  (3.04)  (3.03)  
 BM  -0.16
b -0.15  -0.17 b 
  (-1.96)  (-1.90)  (-2.04)  
 FCF  0.08      
  (0.36)      
 exfindef    0.83 b   
    (2.58)    
 equitydef      0.64 b 
      (2.14)  
 Mrunup  -0.16  -0.19  -0.17  
  (-0.43)  (-0.52)  (-0.46)  
 credit∆  -17.90 a -19.53 a -18.45 a 
  (-3.24)  (-3.51)  (-3.34)  
 term∆  -7.49 b -7.30 b -7.33 b 
  (-2.30)  (-2.23)  (-2.25)  
  2pseudo R  0.12   0.12   0.12   
a significant at the 1 % level, b significant at the 5 % level 
The dependent variable is the issue dummy, jI , that takes the value 1 when the firm  belongs to the “Short-
term” sample and 0 if it belongs to the “Non ent” sample. The explanatory variables are the logarithm of the 
firm  market value, 
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The growth potential of the firm plays a small role in explaining the equity issue decision. 
The coefficient of the book-to-market ratio is negative but only slightly significant (in the 
“agency” and the “equity” regressions). The magnitude of free cash flow and the risk of moral 
hazard that it proxies is not considered as a relevant determinant of the equity financing 
e included in the 
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decision. On one hand, the results outline the marginal role of the agency theory in explaining 
the choice of equity as the financing source. On the other hand, the financial constraints 
variables are found to have a significant explanatory power. The greater the external financing 
deficit, the greater is the probability to issue equity. A similar relation is observed with the 
equity financing deficit. 
The mean estimated probability of issuance for the “Short-term” sample (measured by the 
“slack” Probit model) is equal to 40 % while that of the “Non-Event” sample reaches only 
27 %. The difference is significant at the 1 % level (t-stat = 8.77). No difference is noticed 
according to the use of the proceeds. The mean estimated probability to issue is equal to 39 % 
for “Capital Structure” issuers and to 41 % for “Financing New Investment” issuers. Results 
according to the “equity” and “agency” Probit models are not qualitatively different, although 
the mean probabilities given by the “agency” model are smaller (35 % and 22 % for, 
respectively, the “Short-term” and the “Non-Event” samples, the t-stat of the difference being 
equal to 9.62). 
The estimated probability of issuance is corrected for the unequal sample bias. The number 
of observations in the “Short-term” sample accounts for 198 ( S ). The total number of rights 
offerings realised between 1984 and 2000 equals 436 ( ). The “Non-Event” sample includes 
583 observations ( ) and a total of 2201 firms are listed on the French Stock Exchange 
during the period ( ). According to Equation 3.19, the correction coefficient is given by : 
e
eN
neS
N
( ) 1.375
e e
ne e
S Nc
S N N
= =
−
 (3.23) 
From the corrected estimated probabilities, 
Once corrected for the unequal sampling bias, the mean probabilities to issue, according to 
the “slack” Probit model, equal 28 % for the “Short-term” sample and 18 % for the “Non-
Event” sample. The difference is still significant at the 1 % level (t-stat = 8.26). 
ˆ cip , the private information variable (truncation 
ratio) is constructed for each issuer in the ” sample, following Equation 3.20. The 
results of the second-stage OLS regressions are presented in Table 3.16. The first three 
column report the coefficients estimated fr  the “Short-term” sample. Each column 
corresponds to the Probit model (“agency”, “slack” and “equity”) used to compute the 
probabilities of issuance in 
“Short-term
om
iprivate . Regressions are also run on both uses of the proceeds 
sub-samples. Results are shown in the last six columns of Table 3.16. 
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At the “Short-term” sample level, the coefficients of the private  variable are negative and 
significant at the 1 % level. These findings support the fact that the SEO announcement 
conveys unanticipated private information. The negative sign stipulates that the greater 
private information, the lower is the stock price reaction, which is consistent with the 
information asymmetry theory. When the sample is split according to the use of the proceeds, 
the private information variable remains significant, in all cases, for the “Financing New 
Investment” issuers. Conversely, it is not significant in two of the three regressions at the 
“Capital Structure” sample level. The fact that the unanticipated effect is restricted to 
announcements of “Financing New Investment” offerings is not surprising. Indeed, only these 
operations are shown, in the standard cross-section analysis, to be sensitive to information 
asymmetry problems. Furthermore, they are the only ones to induce both a revision in 
earnings forecast and a change in the business risk. 
The correction for the selection bias does not dramatically modify the significance of the 
explanatory variables coefficients. Information asymmetry receives the greatest support as the 
coefficients of the spe  and  variables are still significantly negative for both 
“Short-term” and “Financing New Investment” samples. Their level of significance increases 
from the one observed in the standard cross-section analysis. 
cific runup
The impact of timing is also confirmed. The past market performance, Mrunup , positively 
influences the valuation effect. It is significant at the 1 % level for the “Short-term” sample, at 
the 5 % level for “Financing New Investment” issuers but not significant at a convenient level 
for “Capital Structure” issuers. Overall, the explanatory power of the market momentum 
increases with the correction for the selection bias. The converse is true about the credit 
spread. The coefficient of the  variable is still negative and significant at the “Short-
term” sample level but the significance is restricted to the “Capital Structure” sample when 
operations are separated across uses of the proceeds. It disappears at the “Financing New 
Investment” sample level. The greater the valuation effect of unanticipated information, the 
lower becomes the influence of current economic conditions. Expected economic conditions, 
represented by the term spread, do not explain the announcement valuation effect, like in the 
standard cross-section analysis. However, the sign of ∆  coefficients become positive for 
all samples, which is consistent with theoretical predictions. 
credit∆
term
Mrunup  has no influence on the 
probability to issue. Hence, its explanatory power is strengthened when the anticipation of the 
event is considered. The opposite rationale applies to the credit spread, which is significant in 
the Probit model. 
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Table 3.16 : Anticipation and private information effect on the stock price reaction 
  FNI sample   "Short-Term" sample CS sample 
    “agency” “slack” “equity” “agency” “slack” “equity” “agency” “slack” “equity”
  0.060 0.023   0.078 
 (2.48)   (2.07)  (1.08)  (1.14)  (2.76)  (2.78)   
  -0.010  -0.010  -0.010            
 (-1.47)  (-1.44)             
    -0.003  -0.010  0.016  0.027  0.021  -0.022     
  (-0.56)  (-0.18)  (-0.51)  (0.84)  (1.10)  (0.85)  (-0.66)  (-0.67)  (-0.47)  
  -14.09 -12.82 -6.23 -4.61  -4.68  -20.68
  (-3.25)    (-2.12)  (-1.43)   (-2.61)  (-2.67)  (-3.33)  
 -0.042 -0.041 -0.042 -0.008  -0.009  -0.071 -0.069 -0.069
  (-3.56)  (-3.60)  (-3.59)  (-0.76)  (-0.81)   (-4.38)  (-4.56)  
0.007  0.007  0.007  -0.004  -0.003  0.021 0.020
  (1.47)  (1.51)  (-0.60)  (-0.70)  (-0.52)   (2.88)  
 -0.013      -0.189 a   
      
      0.031
    0.081    
  (-0.32)    (-4.12)   (1.65)     
exfindef    -0.002   -0.031       
    (-0.09)      (-0.94)      (0.76)    
 equitydef     0.020      -0.031      0.079 b
      (0.84)      (-1.05)      (2.45)  
 Mrunup  0.080 a 0.081 a 0.081 a 0.057  0.055  0.055  0.092 a 0.085 b 0.087 b
  (3.22)  (3.29)  (3.26)  (1.61)  (1.60)  (1.60)  (2.71)  (2.39)  (2.48)  
 credit∆  -1.076 b -1.042 b -1.048 b -0.760  -0.973 b -1.011 b -0.633  -0.678  -0.676  
  (-2.64) (-2.57)
(-3.15) (-3.28)
 (-2.57)   (-1.82)  (-2.16)  (-2.20)  (-0.98)  (-0.98)  (-1.01)  
 term∆  0.054  0.034  0.058  0.372  0.207  0.270  0.262  0.173  0.243  
  (0.25)  (0.16)  (0.26)  (1.39)  (0.75)  (0.98)  (1.05)  (0.65)  (0.91)  
 private  -0.037 a -0.036 a -0.038 a -0.028 b -0.021  -0.023  -0.055 a -0.058 a -0.060 a
  (-3.01)  (-2.85)  (-3.01)  (-2.33)  (-1.58)  (-1.66)   (-3.10)   
  2.adj R  0.30  0.31 0.13   0.30  0.25   0.13  0.51   0.49   0.51  
0α a 0.052 059 0.040 0.024 0.074 a 0.091b 0. a b a a 
  (2.87) (2.80) (3.33)
  
 (-1.45)   
-0.011 -0.024 -0.016
UOP
target∆
specific a  a  -13.99 -18.47 -24.51
(-2.81) (-3.07) (-1.47)
 -0.011  
(-0.95)  (-4.50) 
 -0.003  a 0.020 a
(1.53)  (3.05)  (2.87) 
a b  b  a a  
runup a  a a a  a a    
 a BM  
FCF  
 
a significant at the 1 % level,  b significant at the 5 % level 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
The dependent variable is the 3-day CAR. UOP  is the use of the proceeds dummy. Static trade-off, information 
asymmetry, agency and timing variables are defined in Table 3.10. The  variable is the information 
asymmetry valuation effect. It is computed as the truncation ratio (Heckman, 1979) : 
private
( )( )1 ˆ ˆc ci iprivate p pφ −= Φ i  
where φ  is the normal density function,  is the normal cumulative function and  is the probability of 
issuance estimated from the Probit Equation 3.17 and corrected for the unequal sampling bias. The “agency” 
column corresponds to the use of the 
Φ pˆci
FCF
equ
 variable in both Probit and second-stage regression, “slack” to the 
 variable and “equity” to the  variable. T-stat are given in parentheses. exfindef itydef
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The explanatory power of static trade-off and agency variables remains unchanged relative 
to the standard OLS analysis. The coefficients of  are not different from zero in all the 
cases. The book-to-market ratio positively influences the stock price reaction to equity issue 
announcement involving a specific investment project. On the other hand, the negative impact 
of free cash flow is restricted to “Capital Structure” operations. The  variable, 
measuring the equity financing deficit has a positive and significan cient at the 
“Financing New Investment” sample level. Issu is sample are inclined ace higher 
degrees of adverse selection and information as try. The significan
variable is consistent with the pecking order prediction that equity financing should be used 
only when other sources are extinct. 
Correcting for the selection bias in the case of French equity issues appeals one remark. 
The announcement of equity issues realised to finance a specific investment project conveys 
unanticipated private information that partially explains the stock price reaction. This finding 
gives a strong support to the information asymmetry theory as being one of the main 
determinant of marginal financing decisions. 
The stock price reaction to “Financing New Investment” offerings announcement is 
explained by information asymmetry, proxied by pre-announcement issuer’s specific risk and 
stock price runup, and by the growth potential, measured by the book-to-market ratio. 
target∆
ers in th
ymme
equitydef
t coeffi
 to f
ce of the equitydef  
3.4 Discussion about the stock price reaction to SEO announcements 
The announcement of French rights offerings generates, on average, a negative stock price 
reaction. When examined in more details, this reaction is not common to all issues. It is 
restricted to firms announcing a specific investment project at the same time as the financing 
solution. The average 3-day CAR of the “Financing New Investment” sample is equal to 
-2.16 %. The overall stock price reaction is similar to what is found previously on the French 
market. 
The use of the proceeds should be viewed as a composite indicator that differentiates equity 
issuers and thus, their announcement valuation effect. It captures the difference between, on 
one side, the capital structure irrelevancy and, on the other side, the information asymmetry 
and agency implications on the firm market value. Consequently, the separation of equity 
issuers according to the use of the proceeds creates an experiment framework able to test what 
capital structure theory applies and for which issuers’ types. 
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However, relevant information is still released at the announcement. “Capital Structure” 
offerings announcement valuation effect is sensitive to the magnitude of free cash flow and at 
a lower extend to the deviation from an industry target debt ratio. Timing, when it is 
considered at the level of the economy, has similar implications on both issuers’ types. Past 
market performance and current economic conditions explain significantly the 3-day CAR. 
Conversely, no consistent evidence is found that expected economic conditions influence the 
investors’ reaction to equity issue announcements. 
The explanatory power of information asymmetry is further analysed through the work of 
financial analysts. The revision in analysts’ earnings forecasts around the announcement is 
positively correlated with the stock price reaction. This relation is restricted to the issuers 
using the proceeds to finance a specific investment projects. Moreover, the introduction of the 
revision variable eliminates the explanatory power of previous information asymmetry and 
timing variables. The earnings forecast revision is computed ex-post. Though, it allows to 
control for two hypotheses. First, the SEO announcement, when associated with a new 
investment project, conveys private information about future earnings. Second, the issuer’s 
specific risk in particular and the stock price runup are relevant in capturing private 
information effects. The fact that timing variables such as past market performance and the 
credit spread loose their significance indicates that managers, independently of the use of the 
proceeds, time the equity issue when an earnings downturn is expected. The negative average 
earnings forecast revision for the “Capital Structure” issuers support this explanation. 
The decision to issue equity is voluntarily taken by managers, depending on their private 
information. It is also anticipated by investors who estimate the probability to issue from a set 
of public information that could also explain the announcement valuation effect. The 
consequence is the emerging of a selection bias. In order to solve this problem, the cross-
section model used to explain the stock price reaction must be corrected. A truncated 
regression is estimated to examine the determinants of the marginal financing decision 
valuation effect conditionally to the SEO anticipation. The conditional methodology leads to 
two main results. First, the announcement of “Financing New Investment” equity offerings 
conveys unanticipated information about the firm value or, more specifically, about the 
investment project net value. Private information cannot be entirely extracted from a set of 
pre-SEO public variables. Second, even if the standard cross-section analysis results are 
biased, they are good estimators of the ones corrected for the selection problem. Significant 
explanatory variables with the conditional methodology are already significant with the 
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standard analysis. Small differences exist for the timing variables that could be attributed to 
the fact that these variables are used by investors to anticipate the event. Therefore, they could 
loose some of their explanatory power in the conditional framework. 
The average negative valuation effect comes from the “Financing New Investment” sample. 
Information asymmetry seems to be concentrated in the value of the that project. In addition, 
the project let the issuer’s business risk increase. The choice of equity as the financing source 
is deliberate since other sources are available to the issuer. These observations considered 
globally make the investment opportunity look like a high-risk negative NPV project that is 
expected to generate a very large payoff in case of success but with a low probability. Under 
these circumstances, the question about the investors’ ability to correctly and entirely adjust 
their expectations about the firm value at the SEO announcement seems legitimate. In other 
words, does the investment/financing decision have implications on the firm value that could 
exceed the short-term analysis horizon ? A long-term event study about the impact of that 
kind of managerial decisions could bring some pertinent answer. 
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Chapter 4 :  The impact of equity issue decisions on long-term 
stock performance 
Does the stock price reaction at the SEO announcement integrate all the information or 
does the underperformance persist several years after the issue? Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
are the first to mention the “New Issue Puzzle”. The overall evidence about the long-term 
underperformance is mixed and it raises several questions about market efficiency. Theories 
of capital structure explain why and how a marginal change in the capital structure may affect 
firm value on the short-term. Indeed, if equity issuers exhibit negative abnormal returns 
during several years after the event, arbitrageurs could earn abnormal profit regardless of their 
level of private information. The “New Issue Puzzle” has created a large debate. A strand of 
the research argues that the long-term underperformance is caused by inference biases 
introduced by the time aggregation method of abnormal return, by model misspecification and 
by incomplete adjustment for systematic risk. Long-term anomalies are expected to disappear 
with reasonable changes in performance measurement. Concurrently, theories based on 
investors’ cognitive biases reject market efficiency. Behavioural models attempt to define 
investors’ irrational reaction to information and describe its impact on the long-term stock 
return pattern. However, behaviourist theories are controversial; i.e. Fama (1998), Brav and 
Heaton (2002) and Constantinides (2002). They are notably criticized for fact that they do not 
rely on a new and well-defined economic paradigm. 
The first two sections overview the empirical evidence of long-term post-SEO performance 
and the theoretical debate between behaviourists and defenders of market efficiency. Section 
1 addresses to the “New Issue Puzzle”. It reviews selected empirical studies documenting 
long-term stock and operating performance after equity issues. It also covers the literature that 
contradicts the existence of a puzzle. In the first part of Section 2, three behavioural models 
are presented. The aim is to describe what elements of investors’ irrationality cause them to 
over or underreact to public information. Implications of behavioural theories on the long-
term stock performance after SEO are also exposed. Section 2 ends with examples where 
apparent deviations from rationality can be reconciled with the rational economic paradigm. 
Section 3 contains an empirical study that analyses the long-term stock performance of 
French equity issuers. Consistent with the short-term evidence, the use of the proceeds 
constitutes a discriminating variable to separate average poor performers from good ones. The 
anomaly is restricted to “Financing New Investment” issuers. Some evidence is given to the 
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“window of opportunity” hypothesis since equity offerings of both types are realised after a 
period of abnormal positive performance. However, only “Financing New Investment” issuers 
experience a reversal in the long-term post-SEO abnormal returns. A cross-sectional analysis 
is realised to test the influence of “timing”, “irrational investors” and “inefficient use of the 
proceeds” hypotheses on the long-term abnormal stock performance. “Inefficient use of the 
proceeds” seems to be the most relevant explanation although “timing” and “underreaction” 
are credited of some marginal influence. The section ends with concluding remarks about the 
impact of SEO on the long-term stock performance. 
4.1 Long-term abnormal stock performance after securities issues 
4.1.1 The “New Issue Puzzle” 
The puzzling results of Loughran and Ritter (1995) about the long-term stock 
underperformance of US equity issuers inaugurate a long stream of academic research in this 
area. The selected studies reviewed in this sub-section are ordered into three groups: 1) 
studies about US equity issuers, 2) studies about non-US equity issuers, and 3) studies about 
other securities issuers. The main findings are summarised in the first three panels of Table 
4.1, at the end of the section. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) determine the long-term post-SEO abnormal stock performance 
according to a matching firm methodology over an analysis horizon of sixty months after the 
issue. To be selected as a matching firm, the potential candidate must not have issued equity 
during the last five years. If the matching firm offers stocks (or is delisted) within the analysis 
horizon, it is replaced by the next closest firm at the time of the issue. This procedure 
eliminates the survivorship bias. The matching criterion in Loughran and Ritter (1995) is the 
firm market capitalisation. The abnormal performance is measured by the wealth relative 
ratio; i.e. the buy-and-hold return (BHR) of the issuer at a given horizon divided by the BHR 
of its matching firm. Five years after the SEO, the average wealth relative ratio is equal to 
0.69. This result is robust when the matching firm is replaced by a value-weighted market 
index as benchmark. The abnormal performance is not dependent on the issuer's age. A 
positive relation is found between the monthly performance of SEO firms and the book-to-
market ratio, showing that high book-to-market firms tend to have higher returns. However, 
4.1.1.1 The long-term stock underperformance of US equity issuers 
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the magnitude of the  book-to-market effect appears to be small relative to the total 
underperformance. 
The findings of Loughran and Ritter (1995) have been challenged by changing the 
matching methodology, the matching criteria, and the time aggregation of abnormal returns. 
Instead of a single matching firm, several authors use a control portfolio of matching firms. 
The abnormal performance relative to a single matching firm could be imputed to the control 
and not to the event firm. In other words, factors other than the matching criteria could be 
responsible for the anomaly. With a portfolio of matching firms, the firm-specific factors of 
the benchmark is reduced and the influence of the matching criteria should be strengthen. 
However, this methodology introduces new listing and rebalancing biases. Matching criteria 
are expected to control for risk factors common to both event and matching firms. Size, book-
to-market ratio, industry and stock return momentum are the most commonly used matching 
criteria. They can be employed separately or in combinations, which introduces distance 
measurement problems. Long-term event studies are based on monthly returns. Monthly 
abnormal returns can be cumulated over the analysis horizon. This method, Cumulative 
Abnormal Return [CAR], implies a monthly rebalancing of the portfolio of event and 
matching firms. The alternative aggregation method is the buy-and-hold process. It measures 
the return on an unbalanced portfolio over the analysis horizon. The Buy-and-Hold Abnormal 
Return [BHAR] corresponds to the buy-and-hold return on the event firm minus the buy-and-
hold return on the benchmark over a given analysis horizon. Both CAR and BHAR being equal 
to zero, on average, constitute the  hypotheses to be tested. The mean CAR and BHAR can 
be computed using equal weights or relative market capitalisation weights (value weights). 
Equal weights exacerbate the economic impact of the event on the firm value while value 
weights aim to outline the wealth effect of a well-diversified investor. The role of the 
weighting scheme is further discussed in Section 4.1.1.2. 
0H
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) examine the long-term stock performance after primary 
equity offerings. Unlike Loughran and Ritter (1995), they exclude combined offerings 
(primary and secondary). In order to improve the matching procedure, they use industry and 
size, and size and book-to-market (BM) ratio as matching criteria. Their sample exhibits 
similar results to Loughran and Ritter (1995). Furthermore, they detect long-run stock 
underperformance according to the CAR methodology as well (-31 % after 60 months). The 
results are not sensitive to the year of issuance, the age of the issuer and to size and book-to-
market ratio. The trading location has no influence : firms listed on the Nasdaq, on the NYSE 
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and the AMEX significantly underperform their benchmarks. Finally, the average wealth 
relative ratios of 13 out of 16 industry groups are inferior to one, showing that poor post-SEO 
stock performance is not driven by industry factor. Beside Loughran and Ritter (1995) and 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), equity issuers are found to underperform their matching 
firm or control portfolio on the long-run in most of the studies realised on the US market; see 
Panel A of Table 4.1 for a list of empirical works. The underperformance is reduced in the 
value-weighting scheme but it does not disappear systematically. Utilities are documented to 
overperform their benchmark; see Kahle, 2000. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) attribute the underperformance to the managers’ ability to issue 
overvalued securities. Lee (1997) examines the insider trading before the equity issue and its 
relation with the long-run post SEO stock performance. Consistent with the timing 
hypothesis, he observes that the ratio of purchases to sales made by insiders is lower than the 
one documented in studies not focusing on SEO. Primary issuers underperform their 
benchmark regardless of the insider trading pattern (wealth relative ranging between 0.86 and 
0.88 depending on the insider trading strategy : pure purchases, mixed or pure sales). 
Conversely, firms that realise secondary offerings do not underperform in the exception of the 
insider pure sales group. Therefore, insider trading is a useful signal for the future 
performance of secondary offerings, if insiders are unbiased in their future prospects 
forecasts. In the case of primary offerings, managers are able to time their issue strategically 
but top executives are not able to time their personal trades appropriately. 
Unlike Lee (1997), Kahle (2000) documents abnormal insider trading in the quarter 
immediately preceding the issues of equity and convertible bonds. Sales (purchases) by 
insiders are significantly higher (lower) than their historical levels. Abnormal trading is 
defined as the actual trading at the SEO minus the expected trading (estimated by the average 
trading computed over months –48 to –13 relative to the issue). After the issue, sales decrease 
and purchases increase. A negative relation is found between the abnormal insider selling and 
the long-run abnormal performance following primary equity offerings. There is a positive 
relation between abnormal insider purchasing and the long-run performance of straight debt 
issuers. These results are consistent with the managers issuing overprice equity and timing 
their personal trades accordingly. They are more incriminating than those of Lee (1997) about 
the timing strategy of insiders’ personal trades. 
The existence of a “window of opportunity” to sell overpriced equity is further examined 
by Clarke, Dunbar and Kahle (2001) who analyse the long-run performance of pure secondary 
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offerings made by US firms. Secondary sales do not involve the issuance of new stocks. 
Consistent with the “window of opportunity” hypothesis, only the sample of insider sales 
exhibit a negative abnormal performance –33.3 % at a 5-year horizon. In the same line of 
thought, Marciukaityte and Szewczyk (2001) document that equity issues involving the sales 
of new stocks (primary and combined offerings) underperform their size and BM matched 
firms over a 3-year post-issue horizon while the BHAR of secondary offerings is positive but 
insignificant. At the 5-year horizon, the underperformance of primary and combined offerings 
is no longer significant and the overperformance of secondary offerings becomes significant. 
The overperformance of secondary offerings is influenced by tax or “window dressing” 
considerations and it is higher when sellers have strong reasons to sell their shares. In this 
case, sellers may experience benefits that outweigh the cost of underpricing. No evidence of 
overperformance is found when sellers in secondary offerings are related to firm management. 
The issuance of overpriced securities alone is not sufficient to explain the long-term 
underperformance pattern. It must be associated with the investors’ inability to correctly 
adjust the stock price at the time of financing decision announcement. The evidence of 
earnings manipulations around equity issues given by Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998) supports the explanation of the stock underperformance proposed by Loughran 
and Ritter (1995). If investors follow the earnings disclosure to form their stock price 
valuations, they will lower the prices as the earnings decrease after the issue or as the 
operating performance decreases. In that sense, Clarke, Dunbar and Kahle (2001) notice that, 
for all issuers, the operating performance increases during the three years preceding the 
secondary offerings and decline during the three years after. However, the pattern is more 
accentuated for operations involving insider sales. The change between pre- and post-offering 
performance is significant for the insider sample only. The argument of investors’ misleading 
is mitigated by Shivakumar (2000). Moreover, legal disclosures of quarterly turnover, as it is 
the case in France, could be a way to reduce the impact of accounting misrepresentations. 
Turnover is less prone to be manipulated. The misleading of investors’ perceptions of future 
prospects may not be valid in every institutional setting. 
4.1.1.2 International evidence of long-term post-SEO stock performance 
Marked differences are noticed between the US and the rest of the world for stock price 
reaction to equity issue announcements, especially relative to the flotation method. Do the 
same differences exist about the long-term post-SEO stock performance ? Rights offerings in 
Germany are found to underperform their size-matched control portfolio in both equally and 
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value-weighting schemes; see Stehle, Ehrhardt and Przyborowsky (2001). Relative to the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange top segment market portfolio, the underperformance is restricted to 
equally-weighting scheme. One interpretation is that the underperformance comes mainly 
from small issuers. However, the difference between equally and value-weighted 36-month 
BHAR are not significant. Small issuers dominate the composition of the sample. Therefore, 
matching with a market index including only the largest German firms may not be 
appropriate. The overall long-term stock underperformance of German equity issuers 
contrasts with the positive stock price reaction observed at the announcement. 
The long-term underperformance after equity issues with rights is supported by the results 
on the South African market. Affleck-Graves and Page (1996) document significantly 
negative 3-year CAR relative to size-matched and BM ratio-matched non-issuing firms. No 
evidence of timing is found on the South African SEO market. The rights prevent the wealth 
transfer between new and existing shareholders. Moreover, they are not heavily traded, which 
means that a large majority of the existing shareholders exercise them. The retained 
explanation is that equity is raised to compensate for the downturn in the economy and its 
impact on earnings. However, it does not explain why the negative signal is not fully 
integrated into the stock prices at the SEO announcement. In Switzerland, the findings of 
Dubois and Jeanneret (2001) do not indicate that rights issuers (both financial and non-
financial firms) experience any long-term abnormal performance. This absence of reaction is 
consistent with the insignificant announcement effect observed by Caramanolis et al. (1996). 
Non-financial issuers can be split into three groups : First, firms that issue equity as an 
alternative to stock dividend (“quasi” SEO) do not perform differently from their benchmark. 
Second, firms that issue equity because they need cash to invest in new projects significantly 
underperform their benchmark (36-month BHAR equal to –27 %). Third, firms that issue 
equity to repay debt outperform their benchmark (36-month BHAR equal to +15 %). These 
results outline the role of the motivations driving the equity issue decision to explain the long-
term stock performance. 
Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999) have a sample of Japanese cash equity issuers and a sample of 
Japanese rights issuers. Only the sample of cash offerings underperforms its size and BM ratio 
matched benchmark. The sample of rights offerings exhibit insignificant negative BHAR. The 
“window of opportunity” argument is rejected because, like rights and public offerings, 
private equity issues experience a pre-issue overperformance and a post-issue 
underperformance. The private negotiation process is expected to verify whether the firm is 
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overvalued at the time of the issue. According to that, Japanese managers do not look like 
voluntarily issuing overpriced securities. 
In Australia, Allen and Soucik (2000) observe that direct cash equity issuers significantly 
underperform their benchmark three years after the offering. Five years after the offering, the 
abnormal performance is still negative but of lower magnitude and not significantly different 
from zero. The Australian pattern is only partially supportive of the US evidence where the 
underperformance of direct cash equity issuers persist over a 5-year horizon. Australian equity 
issuers are found to spend more money in new investments and R & D expenditures during 
the post-issue period than their non-issuing counterparts. Though, these efforts have a 
negative impact on the 3 to 5-year productivity. 
The evidence about the subscription rights affecting the long-term post-SEO stock 
performance is mixed. In Germany and South Africa, issuers abnormal performance is close 
to the US evidence in spite of the different flotation method. The difference clearly appears in 
Japan since both flotation methods exhibit opposite results. In Switzerland, the neutral effect 
of subscription rights may allow some firms to realise SEO for non-financing/investing 
motives without being penalised on the long-run. Like in the short-term announcement effect 
framework, the international evidence underlines the influence of the institutional setting, 
which may prevent a direct comparison of the results. 
In order to improve the comparison between foreign and US issuers, Foerster and 
Karolyi (2000) analyse the long-run stock performance of global equity offerings with US 
depositary receipts (ADR) tranches from 35 countries. These global offerings are capital 
raising operations. Through these global offerings, the influence of the domestic institutional 
setting is reduced. US listing and disclosure requirements as well as US accounting standards 
must be adopted by foreign issuers on the US market. Two types of benchmark are used. The 
first one is a domestic matching firm selected on the basis of size and BM ratio, not listed on 
the US market. The second type consists in a US matching firm that issued equity within the 
same month and with similar size and BM ratio characteristics. Foerster and Karolyi (2000) 
observe that global equity offerings follow a period of strong performance in the domestic 
market (1-year pre-issue CAR equal to +16 %, significant at the 1 % level). The 36-month 
post-issue abnormal performance is overall negative although it is of a lower magnitude than 
for US issuers : the CAR equals -9 % (-6 % after public offers and –10 % after private offers). 
These results are not significantly different from zero at all convenient levels. The same 
pattern is found with the US issuer matching procedure. Private global equity offerings made 
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by firms from countries with lower accounting standards are more penalised by both US and 
national investors. Conversely, public global offerings realised by emerging market firms 
outperform their benchmarks. Furthermore, the post-issue performance is positively related to 
the ability of the issuer to capture a proportionately larger share of US trading volume 
(liquidity effect). The findings underline the leading role of the US market especially toward 
the emerging markets. Listing on the US market constitutes a strong signal of good quality 
especially when the most severe disclosure requirements are endorsed. 
4.1.1.3
The long-term abnormal stock performance following the offerings of units or convertible 
debt is similar, if not worse, to the performance following equity offerings. Byoun (2001) 
documents an underperformance of –57.47 % for unit issuers in the US over a 5-year horizon 
after the issue. Issuers of convertible bonds underperform their benchmark; in the US, see 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999), Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001)59, and in Japan, see 
Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999). Dichev and Piotroski (1999) show that US firms that increase 
the most their convertible debt account on balance sheets underperform both the market and 
firms that increase the least their convertible debt accounts over a 5-year horizon. Conversely, 
Ho and Abhyankar (2002) observe that UK issuers of convertible bonds do not underperform 
their size and BM ratio matched portfolios during the three years following the issue. 
However, UK convertible preference share issues underperform their benchmarks. Consistent 
with the announcement returns, the long-term abnormal performance following a straight debt 
issue is not different from zero; see Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999); Dichev and 
Piotroski (1999), for the US evidence; Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999), for the Japanese 
evidence. 
                                                
 Long-term stock performance after other securities issues 
4.1.2 Controversy of the New Issue Puzzle 
4.1.2.1 About the time aggregation of mono-periodical returns 
The methodology used to determine the abnormal performance in long-term event study is 
subject to several criticisms. Kothari and Warner (1997) show that test statistics based on 
cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns are misspecified. 
 
59 Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001) find a significantly negative market-adjusted annual return during the 
three years following the issue, respectively –4.3 %, -7.5 % and –9.7 %. When a matching firm based on 
industry, size and operating performance is used as benchmark, the annual returns are only significantly negative 
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Bootstrapping and non-parametric procedures may be promising solutions to eliminate the 
bias. Conrad and Kaul (1993) indicate that the positive bias on the long-run comes from the 
cumulating process of returns. Cumulating mono-periodical returns over long time intervals 
not only cumulates "true" returns but measurement errors as well. Unfortunately, "true" 
returns are not directly observable. BHAR should be preferred to CAR since this time 
aggregation method minimises the measurement errors of mono-periodical returns. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) analyse the empirical power and the specification of the tests 
statistics in long-run event studies (12, 36 and 60-month horizons). Abnormal returns are 
computed by CAR or BHAR. The benchmarks are either a control portfolio (equally-weighted 
market index), a matching firm or the Fama and French [FF] 3-factor model60. Random events 
are simulated. CAR results are positively biased according to the market index because of the 
new listing bias. They are well specified for matching firms at a 5 % level, except for the 
36-month horizon. The new listing bias is reduced because the firm must be listed for at least 
one year to be selected as control. CAR are negatively biased according to the 3-factor model 
especially for the 12 and 36-month horizons. BHAR results are negatively biased according to 
the market index because of the rebalancing bias and the skewness bias. When the benchmark 
is a matching firm selected according to size and BM ratio, the tests statistics are well 
specified at a 1 % level. The Wilcoxon sign test gives good results as well according to the 
matching firm methodology (Barber and Lyon, 1997; p. 369). CAR are bad predictors of 
BHAR. 
4.1.2.2 About the independence of the events 
With the matching firm methodology, events are assumed to be independent. Though, SEO 
are decided by managers and “timing” has been shown to be a relevant variable to influence 
this decision. Consequently, events are likely to be cross-sectionally dependent. The abnormal 
returns may be cross-correlated and the statistical tests could be overstated. A calendar time 
approach solves this dependence problem. The calendar time portfolio of event firms is 
formed by 1) including the issuer at the event month, 2) holding it over the analysis horizon 
(unless it is delisted or engages itself in the event before the end of the horizon), and 3) 
removing it at the end of the analysis horizon. The calendar time portfolio is rebalanced every 
                                                                                                                                                        
during the two years following the issue. Because only annual abnormal returns are computed, the results of 
Lewis et al. (2001) do not figure in Table 4.1. 
60 FF 3-factor model is introduced in Fama and French (1993). The risk factors are the market, size and the BM 
ratio. Refer to the original text for the detailed explanation of the risk premia computation. 
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time a firm is added or removed. Individual firm returns inside the portfolio may be equally or 
value weighted. The time series of the portfolio return in excess of the risk free rate is then 
regressed on a pricing model. The intercept of the regression (Jensen’s alpha) measures the 
monthly abnormal performance. In order to check the efficiency of the pricing model, the 
performance of a portfolio formed with the matching firms can be estimated. Zero-investment 
portfolios long in event firms and short in matching firms can also be used to test the validity 
of the matching variables. However, one must keep in mind that the adequacy of the Jensen’s 
alpha to measure the abnormal performance is reduced when the portfolio is subject to 
rebalancing. 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) observe that SEO firms BHAR are positively cross-correlated 
when overlapping in calendar time. After controlling for the positive cross-correlation, there 
is little evidence of abnormal performance. Using a calendar time approach and the FF 
3-factor model as benchmark, they show that the 3-year underperformance after the SEO is 
restricted to small issuers, the equally-weighted alpha being significant but not the value-
weighted alpha. Calendar time performance results are summarised in the first three panels of 
Table 4.1. 
4.1.2.3 About bad model specification 
With the matching firm methodology, the choice of the control variables may not be 
adequate. Bacmann and Dubois (2002) show that a matching methodology based on arbitrary 
criteria (randomly selected firms or the next in the CRSP list) has the same statistical power in 
rejecting the null hypothesis than methodologies based on conventional variables. Under these 
circumstances, matching should be performed according to characteristics that differentiate 
event firms from the entire population. In that sense, the matching criteria are not universal. 
They should depend on the event itself and on the firms that undertake it. 
Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) argue that the underperformance is mainly due to small 
issuers. First, they observe that 24.1 % of the equity issuers belong simultaneously to the 
smallest size and to the lowest BM ratio quintiles. Indeed, 40.5 % of the offerings are made by 
firms in the smallest size quintile while only 7.8 % are made by firms in the largest size 
quintile. Furthermore, 50.7 % of the issues are done by firms in the lowest BM ratio quintile 
compared to 7.8 % in the highest BM ratio quintile. Consequently, the benchmark used to 
determine the abnormal performance must be well specified, especially in its ability to price 
the small and high-growth firms. 
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In order to test the bad model problem, Brav et al. (2000) split the firms population into 25 
portfolios based on size and BM ratio quintiles. They regress the time series returns of these 
portfolios on the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model (market, size, BM ratio and momentum). The 
results show that the 4-factor model has difficulty to price the smallest size – lowest BM ratio 
portfolio (intercept equal to –0.53 % and significant). Almost a quarter of the issuers have 
returns that strongly covary with those of the mispriced portfolio. If these issuers display a 
significant underperformance, the cause could be a misspecified model, that is an anomaly 
with respect to asset pricing model. In fact, using factors decontaminated from the issuers’ 
influence, the intercept of the equally-weighted issuers’ portfolio is significantly negative 
(-0.22 % per month). The significance disappears with the value-weighted performance 
(-0.07 % per month). When the sample of issuers is split into size terciles, the abnormal 
performance is restricted to the medium and small issuers sub-samples with respectively 
-0.23 % and -0.50 % per month. Large issuers do not exhibit any abnormal performance. The 
empirical results show that the underperformance is not restricted to the smallest – high 
growth issuers. It is common to all the firms that share these characteristics. 
Brav et al. (2000) replace the standard HML factor (measuring the BM ratio risk premium) 
in the 4-factor model by a portfolio formed exclusively with AMEX and Nasdaq stocks. 
These stocks are expected to have smaller market capitalisation than NYSE listed stocks. 
Therefore, the new factor should better price the small firms book-to-market risk. Indeed, the 
underperformance of issuers is halved although the significance of the equally-weighted alpha 
remains. Nevertheless, the new model specification seems to better capture general co-
variations in returns. 
The conclusion of Brav et al. (2000) are challenged by Bayless and Jay (2000) who test two 
antagonist hypotheses : 
1. In support of the “New Issue Puzzle”, firms underperform only during the post-issue 
period and do not otherwise. 
2. In opposition to the “New Issue Puzzle”, (small) firms that underperform during the 
post-issue period do so otherwise as well. 
Bayless and Jay (2000) form four portfolios of issuers but at different periods relative to the 
month of the offering (month 0) : a) the pre-issue period (from month –24 to month –13), b) 
the prior-issue period (months -12 to -1), c) the issuing period (months 0 to +60), and d) the 
post-issue period (months +61 to +120). The performance is measured according to the FF 3-
 195
factor model and the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. The Jensen’s alphas differ across the 
periods. Underperformance is concentrated in the issuing period, which is significantly 
different from the overperformance observed in the pre- and post-issue periods. Even for 
small and medium firms, the performance is significantly different between pre- and post-
issue periods. The results are consistent with the “New Issue Puzzle” hypothesis. Issuers that 
are expected to underperform regardless of the period do not. The results are not sensitive to 
factor contamination since the alphas are not different whether  estimated with purged factors 
or not. 
In accordance with Brav et al. (2000), Jegadeesh (2000) observes that factor models set too 
low benchmark for the large firms and too high benchmark for the small firms. This pattern 
generates a negative abnormal performance for small firms (issuers or not) and a positive 
abnormal performance for large firms (issuers or not). As a large fraction of the issuers are 
small firms, equally-weighted portfolios are expected to exhibit a significant 
underperformance that should disappear in the value-weighting scheme. Jegadeesh (2000) 
addresses the problem by computing the factor model performance for a sample of issuers and 
for a sample of size and BM ratio matched firms. He observes a monotonically positive 
relation between the firm size and the abnormal performance for both samples. However, 
when the matching firms portfolio return is subtracted from the issuers’ portfolio return, the 
bias implied by the bad model specification should be eliminated. The portfolio to be 
regressed is a zero-investment portfolio long in the issuers and short in the matching firms. 
The abnormal performance of this portfolio is significantly negative regardless of the issuer 
size. Similar levels of underperformance are found for large, small, growth or value SEO 
firms. In other words, despite of the bad model argument, issuers underperform their 
benchmark, even with a calendar time methodology. 
The weight attributed to each event firm has an important role in the interpretation of the 
results. Small stocks are the most likely to be subject to the bad model problem. Weighting 
the individual abnormal performance by the stock market capitalisation measures the total 
wealth effect of the anomaly that a representative investor experiences61. Fama (1998) favours 
this weighting scheme because it attenuates the bad model problem. In other words, the 
average investor can easily reduce his exposure to the potential anomaly by value-weighting 
his portfolio. However, Jegadeesh (2000) shows that even after adjusting for the model 
                                                 
61 The investor is assumed to diversify away some of the small issuers underperformance effect by selecting 
appropriate weights. 
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misspecification, underperformance may still be detected. Value-weighting cannot guarantee 
the elimination of the bad model effect but it could instead cover up some of the economic 
effect due to the event. Indeed, Loughran and Ritter (2000) refute the ability of the value-
weighting approach to capture the real economic effect of the event itself. The experiment 
framework should not be designed to detect the average investor’s wealth effect but to 
measure the event-specific impact on the firm value. In that sense, equal weights are more 
adequate. 
4.1.2.4
                                                
 About the incomplete adjustment to systematic risk 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) attribute the long-term underperformance to an 
incomplete adjustment for risk with standard benchmark methodologies. According to a size 
and BM ratio matched firm methodology, they find that US industrial issuers underperform 
over a 60-month post-SEO horizon in both equally and value-weighting schemes. The poor 
performers are not uniformly distributed among exchanges as 71 % of them are listed on the 
Nasdaq. Eckbo et al. (2000) use six pre-specified macro risk factors62 to show that, on average 
during the post-offering period, issuers’ stocks are less risky and require lower returns than 
their matching stocks. They argue that the underperformance detected by the matching firm 
methodology comes from the fact that this technique does not adequately adjust for risk. The 
overall risk exposure of issuers is lower than the one of non-issuing firms. Indeed, the 
calendar time abnormal performance measured by the 6-factor model is not different from 
zero. Issuers’ portfolio and matching firms portfolio exhibit insignificant alphas in both 
weighting schemes. In addition, zero-investment portfolios long in issuers and short in 
matching firms do not exhibit any abnormal performance. A conditional version of their 
factor model63 allows time-varying factor loading to take into account potential changes in the 
systematic risk. Once again, the alphas are never significant even when Nasdaq issuers are 
examined separately.  
If factor model analysis raises doubt on the existence of a “New Issue Puzzle”, one remark 
can be made about the experiment design of Eckbo et al. (2000). The validity of the macro 
factor model depends on the factors selection. The results may be sensitive to the choice of 
 
62 Risk factors are the market (CRSP value-weighted market index), the change in real per-capita consumption of 
non durable goods, the default risk (difference between BAA and AAA yield change), the unanticipated inflation 
rate, the term structure (difference between 20-year and 1-year Treasury bonds return and the return on Treasury 
bills. 
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the factors. In addition, no theory proposes which factor should be considered. In that respect, 
the findings of Bossearts and Hillion (1999) indicate that macro risk factors are not universal. 
Even the conditional macro factor model can detect cases of significant abnormal 
performance. Clarke, Dunbar and Kahle (2001) find a significantly negative alpha for their 
portfolio of insider secondary sales of stocks (-0.83 % per month) using the Eckbo et 
al. (2000) conditional model. This finding corroborates the result of FF 3-factor model (-
0.5 % per month) and Carhart (1997) 4-factor model (-0.43 % per month). 
Avramov (2002) addresses to the problem of “model uncertainty”. The “true” variables 
used to forecast the risk premium are unknown. He uses a Bayesian learning approach to 
estimate these “true” variables. By doing so, model uncertainty is incorporated into the tests 
of return predictability. His main findings indicate that a model averaging various return 
generating processes displays robust properties. The introduction of model uncertainty may 
weaken the predictive power of economic variables on stock returns. Finally, model 
uncertainty appears to be more important than estimation risk. Avramov (2002) conclusion 
suggests that instead of making additional effort to the search for universal macro risk factors, 
the focus should be put on the inclusion of model uncertainty into performance measurement. 
Term and market premia look like robust predictors of stock returns once model uncertainty is 
controlled for. 
Overall, the use of factor models as benchmark mitigates the “New Issue Puzzle”. Most of 
the underperformance found in the equally-weighting scheme tend to disappear in the value-
weighting scheme. The cases where the calendar time approach eliminates the abnormal 
performance detected with the matching methodology are more numerous than the cases 
where the calendar time approach confirms the presence of abnormal returns. The 
contribution of factor model to event-related stock performance has been extensively studied 
on the US market but less outside the US. Dubois and Jeanneret (2001) find no abnormal 
performance after rights SEO on the Swiss market using FF 3-factor model and a conditional 
CAPM. Ho and Abhyankar (2002) observe no abnormal calendar time performance for 
issuers of convertible bonds in the UK and a significant negative performance for issuers of 
convertible preference shares. These results are consistent with those obtained with the 
matching firm methodology. 
                                                                                                                                                        
63 The conditional factor model includes four time-varying factors in addition to the market risk : the lagged 
dividend yield on the CRSP value-weighted market index, the lagged 30-day Treasury bill rate, the lagged value 
of the default risk premium and the lagged value of the term structure premium. 
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4.1.3 Long-run operating performance and financial analysts’ over-optimism 
4.1.3.1 Abnormal operating performance of equity issuers 
Equity issues tend to be timed at a peak in the operating performance. The earnings pattern 
could be provoked by managers that would borrow future income to overstate current one or 
simply due to the business cycle. Equity offerings are more likely to be realised before a 
downturn in the economy or in earnings. Miller and Rock (1985) argue is that equity issues 
are done to compensate for an expected decline in retained earnings. McLaughlin, Safieddine 
and Vasudevan (1996) analyse the changes in operating performance of US equity issuers 
from three years before the offering to three years after. The raw operating performance is 
measured by the pre-tax operating cash flow divided by the book value of assets. The 
abnormal operating performance is computed by subtracting the industry median performance 
to that of the issuer. They show that equity issuers outperform firms in the same industry 
during the year preceding the offering, which is consistent with the pre-issue stock price run-
up documented in the studies of the SEO announcement effect. The main results overviewed 
in this sub-section are summarised in Panel D of Table 4.1. 
From the end of the fiscal year preceding the issue to the end of the third year after, the 
median raw operating performance drops from 15 % to 11.5 %. Over the same horizon, the 
median industry-adjusted performance decreases from 3.4 % to 1.4 %, showing that issuers 
are good performers relative to their industry. The overperformance persists during the post-
issue period although it decreases significantly. Indeed, the change in the abnormal 
performance between year –1 and year +3 is about –2 % and significant at the 1 % level. The 
yearly changes between years 0 and 1 and between years 1 and 2 are also significantly 
negative. Consistent with Jensen (1986), firms with the highest free cash flow at the time of 
the issue experience the worst post-issue operating performance. Managers of these firms 
have a tendency to invest in negative NPV projects. In support of Myers and Majluf (1984) 
and Miller and Rock (1985), equity issues occur after a period of abnormally positive 
operating performance and before a significant performance decline. Managers issue the new 
stocks at their maximum price when the future income is about to decrease. In addition, the 
post-issue operating performance is positively related to the change in fixed asset between 
year –1 and year +1. The more the firm acquire new property, plant and equipment at the time 
of the issue, the better is its long-run operating performance. This finding suggests that 
investing in fixed assets mitigates the free cash flow problem. No evidence is found of a 
relation between the level of growth opportunities and the long-run operating performance. 
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However, firms with higher growth opportunities have a greater tendency to issue equity, 
which could explain why the level of investment in fixed assets has a positive influence on the 
long-run operating performance. 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) conduct a study about the long-term operating performance of 
SEO firms that differs from that of McLaughlin et al. (1996) in three points : First, the sample 
includes not only pure primary offerings but every seasoned offering that involves a primary 
sales such as combined offerings. Second, a matching firm selected on the basis of industry, 
assets size and past operating performance is used in order to compute the abnormal 
performance. Third, five operating performance measures (instead of one) are used. They 
include the operating income to assets ratio, the operating income to sales ratio, the profit 
margin, the return on assets and the capital expenditures and R & D expenses to assets ratio. 
The median operating performance of the issuers is significantly inferior to the median 
performance of the matching firms over a 4-year horizon after the issue. This result holds for 
all operating performance measures. The difference in the 4-year performance change ranges 
between –1.4 % for the operating income to assets ratio to –3.2 % for the capital expenditures 
and R & D expenses to assets ratio. The underperformance pattern is also found in three of the 
issuers size quartiles, the middle-low size quartile being statistically insignificant. The results 
are not altered when primary and combined offerings are examined separately. Overall, the 
findings of Loughran and Ritter (1997) are consistent with those of McLaughlin et al. (1996). 
Under the “Efficient Market Hypothesis”, the operating performance downturn could be 
anticipated by the market. It would not necessarily lead to a post-SEO long-term abnormal 
stock performance. However, Loughran and Ritter (1997) observe that the annual stock 
performance of issuers, measured over the 5-year post SEO period, is also significantly 
inferior to the stock performance of the matching firms (-7.4 % per year). The operating 
underperformance pattern is not impounded into the stock prices at the time of the issue. 
Moreover, the post-issue underperformance is reflected in the corresponding stock returns. 
Issuers are found to be disproportionately fast growing firms. Returns on fast growing firms 
are expected to be lower than those on slow growing firms. Though, the stock performance of 
issuers is still significantly lower than that of non-issuers after controlling for the growth rate. 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) argue that SEO firms manage earnings to intentionally mislead 
investors and issue over-valued equity. The decline in operating income that follows the 
offering is reflected in the stock prices over the long-run. 
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Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees (2002) analyse the operating performance around private 
placements of equity. They observe a sharp contrast to public equity issues concerning the 
pre-issue operating performance. Private equity issues are more likely to follow periods of 
negative abnormal operating performance (median industry-adjusted). Furthermore, the 
operating performance continues to decline over the 4-year period starting from the issue 
year. Similar to the results of public equity issues, private equity issuers experience a 
significant pre-issue stock price run-up and they have lower BM ratios than their control firms 
(size and industry-matched). Hertzel et al. (2002) attribute some of this pattern to managers 
and investors’ over-optimism about the issuers’ prospects. The fact that the ratio of capital 
and R&D expenditures to total assets for issuing firms is significantly greater than the 
industry median corroborates this explanation. 
In the case of convertible debt issues, Lewis et al. (1999) also document that the operating 
performance of issuers deteriorates in the years after the offering. This decline is apparently 
due to industry factors, since the operating performance of matching firms within the same 
industry is also decreasing. In addition, they observe that the investment-related operating 
performance diminishes. This effect comes mainly from firm-specific factors, since the non-
issuing firms belonging to the same industry do not experience such a decline. The results of 
Lewis et al. (1999) support the evidence that convertible debt is used as a delayed equity issue 
and not as quality-signalling financial instrument. 
4.1.3.2 Stock price reaction to post-SEO earnings announcement and long-term 
underperformance 
Jegadeesh (2000), Denis and Sarin (2001) and Brous, Datar and Kini (2001) use 
announcement returns to earnings disclosure as the source of public information susceptible to 
explain the post-SEO long-run abnormal performance. Jegadeesh (2000) cumulates the 
abnormal returns to earnings announcements during 20 quarters following the SEO. On 
average, the abnormal performance attributable to earnings announcement reaches –4.3 %, 
which represents 12.5 % of the total 60-month underperformance. The cumulated earnings 
announcement effect is measured over a period that corresponds to only 6.4 % of the trading 
days included in the long-term horizon. Therefore, an important fraction of the SEO 
underperformance can be directly linked to unpleasant earnings surprises. In other words, the 
long-run underperformance could come from, at least in part, market over-optimism about the 
SEO firms prospects. 
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Denis and Sarin (2001) examine earnings announcement returns over a 28-quarter horizon, 
starting 2 years before the offering. They compute the announcement 3-day CAR according to 
an industry, size and BM ratio matched firm. The same matching firm is used to calculate the 
post-SEO 60-month BHAR. Earnings announcement returns are on average significantly 
positive (+0.72 %) during the pre-SEO period and significantly negative (-0.28 %) during the 
post-SEO period. The mean abnormal return is negative in seventeen of the twenty quarters 
after the issue. However, negative earnings announcement returns are concentrated among 
small issuers. The lowest issuer size quartile return equals –0.87 % and the results of other 
quartiles are not statistically significant. Negative earnings announcement returns are also 
concentrated in the two middle market-to-book ratio quartiles. Extreme growth or value 
issuers do not seem to experience post-SEO earnings surprises. Then, the anomaly seems to 
be restricted to the smallest issuers. For these firms, the over-optimism hypothesis about 
future prospects is verified but they represent only a small fraction of the issuers. 
Furthermore, long-term deviations from the normal price may not be arbitraged for the 
smallest firms because of higher costs in collecting information and transacting. 
Consequently, abnormal stock returns may not be considered as contradictive to market 
efficiency. 
The findings of Jegadeesh (2000) and Denis and Sarin (2001) are mitigated by those of 
Brous et al. (2001). Using an experiment framework close to the one of Denis and 
Sarin (2001), Brous et al. (2001) observe that earnings announcement returns for glamour 
issuers, hot market issuers and Nasdaq listed issuers are not significantly different from zero. 
Though, these firms are the most likely to convey unfavourable information through their 
earnings announcements. Investors are not systematically disappointed by the earnings 
announcements that follow SEO as none of the mean or median 3-day announcement returns 
are statistically different from zero. These results raise doubts about the existence of 
optimistic expectations by market participants a the time of an equity issue. 
4.1.3.3 Financial analysts’ over-optimism 
Firms conducting a SEO underperform on the long-run similar firms that are not subject to 
the event. The underperformance is more severe for small issuers. Following these 
observations, Ali (1995) shows that the earnings forecasts made by financial analysts about 
issuing firms are optimistically biased relative to those about non-issuing firms. Moreover, the 
smaller the size of the issue, the more optimistic are the earnings forecasts. These findings 
support the hypothesis raised by Loughran and Ritter (1995) stating that the poor long-run 
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stock performance after a SEO comes from market's overly optimistic earnings anticipations 
about these firms. 
The overall results are not sensitive to the forecasting horizons. However, the shorter the 
horizon, the smaller is the forecast error. Financial analysts have pessimistic forecasts for the 
end of the current fiscal year and optimistic forecasts for the next year. The optimistic bias in 
forecasts is greater for small firms compared to the one about large firms. Managers of small 
firms have more private information about the "true" value of earnings than managers of large 
firms, which explains the greater bias for small firms. An alternative explanation to the small 
firms bias could come from the fact that they are less followed by analysts. Forecasts 
accuracy is increasing with the number of analysts. Consensus forecasts are used to determine 
the forecasts errors and individual forecasts are assumed to be iid distributed. From a 
statistical standpoint, the precision of the consensus forecast is expected to decrease the 
smaller the number of individual forecasts in the consensus. 
The findings of Ali (1995) bring out the fact that analysts are overly optimistic about the 
issuers prospects during four years after the offering. If investors base their stock price 
valuation on the analysts forecasts, they have to revise their valuation downward over this 
horizon, which could explain why the stock underperformance persists on the long-run. One 
reason that could incline financial analysts to positively bias their earnings forecasts is given 
by Lim (2001). Analysts try to gain management and information access by overstating 
earnings predictions. The eager to attract underwriting contracts could induce over-optimistic 
earnings forecasts coming from affiliated analysts; see Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000), 
Hayward and Boeker (1998), Carleton, Chen and Steiner (1998). However, according to 
Hansen and Sarin (1998), this over-optimism is not restricted to issuers but it affects all the 
high growth firms, one characteristic of poorly performing equity issuers. 
For IPOs, Rajan and Servaes (1997) observe that firms with the lowest industry-adjusted 
growth forecasts outperform their benchmarks on the long-run (NYSE/AMEX index adjusted 
4-year return of +35.61 % and industry and size-matched 4-year return of +74.13 %). On the 
other hand, firms with the highest industry-adjusted long-term growth forecasts underperform 
their benchmarks (-62.82 % for NYSE/AMEX index adjusted return and –35.86 % for the 
matched firm return). When the analysts are over-optimistic about an issuer, its long-run stock 
performance tends to be negative while it is positive when analysts predict a low growth rate. 
The growth forecasts remain above the industry average for at least three years after the event. 
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Over the same period, the abnormal performance decreases. The over-optimism of financial 
analysts is not rapidly corrected after the event. The same rationale could apply to SEO. 
4.1.4 Summary of security issues on the long-term performance 
In exception of straight debt offerings, the matching firm methodology indicates that issuers 
underperform their benchmark at 3 and 5-year horizons after the issue. The evidence of the 
managers issuing securities within the window of opportunity is mixed and not sufficient to 
explain the long-term pattern of abnormal returns. Indeed, earnings manipulations that 
mislead investors in their stock price valuation over long horizon may be more convincing. 
Calendar time performance measurement and value-weighting mitigate the stock 
underperformance but they do not eliminate it in all the cases. Post-SEO poor operating 
performance may explain why external financing was needed but, if the “Efficient Market 
Hypothesis” holds, it should not lead to long-term stock underperformance. Therefore, the 
behaviour of investors in interpreting the signals about stock prices should have an important 
role to play in explaining long-run underperformance. Investors may not incorporate into the 
stock price all the relevant information involved in corporate news announcements (equity 
issue or earnings disclosure). In that sense, the persistence of stock underperformance after 
equity issues casts some doubt about market efficiency. 
4.2 Alternative theories to market efficiency 
The persistence of abnormal returns on the long run leads to wonder about investors’ 
rationality when they form their expectations about stock prices. Their inability to incorporate 
all relevant information conveyed by corporate events announcements gives raise and support 
to alternative theories to market efficiency. Investors may be less than fully rational and the 
stock price valuation may be affected by human biases described in the psychology literature. 
Over-confidence, self-attribution, conservatism or representativeness heuristic are the main 
psychological characteristics investors could be subject to. The first sub-section presents three 
behavioural models that reject market efficiency and attempt to explain anomalies in long-
term stock returns. Implications of behavioural theories on the long-term stock performance 
around equity issues are discussed in the second sub-section. In the third sub-section, 
behavioural theories are confronted to rational explanations, in particular to rational structural 
uncertainty models that reach similar outcomes without rejecting market efficiency. 
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Table 4.1 : Long-run stock performance following an external financing decision 
Authors     Sample  Matching methodology Calendar time methodology 
W 3y/5y MF/CP size BM ind mom CAR BHAR FF 3-F CT 4-F C-CAPM 
Panel A : Post-SEO stock performance of US firms   
Loughran and Ritter (1995) US 1970-1990 
3702 SEO, industrials 
large issuers 
large issuers 
small issuers 
small issuers 
 
EW 
EW 
EW 
VW 
EW 
VW 
3y 
5y 
5y 
5y 
5y 
5y 
MF 
MF 
× 
× 
   
    -18. 7%
US 
 
EW 
 
5y 
     
-0.38 %
Brav et al. (2000) US 
medium issuers 
small issuers  EW 
5y 
5y 
× 
× 
-17.1 %
-0.30 %
-0.50 %
 
-33.0 %
-59.6 %
-0.27 %
-0.21 %
-0.45 5
-0.34 %
 
Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995) 
US 1975-1989
1247 primary SEO, industrials 
EW 
EW 
EW 
EW 
 
3y 
3y 
5y 
5y 
MF 
MF 
MF 
MF 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
 
× 
× 
 
× 
-17.5 %
-31.2 %
-31.0 %
-22.8 %
-42.5 %
 
Bayless and Jay (2000) 1977-1992 
721 SEO, industrials 
large issuers 
medium issuers 
small issuers 
 
EW 
EW 
EW 
5y 
5y 
5y 
-0.49 %
-0.09 %
-0.63 %
-1.16 %
-0.07 %
-0.42 %
-0.98 %
 
1975-1992 
4526 SEO, industrials, no units 
large issuers 
EW 
VW 
EW 
EW 
5y 
5y 
5y 
CP 
CP 
× 
× 
 × 
× 
-15.3 % -27.3 %
-23.8 %
-0.40 %
-0.17 %
-0.20 %
-0.69 %
-0.28 %
-0.07 %
-0.10 %
-0.23 %
       
      
Figures in bold are significant at the 5 % level or less. Column titles :  for the weighting scheme (equally-weighted = EW and value-weighted = VW),  3y (5y)  for 3-year(5-year)  post-issue 
performance, MF for single matching firm and CP for control portfolio of matching firms, size for the market value of equity, BM for the book-to-market ratio, ind for the  industry, mom for the 
pre-issue stock return momentum, CAR for cumulative abnormal return, BHAR for buy-and-hold abnormal return, FF 3-F for the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993), CT 4F for the 4-
factor model of Carhart (1997), C-CAPM for a conditional CAPM (refer to the original texts for the list of instrumental variables). 
w
 205
 Table 4.1 : continued 
  Matching methodology Authors  Sample   Calendar time methodology 
w 3y/5y size BM ind mom CAR CT 4-F C-CAPM 
Panel A : continued  
Eckbo et al. (2000) US 1963-1995 
VW
5y 
MF 
  -23.2 %
-10.6 %
-0.12 %
Jegadeesh (2000) 
EW 
× ×   
  
VW 
EW 
3y 
3y 
3y 
CP × 
× 
×   
US EW 
-21.3 %
4860 SEO, units excluded 
nasdaq issuers 
nasdaq issuers 
 
EW 
VW 
EW 
5y 
5y 
5y 
MF × 
× 
× 
× 
-0.12 %
-0.17 %
-0.42 %
-0.05 % 
-0.05 % 
-0.09 % 
+0.10 % 
US 1970-1993 
2992 SEO 
 
VW 5y 
5y 
CP -34.3 %
-0.45 % -0.38 %
 
Kahle (2000) US 1981-1992 
2014 SEO, industrials 
                   utilities 
 
 
EW 
EW 
 
3y 
3y 
 
MF 
MF 
 
× 
× 
 
× 
× 
-14.7 %
+1.3 %
 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) US 1953-1993 
4911 SEO 
growth issuers 
growth issuers 
value issuers 
value issuers 
 
EW 
VW 
EW 
VW
3y 
3y 
3y 
CP × 
-10.2 %
-4.2 %
-0.33 %
-0.03 %
-0.32 %
-0.19 %
-0.31 %
-0.24 %
 
Brous et al. (2001) 1977-1990 
1475 SEO, industrials EW 
3y 
5y 
MF 
MF 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
 -12.4 %  
   MF/CP   BHAR FF 3-F
       
Figures in bold are significant at the 5 % level or less. Column titles :  for the weighting scheme (equally-weighted = EW and value-weighted = VW),  3y (5y)  for 3-year(5-year)  post-issue 
performance, MF for single matching firm and CP for control portfolio of matching firms, size for the market value of equity, BM for the book-to-market ratio, ind for the  industry, mom for the 
pre-issue stock return momentum, CAR for cumulative abnormal return, BHAR for buy-and-hold abnormal return, FF 3-F for the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993), CT 4F for the 4-
factor model of Carhart (1997), C-CAPM for a conditional CAPM (refer to the original texts for the list of instrumental variables). 
w
 206
Table 4.1 : continued 
Authors     Sample  Matching methodology Calendar time methodology 
w 3y/5y MF/CP size BM ind mom CAR BHAR FF 3-F CT 4-F C-CAPM 
Panel A : continued   
Byoun (2002) US 1980-1993 
3300 SEO 
309 units offerings 
  
EW 
CP 
-0.18 %
0.00 %
   
  
US 1980-1996 
619 private equity offerings 
EW 
EW 
VW 
3y 
3y 
3y 
MF 
MF 
× 
 
 
EW 
EW 
 
5y 
5y 
 
CP 
CP 
 
× 
× 
 
× 
× 
× 
× 
-21.9 %
-57.5 %
-0.97 %
-3.11 %
-0.80 %
-3.22 %
 
Clarke et al. (2001) US 1980-1996 
424 secondary offerings 
89 sales by insiders 
89 sales by insiders 
335 sales by non-insiders 
335 sales by non-insiders 
 
EW 
EW 
EW 
EW 
EW 
3y 
5y 
3y 
5y 
3y 
5y 
CP 
CP 
CP 
CP 
CP 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
 × 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
+5.9 %
+2.0 %
-15.7 %
-33.3 %
+11.7 %
+11.4 %
-0.22 %
-0.50 % -0.43 %
-0.08 %
-0.27 % 
 
-0.83 % 
 
-0.14 % 
Denis and Sarin (2001) US 1982-1990 
1213 SEO, industrials 
 
EW 5y MF × × ×  -30.3 %  
Marciukaityte et al. (2001) US 1974-1997 
1917 primary SEO 
1528 combined offerings 
1528 combined offerings 
758 secondary offerings 
758 secondary offerings 
 
EW 
EW 
EW 
EW 
EW 
EW 
3y 
5y 
3y 
5y 
3y 
5y 
MF 
MF 
MF 
MF 
MF 
MF 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
-23.0 %
-22.9 %
-21.8 %
-19.5 %
+13.0 %
+39.4 %
 
Hertzel et al. (2002) 
× 
 
× 
×  -38.2 %
-23.8 %
-1.18 %
-1.23 %
 
      
      
Figures in bold are significant at the 5 % level or less. Column titles : lly-weighted = EW and value-weighted = VW),  3y (5y)  for 3-year(5-year)  post-issue 
performance, MF for single matching firm and CP for control portfolio of matching firms, size for the market value of equity, BM for the book-to-market ratio, ind for the  industry, mom for the 
pre-issue stock return momentum, CAR for cumulative abnormal return, BHAR for buy-and-hold abnormal return, FF 3-F for the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993), CT 4F for the 4-
factor model of Carhart (1997), C-CAPM for a conditional CAPM (refer to the original texts for the list of instrumental variables). 
w  for the weighting scheme (equa
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 Table 4.1 : continued 
Authors     Sample  Matching methodology Calendar time methodology 
w 3y/5y MF/CP size ind FF 3-F CT 4-F C-CAPM 
Panel B : Post-SEO stock performance of non-US firms  
Affleck-Graves and 
Page (1996) 
RSA  
× 
  -21.6 %  
51 SEO with rights 
EW 
EW 
EW 
3y   
EW 3y 
5y 
MF 
D 1960-1992    
  
× 
  
+3.0 %
+6.2 %
+0.11 % 
1980-1990
149 SEO with rights 
 
EW 
EW 
3y 
3y 
MF 
MF 
×  
-20.7 %
Kang et al. (1999) JPN 1980-1988 
727 cash SEO 
51 SEO with rights 
 
EW 5y 
3y 
5y 
MF 
MF 
MF 
MF 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
-14.7 %
-69.4 %
-2.5 %
-18.2 %
 
Allen and Soucik (2000) AUS 1984-1993 
102 SEO 
 
EW MF 
× 
× 
 × 
× 
 -47.7 %
-39.5 %
 
Stehle et al. (2000) 
584 SEO with rights 
 
EW 
VW 
3y 
3y 
CP 
CP 
× 
× 
-6.0 %
-6.2 %
 
Dubois and 
Jeanneret (2001) 
CH 1984-1994
231 SEO with rights 
80 financials 
80 financials 
151 non-financials 
151 non-financials 
EW 
VW 
EW 
VW 
EW 
VW 
3y 
3y 
3y 
3y 
3y 
3y 
CP 
CP 
CP 
CP 
CP 
CP 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
+1.6 %
+6.7 %
+1.0 %
-0.9 %
+2.8 %
+4.9 %
+5.1 %
+3.4 %
+1.7 %
+7.3 %
-0.07 %
+0.18 %
+0.15 %
+0.15 %
-0.12 %
+0.24 %
+0.01 % 
+0.10 % 
+0.05 % 
-0.02 % 
+0.024 % 
     BM  mom CAR BHAR 
           
Figures in bold are significant at the 5 % level or less. Column titles :  for the weighting scheme (equally-weighted = EW and value-weighted = VW),  3y (5y)  for 3-year(5-year)  post-issue 
performance, MF for single matching firm and CP for control portfolio of matching firms, size for the market value of equity, BM for the book-to-market ratio, ind for the  industry, mom for the 
pre-issue stock return momentum, CAR for cumulative abnormal return, BHAR for buy-and-hold abnormal return, FF 3-F for the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993), CT 4F for the 4-
factor model of Carhart (1997), C-CAPM for a conditional CAPM (refer to the original texts for the list of instrumental variables). 
w
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Table 4.1 : continued 
Authors      Sample Matching methodology Calendar time methodology 
   MF/CP      
       
w 3y/5y size BM ind mom CAR BHAR FF 3-F CT 4-F C-CAPM 
Panel C : Stock performance after debt issues  
Dichev and Piotroski (1999) US 1964-1991 
17370 increases in annual 
straight debt account 
1193 increases in annual 
convertible debt account 
EW 
VW 
 
EW 
VW 
 
5y 
5y 
 
 
CP 
    
400 convertible bonds 
MF 
 
  -0.26 %  
Kahle (2000) US   
JPN 
 
MF 
  
3y 
  
5y 
5y
CPa 
 
CP 
CP 
+4.3 %
-6.7 %
-71.7 %
-52.8 %
 
Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1999) 
US 1975-1989 
392 straight bonds 
400 convertible bonds 
EW 
VW 
EW 
VW 
 
5y 
5y 
5y 
5y 
 
MF 
 
× 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
-14.3 %
-36.9 %
+0.17 %
-0.31 %
-0.25 %
1981-1992 
577 straight bonds 
527 convertible bonds 
 
EW 
EW 
 
 
3y 
3y 
 
MF 
MF 
 
× 
× 
 
× 
× 
-9.5 %
-18.1 %
 
Kang et al. (1999) 1980-1988 
708 convertible bonds 
EW 
EW 
3y 
5y 
MF × 
× 
× 
× 
-38.4 %
-44.6 %
 
Ho and Abhyankar (2002) UK 1982-1996 
152 convertible bonds 
147 conv. preference shares 
147 conv. preference shares 
EW 
VW 
EW 
VW 
3y 
3y 
3y 
CP 
CP 
CP 
CP 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
-11.9 %
-7.6 %
-18.4 %
-28.4 %
-0.29 %
-0.23 %
-0.69 %
-1.18 %
-0.05 %
-0.16 %
-0.61 %
-1.12 %
 
aThe benchmark is the return on a portfolio long in the highest debt increase quintile and short in the market index.  
Figures in bold are significant at the 5 % level or less. Column titles :  for the weighting scheme (equally-weighted = EW and value-weighted = VW),  3y (5y)  for 3-year(5-year)  post-issue 
performance, MF for single matching firm and CP for control portfolio of matching firms, size for the market value of equity, BM for the book-to-market ratio, ind for the  industry, mom for the 
pre-issue stock return momentum, CAR for cumulative abnormal return, BHAR for buy-and-hold abnormal return, FF 3-F for the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993), CT 4F for the 4-
factor model of Carhart (1997), C-CAPM for a conditional CAPM (refer to the original texts for the list of instrumental variables). 
w
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Table 4.1 : continued 
Authors   Sample w 3y/5y Matching methodology  Average annual abnormal performance 
Panel D : Long-term operating performance         
McLaughlin, Safieddine 
and Vasudevan (1996) 
US    
  
  
  
1980-1991
1296 SEO, industrials 
EW 3y Industry median operating performance -1.7 % 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) US 1979-1989 
1338 SEO, industrials 
EW 3y Matching firm, industry, assets size and past 
operating performance 
-1.4 % to –3.2 %  
depending on the operating performance measure 
Lewis et al. (1999) US 1979-1990 
566 convertible bonds offers 
EW 3y Industry median operating performance -0.2 % to –0.7 %  
depending on the operating performance measure 
Hertzel et al. (2002) US 1980-1996 
619 private equity offerings 
EW 3y Industry median operating performance –7.6 % to -11.06 %  
depending on the operating performance measure 
Figures in bold are significant at the 5 % level or less. Column titles :  for the weighting scheme (equally-weighted = EW and value-weighted = VW),  3y (5y)  for 3-year(5-year)  post-issue 
performance.  
w
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4.2.1 Behavioural theories 
4.2.1.1 Investors’ overconfidence and self-attribution 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) [hereafter DHS] develop a theory based on 
investors’ overconfidence and on changes in confidence resulting from biased self-
attribution of investment outcomes. The model implies that investors overreact to private 
information signals and underreact to public signals. It offers a joint explanation to both 
short-term momentum and long-term reversal in stock returns. The model also explains why 
the stock price reaction to public announcements of selective events have the same sign as 
the post-event long-term performance. The population of agents is divided between the 
informed ones who receive a private signal and the uninformed who only receive public 
signals. The informed agents are risk neutral and they over-estimate the precision of the 
private signal (overconfidence). In addition, the transaction price is set according to their 
expectations. The uninformed agents are risk averse. The model entails a time-varying 
investor’s confidence and has five dates : 
• Date0, no information is released. Individuals have identical prior beliefs. They trade 
only for optimal risk transfer purposes. 
• Date1, a noisy private signal about the underlying security value arrives to the informed 
investors. Then, informed investors trade with the uninformed according to their 
private information. 
• Date2, a second private signal is transmitted to informed individuals, causing managers 
(a category of informed individuals) to decide on the undertaking of corporate 
events. These events are publicly observed and they convey private information to 
the uninformed investors. Further trades occur between informed and uninformed 
investors. 
• Date3, noisy public information is released. 
• Date4, conclusive public information is released. The securities pay a liquidating 
dividend. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the average stock price path following a positive (upper curve) or 
negative (lower curve) private signal released at Date1. The bold lines are driven by the 
overconfident and self-attributed reaction of informed investors while the dotted lines 
represent the rational expected value of the security. Overconfidence in the private signal 
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causes the Date1 security price to overreact to this new information. At Date2, informed 
agents receive a second private signal. Among them, managers observe the stock price 
deviation from the rational expected value and selectively decide on the corporate event to 
undertake. A corporate event is said to be selective when its decision process is driven by 
the Date2 mispricing. All investors observe the event which announcement is public. They 
partially correct the stock price which causes a reversal in the stock price path. Because of 
overconfidence in private signals, informed investors underreact to public news and the 
deviation between the current stock price and its fully rational value persists. At Date4, the 
flow of public information is sufficient to convince the investor on the “true” value of the 
stock. The post-event underreaction phase is over. 
Figure 4.1 : Average price response as a function of time with irrational investors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the model, the level of investor’s confidence is allowed to be outcome depend
main implication is the appearance of a short-run momentum pattern. A publ
confirming the private signal increases the informed investors’ level of confidence. 
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private information. Therefore, the correction phase driven by the flow of public signals is 
expected to persist during long periods.  
Returns are expected to be positively autocorrelated between Date1 and Date2 because of 
a momentum effect implied by overconfidence in the private signal. The momentum effect 
is accentuated if public signals corroborate the private signal during the period. Between 
Date2 and Date3, the autocorrelation in returns should reverse to become negative. This 
reversal is caused by the corporate event public announcement made at Date2. From the 
announcement, investors infer that the stock price is misvalued but they underreact since 
they are underestimating the pertinence of public information. Their level of confidence in 
the public information increases with the number of disclosures. Yet, returns between Date3 
and Date4 should be positively autocorrelated, due to the post-event underreaction pattern. 
In other words, the DHS model predicts unconditional short-lag positive autocorrelation in 
stock returns (momentum) and long-lag negative autocorrelation in stock returns (reversal). 
4.2.1.2 Investors’ conservatism and representativeness heuristic 
To explain both under and overreaction patterns in stock returns, Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) [hereafter BSV] propose a switching-regime model based on psychological 
characteristics of a representative investor. The first regime describes the underreaction 
pattern (Model 1). News is incorporated slowly into prices which tend to exhibit positive 
autocorrelations on short intervals. The investor’s psychological characteristic is 
conservatism. He puts more weight on his prior beliefs about the stock price than on recent 
information. In that sense, he underreacts to the latest news and the prices tend to exhibit 
short-horizon momentum.  
The second regime represents overreaction (Model 2). Stocks should become overpriced 
after a stream of good surprises and underpriced after a stream of bad surprises. 
Overreaction is attributed to representativeness heuristic. The investors gives more attention 
to the strength of a particular and recent evidence instead of taking into account all the data 
available (prior beliefs and longer-lagged earnings). For instance, if the investor observes a 
stream of good surprises in earnings, he would become a trend chaser in spite of the low 
probability that the trend will last much longer. He focuses on recent information and forgets 
about his prior beliefs or earlier earnings. He overreacts to recent information. 
The investor is assumed to be risk neutral. Earnings are supposed to follow a random walk 
but the representative investor, who sets the price, is not able to realise it. Most of the time, 
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he considers earnings as more stable than they really are (Model 1). In this model, prices are 
mean-reverting. A positive shock is expected to be followed by a negative shock to stabilise 
the earnings stream. The investor underreacts to an unexpected shock (earnings surprise) 
because of his conservatism bias. However, if subsequent earning surprises are of similar 
sign, the investor thinks that the earnings generating process has changed to a model based 
on earnings trend (Model 2). When the investor believes in Model 2, he becomes subject to 
the other psychological bias, representativeness heuristic and focuses only on recent prices 
to form his expectations. 
Transition probabilities are associated to the switching from one model to the other. Two 
consecutive news with similar sign imply that more weight is given to the earnings trend 
model. Conversely, when consecutive news have opposite sign, more weight is given to the 
mean-reverting model. The revisions in the probability that the current underlying model is 
of type 1 or 2 are made according to a fully rational Bayesian rule. The investor forms his 
expectations about the stock prices according to the probabilities of earnings continuation or 
reversal in each model and to the probabilities of switching from one model to the other. The 
entire model explains both short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction in stock 
returns. 
Empirical evidence in event studies shows pervasive underreaction which supports the 
concept of conservatism and the specification of Model 1. Overall, the stock price reaction 
to an event announcement is followed by a period during which the returns are drift in the 
same direction64. Some events occur after periods of trending returns that are of opposite 
sign relative to the post-event returns pattern. Firms could take advantage of overreaction to 
time events when they have the opportunity to do it. This outcome is consistent with the 
selective event argument of DHS (1998). 
4.2.1.3 Newswatchers and momentum traders, with limited rationality 
Hong and Stein (1999) [hereafter HS] develop an alternative model. Instead of having one 
set of representative agents whose psychological characteristics are responsible for the stock 
price deviation, they build their theory on the interactions between two groups of limited 
rational agents : the newswatchers and the momentum traders. Each type of agents is limited 
rational in the sense that they are only able to process some subset of the available 
                                                 
64 This argument is refuted by Fama (1998) and in several empirical articles that are reviewed in the next sub-
section. 
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information. The newswatchers make predictions about the future stock price based 
exclusively on private signals. They do not know what information is observed by other 
newswatchers and they do not get any information from current or past prices. The 
information they get diffuses gradually into the stock price so that underreaction appears. 
Momentum traders base their forecasts about future prices only on past price changes. 
However, they are limited, by assumption, in their use of past information to simple 
forecasts functions. 
The sequence of the model is as follows : First, only newswatchers are active as they get 
private information but they underreact because they have only access to a restricted part of 
the information. This underreaction leaves an arbitrage opportunity to momentum traders to 
make money. Indeed, since newswatchers are partially informed, the price moves gradually 
toward its long-term fundamental value. Momentum traders observe the price changes and 
act, which accelerates the initial price move and induces more momentum actions. Because 
momentum traders do not observe information about the fundamental value of the stock, late 
traders let the stock price overreact in the sense that they take positions when the stock price 
has already gone beyond its long-term value. The model of HS (1999) proposes then a 
unified theory of under and overreaction. In a first step, one shock (the private information 
arrival) generates underreaction and in a second step, because of excessive momentum 
trading, the stock price overreacts relative to the initial information. 
When public information is added to the model, the overreaction pattern tends to 
disappear. The theory lacks some generality. Public information is revealed to all investors 
at the same time and thus, it is less subject to slow diffusion. However, the public news is 
processed with private information to make judgement about the expected value of the 
security. Therefore, the market response to public news involves the aggregation of private 
signals and underreaction may continue to apply. The problem of overreaction is different 
because now momentum traders are informed of the public news arrival. They know when 
the underreaction period starts. In consequence, they can figure easily whether they act as 
early traders who will make a profit or as late traders that are subject to the overshooting 
problem. This distinction is impossible to make in the case of pure private information, 
which arrival date is unknown to the momentum traders. In the case of public news, 
momentum traders could have incentives to concentrate their actions nearly after the public 
announcement in order to avoid overshooting and overreaction would be reduced if not 
eliminated. 
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4.2.2 Implications on the long-term stock performance 
Implications of behavioural theories on the long-term stock performance is a delicate 
subject. Indeed, such theories have been developed upon the empirical evidence to explain 
long-term pattern of stock returns. In that sense, their predictions are set to match the 
observed long-term anomalies. However, underreaction and overreaction imply testable 
hypotheses about stock price behaviour around equity issues. 
If investors underreact to equity issue announcements, the average long-term post-SEO 
abnormal returns is expected to have the same sign as the announcement valuation effect. In 
addition, the short-term stock price reaction should be positively correlated with the long-
term stock performance after the issue. Consistent with the overreaction argument, pre-SEO 
stock returns should be negatively correlated with post-event abnormal performance. This 
long-term reversal in stock returns should be larger when the SEO occurs during periods 
with few public information disclosures. The size and the number of SEO should be greater 
when potential mispricing is high. In the same line of thought, the probability of occurrence 
of a SEO is expected to increase with the probability that equity is overpriced. Several of 
these behavioural predictions are consistent with the timing hypothesis. For instance, 
DHS (1998) argue that managers select corporate events according to the direction and the 
magnitude of stock mispricing. In addition, mispricing should be stronger for stocks that 
need more attention to be evaluated and for which feedback on the valuation is not clear in 
the short-term. Growth stocks are good examples of this phenomenon. Their valuation 
strongly depends on the option that growth opportunities will be profitable in the mid or 
long-term future. Daniel and Titman (1998) find that momentum effect is strong for growth 
stocks but weak or insignificant for value stocks. In the same way, stocks with high R&D 
expenditures or intangible assets should face more short-term momentum due to valuation 
difficulties and overconfidence in private information. 
Consistent evidence of momentum has been found in the US and in Europe but weak and 
insignificant momentum has been detected in Japan during the nineties; see Haugen and 
Baker (1996) and Daniel, Titman and Wei (2001). Daniel et al. (2001) argue that the self-
attribution bias is less important in Japan than in the US. For instance, Kitayama, Takagi and 
Matsumato (1995) do not find conclusive evidence of self-enhancing biases in attribution 
among Japanese investors. However, momentum effects are more important when the 
market is bullish than when it is bearish; see Conrad, Cooper and Hameed (1999). Since 
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1990, the Japanese market has been essentially bearish, which could explain why 
momentum effects have not been detected. 
The overconfidence theory suggests three further implications. First, firms are expected to 
issue securities when they are overpriced. If investors are overconfident, such overvaluation 
could be measured by recent increases in firm, industry and aggregate stock market prices. 
The opposite is true for stock repurchases. Thus, if managers act to exploit mispricing, there 
should be both general and industry specific financing and repurchase booms. Second, if 
managers act in the existing shareholders’ interest, they tend to realise rights offerings 
instead of cash direct offerings when the stock is underpriced or they will choose debt 
financing to avoid the capital dilution of existing shareholders. Third, as observed by Daniel 
and Titman (2001), investors react appropriately to objective information such as 
information extracted from financial statements but they overreact to subjective information 
such as news or rumours about future cash flows that are not reflected in current accounting 
based growth numbers. Investors are overconfident in their ability to interpret fuzzy 
information. Consequently, SEO realised soon after earnings disclosures and publication of 
the annual report should be less subject to investors’ irrational reactions. 
The HS (1999) model predicts that momentum strategies should earn more profit with 
stocks for which information diffuses slowly. Small stocks or the ones followed by few 
analysts relative to what is expected from their firm size should exhibit longer positive 
autocorrelation patterns. Such stocks should also be subject to more pronounced 
overshooting and stronger reversals in the long-run. Less liquid assets or stock classes with 
high trading costs should also have longer horizon of momentum trading because high 
trading costs slows down the information diffusion process. The adjustment in stock value 
due to marginal private information could be offset by the trading costs and news watchers 
do not adjust their holdings frequently. Moreover, high trading costs themselves lengthen 
the time it takes for the stock value to exceed the initial fees. This implies momentum 
strategies to last longer. 
4.2.3 Rational versus behavioural models 
Fama (1998) criticises the rejection of market efficiency by the behavioural finance. He 
argues that apparent overreaction is about as common as underreaction and post event 
continuations of pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as post-event reversal. 
Furthermore, most long-term anomalies in stock returns are likely to disappear with 
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reasonable changes in the methodology to compute the abnormal performance. Events 
subject to overreaction involve initial public offerings, seasoned equity offerings and 
exchange listing. Underreaction characterises spin-offs, stock splits, stock repurchases, 
dividend initiations or omissions. Mergers and proxy contests are events difficult to classify. 
As Fama (1998) puts it: “A good behavioural theory must satisfy three criteria : First, it 
should rest on plausible assumptions about investors’ behaviour or consistent with casual 
observations. Second, it should explain the existing evidence in a parsimonious and unified 
way. Last, it should make further testable predictions”. He points out that behavioural 
theories do not propose well specified alternative hypotheses to market efficiency (prices 
fully reflecting all available information). Any alternative hypothesis must clearly expose 
the biases in the information process that cause the same investor to underreact to given 
events and to overreact to others. In that sense, behavioural models fit well with the 
anomalies they are designed to explain but they have difficulties to address to other 
anomalies. BSV (1998) and DHS (1998) explain short-term underreaction and long-term 
overreaction. However, events that do not experience a long-term reversal in their long-run 
abnormal returns pattern are not considered by those theories. 
Instead of investors’ irrationality, Fama (1998) underlines the “bad model” problem as the 
main source of anomalies. Testing market efficiency cannot be separated from testing a 
model for normal returns. Different models for expected returns produce different estimates 
of long-term abnormal returns. He concludes that market efficiency should not be 
abandoned in favour of behavioural theories. Anomalies are chance results that are fragile 
since they greatly depend on the model specification. Constantinides (2002) argues that 
rational economic model is greatly enhanced by relaxing some of its assumptions. For 
instance, consumers could face uninsurable, idiosyncratic and persistent income shocks like 
loss of employment that limit their participation to the stock market. In turn, these shocks, 
which are more likely to occur during economic downturns, may impact the equity 
premium. Taking these facts into account helps understanding variations of assets returns 
unconditional moments along the business cycle. Life-cycle phases of investors and their 
corresponding borrowing constraints also could influence the equity premium and the 
demand for bonds. 
The empirical evidence does not systematically support the behavioural explanation to 
long-run stock underperformance. If investors underreact to public news, the long-run 
abnormal stock returns following a SEO should be positively correlated with the 
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announcement returns. Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999) find that both horizon returns are 
negatively and insignificantly correlated ( between 0.09 and 0.06ρ − − ) regardless of the 
flotation method. The underreaction hypothesis is thus rejected in Japan. Both short and 
long-term results in Germany appear to have opposite signs, at least at the macro level; see 
Gebhardt et al. (2001) for the positive stock price reaction to SEO announcements and 
Stehle et al. (2001) for the overall long-term underperformance. No further conclusion can 
be drawn because the correlation between the announcement effect and the long-term 
abnormal returns cannot be estimated from these different studies. 
Marciukaityte and Szewczyk (2001) reject the underreaction hypothesis using samples of 
pure primary, combined and pure secondary offerings made by US industrial firms. They 
observe a significant negative 2-day announcement effect (-1.55 %, -1.33 % and -0.62 % 
respectively). According to a size and BM ratio matched firm, the 36-month abnormal 
performance is significantly negative for primary and combined offerings while it is not 
significant for secondary offerings. The short and long-term pattern of secondary offering 
returns is not consistent with the behavioural models of BSV (1998) and DHS (1998). When 
the horizon is extended to 60 months, the underperformance of the first two groups becomes 
insignificant and secondary issuers significantly outperform their benchmark, which extends 
the rejection of underreaction to all samples. 
Behavioural models reviewed in the previous sub-section present underreaction and 
overreaction as embedded. Firms underreact to a given event but when the analysis horizon 
is extended to the pre-event period, the same firms overreact and a mean-reverting returns 
should be observed. Fama (1998) argues that the under or overreaction pattern depends on 
the event. Kadiyala and Rau (2001) test the two behavioural biases one against the other. 
They use four events : SEO and stock-financed acquisitions as overreaction events and share 
repurchases and cash-financed acquisitions as underreaction events. They consider three 
variables : the last earnings surprise prior to the event (the last piece of public information 
common to all firms and to all events), the announcement abnormal returns and the 36-
month post-event CAR computed relative to size and BM ratio matched portfolios. If 
investors underreact to information, a sample of firms announcing a corporate event after a 
negative news should underperform relative to a sample announcing the event after a 
positive information release. Conversely, if investors overreact to information, a sample of 
firms announcing a corporate event after a positive news should underperform relative to a 
sample announcing the event after a negative information release. The hypotheses of under 
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and overreaction are set to be conflicting. For each event, the firms are split into two sub-
samples according to the sign of the earnings surprise. 
No relation is observed between the sign of the earnings surprise and the announcement 
returns with the exception of stock repurchases. Conversely, long-term adjusted CAR are 
strongly related to the sign of the earnings surprise, which is consistent with the 
underreaction hypothesis. Positive surprise sub-samples outperform their corresponding 
negative surprise sub-sample except for SEO where both 36-month CAR are not statistically 
different. No evidence of overreaction is found even when the firms are sorted according to 
pre-event CAR instead of earnings surprise. The results hold when the long-term 
performance is measured by the FF 3-factor model alphas. For SEO, the evidence of 
underreaction is sensitive to the measure of pre-event information. Investors underreact to 
earning surprise but not to the SEO announcement. This finding highlights the importance of 
identifying the exact stimulus the investors respond to. In addition, Kadiyala and Rau (2001) 
do not find any evidence of a negative correlation between pre-event trends and post-event 
long-term performance. 
Brav and Heaton (2002) compare competing theories of financial anomalies. A 
behavioural switching regime model as in BSV (1998) is compared to a rational structural 
uncertainty model based on rational investors and on their ignorance about the stability of 
the asset expected payoff. In the behavioural model, the stream of pay-offs follow a random 
walk but irrationality let investors infer that the pay-off generating process changes from 
mean reverting to trend following. In the rational structural uncertainty model, the pay-off 
generating process may effectively be subject to changes but investors have insufficient 
information to correctly notice it. Thus, in both models, the expected value of the asset 
payoff depends on the mean of the most recent payoff realisations and on the investors’ prior 
beliefs. 
In a world of rational expectations, investors make optimal statistical decision because 
they possess all relevant structural knowledge. If the assumption of rational expectations is 
relaxed, rational investors still make optimal statistical decision but they lack critical 
structural knowledge. In this case, rational structural uncertainty models, as they are referred 
to, generate financial anomalies from mistakes about risk premium resulting from 
incomplete information. There are two sources of uncertainty: 1) model uncertainty with the 
true variables used in order to forecast the risk premium being unknown (Avramov, 2002), 
and 2) learning that helps discovering the true value of the parameters. 
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In the behavioural model, conservatism implies underreaction and representative heuristic 
implies overreaction. The rational structural uncertainty model also predicts both under- and 
overreaction. The difference in the weighting of prior beliefs relative to recent observations 
is imputed to the occurrence of the structural change. If the change does not occur, too much 
weight will be put on recent observations and overreaction will appear. When a structural 
change occurs within the horizon, the difficulty for the rational investor to actually observe 
it causes him to underreact to the following payoff realisations, like it is the case with 
conservatism. Therefore, the outcomes of the two models are very close and even 
indistinguishable. One can consider it as an advantage arguing that under and overreaction 
pattern are not due to investors’ irrationality and that market efficiency still holds up to a 
certain degree. However, one model cannot reject the other, meaning that no theory can be 
falsied. This weakness comes from the fact that the models are designed to produce similar 
outcomes even though they are not based on similar sets of hypotheses. 
Investors use data incorrectly in behavioural models because they are subject to cognitive 
biases. In rational structural uncertainty models, investors use data incorrectly because they 
are mistaken about the structure of the environment. In both cases, anomalies could be 
corrected either by learning or by arbitrage actions made by rational investors. However, 
with rational structural uncertainty, the correcting power of arbitrage depends on the rational 
investors’ ability to become better calibrated to the structural features of the data. Learning 
in such a context is also difficult because structural changes could occur at short-term 
intervals, before the rational investors are able to correctly identify the regime. In the case of 
irrational behaviour, rational arbitrageurs should be confident that mispricing exists and 
should be able to explain it to their providers of funds. For learning to be efficient in a 
behavioural context, the outcome must be immediate and the feedback clear. With financial 
markets, the feedback is noisy and the outcome is delayed for several periods. Thus, learning 
from experience is unlikely to occur. 
Public information disclosures that follow a corporate event should influence investors in 
their stock price valuation. If investors are psychologically biased, the sign and the 
magnitude of the public news  could accentuate or reverse their abnormal reaction. In the 
case of incomplete information about the economic structure, additional public information 
should help rational investors to sharpen their knowledge of the effective pay-off generating 
process. Furthermore, selective corporate events are not occurring by chance. They are 
decided by the managers, conditioned by the financial situation of the firm and the economic 
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environment. If corporate events have implications on the long-run deviation from the 
normal stock price, the market reaction to public news within the post-event period should 
be related to the post-event long-term abnormal performance. 
4.3 Long-term stock performance of French SEO with rights 
This section is dedicated to a long-term event study about the stock performance 
following rights offerings of French companies. According to the stock price reaction to 
SEO announcements, the long-term abnormal performance is analysed separately for 
“Capital Structure” and “Financing New Investment” issuers. Implications of the “New 
Issue Puzzle” on the long-run pattern of stock returns are tested in order to examine the 
contribution of potential explanations such as “timing”, “investors’ irrationality” and 
“inefficient use of the proceeds”. 
The first sub-section states the motivations to run a long-term event study and it defines 
the hypotheses to be tested. The design of the event study is presented in the second sub-
section. It includes the description of the “Long-term” sample of French equity issuers and 
the methodology to compute the abnormal performance, matching firm and calendar-time. 
Empirical results are shown in sub-sections 4.3.3 to 4.3.6. The impact of the “use of the 
proceeds” argument on the long-term abnormal returns appears in sub-section 4.3.3. 
Calendar-time performance are exposed in sub-section 4.3.4 to check the robustness of the 
matching firm findings. A direct test of the “window of opportunity” is performed in sub-
section 4.3.5. Sub-section 4.3.6 entails a cross-sectional analysis of the long-term 
performance. Abnormal returns are regressed on a set of control variables that proxy for 
potential explanations to the “New Issue Puzzle”. The last sub-section presents the 
concluding remarks. 
4.3.1 Why long-term stock performance of French equity issuers should matter ? 
The stock price reaction to equity issue announcements of French companies outline the 
discriminating role of the use of the proceeds. “Financing New Investment” issuers alone 
experience an average stock price decline. The valuation effect is explained by the revisions 
in 3-year earnings forecasts. Financial analysts consider the announcement of “Financing 
New Investment” equity offerings as informative about a downturn in the earnings pattern. 
According to the debate about the diffusion speed of information into stock prices, it seems 
relevant to examine the long-run post-SEO performance of French equity issuers. The 
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downturn in future earnings constitutes the motivation driving the equity issue decision in 
the Miller and Rock (1985) model. The equity offering announcement should signal a period 
of poor operating performance but the signal could be noisy so that investors may not fully 
anticipate its impact on the firm value. The explanatory power of the pre-issue stock price 
run-up to the announcement valuation effect is a second justification for a long-term event 
study. The stock price run-up could denote of the existence of the “window of opportunity” 
suggested by Loughran and Ritter (1995), which implies post-SEO long-term 
underperformance. 
If French equity issuers are found to underperform their benchmark on the long-run, the 
findings of Loughran and Ritter (1995) would be added some evidence. Moreover, this 
evidence would come from an institutional setting different from the US context in many 
regards. For instance, the sample includes only offerings with subscription rights. In that 
sense, the study also contributes to the analysis of the specificities of such operations, an 
area that has been less extensively studied than cash offerings. Besides, a wide range of 
models is employed to determine the long-run abnormal performance. I apply the classic 
time aggregation of abnormal returns according to an industry class, size and book-to-
market matching procedure. Equally- and value-weighting schemes are examined in order to 
control for a potential size effect, in the sense of Brav et al. (2000) and Stehle et al. (2000). 
In addition, more sophisticated beta pricing models are employed to check the robustness of 
the results and the relevancy of the control variables. 
The “use of the proceeds” is tested as the discriminating variable to rank equity issuers 
according to their long-term post-SEO performance. Like in the short-term framework, 
“Capital Structure” issuers are not expected to exhibit significant abnormal returns on 
average. Pure capital structure matters should be irrelevant to firm value at both short and 
long-term horizons, and this for the same reason. Such operations do not involve changes in 
the assets structure that should affect either the stream of future operating cash flow or their 
discount factor. Conversely, the impact of “Financing New Investment” issues on the long-
run stock performance is more complex to interpret. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
operation proceeds is directly related to an investment project. Anomalies such as irrational 
investors’ response to public and private information and over-optimism about the 
investment outcome are more likely to occur, affecting the long-term pattern of stock 
returns. Consequently, one could expect both issuers’ types to differ in their long-run post-
offering performance. 
 223
The aim of the long-run stock performance analysis is to develop a framework in which 
the influence of three potential explanations to the “New Issue Puzzle” can be tested. First, 
the “window of opportunity” argument assumes that managers time the equity issues during 
phases of stock price overvaluation. Second, investors may respond irrationally to equity 
issue decisions creating underreaction and overreaction patterns in long-term stock returns. 
Third, the underperformance could come from an inefficient use of the SEO proceeds 
associated with a general over-optimism about the success of the investment project. The 
over-optimism is said to be general as it is shared by managers, financial analysts and 
investors. The implications of all three explanations on the issuers’ performance are 
summarised in Table 4.2. 
The “window of opportunity” argument implies that equity issues are timed, first, after a 
period of good stock performance but also before a downturn in the firm performance. The 
first phase of the “timing” argument (pre-SEO good stock performance) could be valid 
independently of the use of the proceeds. Indeed, managers could be inclined to sell 
overpriced securities even if their motivation is rebalancing the capital structure. The second 
phase (post-SEO negative performance) should differ, depending on the use of the proceeds. 
Following Miller and Rock (1985), equity issue should be realised to compensate for a 
future decrease in retained earnings. This prediction is verified by Hansen and 
Crutchley (1990) that document a significant downturn in earnings after US equity issues. In 
the presence of a momentum effect, the downturn in earnings could be transferred and 
amplified into a stream of negative stock returns. Therefore, the greater is the momentum 
effect, the lower should be the average underperformance. In a cross-sectional analysis, the 
long-term stock abnormal performance should be explained by the magnitude momentum 
effect through a negative relation. Nonetheless, this relation should be valid only for 
“Financing New Investment” issuers because they are the only ones expected to experience 
a negative stock performance on average. For “Capital Structure” issuers, no trend is 
expected in the average long-term post-SEO abnormal returns. Consequently, the existence 
of a momentum effect should let the initial negative as well as positive abnormal reaction 
increase over time. Since both direction should be equivalently distributed among “Capital 
Structure” offerings65, no linear relation should be observed between the magnitude of the 
momentum effect and their long-term abnormal performance. The presence or absence of a 
trend in the average abnormal stock performance should differentiate both issuers’ types 
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relative to the existence of the linear relation between the momentum effect and the post-
SEO abnormal returns. 
Following DHS (1998), equity issues should be considered as selective events regardless 
of the use of the proceeds. Therefore, investors should underreact to the announcement of 
the equity financing decision and long-term underperformance should be observed. The 
announcement valuation effect should be positively related to the long-term 
underperformance. In addition, Fama (1998) ranks seasoned equity offerings in the category 
of events subject to overreaction. It implies that a negative relation should be detected 
between the pre-SEO stock performance and long-term post-SEO abnormal returns.  
The assumption that all equity issues are selective events is mitigated by Cornett, Mehran 
and Tehranian (1998). In the bank industry, voluntary equity issues (selective events) are 
separated from involuntary ones (non-selective events). Involuntary offerings are realised in 
order to respect the minimum required capital standards (Cook ratio). They should not be 
decided on a current deviation from the stock price “rational” value. 
Table 4.2 : Explanations of the “New Issue Puzzle” and issuers’ stock performance 
 “Capital Structure” issuers “Financing New Investment” issuers 
“Timing” argument Pre-SEO abnormal returns ≥ 0 
Post-SEO abnormal returns ≥ 0 
Post-SEO abnormal returns not correlated 
with the magnitude of a momentum effect 
Pre-SEO abnormal returns > 0 
Post-SEO abnormal returns < 0 
Post-SEO abnormal returns negatively 
correlated with the magnitude of a momentum 
effect 
“Irrational investors” 
argument 
Post-SEO abnormal returns positively 
correlated with initial abnormal returns 
(underreaction) 
Post-SEO abnormal returns negatively 
correlated with pre-SEO abnormal return 
(overreaction) 
Post-SEO abnormal returns positively 
correlated with initial abnormal returns 
(underreaction) 
Post-SEO abnormal returns negatively 
correlated with pre-SEO abnormal return 
(overreaction) 
“Inefficient use of the 
proceeds” argument 
post-SEO abnormal returns not correlated 
with revisions in earnings forecasts 
post-SEO abnormal returns positively 
correlated with revisions in earnings forecasts 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
Cornett et al. (1998) examine both announcement returns and long-term stock 
performance. Abnormal reactions are restricted to the sample of voluntary issuers that 
experiences an average announcement effect of –1.62 % and 36-month BHAR of –14.44 %, 
both significant at the 5 % level. No anomaly is detected for the sample of involuntary 
issuers. Furthermore, both samples long-term average abnormal performance is significantly 
different. These findings are consistent with the “selective event” argument. Only voluntary 
 
65 See the short-term results, Table 3.9 in section 3.2.2 of Chapter 3. 
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issuers present evidence of underreaction. Cornett et al. (1998 ; p. 2149) argue that voluntary 
issues involve more information than involuntary ones. Moreover, involuntary issues are 
pure capital structure operations. In that sense, they have similarities with the “Capital 
Structure” offerings, one of them being the absence of significant stock price reaction to the 
financing decision announcement. That observation supports the hypothesis that “Capital 
Structure” and “Financing New Investment” issuers could present different long-term 
abnormal performance. However, “Capital Structure” offerings, although they could be 
decided because of a leverage ratio reaching a presumed upper bound, cannot be considered 
as real involuntary operations. Managers being legally constrained to reduce leverage is not 
common to the large majority of “Capital Structure” issuers66. 
The “inefficient use of the proceeds” argument should affect only “Financing New 
Investment” issuers. It is based on the theory of model uncertainty. The long-term abnormal 
stock performance should be attributed to a general over-optimism about the outcome of the 
investment project. To explain that over-optimism, consider the investment opportunity as 
being an independent project like a start-up. Managers and investors could view it as a bet 
on the future. If the project is a success, it would contribute to increase consistently the firm 
value. Conversely, in case of failure, the firm value would be negatively affected (and it 
would not fall to zero as for a start-up). At the time of the investment/financing decision, the 
probability of success would generally be overstated because the parameters of the model 
used to value the net contribution of the project are not known with certainty. As time 
passes, further information arrives about the partial outcome of the project that, on average, 
lowers the weights attributed to favourable states of the nature. Thus, expectations about the 
project should be revised downwardly, causing the stock price to be adjusted downwardly as 
well. One way to test this learning effect hypothesis is to estimate the earnings forecast 
revision over the analysis horizon and to control its explanatory power to the long-run stock 
performance. “Capital Structure” issuers should not exhibit any relation between their long-
term post-SEO abnormal returns and revisions of their earnings forecasts. 
                                                 
66 Firms subject to the Cook ratio requirement reach only 20 % of the “Capital Structure” issuers. 
 226
4.3.2 Long-term event study design 
4.3.2.1 Characteristics of the “Long-term” sample 
  Observations 
In order to allow a 3-year post-SEO analysis horizon, the sample of equity issuers must 
stop in December 1998. Between 1984 and 1998, the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 
reports in its annual publications (L’Année Boursière) 402 seasoned equity offerings with 
rights67. The “Long-term” sample is formed by excluding 1) operations for which the issuing 
prospectus is not available, 2) those with missing market or book value (not available one 
year before the issue), and 3) overlapping events. A subsequent offerings is said to be 
overlapping when it occurs within the 36-month period after the issuer’s preceding 
operation. The analysis periods of both issues overlap and their abnormal performances are 
embedded, which would influence the interpretation of the results. As shown in Table 4.3, 
the “Long-term” sample includes 232 rights offerings of common stocks68. A “Long-term 
I/B/E/S” sample is then formed. It starts in 1987 and is restricted to 95 observations because 
of analysts earnings forecasts availability. 
Table 4.3 : Formation of the “Long-term” samples 
Sample 
 “All rights” sample 1984-1998  402 
Operations excluded because of issuing prospectus unavailability - 150 
Operations excluded because of missing market and book data 20 
 “Long-term” sample  232 
 Offerings in the Long-term sample realised between 1984 and 1986 - 64 
 -  
  “Long-term I/B/E/S” sample   95  
 
 - 
Operations with missing I/B/E/S data 73
All operations, their type and their dates are identified from the annual SBF report “L’Année 
Boursière”. Market data are taken from the AFFI database for operations prior to June 1991 
and from Datastream for operations realised since June 1991. Book data come from the 
“Dictionnaire Dafsa Desfossés des Sociétés”. I/B/E/S data are taken from the International 
History Tape. 
 
According to the “use of the proceeds” argument, the “Long-term” sample is split into two 
sub-samples : “LT Capital Structure” including 118 observations and “ LT Financing New 
Investment” with 114 offerings. The yearly distribution of the “Long-term” sample of 
French rights issuers is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
                                                 
67 Refer to the Section 3.1.2 of Chapter 3 for more details about the sample formation. 
68 Since less accounting data are required in the long-term sample, less operations are excluded because of data 
unavailability than for the short-term sample in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 4.2 : Rights offerings with stocks made in France between 1984 and 1998 
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The “Long-term” includes 232 rights offerings of common stocks – 118 “LT Capital Structure” offerings and 
114 “LT Financing New Investment” issues. The use of the proceeds is taken from the issuance prospectuses. 
Descriptive statistics of both long-term sub-samples appear in Table 4.4. Panel A presents 
data about market capitalisation, book-to-market ratio, the offering size and the issuing 
discount. The first four columns show means and medians of both sub-samples while the last 
column exhibits their difference in median. The issuer size is measured by the pre-SEO 
market capitalisation of the firm. As it is the case for the “Short-term” samples, the 
distribution of the size is highly skewed to the right, indicating that small firms are more 
numerous than large ones. This finding justifies the use of both equally and value weighting 
schemes in the computation of the abnormal performance. The median characteristics of 
both sub-samples are not statistically different at convenient levels. According to that, the 
average issuer in the “LT Capital Structure” sample is similar to its counterpart in the “LT 
Financing New Investment” sample. 
In Panel B of Table 4.4, data about issuers’ financial structure are exposed. “Capital 
Structure” issuers appear to be significantly more levered than “Financing New Investment” 
firms. They also have less cash and less cash flow. These findings are similar to the “Short-
term” samples pattern. They are consistent with the “voluntary SEO” argument of Cornett et 
al. (1998) and with the “window of opportunity” argument of Loughran and Ritter (1995). 
The difference in leverage ratio between “Capital Structure” and “Financing New 
Investment” issuers could induce systematic risk mismatching problems. Abnormal 
performance measures should take this possibility into account. 
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Table 4.4 : Descriptive statistics of the “Long-term” sample, 1984-1998 
    "Capital Structure"  
"Financing New 
Investment"   Difference  
  118 observations 114 observations 
  
Panel A : General characteristics 
 CS - FNI 
  mean  median  mean  median   median  
     
 Issuer size (millions FRF) 4118 482 3340 914  -432  
          (-1.56)  
 Book-to-market ratio 0.89 0.58
 
0.21
   
Cash flow-to-assets ratio 
0.76 0.53  0.05  
          (0.34)  
 Relative size of the offering 0.52 0.21 0.40 0.16  0.05  
          (1.46)  
 Issuing discount 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.22  -0.02  
          (-0.47)  
Panel B : Financial characteristics        
 Debt-to-assets ratio 0.32  0.29  0.25    0.08 a 
       (3.01)  
 Cash-to-assets ratio 0.05  0.03  0.08  0.05  -0.02 a 
          (-3.06)  
 0.03  0.04  0.09  0.09  -0.05 a 
          (-4.58)  
Panel C : Change in systematic risk coefficient      
 E OLSβ∆   -0.18  -0.11  0.14 a 0.03 b -0.14 b 
  (-1.00)  (-0.32)  (2.04)  (1.82)  (-1.75)  
 E calculatedβ∆  -0.16 a -0.06 a -0.09 a -0.05 a -0.01  
  (-3.77)  (-5.90)  (-6.69)  (-8.04)  (-0.76)  
 E OLS E calculatedβ β∆ − ∆  -0.02  0.05  0.23 a 0.17 a -0.12 a 
    (-0.12)   (0.54)   (3.45)   (2.04)   (-2.01)   
a significant at the 1 % level,  b significant at the 5 % level 
The issuer size is given by the market value of equity at the pre-SEO month taken from Datastream. The book-
to-market (BM) ratio is computed as the last pre-SEO fiscal year book value of equity divided by the market 
value of equity at the pre-SEO month. The book value of equity is taken from the “Dictionnaire Dafsa-
Desfossés des Sociétés”. The relative size of the offering is the raw SEO proceeds divided by the market value 
of equity at the pre-SEO month. The raw proceeds and their use are taken from the issuing prospectus. The 
issuing discount is equal to 1  and it is taken from the SBF report “L’Année Boursière”. issuing price
last market price
−
E OLSβ  is estimated over the pre-SEO period [-255;-6]. A calculatedβ  is computed with the Hamada (1972) relation 
(without tax). E OLSβ∆  is the difference in beta between pre and post-SEO estimation periods. E calculatedβ∆  is the 
variation in equity beta implied by the SEO, other things equal. T-stats are given in parentheses below mean 
values, z-stat appear in parentheses below median values and Wilcoxon rank test statistics are given in 
parentheses below median differences in the last column. 
 
The Panel C of Table 4.4 reports the changes in issuers’ systematic risk around the equity 
offerings. Both “Long-term” use of the proceeds sub-samples have similar characteristics as 
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the “Short-term” samples in Chapter 3, Table 3.5. The equity beta of “Financing New 
Investment” issuers increases after the SEO. This change is explained by an increase in the 
business risk that is greater than the reduction in financial risk implied by the SEO. At the 
“Capital Structure” sample level, no such phenomenon is detected. The difference between 
the OLS estimated change in equity beta and the change implied by the SEO is not 
significant. The increase in business risk for the “Financing New Investment” issuers is 
consistent with the hypothesis that equity is selected to finance high-risk investment 
(similarity with the financing constraint of start-ups). 
The “Long-term” sample is checked not to be different from the “All rights” and “Short-
term” samples described in Chapter 3. In Panel A of Table 4.5, p-values of 2χ  tests show 
that no significant differences can be noticed. Issuers’ general characteristics of the various 
samples are compared in Panel B of Table 4.5. Differences in median values are not found 
to be significant at a convenient level. Consequently, the “Long-term” sample is not biased 
relative to the composition of both “All rights” and “Short-term” samples. 
Table 4.5 : Tests of differences across samples 
    
All rights vs. 
Long-term  
Short-term vs. 
Long-term   
    sample  sample 
Panel A : p-values of 2χ  test    
 Yearly frequency (1984-1998) 0.93 0.41 
 Intra-year repartition 0.60 0.22 
 Industry repartition 0.60 0.99 
Issuing discount 0.01
Panel B : Differences in median values    
 Issuer size (millions FRF) -91 193 
  (-0.96) (0.99) 
 BM ratio -0.03 -0.05 
  (-0.64) (-1.59) 
 Relative size of the offering 0.03 0.01 
  (1.45) (1.20) 
  -0.01 
    (0.10)  (-0.12)   
  
“All rights” and “Short-term” samples refer to the samples presented in Section 3.1.1 of Chapter 3. The 
industries are : Natural resources and construction, Food, Transformation industries, Manufacturing industries, 
Transports, Communication and internet, Retail, Bank and insurance, Real estates, Other financial companies, 
Private services, Services to the community. Definitions of firm size, BM ratio, offering relative size and 
issuing discount are similar to those given in Table 4.4. Italic numbers are p-values and Wilcoxon rank tests 
are given in parentheses. 
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4.3.2.2 The matching firm methodology 
The selection of the matching firm is based on three criteria : a) it has not undertaken an 
equity issue within the last 36 months; b) it belongs to the same industry class69; and c) it 
minimises the following distance : 
( ) ( )2 2,0 ,0 ,0 ,0
,0 2 2
i c i c
i
size BM
size size BM BM
d
σ σ
− −
= +  (4.1) 
where   is the distance measure of SEO firm  and matching firm  at event month 0, ,0id i c
  is the market value at the beginning of month 0,  size
 BM  is the book-to-market ratio at the beginning of month 0,  
  is the variance of the series of the variable .  
Each control variable is standardised in order to prevent one variable to have more weight. 
Size is measured by the pre-SEO market value of the firm. 
( )2 2,size BMσ σ ( )size BM
BM  is determined as in sub-
section 4.3.2.1, using the pre-SEO market value in order to take into account the current firm 
valuation. If during the post-SEO analysis horizon a matching firm engages itself into a SEO 
process or is delisted, it is switched to the next closest firm at the current month on a point 
forward basis. I retain industry, size and BM ratio as control variables in order to present 
results that are comparable with those of previous studies. Beside the fact that they are the 
most commonly used controls in the literature, these variables match firms which returns are 
expected to co-vary. 
Loughran (1997) mitigates the role of the BM ratio in explaining the cross-section of stock 
returns as its effect is restricted to small, young and growth firms. However, these 
characteristics are shared by an important fraction of the firms that issue equity. 
Accordingly, matching on BM ratio could be more appropriate to measure the long-term 
abnormal performance after a SEO than after other corporate events. Ang and Zhang (2002) 
examine the matching ability of several variables. They find that the inclusion of pre-event 
stock returns correlation coefficient in the set of control variables (in addition to size and 
BM ratio) improves the benchmark. The correlation coefficient offers a better matching than 
the pre-event beta. Following Ang and Zhang (2002), I replace, in the set of matching 
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variables, the industry by the correlation coefficient computed over the 24-month period 
preceding the issue. Results are not sensitive to this modification in the benchmark 
selection70. Therefore, I concentrate only on the matching according to industry, size and 
BM ratio. The advantage of industry in not being an estimated control. It avoids the error-in-
variable problem. 
4.3.2.3 The computation of the abnormal returns 
The long-run abnormal performance is computed over a 36-month horizon after the issue 
using monthly returns computed cum-dividend and adjusted for capital structure changes
First, I compute the average monthly adjusted returns (AR onth 36 after the issue, 
month 1 being the issue month : 
)c it−
 n ber of seasoned equity offering firms. 
                                                                                                                                                     
71. 
t) up to m
( , ,
1
tn
t i SEO it
i
AR w R R
=
=∑  (4.2) 
where RSEO,it is the return on the seasoned equity offering firm i in event month t,  
 Rc,it is the return on the benchmark over the same period, 
 wi is the weight of the firm i in the sample72, 
The negative abnormal performance could be caused by small firms so that the global 
economic impact is overwhelmed; see Brav et al. (2000) and Stehle et al. (2000). Therefore, 
in order to control for this phenomenon, the abnormal performance is determined according 
to both an equally and a value-weighted methodology.  
t is the num
 
69 Restricting the set of potential matching firms within the issuer’s industry allows to take into account 
industry effects on the stock returns. 
70 The results of the matching procedure including the correlation coefficient are statistically the same although 
the magnitude of the abnormal performance is systematically lower. 
71 Data sources are given in sub-section 3.1.2.1 in Chapter 3. 
72 For the equally-weighted average the weight is 1/nt. For the value-weighted average, the weight of firm i in 
the sample is computed in a two-stage method. First, in order to avoid scale problems related to non-
synchronous events, the market value of the SEO firms is scaled by the total market capitalisation at the SEO 
month : ∑
=
=
mn
j
imjimiimi
mvmvav
1
,,,
e market value of firm
, the weight is calculated
 values in the sample : 
,where avi,m is the adjusted market value of the firm i at the issuing date m, 
mvi,m is th  i at date m and nm is the number of stocks present in the database at date m. 
Second  as the proportion of the SEO firm adjusted value relative to the sum of all the 
adjusted ∑
=
=
pn
k
imkimii
avavw
1
,,  
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The cumulative average monthly adjusted return for months 1 to T (T = 6, 12, 24 and 
36 months) is computed as : 
∑
=
=
T
t
tT ARCAR
1
 (4.3) 
I also compute the average buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) : 
( ) (,
1 1 1
1 1
Tn T T
T i SEO it c i
i t t
BHAR w R R
= = =

= + − + ∑ ∏ ∏ ), t

0
)
The constant term in the regression (αpU) is the Jensen's alpha of the portfolio p according 
to the model used (here U stands for the U-CAPM). 
                                                
 (4.4) 
where nT is the number of firms at month T. 
The null hypothesis to be tested is the following :  
( ) ( )0 1: 0 vs. :T T T TH CAR BHAR H CAR BHAR= ≠ . 
Under the null, the standardised cumulated average abnormal returns adjusted for cross-
sectional variance and first order autocovariance is distributed as Student-t; see 
Ritter (1991). Empirically, the buy and hold series are highly skewed. Consequently, I use 
the skewness adjusted t-statistic proposed in Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999). A (non-
parametric) sign test based on the proportion of positive abnormal returns (CARi,T or 
BHARi,T) is presented as well to check the results. 
4.3.2.4 Alternative models to determine the abnormal performance 
Three different beta pricing models are used to check the robustness of the results. The 
abnormal performance is measured by the Jensen's alpha. 
Performance measured with the standard unconditional CAPM (U-CAPM) 
( tmpUptp rr ,, βα +=  (4.5) 
where rp,t is the monthly return on a portfolio p in excess of the risk free rate73, 
 rm,t is the monthly return on the SBF market index74 in excess of the risk free rate. 
 
73 The risk free rate is given by the 1-month Euro FRF. 
74 The SBF index is a value-weighted index adjusted for dividend and capital structure operations that contains 
the firms with the highest market value. The number of firms included in the index increases with the number 
of companies listed. 
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Performance measured with the Fama and French three-factor model (FF 3-factor) 
tptptmp
FF
ptp HMLSMBrr 3,2,,1,, βββα +++=  (4.6) 
where SMBt is the difference in return between small firms75 (bottom half) and large 
firms (top half) at month t, 
76. 
 HML turn between high (top 30 %) and low book-to-market 
firms (bottom 30 %) at month t. 
Both SMB and HML factors can be contaminated by the firms involved in a SEO; see 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) and Brav et al. (2000) for a justification. Therefore, the factors 
are purged of those companies. The same incidence affects the market risk premium. 
Though, Loughran and Ritter (2000) suggest to use a non-purged market index. They base 
their argument on the fact that the CAPM is an equilibrium model and consequently, the 
market index containing all the listed companies is the only one appropriate to measure the 
risk premium. One can object to this rationale that the CAPM is developed under the 
hypothesis of a perfect market. Moreover, the long-run abnormal stock performance after an 
event affecting the firm is considered as an anomaly. In that sense, not integrating the firms 
that cause the anomaly into the benchmark represents a better approximation of perfect 
market conditions. As the aim of the study is not to focus on the epistemology of long-run 
abnormal performance determination, the Jensen's alphas are estimated separately with a 
non-purged and a purged market index
Performance measured with a conditional CAPM (C-CAPM) 
Eckbo and Smith (1998) and Eckbo et al. (2000) show that the abnormal performance is 
better measured by a conditional Jensen's alpha when the expected returns are time varying. 
Thus, I use a conditional CAPM with a time-varying beta as defined in Ferson and 
Schadt (1996, p. 430, eq. 4) : 
 (4.7) 
                                                
t is the difference in re
( ) tmttmCptp rrdr ,1,,01, ' −++= zdββα
where d0,β is the unconditional beta, 
 
75 In order to avoid the extreme returns due to the very low market price of companies in financial distress, 
firms in lowest quintile according to the market capitalisation are not taken into account during the factor 
formation. 
76 The purged market index is a value-weighted index adjusted for dividend and capital structure operations, 
from which SEO firms are excluded during their 36-month post-issue period. 
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 zt-1 = Zt-1 - E(Z) is the vector of the set of centred information variables 
(instruments), 
 d ension of Z
One drawback of the matching firm methodology is that it does not specifically control 
for differences in equilibrium returns between event and matching firms. Eckbo et al. (2000) 
attribute the underperformance to the incomplete adjustment for risk with standard 
benchmark methodologies. “Zero-investment” portfolios long in the event firms and short in 
the matching firms allow to control for such risk adjustment problems. If their alphas are 
significantly different from zero, the abnormal performance cannot be fully explained by 
differences in systematic risk. 
                                                
β  is the vector of coefficients with equal dim t-1. 
I examine the explanatory power of the instruments used by Bossaerts77 and 
Hillion (1998) as well as other standard instruments employed in previous studies. I retain 
the three most significant variables as instruments78 : the long-term bond yield (Datastream 
France bond yield government 10 years), the price to earnings (MSCI), the inverse of the 
market price (1 over the SBF market index monthly price). 
Construction of the calendar-time  portfolio returns (rp) 
Following Eckbo et al. (2000), I form equally and value-weighted calendar-time portfolios 
of issuers. A separate portfolio is created for each “use of the proceeds” category. Starting 
with the initial issuer in the sample, the SEO firms enter the portfolio at their offering month 
and they are held during 36 months (unless they are delisted before the 36th month). The 
portfolio is rebalanced each time a firm is included or removed (or delisted), using current 
value weights or equal weights. The same procedure is applied to form the portfolios of 
matching firms with weights identical to those of the issuers’ portfolios. 
In order to test the use of the proceeds argument, a "zero-investment" portfolio is built 
where the “Financing New Investments” issuers are sold short to finance the long position in 
the “Capital Structure” issuers. The same procedure is applied to both matching firms 
portfolios. The Jensen’ alpha is expected to be negative for the first “zero-investment” 
portfolio and not significantly different from zero for the second one. 
 
77 I am grateful to Peter Bossaerts for giving me access to his data on the French market. 
78 As the choice of relevant instruments is not the main preoccupation of this study, I do not present the results. 
However, they are available upon request. 
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4.3.3 Post-SEO abnormal returns and use of the proceeds 
The results about the long-run performance according to the matching firm methodology 
are presented in Table 4.6. Cumulative abnormal returns are shown on the left part of the 
Table and buy and hold abnormal returns on the right. Each Panel entails the results of the 
equally-weighting scheme, those of the value-weighting scheme and the non-parametric 
performance. The abnormal performance of the whole sample (all uses of the proceeds 
included) is shown in Panel A. The equally-weighted abnormal returns are negative and 
significant over the 24-month horizon (-15.38 % for the CAR and –18.62 % for the BHAR). 
After 36 months, the abnormal returns are no longer significant at a conventional level. 
When the performance is value-weighted, the CAR loose their significance at every horizon 
while the significance of the BHAR persists up to 24 months after the issue. However, the 
magnitude of the abnormal returns is lower (-11.31 % for the 24-month BHAR and –4.63 % 
for the 36-month BHAR), showing that the underperformance is sensitive to the size of the 
issuer but not sufficiently to drastically alter the results. In that sense, the results of French 
rights offerings are different from what is observed in Germany; see Stehle et al. (2000). On 
the long-run, median CAR is significantly negative (-12.98 % after 36 months) but median 
BHAR is not. All in all, the results of the whole sample are unclear about a persistent 
underperformance after SEO with rights. They only give partial support to the 
underperformance pattern of US equity issuers; see Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995) or Jegadeesh (2000). 
Panels B and C present the results of respectively the “LT Capital Structure” and “LT 
Financing New Investments” samples. As expected, “Capital Structure” issuers exhibit no 
abnormal performance. Equally-weighted CAR and BHAR over the 36-month horizon are 
negative but not different from zero (-2.20 % for CAR and –6.63 % for BHAR). The value-
weighted performance is negative on the shorter horizons and turns to become positive after 
36 months, without being significant. Median CAR and BHAR are not significant either at a 
convenient level. These results support the hypothesis that an equity issue made to improve 
the capital structure does not affect the firm market value. 
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Table 4.6 : Long-run performance based on a matching firm methodology 
      Cumulative Abnormal Returns   Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
    36-month 
 
  6-month 12-month 24-month   6-month 12-month 24-month 36-month 
Panel A : Rights offerings of common stocks, “Long-term” sample  (232 observations)      
 equally weighted performance   
 -12.90 -8.01
 (-2.33)
  
            
 mean (%) -8.05 -9.27 -15.38   -7.75  -18.62 -18.22  
 T stat (-2.49)  (-2.02)   (-1.57)   (-2.91)  (-1.75)  (-2.36)  (-1.72)  
 value weighted performance        
  mean (%) 
 (-2.04)  
  
median (%) -9.55 -12.98 a -8.89  
sign test (-3.18) (-1.28)  (-2.82)  
   
    
-5.38   -5.61 -6.63
(-0.86)  (-1.73)  (-0.86)  (-1.10) 
 value weighted performance   
      
-7.47  -10.41  -13.13  -7.38   -6.90 -8.23 -4.63  
 T stat (-1.51)  (-1.48)  (-1.30)  (-0.59)   (-3.09)  (-2.34)  (-0.52)  
 Non-parametric performance             
  -7.26  -11.77   -7.46 -5.89  -9.46  
   (-1.86)   (-2.95)  (-1.21)  (-1.85)  (-1.66)  
Panel B : Rights offerings of common stocks, "LT Capital Structure" (118 observations)    
 equally weighted performance           
  mean (%) -5.49  -11.31  -2.20   -5.58  -12.49   
  T stat (-1.20)   (-0.19)   (-1.50)  (-0.41)  
    
-10.69
        
  mean (%) -6.97  -9.04  3.50  7.37   -5.22  -6.55  4.20  8.98  
  T stat (-0.84)  (-0.77)  (0.21)  (0.35)   (-1.86)  (-1.50)  (0.42)  (0.63)  
 Non-parametric performance               
  median (%) -9.33  -8.82  -9.93  -3.62   -7.19  -8.62  -1.54  -2.28  
  sign test (-1.79)  (-1.13)  (-0.48)  (-1.18)   (-1.82)  (-1.15)  (-0.30)  (-0.20)  
Panel C : Rights offerings of common stocks, "LT Financing New Investment" (114 observations)      
 equally weighted performance               
  mean (%) b -13.03 b -17.98 b -23.30 b  -10.32 b -9.85  -24.36 b -28.95 b
  T stat (-2.46)  (-2.11)  (-2.04)  (-2.11)   (-2.58)  (-1.62)  (-2.27)  (-2.16)  
 value weighted performance        
(-3.15) (-2.57) (-2.04)
   
-9.61 -16.25 -4.39  
(-1.60)
        
  mean (%) -8.11  -10.69  -22.97 b -27.42 b  -9.59 a -10.33 b -17.52 b -20.64 b
  T stat (-1.47)  (-1.37)  (-2.02)  (-1.97)    (-2.24)     
 Non-parametric performance            
  median (%) a -4.37  a -16.11 a  -8.61 b -9.43 b -12.30 b
    sign test (-2.81)      (-3.32)   (-2.91)     (-2.35)  (-0.57)     (-2.29) (-2.12)  
b  b b a b  
a b -11.31 b 
a a
 
a significant at 1 %  % 
c it − 
b significant at 5
CAR are computed as : CA  where T is for 6, 12, 24 and 36 months, R, ,
1 1
tnT
T it SEO it
t i
R w R R
= =
= ∑∑ SEO,it is the return on SEO 
firm i at month t, Rc,it is the return on the matching firm of i at month t, wit is the weight of i in the sample at month t and nt 
is the number of firms in the sample at month t. The t-stat for the CAR is computed as in Ritter (1991) as : 
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( ) ( ), ,
1 1
1 1
T T
SEO it c it
t t
w R R
= =

+ − + ∏ ∏
T TCAR n T⋅ ⋅

where T is the horizon considered (number of months), var is the average (over 
36 months) cross-sectional variance and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the ARt series. The average BHAR is 
calculated as  where R
1
Tn
it
i=
∑ SEO,it is the return on the SEO firm i at month t, Rc,it is the return on the 
matching firm of i at month t, T is the holding period considered (6, 12, 24 or 36 months), wit is the weight of i in the 
sample at month t and nT is the number of the SEO stocks for the T-month period. The t stat is the skewness adjusted t 
statistic of Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and is calculated as : ( ) ( ) ( ) TTTTTTTT skewnnskewnsttsstatt ⋅⋅+⋅⋅+= 6131 2
( )( )
 
where tsT is the standard t stat value computed at month T, skewT is the skewness of the BHAR series at month T and nT is 
the number of SEO firms at month T. The sign test is computed as : ( ) 0.50.5 0.5 1 0.5T Tp n− × − ×  where pT is the 
percentage of positive abnormal returns at month T and nT is the number of observations at month T. 
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The long-run performance of the “LT Financing New Investments” sample is significantly 
negative at a 5 % level. The 36-month cumulative abnormal returns range from –20.64 % to 
-28.95 % depending on the weighting scheme and on the computation method. The medians 
are also significantly negative, –16.11 % for the CAR and to –12.30 % for the BHAR. The 
underperformance is significant in most of the horizons less than 36 months, the 12-month 
horizon showing the least cases of significance (only the 12-month value-weighted BHAR is 
significant). Hence, “Financing New Investments” issuers are poorly performing firms from 
the time they issue new equity and up to three years after the event. On one hand, firms 
caring about financial flexibility, that preserve their financing sources, do not underperform 
their benchmark over a 36-month horizon. On the other hand, firms that voluntarily select 
equity financing to undertake a specific investment project are penalised on the long-run.  
Based on the “use of the proceeds” argument, I compare the 36-month means and medians 
of both sub-samples. The hypothesis is the following : 
,36 ,36 ,36 ,360 1: vs. :FIN CS FIN CSH R R H R R> ≤  
where ,36sR  is the mean or median abnormal return (CAR or BHAR) of sample, 
{ },S FNIs C= , at the 36-month horizon. 
Table 4.7 : Difference in abnormal performance according to the use of the proceeds 
    36-month CAR   36-month BHAR   
    CS   FNI  CS-FNI  CS  FNI   CS-FNI   
 mean equally-weighted (%) -2.20  -23.30 21.10 b -6.63 -28.95  22.32 b 
     (1.70)     (1.74)  
 mean value-weighted (%) 7.37  -27.42 34.80 a 8.92 -20.64  29.56 b 
     (2.88)     (1.74)  
 median (%) -3.62  -16.11 12.49 b -2.28 -12.30  10.02  
           (1.71)          (1.01)   
 a significant at 1 % b significant at 5 % 
CS denotes the “LT Capital Structure” sample and FNI represents the “LT Financing New 
Investment” sample. The CAR and BHAR are taken at the 36-month horizon. The tested hypotheses 
are : ,36 ,36 ,36 ,360 1: :FIN CS FIN CSH R R vs H R R> ≤ , where ,36sR  is the mean (median) abnormal return (CAR 
or BHAR) of sample, { },s CS FNI= , at the 36-month horizon. The t-stat for the difference in means 
(given in parentheses) is computed as : 
,36 ,36
,36 ,36
2 2
stat
CS FNI
CS FNI
R R
CS FNI
R R
n n
σ σ
−
− =
+
t ; where  is the cross-sectional 
variance of the 36-month abnormal returns (CAR or BHAR) of sample, 
2
,36sσ
{ },s CS= FNI , and sn  is the 
number of observations in sample, s. The test of the difference in medians (given in parentheses) is a 
Wilcoxon rank tests. 
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As it can be seen in Table 4.7, the  hypothesis is rejected in five of the six cases. Only 
the median BHAR of the “LT Capital Structure” sample is not significantly greater than its 
“LT Financing New Investment” correspondent. Otherwise, for all weighting schemes and 
abnormal returns aggregation methods, both issuer types are different relative to their long-
term stock performance. These findings emphasise the “use of the proceeds” argument. 
,
0H
One reason for the abnormal performance of “Capital Structure” issuers not to be 
significant could be that the standard deviation of their abnormal returns is greater than that 
of “Financing New Investment” issuers. I test the following hypothesis about the variance of 
both samples : 
2 2 2 2
0 , , 1 ,: vs. :CS T FNI T CS T FNI TH Hσ σ σ σ≤ >  
where 2,s Tσ  is the cross-sectional variance of sample { },s CS FNI= abnormal returns at 
horizon { }6,12, 24, 36=T .  
The Table 4.8 shows the F-test results of the differences in variance for CAR and BHAR. 
Table 4.8 : Difference in distributions of abnormal returns 
    Cumulative Abnormal Return   Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
    6-month   12-month  24-month 6-month  36-month   12-month  24-month  
    
 36-month   
Panel A : Equally-weighted scheme       
 0.31  0.95  0.15 0.45 0.79  2.42  
2
FNIσ  0.18  0.30  0.62
(0.18) (0.33)
  
0.49 0.24
0.79  0.22 0.42 0.73  2.27  
 p-value (0.16)  (0.40)  (0.17)  (0.02) b (0.35)  (0.37)  
Panel B : Value-weighted scheme         
 
2
CSσ  0.11  0.22  0.44  0.11 0.61  1.38  
 0.19  0.33  0.10 0.22 0.54  1.28  
p-value (0.09)    (0.36)  (0.08)   (0.67)  (0.54)  (0.26)   (0.35)   
  
2
CSσ  0.15  0.74
 
2
FNIσ  0.08  0.45
    (0.21)
The variance in abnormal returns is noted, respectively,  for the “LT Capital Structure” sample and 2CSσ 2FNIσ  
for the “LT Financing New Investment” sample. Unilateral p-value of the F-test is given in parentheses. 
 
On average, the variance of the “LT Capital Structure” sample is greater than the one of 
the “LT Financing New Investment” sample but they are not significantly different at the 
5 % level for all horizons, except for 6-month BHAR. According to these findings, the non-
significance of “LT Capital Structure” results does not come from a higher standard 
deviation of its abnormal performance. 
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4.3.4 Calendar time abnormal performance 
Does the underperformance found with the classical methodology survive the test of other 
benchmarks ? Because the decontamination of the market index does not affect the 
significance of the results, only Jensen’s alphas estimated with a non-purged market index 
are shown in Table 4.9. The portfolios of issuers and matching firms are presented in the 
first four columns and the alternative models in rows. Panel A contains the results of the 
equally-weighted portfolios and Panel B presents those of the value-weighted portfolios. 
The first general comment is that the abnormal performance relative to alternative 
benchmarks support the matching firm results. Beta pricing models also detect a significant 
underperformance for the “LT Financing New Investments” portfolio while other calendar-
time portfolios do not exhibit significant alphas, at the 5 % level. These findings contradict 
those of Brav et al. (2000) and Eckbo et al. (2000) showing that the calendar-time approach 
eliminates the underperformance. However, they are in accordance with Jegadeesh (2000). 
The results also underline the importance of the use of the proceeds as a variable to 
differentiate the issuers. The introduction of supplementary risk factors emphasises the 
significance of the “LT Financing New Investments” portfolio results. Another interesting 
feature is the closeness of the alphas given by both conditional and unconditional CAPM. 
Consequently, one can reasonably say that the abnormal performance is not time varying. 
The alphas of the “LT Capital Structure” portfolio (1st column of Table 4.9) range 
between 0.37 % and 0.46 % per month in the equally-weighting scheme and between 0.16 % 
and 0.61 % per month in the value-weighting one. They are never significant at the 5 % 
level. The alphas of the “LT Financing New Investments” portfolio (3rd column of Table 
4.9) are significantly negative according to all models except for the unconditional CAPM in 
the value-weighting scheme. They range from –0.47 % to -0.95 %. The alphas of both 
matching portfolios are never statistically significant (columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.9), which 
outlines the fact that the abnormal performance cannot be attributed to non-event firms. 
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Table 4.9 : Abnormal performance (Jensen's alpha) computed from alternative models 
    
CS   Match CS 
 FNI  Match FNI 
 CS-
Match
 FNI-
Match 
  CS-FNI   Match CS-FNI   
Panel A : Equally-weighted portfolios               
 mean rp - rf (%) 0.88  0.41  0.03  0.38
 
(0.39)
   
(0.15) (-2.58)  (1.72)  (-1.01)  
 FF 3-factor alpha (%) 0.61  -0.47 -0.74
  
 b 
 0.48  -0.35  0.85  0.03  
 std. deviation (%) 6.92  4.92  5.90 5.37  5.76  5.18  5.03  4.93  
 U-CAPM alpha (%) 0.37  0.11  -0.47 b 0.10  0.26  -0.57 b 0.84 b 0.01  
  (1.11)  (0.39)  (-2.03)  (0.30)  (0.72)  (-2.00)  (2.47)  (0.03)  
 FF 3-factor alpha (%) 0.38  -0.32  -0.75 a -0.25  0.70  -0.50 b 1.13 b 0.14  
  (1.05)  (-1.22)  (-2.57)  (-1.09)  (1.84)  (-1.97)  (2.36)   
 C-CAPM alpha (%) 0.46  0.13  -0.50 b 0.15  0.33  -0.65 b 0.96 a -0.01  
  (1.32)  (0.47)  (-2.06)  (0.44)  (0.87)  (-1.97)  (2.63)  (-0.04)  
Panel B : Value-weighted portfolios             
 mean rp - rf (%) 0.83  0.32  -0.09  0.93  0.51  -1.02  0.92  -0.61  
 std. deviation (%) 8.14  6.97  6.81  6.65  9.30  7.60  6.63  8.14  
 U-CAPM alpha (%) 0.16  0.08  -0.62  0.66  0.09  -1.28 a 0.78  -0.58  
  (0.47)  (0.16)  (-1.93)  (1.53)   
 -0.95 a 0.27  1.08  -1.22 b 1.56 a  
(1.78)  (-1.00)  (-2.76)  (0.61)  (1.91)  (-2.14)  (3.15)  (-1.25)  
C-CAPM alpha (%) 0.30  0.10  -0.69 b 0.78  0.19  -1.47 a 0.99 -0.67  
    (0.82)   (-2.89)   (2.10)  (0.21)   (-2.07)   (1.76)   (0.32)    (-1.11)   
a significant at 1 % b significant at 5 % 
The mean rp is the mean monthly (equal- or value-weighted) return on the portfolio p in excess of the monthly 
risk free rate (1-month Euro FRF). The Jensen's alpha is estimated with three alternative models : 
The coefficients are estimated using OLS. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
 
unconditional CAPM (U-CAPM) : mtpUppt rr βα +=  
where  rmt is the monthly return on the SBF market index in excess of the risk free rate at month t, 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor (FF 3-factor) : tptpmtpFFppt HMLSMBrr ,3,2,1 βββα +++=  
where  SMBt is the difference in monthly return between small and large firms (size is measured by equity 
market value), 
 HMLt is the difference in monthly return between high and low book-to-market firms,  
SMB and HML are purged from SEO firms 
conditional CAPM (C-CAPM) : r ( ) mttptptppCppt rmidpedydd 1,31,21,1,0 −−− ++++= α  
where yt-1 is the one month lagged French government 10-year bond yield, 
 pet-1 is the market aggregated one month lagged price to earnings ratio, 
 mit-1is the one month lagged inverse of the SBF market index price. 
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The last two columns of Table 4.9 present the results of “zero investment” portfolios long 
in “Capital Structure” issuers (matching firms) and short in “Financing New Investment” 
issuers (matching firms). The portfolio of issuers shows significantly positive alphas 
according to all models. Firms raising equity for pure capital structure concerns outperform, 
on the long-run, the ones that use the SEO proceeds to finance specific investment projects. 
Note that the difference between the portfolios of matching firms is not different from zero. 
This corroborates the fact that the anomaly is restricted to the “Financing New Investments” 
issuers. 
4.3.5
                                                
 Test of the window of opportunity 
In this sub-section, I extend the analysis of the long-run performance to a 48-month 
horizon starting one year prior to the issue month. The aim is to examine if the “window of 
opportunity” argument. In other words, is the long-run underperformance of “Financing 
New Investments” issuers preceded by a period of overperformance ? Does the difference 
between the two main groups remain when the analysis horizon includes the pre-SEO 
period ? Using the matching firm methodology introduced in sub-section 4.3.2.279, I 
compute the BHAR starting one year prior to the issue month and ending 36 months after. 
The results are presented in Table 4.10. Panel A concerns the “LT Capital Structure” sample 
while Panel B addresses the “LT Financing New Investment” sample. 
The “LT Capital Structure” sample exhibits a significant overperformance during the pre-
SEO period in both weighting schemes (+15.77 % for the equally-weighted BHAR and 
+12.94 % for the value-weighted BHAR). The median BHAR is also positive but not 
significant. Over the same horizon, “Financing New Investment” issuers are noticed to 
outperform their benchmark in proportions similar to the other issuers (equally weighted 
BHAR = +15.96 %; value-weighted BHAR = +13.01 %). In fact, the difference in the pre-
SEO abnormal performance between the two samples is not statistically significant : the 
equally-weighted difference equals -0.19 % (t-stat = -0.02), the value-weighted difference 
equals –0.07 % (t-stat = -0.01), and the Wilcoxon rank test is also insignificant (-0.38). 
 
79 The matching is realised at the SEO month. The selected matching firm should be the same as the one used 
on the post-issue horizon only. Exceptions could be due to missing data for the matching firm during the pre-
SEO period. In that case, the next closest non-issuing firm is selected as the new matching firm for the whole 
period (or until it is delisted or engages itself into a SEO process). For the “Long-term” sample, twenty-two 
original matching firms have to be replaced. The introduction of the new matching firms does not affect the 
significance of the post-issue performance although the underperformance of the “LT Financing New 
Investment” sample is strengthened. 
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These results indicate that managers time the equity issue within the window of opportunity 
independently from the intended use of the proceeds. 
Table 4.10 : The long-run performance around the offering 
    Samples Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
       -12 to+12  -12 to seo -12 to +24  -12 to +36   
Panel A : Rights offerings of common stocks, "LT Capital structure" (118 observations) 
 equally weighted performance       
 
 
Non-parametric performance  
1.00 
 
  mean (%) 15.77 b 7.71  8.65  8.03  
  T stat 2.63  0.65 0.50  0.38  
 value weighted performance        
  mean (%) 12.94 b -4.39  6.74  9.79  
  T stat 2.39  -0.48  0.47 0.62  
       
  median (%) 7.03  8.85  3.82  10.29  
  sign test 0.95  0.38  0.10   
Panel B : Rights offerings of common stocks, "LT Financing New Investment" (114 observations) 
  
  
 
  -0.32  
 
median (%) -17.18 
  -0.97 -1.19
equally weighted performance       
  mean (%) 15.96 b -10.11  -25.97 b -29.01 b 
  T stat 2.00  -1.00  -1.97  -2.04  
 value weighted performance      
 mean (%) 13.01 b -3.67  -25.76 b -25.41 b 
T stat 2.11   -2.28 -2.02  
 Non-parametric performance       
  13.31 b -7.21  -10.13  b 
  sign test 2.12      -2.07   
a significant at 1 % b significant at 5 % 
The computation of the abnormal performance starts 12 before the issue and ends 36 months after. The 
matching procedure is done at the SEO month. The average BHAR is calculated as ∑  
where R
( ) (, ,
1 1 1
1 1
Tn T T
it SEO it c it
i t t
w R R
= = =
 
+ − +  ∏ ∏ )
)
SEO,it is the return on the SEO firm i at month t, Rc,it is the return on the control portfolio of i at month t, 
T is the holding period considered , w( 12, 24, 36, 48T = it is the weight of i in the sample at month t and nT is 
the number of the SEO stocks for the T-month period. The t stat is the skewness adjusted t statistic of Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai (1999) and is calculated as : ( ) ( ) ( ) TTT skewn ⋅⋅
( ))
TTTT nskewnstts +⋅⋅+ 6131
2
Tstatt =  where tsT is the 
standard t stat value computed at month T, skewT is the skewness of the BHAR series at month T and nT is the 
number of SEO firms at month T. The sign test is computed as : ( ) ( 0.50.5 0.5 1 0.5T Tp n− × − ×  where pT is 
the percentage of positive abnormal returns at month T and nT is the number of observations at month T. 
 
Over the 48-month horizon, the two samples show different patterns. The positive 
performance in terms of means and median persists for the “Capital Structure” issuers all 
through the post-SEO period but without being significant. On the other hand, the abnormal 
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performance of the “LT Financing New Investment” sample decreases during the post-SEO 
period to become significantly negative at the two longest horizons. The equally-weighted 
48-month BHAR is equal to –29.01 % whereas the value-weighted abnormal return reaches 
-25.41 %. These figures are lower than their corresponding 36-month post-SEO BHAR in 
Table 4.5. This is mainly due to the replacement of original matching firms because of pre-
SEO missing data; see footnote 29 for more detailed about the matching firm replacement 
conditions. An additional reason is that firms with the highest pre-SEO overperformance do 
not experience the worst reversal in abnormal performance during the post-issue period. The 
48-month median BHAR also becomes significantly negative, showing that the number of 
underperformers increases with the horizon length. 
The evolution of the long-term abnormal performance around the SEO is consistent with 
the predictions of the “inefficient use of the proceeds” hypothesis and partially with those of 
the “timing” hypothesis. The pattern presented by the “Financing New Investment” issuers 
is clear and does not deserve further comments. It gives support to the “window of 
opportunity” argument and does not contradict both “investors’ irrationality” and 
“inefficient use of the proceeds” explanations. The case of “Capital Structure issuers is more 
puzzling. The pre-SEO positive abnormal performance is consistent with the “timing” 
hypothesis but not evidence of is given to the fact that this overvaluation is temporary (no 
post-issue underperformance). One reason to this phenomenon could be that managers wait 
for the stock price to be no longer undervalued before deciding on “Capital Structure” equity 
offerings. The pre-SEO overperformance could be the correction that brings back the stock 
price to its “normal” value. If this explanation is true, the pattern of the “LT Capital 
Structure” still denotes of the presence of timing. However, it is not supportive to the 
behavioural theories. The timing of “Capital Structure” offerings implies that such events 
are also selective and thus, according to behavioural models, they should exhibit long-term 
anomalies in stock returns. One could argue that the adjustment time to the rational value 
described in Figure 4.1 could be shortened for “Capital Structure” issuers because the event 
still could be less informative. This period could last less than half a year. Though, the stock 
price reaction at the announcement would have to be negative, which is not consistent with 
the findings in Chapter 3. 
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4.3.6 Irrational investors, timing or inefficient use of the proceeds ? 
Up to this point, the long-term post-SEO underperformance is proven to be restricted to 
“Financing New Investment” issuers. Evidence that managers time their equity issue 
decisions has been brought up but it could differ according to the use of the proceeds. 
“Financing New Investment” issues seem to be realised within the “window of opportunity” 
advanced by Loughran and Ritter (1995). “Capital Structure” offerings could be more likely 
to occur after a period of stock undervaluation. However, no conclusion can be drawn about 
the cause or the absence of long-term abnormal performance after equity issues. 
To test which hypothesis better explains the long-run stock performance, 36-month CAR80 
are regressed cross-sectionally on a set of control variables that proxy for “timing”, 
“investors’ irrationality” and “inefficient use of the proceeds”. The magnitude of the 
momentum effect is measured by the cumulative return on a “zero-investment” momentum 
portfolio over the 36-month post-SEO horizon. At the beginning of the first post-SEO 
month, the zero-investment portfolio is formed. The long position of the portfolio includes 
the last six months best performers quartile (equally weighted) and the short part the last six 
months worst performers quartile; the firms being taken from the entire population of listed 
French companies. The portfolio is held during one month and then liquidated. The 
procedure is repeated every month in the post-SEO horizon, producing a series of 36 
monthly returns for each issuer. These returns are cumulated to form the variable, iBMW  : 
36
,
1
i best t worst t
t
BMW r r
=
= −∑ ,  (4.8) 
where ,best tr  is the mean equally-weighted return of the top last 6-month performers 
quartile at month, t ; being the t th month after the issue made by firm, i , 
 ,worst tr  is the mean equally-weighted return of the bottom last 6-month performers 
quartile at month, t . 
The expected sign of the iBMW  variable is negative for “Financing New Investment” 
issuers. The greater momentum effect captured by iBMW , the lower should be their 
                                                 
80 Regression are also run with the 36-month BHAR as the dependent variable without altering the results 
qualitatively. 
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iBMW36-month underperformance. The coefficient of  should not be significantly different 
from zero for “Capital Structure” issuers. 
                                                
The abnormal return computed over the SEO month is used to control for investors’ 
underreaction to public information, the first implication of behavioural theories. This 
monthly initial abnormal return, , includes the announcement stock price reaction and 
it is determined according to the same matching methodology as the long-term abnormal 
performance. The sign of the  coefficient is expected to be positive if investors are 
subject to underreaction. Indeed, they should be able to identify the direction of the event 
impact on the firm value but not its “rational” magnitude; they are assumed to underestimate 
it. The second behavioural models prediction is investors’ overreaction. The pre-SEO stock 
performance ( ), measured by the CAR computed over the 12 months preceding the 
issue
0AR
0AR
irunup
81 is expected to be negatively related to the post-offering abnormal performance. 
Therefore, the coefficient sign of the overreaction variable, , should be negative. 
Overreaction assumes that the greater deviation from the normal value at the time of the 
event, the larger should be the reversal in the post-event period. 
irunup
The “inefficient use of the proceeds” relies on model uncertainty. This uncertainty leads 
market participants’ over-optimism about the firm prospect and especially about the 
investment project outcome. One way to control for market uncertainty is to consider the 
evolution of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts during the post-SEO analysis horizon as a 
measure of a learning effect. As time passes since the investment decision, financial analysts 
are assumed to verify the investment outcome and revise their forecasts accordingly. Over-
optimism implies a downward revision of earnings forecasts over the 36 months following 
the investment/financing decision. If the “inefficient use of the proceeds” argument is valid, 
the earnings forecasts revisions should be positively related to the long-term post-SEO 
abnormal performance. A second implication of the relation between earnings forecasts 
revisions and the post-issue stock performance addresses to investors’ rationality. Indeed, if 
the evolution of the stock price is explained by the revisions of earning forecasts, investors 
cannot be considered as irrational. 
Data about the consensus earning forecasts are taken from the I/B/E/S Summary History 
File. I define the forecast revision as the difference between two forecasts made at different 
 
81 Using the 6-month pre-issue CAR does not alter the results. It indicates that the pre-SEO stock price run-up 
is concentrated within the last six months prior to the issue. 
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times but for the same fiscal year’s end. In other words, the forecasted earnings per share is 
fixed in time. Only the dates the forecasts are realised differ. In order to stick with the 
performance horizon, I set the end of the forecast horizon to be the end of the third fiscal 
year after the issue and that for all earnings forecasts considered. The timeline of the 
forecast revision is illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 : Timeline of the earning forecast revision 
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where  is the forecast consensus about the next fisc
months after the issue, about issuer, i , 
,24 1iF −
  is the forecast consensus about the third fiscal-y
made at the issue month, about issuer, i , 
,0 3iF −
  is the stock price at the issue month, of issuer, i . ,0iP
Earnings forecasts are corrected for currency changes (FRF to EU
changes. To avoid industry effects, the median forecast revision 
industry group is subtracted from each issuer’s forecast revision :
36 36 36i iRIF RF RI= −  
where  is the industry-adjusted forecast revision of iss36iRIF
  is given by Equation 4.9, 36iRF
 247End of the third fiscal
year after the issue ed as : 
(4.9) 
al-year earnings, made 24 
ear earnings after the issue, 
R) and for capital structure 
of all firms within the same 
 
(4.1 ) 0
uer, i , 
 36iRI  is the median forecast revision of all firms within the same industry group, 
computed as in Equation 4.9. 
The  variable is designed to cover the same horizon as the abnormal performance 
measure. Because earnings forecasts are not available each month in the I/B/E/S data file 
(especially 3-year forecasts), the variable  takes the value of the 3-year forecast made 
within the same fiscal year and closest to the issue month. The same procedure is applied to 
the variable ; the closest 1-year forecast to the 24-month anniversary and within the 
same fiscal year. 
36iRIF
F
,0 3iF − y
y
i i 1
,24 1i −
The Equation 4.11 defines the complete regression. The “Long-term I/BE/S” sample 
includes forty-four “Capital Structure” operations and fifty-one “Financing New 
Investment” issues82. In order to control for the “use of the proceeds” argument, a dummy 
variable, UOP , is added : i
0 1 2 3 4 536 0 36i i i i iCAR a a UOP a BMW a AR a runup a RIF ε= + + + + + +  (4.1 ) 
where  is the 36-month post-SEO cumulative abnormal return of issuer, , 36iCAR i
  is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the intended use of the 
proceeds is financing a specific investment project and 0 otherwise, 
iUOP
 iBMW  is the 36-month post-SEO cumulative return on a momentum portfolio, 
 0  is the monthly initial abnormal return of issuer, i ,  iAR
  is the 12-month pre-issue CAR of issuer, , irunup i
  is the industry-adjusted earnings forecast revision over the post-SEO 
horizon for issuer, i , 
36iRIF
  is an error term. iε
                                                 
82 Reducing the size of the long-term samples does not affect the overall long-term abnormal performance. The 
fifty-one “LT Financing New Investment I/B/E/S” issues exhibit negative 36-month equally-weighted CAR 
(-27.01 %) and equally-weighted BHAR (-27.00 %), both significant at the 5 % level. The long-term 
performance of the forty-four “LT Capital Structure I/B/E/S” operations remains insignificantly different from 
zero with 36-month equally-weighted CAR of –9.63 % and 36-month equally-weighted BHAR of –8.88 %. 
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In some cases, the influence of the explanatory variables is predicted to be different 
according to the use of the proceeds  regression is also estimated : 
i i 2
83. Therefore, the following
0 136i i iCAR a a UOP CS FNI ε= + + × + × +CS i FNI ia 'X a 'X  (4.1 ) 
where  ( FN ) is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for “Capital Structure” 
(“Financing New Investment”) issuers and 0 otherwise, 
iCS iI
 [ ]0 3i i iBMW AR runup RIF=iX ' 6i , 
  and  are vectors of coefficients. CSa FNIa
The coefficients in a  and a  outline, respectively, the specific effect on “Capital 
Structure” and “Financing New Investment issuers. Results of Regressions 4.11 and 4.12 are 
shown in Table 4.11. Each explanation to be tested induces a different version of the 
regressions. The “timing” regression includes only the  dummy variable and the 
momentum effect. Both behavioural variables,  and  are added in the “irrational 
investors” regression. Third, the “inefficient use of the proceeds” regression entails all 
explanatory variables. For all three hypotheses, the first row entails the coefficients 
estimates of Equation 4.11 and the second one, those of Equation 4.12 with the separated 
effect of CS  and . 
CS FNI
iFNI
irunup0iAR
FNI
The coefficient of the momentum variable, iBMW , is significantly negative for the “Long-
term I/B/E/S” but its influence is restricted to the “Financing New Investment” issuers. 
These findings are consistent with the “timing” hypothesis. At the same time, the coefficient 
of the UOP  dummy variable is also significantly negative, showing that financing a new 
investment project has a negative impact on the long-term abnormal performance even after 
controlling for the “timing” effect. 
i
The evidence about investors’ irrationality is mixed; see the “Irrational investors rows in 
Table 4.11. The positive sign of the  coefficient is consistent with the underreaction 
hypothesis. However, underreaction is confined to “Financing New Investment” issuers, 
which contradicts behavioural theories prediction. Furthermore, no evidence of overreaction 
is noticed. The impact of the  variable is negative overall and for “Financing New 
Investment” offerings separately but its coefficients ,  and  are not significant. 
0AR
irunup
4a 4CSa 4FNIa
                                                 
83 Refer to Table 4.1 for the model predictions. 
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This result adds evidence against the validity of behavioural theories. It is not consistent 
with the ranking of SEO as an overreaction event; see Fama (1998). Post-issue abnormal 
performance not being inversely proportional to pre-issue performance supports the remark 
that best pre-SEO performers are not the worst post-SEO performers; see the test of the 
“window of opportunity” in sub-section 4.3.5 of this chapter. 
The inclusion of the behavioural variables does not eliminate the significance of the 
momentum variable overall and for “Financing New Investment” issuers. It indicates that 
underreaction does not predominate timing but both explanations could rather be 
complementary. The UOP  dummy variable remains negative and significant. As expected, 
“timing” and “irrational investors” do not explain the difference in long-term abnormal 
returns across uses of the proceeds. 
i
Investors’ irrationality is further challenged by the results of the “inefficient use of the 
proceeds” regression; see the last rows of Table 4.11. The earnings forecast revision variable 
contribute significantly to explain the underperformance of “Financing New Investment” 
issuers while it is not significantly related to the performance of “Capital Structure” issuers. 
According to that, evidence is given to the learning effect about the investment project 
outcome. Model uncertainty prevents investors to value correctly the investment project. 
They are over-optimistic about the probability of success. In that sense, equity-financed 
investment projects are confirmed as bets on the future, that are, on average, not worth it. It 
comes out of the cross-sectional analysis that managers are inclined to inefficiently spend 
the SEO proceeds, at the expenses of new investors, when financing specific projects. 
It is interesting to notice that the UOP  dummy variable looses its significance with the 
inclusion of the  variable, outlining the explanatory power of the latter variable. 
Furthermore, the adjusted  is at its highest level in the third regressions. The initial 
investors’ reaction is in the right direction as the variable, , remains significantly 
positive but general over-optimism prevents them to correctly adjust their anticipations 
about the stock price. The significant momentum effect does not contradict the “inefficient 
use of the proceeds” explanation. It shows that managers not only sub-optimally invest the 
SEO proceeds but they also time their investment/financing decisions within windows of 
opportunity.  
i
36iRIF
2R
0AR
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Table 4.11 : Cross-sectional analysis of long-term post-SEO abnormal performance 
    0a  iUOP iBMW  0iAR  irunup  36iRIF  
2adj. R    
      iCS×  iFNI×  iCS×   iFNI×  iCS×  iFNI×  iCS×  iFNI×   
                
  
“Timing” 0.06 -0.48 b -0.96a  0.14
(0.30) (-2.09) (-3.42)  
0.15 -0.69 b -0.64 -1.33a   0.17
(-1.50) (-4.12)      
0.05 -0.45 b -1.04a 1.88b -0.07 0.17
(0.25) (-3.68) (2.50)
  0.18 -0.57 b -0.49 -1.14a -1.09 a 0.58 -0.53
 (0.79) (-1.98) (-1.03) (-3.42) (-0.75) (2.88) (1.15) (-1.05)
 “Inefficient use of the proceeds” 0.10  -0.43 -0.91a 1.67b -0.07 2.51b 0.20
(0.51) (-1.74) (-3.20) (2.24) (-0.19) (2.01)
0.20 -0.38 -0.45 -0.75b -1.23 2.80a 0.63 -0.62 0.97 8.53a 0.28
    (0.90)   (-1.25)  (-0.96) (-2.18)  (-0.87) (3.11)  (1.28) (-1.27)  (0.70) (2.93)    
                 
                
  (0.64)  (-2.32)            
 “Irrational investors”             
   (-1.99)      (-0.20)       
      2.70         0.22  
                  
           
              
                   
                
a significant at 1 % b significant at 5 % 
The “Long-term I/B/E/S” sample includes 95 operations between 1987 and 1998 for which 3-year earnings forecasts are available in the I/B/E/S Summary History File. The 
equations to be estimated is the following (t-stat are given in parentheses) :  
0 136i i iCAR a a UOP ε= + + +ia'X  
0 136i i i i iCAR a a UOP CS FNI ε= + + × + × +CS i FNI ia 'X a 'X  
where  is the 36-month post-SEO cumulative abnormal return of issuer, , 36iCAR i
NI CS , iUOP iF  ( ) are dummy variables taking the value 1 for “Financing New Investment” (“Capital Structure”) issuers and 0 otherwise, i
[ ] 0 3i i iBMW AR runup RIF=iX ' 6i  with  being the 36-month post-SEO cumulative return on a momentum portfolio, iBMW 0iAR  the abnormal return of 
issuer, , at the issue month,  the 12-month pre-issue CAR of issuer, , and  the industry-adjusted earning forecast revision over the post-SEO 
horizon for issuer, i , 
anda a
i irunup i 36iRIF
  are vectors of coefficients, CS FNI
  is an error term. iε
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These observations contribute to indicate that the underperformance of the “Financing 
New Investment” issuers could be mainly explained by a sub-optimal investment policy 
combined with a model uncertainty-implied general over-optimism. At the managers’ 
defence, one must admit that they have no other choice than financing such risky investment 
projects with equity. The cost of debt would be prohibitive and creditors would have no 
interest to lend money rather than taking a stake in the firm capital. As shown in Table 4.4, 
“Financing New Investment” issuers have more cash flow and financial slack than other 
issuers. In the light of the long-term performance results, they are better off preserving these 
reserves of cash to finance less risky projects. Following these observations, “Financing 
New Investment” operations could be considered like start-up financing with all the benefits 
and risk that they involve. 
The three potential explanations of the long-term abnormal returns imply testable relations 
across the coefficients of Equation 4.12. Panel A of Table 4.12 summarises the hypotheses 
with the expected result given in parentheses (A for accepted and R for rejected). The first 
column entails a “general test” about all the explanatory variables coefficients. In the next 
columns, specific hypotheses tests are displayed. Consistent with the “timing” explanation, 
the hypothesis of the momentum variable coefficients, a  and , being equal should be 
rejected. Behavioural predictions should be similar for both issuers’ types and so should be 
their  and  coefficients. The “inefficient use of the proceeds” is restricted to 
“Financing New Investment” issuers. Thus, the hypothesis about coefficients  and , 
being equal should be rejected. 
2CS 2FNIa
0iAR irunup
5CSa 5FNIa
The results of the Wald tests (p-values of F-stat and 2χ ) about Equation 4.12 coefficients 
are shown in Panel B of Table 4.12. They confirm that the “inefficient use of the proceeds” 
is most powerful in explaining the long-term abnormal returns of French equity issuers. 
Indeed, the hypothesis that the earnings forecast revisions coefficients of both issuers’ types 
are equal to zero is rejected. It constitutes the only result consistent with Panel A 
predictions. Furthermore, it adds evidence to the explanatory power of the  variable 
found in Table 4.11. The hypothesis about the equality of “timing” coefficients is not 
rejected. Conversely, the equality of “behavioural theories” coefficients is rejected. These 
findings, opposed to the predictions, confirm that “timing” and “irrational investors” are not 
powerful in explaining the long-term abnormal returns of French SEO firms. 
36iRIF
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Table 4.12 : Test on the coefficients of Regression 4.12 
    general test  “timing” test  “behavioural” test   “underreaction”  “overreaction”  “inefficient UOP”   
Panel A : Coefficients expected relations     
 “Timing” 
1 20 and CS FNIa a a= = 2 (R) 2 2CS FNIa a= (R)   
 
“Irrational investors” 1 2
3 3 4 4
0 and ,
and
CS FNI
CS FNI CS FNI
a a a
a a a a
= =
= =
2 (A) (A)
3 3 0CS FNIa a= > (A) 4 4 0CS FNIa a= < (A)
 
 
 
            
           
0.07          
        
       
         
            
“Inefficient use of the proceeds” 1 2
3 3 4 4
5 5
0 and ,
and ,
CS FNI
CS FNI CS FNI
CS FNI
a a a
a a a a
a a
= =
= =
=
2  
(R)
5Ca a= 5F (R) 
 
Panel B : Wald tests, CAR 
 “Timing” 0.07 0.20
  0.20  
 “Irrational investors” 0.04 b 0.05 b 0.03 b 0.12
  0.03 b 0.04 b 0.03 b 0.12  
 “Inefficient use of the proceeds” 0.01 a 0.02 b 
    0.00 a       0.02 b 
3 3
4 4
andCS FNI
CS FNI
a a
a a
=
=
(R) is rejected (A) is accepted 
a significant at 1 % b significant at 5 % 
Normal numbers are F-stat p-values and numbers in italic are 2χ  p-values of Wald tests. The coefficients are estimated from the following equation : 
a 'X a 'X0 136i i i i iCAR a a UOP CS FNI ε= + + × + × +CS i FNI i  
where  is the 36-month post-SEO cumulative abnormal return of issuer, , 36iCAR i
 , iUOP iFNI  ( ) are dummy variables taking the value 1 for “Financing New Investment” (“Capital Structure”) issuers and 0 otherwise, iCS
[ ] 0 3i i iBMW AR runup RIF=iX ' 6i  with  being the 36-month post-SEO cumulative return on a momentum portfolio, iBMW 0iAR  the abnormal return of issuer , 
at the issue month,  the 12-month pre-issue CAR of issuer , and  the industry-adjusted earning forecast revision over the post-SEO horizon for issuer , 
a a
i
iirunup i 36iRIF
 are vectors of coefficients, andCS FNI  
  is an error term. iε
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Financial analysts being over-optimistic at the time of the SEO is still puzzling. Are they 
wrong because there is uncertainty about the future earnings or because some of them have an 
incentive to over-estimate the issuer’s growth potential ? Analysts that are affiliated to the 
underwriters of the offerings have conflicting interests. By over-valuing their earning 
forecasts, they facilitate the placement of new shares, strengthen the business relationship 
between their bank and the issuer and may contribute to acquire additional investment 
banking activities in the future. Evidence of the impact of affiliated financial analysts’ over-
optimism on the long-term post-SEO stock performance is given by Dechow, Hutton and 
Sloan (2000). In his discussion of the Dechow et al. (2000) paper, Kothari (2000) raises 
argument that partly discharges affiliated analysts from their influence on underperformance. 
First, the fact that affiliated analysts are found to produce the most overly-optimistic growth 
forecasts about the equity issuers does not imply that they do it knowingly to attract more 
investment banking activities. The direction of the relation could be reversed. Following the 
assumption that all analysts are on average over-optimistic, equity issuers could select the 
investment bank which affiliated analysts produce the most optimistic forecasts about the 
long-term growth. In that case, the bias in affiliated analysts’ forecasts cannot be fully 
attributed to them. 
In spite of Kothari (2000), controlling for potential agency bias in affiliated analysts’ 
earnings forecasts is still worth doing. Forecasts made by affiliated analysts are separated 
from those who are not. The I/B/E/S Detail History File provides the earning forecasts analyst 
by analyst. An affiliated analyst is identified if he or she works for a bank group that is related 
to the underwriting syndicate. Analysts working for bank groups that are not members of the 
underwriting syndicate are divided into two categories : First, when no members of the 
underwriting syndicate provide earnings forecasts about the issuer, the analysts who follow 
these firms are considered as “independent”. Second, when, among the analysts following an 
issuer, some are affiliated to the underwriting syndicate, the other analysts are considered as 
“non-affiliated”. 
Raw earning forecasts are standardised by the corresponding stock price. For each issuer, 
the consensus forecast is computed each month by averaging the individual standard forecast 
across the analysts within the same group (“Affiliated”, “Non-Affiliated” or “Independent”). 
The procedure is applied to the 3-year forecasts, , and not to the long-term growth 3F
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forecasts because of data availability84 and to keep consistency with the “inefficient use of the 
proceeds” argument. At the issue month, a consensus forecast is computed for each analysts’ 
category. Then the different consensus forecasts are averaged across equity issues. If no data 
are available at the issue month, the group consensus forecast closest to this date and within 
the same fiscal year is retained. Individual earnings forecast revisions, 36RF , are computed 
according to Equation 4.9 with the group consensus forecast85. They are averaged across 
issuers to form separate mean and median revisions for “Affiliated”, “Non-Affiliated” and 
“Independent” analysts.  
Figures about the “Long-term I/B/E/S” sample are displayed in Panel A of Table 4.13. 
Since the over-optimism impact should be restricted to the “Financing New Investment” 
operations, mean and median forecasts and revisions of the “LT Financing New Investment 
IBES” sample appear in Panel B of Table 4.13. 
The last three columns of Table 4.13 undoubtedly show that “Affiliated” financial analysts 
on the French market are not subject to any pressure to over-estimate their forecasts relative to 
“Non-Affiliated” and “Independent” analysts. This evidence is valid for both samples. 
“Affiliated” and “Non-Affiliated” forecasts or revisions are not different in means or in 
medians. The same is true between “Affiliated” and “Independent” analysts or between “Non-
Affiliated” and “Independent” analysts.  
Table 4.13 : Analysis of the potential conflict of interests among financial analysts 
    Affil. Non-Affil. Indep. Difference Difference Difference
    I II III I - II I - III II - III 
Panel A : "Long-term I/B/E/S" sample (95 operations) 
 number of observations 60 60 35     
 mean 3F  (%) 6.55 7.78 7.55 -1.23 -1.00  0.23
 t-stat    (-1.35) (-0.75)  (0.22)
 Median 3F  (%) 7.03 7.54 7.75 -0.51 -0.72  -0.21
 Wilcoxon rank test    (-0.55) (-0.71)  (-0.34)
 mean  (%) 36RF -1.41 -2.68 -1.57 1.27 0.16  -1.11
 t-stat    (1.25) (0.11)  (-0.72)
 Median  (%) 36RF -0.96 -0.85 -0.28 -0.11 -0.68  
 
-0.58
Wilcoxon rank test    (-0.75) (-0.31)  (-1.02)
                                                 
84 The number of long-term growth forecasts about French firms is not large enough to run relevant tests. 
85 Group consensus forecasts are also calculated from individual 1-year forecasts taken 24 months after the issue. 
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Table 4.13 : continued 
  Affil. Non-Affil. Indep. Difference Difference Difference
  I II III I - III I - II II - III 
Panel B : "LT Financing New Investment I/B/E/S" sample (51 operations) 
number of observations 34 17     
 mean 3F  (%) 6.61 7.23 8.81 -0.62 -2.20  
t-stat   (-1.41)  
 
-1.58
  (-0.38) (-1.18)
Median 3F  (%) 7.07 8.58 -1.51  
 Wilcoxon rank test  
mean  (%) 
7.32 -0.25 -1.26
  (-0.15) (-1.56)  (-1.45)
 -2.86 -2.87 -3.68 0.01
 34
36RF 0.82  
  (0.50) 
Median  (%) 0.44
0.81
t-stat   (0.00)  (0.50)
 -1.84 -1.25 -2.29 -0.60   
  Wilcoxon rank test 
1.04
      (-0.23)  (0.63)   (0.45)  
“Affiliated” analysts (Affil.) are analysts working for a bank affiliated to the underwriting syndicate. “Non-
Affiliated” analysts (Non-Affil.) are the analysts working for institutions external to the underwriting syndicate 
in the case where “Affiliated” analysts are following the issuer. On the other hand, “Independent” analysts 
(Indep.) are non-affiliated analysts in the case where no affiliated analysts follow the issuer. 
 
4.3.7 Concluding remarks 
SEOs are initiated by the will of managers and thus, their decisions and their 
implementations may be subject to timing, information asymmetry and agency conflicts. Two 
sets of competing theories try to explain the potential long-term impact of SEO on the firm 
 36RF
Raw earning forecasts are standardised by the corresponding stock price. 3-year forecasts, 3F , estimate the 
earnings at the end of the third fiscal year after the issue. For each group of analysts, the rdised individual 
forecasts are averaged to form a group-specific consensus. At the issue month, group cons s forecasts are 
averaged across all issuers to form the mean and median forecasts. If no data is available  month, the 
group consensus forecasts closest to this date and within the same fiscal year is retained  forecast 
revisions, , are computed as in Equation 4.9 with group consensus forecasts and th raged within the 
analysts groups. 
standa
ensu
at the issue
. Earnings
en ave 36RF
These results give credit to the general over-optimism argument to explain the long-term 
abnormal performance of the “Financing New Investment” issuers. Potential agency conflicts 
between financial analysts and underwriters do not bias the earnings forecasts of affiliated 
analysts. One could object that analysts’ over-optimism could be apparent only in long-term 
growth forecasts and not in shorter-horizons earnings forecasts. However, the aim of this test 
is not to verify the existence of biased affiliated analysts forecasts in all its aspect. It only 
checks that earnings forecasts used to compute the 36RIF  earnings forecasts revision 
variable is not systematically and noticeably affected by affiliated analysts. The answer to that 
last remark is clearly no. 
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value. On one hand, behaviourist theories link the anomaly in stock returns to biases in the 
investors’ rationality; see DHS (1998), BSV (1998) and HS (1999). On the other hand, 
incomplete information structure models attribute the anomaly to the uncertainty about the 
structure of the economy; see Avramov (2002), Constantinides (2002) and Brav and 
Heaton (2002). The first step of the empirical study shows that, on a new sample of equity 
issuers, the presence of long-term abnormal performance is detected and it is robust to various 
up-to-date benchmarks. Furthermore, the long-term post-offering underperformance is 
restricted to a sub-sample of issuers characterised by their use of the SEO proceeds. Firms 
that raise equity in order to finance new investment projects are the only ones to be penalised 
on the long-run. Issuers that realise seasoned equity offerings to improve their capital 
structure preserve their financial flexibility and they do not exhibit any anomaly during a 36-
month period after the issue. The difference in abnormal performance between both issuer’s 
types is statistically significant. 
When the horizon analysis is extended to 48 months, starting one year before the issue, 
evidence is found that the event occurs after a period of positive abnormal return. No 
difference in pre-SEO performance exists relative to the use of the proceeds. However, issuers 
financing a new investment project are the only ones to be over-valued at the time of the issue 
as their 48-month abnormal performance turns to be significantly negative. Managers seem 
able to time their equity issue decisions but the timing differ according to the use of the 
proceeds. “Financing New Investment” offerings are realised with the window of opportunity 
as argued by Loughran and Ritter (1995). The timing of “Capital Structure” operations is 
more likely to depend on the managers’ ability not to sell undervalued securities. They would 
be inclined to conduct the issues after the stock price has recovered from a period of 
undervaluation. 
In order to explain the long-term abnormal performance, three hypotheses are tested : a) 
“timing”, b) “investors’ irrationality”, and c) “inefficient use of the proceeds”. The last 
hypothesis is given more evidence by the cross-sectional analysis. The long-term 
underperformance of “Financing New Investment” issuers is explained by the revisions in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. It denotes that managers, investors and financial analysts are 
over-optimistic about the investment outcome at the time when the investment/financing 
decision is taken. As financial analysts acquire supplementary information, they revise 
downwardly their earnings forecasts. Investors incorporate the analysts’ earnings forecasts 
revisions into their stock price anticipations, which explains the long-term stock 
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underperformance. “Capital Structure” issues are not concerned with this over-optimism since 
they do not involve a specific investment project. “Timing” is found marginal support as the 
magnitude of the momentum effect significantly influence “Financing New Investment” 
issuers’ underperformance. The positive correlation between the initial monthly abnormal 
return and the long-term abnormal performance is consistent with the underreaction 
hypothesis but no evidence of overreaction is detected. Moreover, the fact that regression 
coefficients specific to “Capital Structure” issuers are significantly different from those of 
“Financing New Investment” issuers lead to reject behavioural theories as one explanation to 
the long-term abnormal performance of the French equity issuers. Investors show evidence of 
rationality through their stock price adjustment to the revisions in earnings forecasts. The fact 
that they are not able to fully integrate the implications of “Financing New Investment” equity 
offerings at the financing announcement should rather be attributed to their incomplete 
knowledge of the structure of the economy. In other words, the results are consistent with 
model uncertainty problems and not with investors cognitive biases. 
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Conclusion 
The concluding remarks entail a summary of my empirical findings, the broad contributions 
to the existing literature and discuss their implications on the theory. They also address to 
some directions to extend the research. 
The examination of French issuers’ characteristics leads to interesting results. When 
separated according to the intended use of the offering proceeds, French issuers present 
significant differences in terms of financial structure and systematic risk, while they are 
similar relative to other general characteristics such as size, book-to-market ratio, offering 
size and issuing price. Equity issues to finance a specific investment projects are realised by 
firms that are less levered and that have more cash and cash flow than issuers motivated by 
The first observation about the French equity issuing process is that it is more constraining 
than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The obtaining of the legal authorisation to issue is more 
formal and the legal disclosure requirements are not less rigorous. When the repartition across 
financing sources of French firms are compared to that of other developed countries (US, UK, 
Japan and Germany), the differences are less noticeable than suggested by the literature about 
the influence of the legal system origin. For instance, over a 12-year period, the average 
proportion of equity financing for French listed firms is equal to 6.6 % while it is of 8.3 % for 
the US, the US firms being reputed to rely the most extensively to outside equity financing. 
The fraction of public financing equals 27.4 % in France and 27.7 % in the US, which 
outlines that the breadth of external public financing is very similar between both countries. 
In that sense, the access to equity financing for French firms does not appear to be more 
restricted than for US corporations. 
An analysis of the equity issue frequency on the French market shows that offerings are 
concentrated in the first six months of the year. This finding appeal two comments. First, most 
of the equity offerings occur after the Extraordinary Meetings that are called mainly between 
April and May. Second, most of the equity issues are realised soon after the release of the 
audited annual financial statements. Thus, some managers take advantage of a potentially 
lower degree of information asymmetry. No alternative variables can explain these hot issue 
periods. Past market performance and expected economic conditions do not have any 
influence. Financial analysts’ over-optimism does not have more explanatory power. 
Favourable current economic conditions induce managers to issue equity but only if the 
offering motive is a pure capital structure concern. 
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pure capital structure reasons. This finding is opposed to the pecking order and it indicates 
that these firms deliberately select equity as their financing source. In addition, the joint 
announcement of the equity issue and the specific investment project generates an increase in 
the issuer’s business risk. This increase let the equity beta inflates as well, although the 
reduction in the leverage ratio implied by the equity offering should lower the systematic risk, 
other things equal. Firms tend to finance high-risk project with equity even if alternative 
financing sources are available. 
The announcement valuation effect is negative, -1.26 % on a 3-day interval starting at the 
announcement day. When computed separately according to the use of the proceeds, 
announcements of pure capital structure concern offerings do not generate any abnormal 
reaction while the joint announcement of the offering and the investment project induces a 
significant stock price decline, 3-day CAR of -2.16 %. The announcement valuation effect 
between both issuers’ types is significantly different. These results are consistent with the US 
evidence, for “Financing New Investment” issuers and with the overall European evidence, 
for “Capital Structure” issuers. Moreover, the average reaction of the total sample is similar to 
the previous evidence on the French market. 
The stock price reaction to the announcement of “Financing New Investment” offerings is 
explained by information asymmetry, timing and to a lower extend by agency considerations. 
The greater is the level of information asymmetry, the more negative is the valuation effect. 
This finding indicates that private information is conveyed by the announcement. The impact 
of this private information is consistent with theoretical predictions. Since information 
asymmetry has no influence on the stock price reaction to “Capital Structure” offering 
announcements, it is more likely to concern the new investment project. Investors consider 
that, on average, the stock price is overvalued once information about the new investment 
project is revealed. The negative impact due to the new project is mitigated by the quantity 
and quality of the issuer’s growth opportunity measured by the book-to-market ratio. The 
investment outcome is positively perceived the greater the growth potential of the issuer. 
According to timing considerations, the current economic conditions have the greater 
explanatory power on the valuation effect. The better the current economic conditions are, the 
less negative is the market reaction. The influence of the current conditions is common to 
both issuers’ types. At a lower level of significance, past market performance is positively 
related to the valuation effect but its impact is restricted to “Financing New Investment” 
issuers. Expected economic conditions do not have any explanatory power, to any sample. 
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It is interesting to notice that the use of the proceeds no longer differentiates issuers 
according to the stock price reaction once other explanatory variables are taken into account. 
In that sense, it can be considered as a composite indicator that aggregates the influences of 
information asymmetry, agency and timing. Its advantages lie in the facts that it is easily 
observable and that it is efficient in discriminating issuers relative to the impact on the firm 
value. 
The last contribution about the stock price reaction to equity issue announcements 
addresses to the conditional event study. Equity issues are voluntary corporate events decided 
by managers. On one hand, investors infer from the offering announcement that the net 
present value of private information is favourable to managers. On the other hand, they can 
use public information to anticipate the event. Both phenomena introduce a selection bias in 
the standard cross-sectional analysis of the announcement valuation effect. A conditional 
methodology takes into account investors’ anticipation of the event and truncates the 
distribution of the unanticipated valuation effect so that the selection bias is corrected. The 
estimation procedure used in the research is a 2-stage procedure. First, the probability to issue 
equity is estimated from a combined sample of issuers and “Non-Event” firms. A “Non-
Event” firm enters the sample if it has received the authorisation to issue equity but did not 
use it during a 2-year period. In addition, it must belong to the same industry as the issuer it 
controls. The probability to issue equity is increased the larger the firm is, the higher above 
the debt ratio, the better the past stock price runup, the lower the book-to-market ratio, the 
The information conveyed by the joint announcement of the equity issue and the 
investment project is related to future earnings. The revision in earnings forecasts around the 
announcement is positively correlated with the stock price reaction of the “Financing New 
Investment” sample. Furthermore, it substitutes for the other information asymmetry 
variables. It also captures the influence of timing. Actually, the magnitude of the earnings 
forecast revisions depends on the degree of information asymmetry and on both past market 
performance and current economic conditions. 
One timing and information asymmetry joint hypothesis is that equity issues are realised to 
compensate for a downturn in future earnings. This hypothesis is rejected since no relation is 
observed between revisions in earnings forecasts and the stock price reaction of the “Capital 
Structure” sample. Lower earnings are expected only in the case of “Financing New 
Investment” offerings. This finding adds evidence to the negative contribution of the 
investment project to the firm value. 
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better the current and the expected economic conditions. This probability also depends on the 
external financing deficit and on the equity financing deficit. Specific risk and past market 
performance have no influence on the probability of issuance. In the second stage, a private 
information variable is computed with the estimated probability and it is introduced in the 
cross-sectional regression of the stock price reaction. The private information variable is 
found to be significantly related to the announcement valuation effect. It shows that the 
greater private information is, the lower the stock price reaction. More importantly, it 
indicates that relevant information is released at the time of the announcement. In other 
words, all the information about the event is not anticipated by investors before its 
announcement. Not surprisingly, the significance of the private information variable is 
restricted to the “Financing New Investment” sample. The contrary would be puzzling since 
only these offering announcements are expected to convey private information to the market. 
With the introduction of the private information variable, the significance of information 
asymmetry variables is strengthened. The explanatory power of timing is also confirmed. 
The final contribution of the long-term event study concerns the explanation of the different 
long-term pattern in post-issue abnormal returns between issuers’ types. Three hypotheses are 
tested : “timing”, “investors’ irrationality” and “inefficient use of the proceeds”. The 36-
month CAR are regressed on proxies for each explanation. Timing is given some slight 
evidence but the main explanatory power is attributed to the inefficient use of the proceeds. 
This argument is restricted to “Financing New Investment” offerings because involving an 
From the short-term results and from the issuers’ characteristics, the investment project can 
be viewed as a start-up the firm takes a stake in. It has a high expected profit and a low 
probability of success. This would be the reason why managers choose to finance it with 
equity. Furthermore, this kind of project is difficult to value because the parameters that 
define the expected payoff process are not known to investors. Under these circumstances, the 
investors’ adjustment of the stock price at the announcement could not be entirely correct. 
The equity financing decision, associated with the investment project could have long-term 
implications on the stock price. Therefore, the use of the proceeds approach to analyse the 
influence of financing decisions on the firm value is transposed into a long-term framework. 
“Financing New Investment” issuers are found to underperform their benchmark up to three 
years after the equity issue. No abnormal performance is detected for “Capital Structure” 
issuers. Moreover, the difference between both issuers’ types is significant. These findings are 
robust as they are not modified by the use of alternative benchmarks.  
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investment project is a necessary condition for it to hold. It supposes that parameters of the 
model to value the investment project are uncertain. Investors interpret correctly the 
financing/investment announcement but they cannot entirely adjust their expectations about 
the stock price. Revisions in the earnings forecasts over the analysis horizon (three years) is 
used to measure the learning effect that develops with time, as further information about the 
investment outcome becomes available. The cross-section analysis of the long-term CAR 
shows that the earnings forecast revision variable explains the “Financing New Investment” 
issuers’ underperformance. The explanatory power of competing theories is rejected because 
of the use of the proceeds typology. The selected proxy for timing should be significant for 
“Financing New Investment” issuers and its influence should be different for “Capital 
Structure” issuers. However, the hypothesis that it affects both issuers’ types the same way 
cannot be rejected. Investors’ irrationality should explain both issuers’ types but this 
hypothesis is rejected. The hypothesis that the inefficient use of the proceeds influences only 
“Financing New Investment” issuer is not rejected, which is consistent with the prediction. 
These findings support market efficiency and explain the long-term underperformance of 
“Financing New Investment” issuers. They also give credit to the use of the proceeds as a 
discriminating variable that contribute to understand the relation between capital structure 
choices and the firm value. 
The second implication deals with the long-term framework. Behaviourist models and those 
based on model uncertainty are developed to explain similar anomalies. Therefore, it is 
difficult to test one model type against the other. The “use of the proceeds” argument creates 
Overall, my empirical results have two theoretical implications. First, the “use of the 
proceeds” argument authorises the co-existence of two competing theoretical branches. Equity 
offerings realised for pure capital structure motives have no impact on the firm value. This 
finding is consistent with capital structure irrelevancy. Any change in the capital structure that 
does not modify the assets structure cannot increase the firm value. Operations that enters that 
category accounts for almost half of the total sample, which is not negligible. This proportion 
is consistent with the practitioners’ concern about preserving the financial flexibility. Equity 
issues made to finance a specific investment project depart from the capital structure 
irrelevancy context. They address to marginal financing decisions models that all predict a 
negative stock price reaction to such financing solution announcements. The valuation effect 
observed on the French market is consistent with this prediction. Indeed, information 
asymmetry, timing and agency theories are given evidence. 
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different predictions for both theories. It allows a direct test that would not be possible if 
offerings are not differentiated. Furthermore, the differentiation benefits from the theoretical 
justification given in the short-term framework and described previously. It is an advantage in 
a long-term context that crucially lacks in solid theoretical background. 
The “use of the proceeds” argument is based on a simple indication about the broad 
managers’ intention to use the offering proceeds. The “Capital Structure” category includes 
many different single purposes (debt repayment, cash increase, capital structure 
strengthening, etc.). The absence of significant valuation effect could come from that 
heterogeneity. A more detailed typology would require larger samples and accurate 
information about the intended use of the proceeds. The French market satisfies the second 
requirement but for the first one, more time is needed to let the number of equity issues 
increase. 
The estimation of the probability of the event occurrence could be further developed to 
increase the accuracy of the measure of private information in the conditional methodology. 
This remark addresses to the formation of the “Non-Event” sample. External financing deficit 
could be used to better match non-issuers with issuers. More sophisticated model could be 
used to estimate the probability to issue equity such as nested Probit that takes into account 
The “Financing New Investment” category only involves two purposes : acquisitions and 
internal growth opportunities. However, since the characteristics of the investment projects 
are important features, comments in the issuing prospectuses are not detailed enough to allow 
a precise evaluation of the projects. For acquisitions, additional information could be 
available if the firm is listed but for other targets or internal projects, the task remain 
impossible. Yet, improved measures of the investment project outcome could constitute a way 
to precise the learning effect and the net contribution of the investment project to the firm 
value. An indication whether the new project is related to an existing business line or whether 
it requires new competences within the firm could bring useful insight about the probability of 
success and in turn, about the long-term impact on the firm value. 
The “use of the proceeds” argument could be tested on a sample of US equity issuers. 
Direct cash offerings would replace offerings with rights. In France, equity is selected to 
finance high risk. Would it also be the case in the US ? The stock price decline is stronger in 
the US than in France. Is the proportion of “Capital Structure” offerings smaller or do these 
operations also generate a negative market reaction ? 
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the reliance to debt financing instead of equity. Still related to the conditional methodology, 
results of the 2-stage estimation procedure could be compared to those obtained with the 
1-stage Maximum Likelihood and GMM estimators. 
Although the literature about capital structure and firm value is dense, the research can be 
extended in many ways. For instance, marginal financing decisions are often analysed in the 
debt vs. equity context. According to the theory of costless signalling, more sophisticated 
financing solutions should be undertaken to render capital structure choices as neutral as 
possible to the firm value. Corporations have, at their disposal, a set of various securities. Do 
they manage their issues of stocks, convertibles, warrants and units according to specific 
factors. Are these factors related to existing theories ? For debt, the choice also exists. Why 
do managers select private rather than public debt in some countries and the contrary in 
others ? Does the maturity of debt depend on investment project characteristics as it is 
predicted by given theories ? To answer all these questions, the level of analysis should be 
increased so that the focus would no longer be put on a specific financing decision. 
The variety of financing solutions also leads to wonder about the existence of one unique 
optimal capital structure. When only debt and equity are considered, the problem of the 
optimal allocation is addressed in relatively simple terms. However, with the inclusion of 
several different forms of financing, that have all their specificities in terms of signalling and 
corporate governance, the number of potentially efficient combinations inflates. Under these 
circumstances, it is legitimated to examine whether different choices could satisfy similar 
needs. If it is the case, it is reasonable to think that corporations would be able to determine 
one optimal financing solution among others. However, from the standpoint of investors, 
recognising the financing solution proposed by the firm as being optimal would become far 
from trivial. Indeed, if optimal solutions are not unique for one given firm, they cannot be 
expected to be similar across corporations. The central point of the research would be to relate 
publicly observable firm characteristics to the financing and investment needs. In other words, 
the elaboration of a precise typology of firms would be a preliminary research necessary to 
analyse the interactions between capital structure determinants and firm value through a 
multiple financing solutions perspective. 
A second direction to extend the research, but also based on the idea of global financing, 
would be to examine the determinants of capital structure choices in a multinational context. 
Firms that are extensively active in several institutional settings have the possibility to raise 
funds in many forms and on many markets. Do they face similar market imperfections or are 
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they subject to different factors when they plan their financing policy ? The analysis of 
corporations in that situation would be an interesting challenge for the universality of capital 
structure determinants. It would also constitute a direct test for the influence of the 
institutional setting. Do multinational companies adapt their financing solutions to local 
specificities or do they raise funds trans-nationally through global offerings of debt, of equity 
or of any more sophisticated securities. The point that immediately follows would be to 
examine the way their financing decisions are perceived by investors, globally or on different 
locations. These studies would require accurate models to measure the abnormal stock 
response to financing decisions in a global context. Some work has already been dedicated to 
the valuation effect of equity issues made by foreign companies on the US market. However, 
the goal of global financing analysis would be to focus on corporations financing strategies 
and not on markets. The question must be : what are the capital structure determinants of 
firms active on several markets ? It should not be reduced to : what is the local stock price 
reaction to foreign firms announcing a financial decision ? 
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